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Abstract 
The primary aim of the thesis is to understand how to strengthen primary care in 
China, by looking at the effectiveness and functioning of a gatekeeping pilot, and more 
broadly at the history of the balance between hospitals and primary care providers. A 
secondary aim is to explore how multiple methods can be used to study a complex 
system-related issue. The thesis developed comprehensive metrics for structural and 
functional balance between primary and hospital care (1949-2013); developed a 
dynamic path dependence analytical framework to study the coevolution of the two 
sectors (1835-2013); used a difference-in-differences analysis to identify the impact of 
a gatekeeping pilot; and developed a qualitative systems analysis to understand the 
functioning of the pilot.  
The quantitative analysis suggested more patients did visit primary care facilities 
(increased by 38.7%) due to the pilot, but without obvious extra-spending. Evidence 
from the qualitative study suggested this seemed to be caused by patients visiting for 
referrals. The intended effects of gatekeeping in changing patients’ utilization pattern 
of care were made unattainable mainly by the existing weak conditions of primary care, 
feedback loops that further weakened primary care development regarding service 
capacity, human resources, and patient trust, as well as unintended consequences of 
other related policies. The dynamics between hospitals and primary care providers in 
the pilot were the contemporary manifestation of a long-term hospital-centric structure, 
where primary care providers were the de-professionalized antithesis of hospitals and 
relatively weakly institutionalized. The institutional complex was path-dependent and 
has gone through three cycles since 1835. 
The thesis has demonstrated the feasibility and value of using multiple analytical 
theories and research methods to address a complex health system issue. The findings 
of the study suggest the importance of building a strong primary care profession and 
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the value of a political coalition for primary care strengthening.  
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Part I  Conceptualization 
 Introduction 
1.1 Importance of balance between hospitals and primary care facilities 
A world-wide momentum has been growing to push for progress towards 
universal health coverage, enshrined in the United Nations’ 2030 agenda for 
sustainable development (United Nations, 2015). With increasing financial resources 
being committed, what is needed “now more than ever” are health systems that focus 
on primary care--“person-centredness, comprehensiveness and integration, and 
continuity of care, with a regular point of entry into the health system” (World Health 
Organization, 2008, p. 42). A primary-care orientation has been associated with 
important contributions to health systems performance ranking on health indicators, 
efficiency and population satisfaction with health services in rich countries (Starfield, 
1994). Ecological studies have showed that stronger primary care is associated with 
better population health, not only in high income countries (Macinko, Starfield, & Shi, 
2003), but also in low- and middle-income countries (Macinko, Starfield, & Erinosho, 
2009). Primary care appears to mitigate the negative health effects of income 
inequality (Shi et al., 2002) and contributes to quality of care (Zahradnik, 2008). 
Primary care has also been demonstrated as a sound platform for cost-effective 
services that could reduce the need for expensive specialist care (Walker et al., 2010). 
The country reality, however, usually runs counter to the vision of a primary-care-
oriented health system, with a widely existing phenomenon known as “hospital-
centrism”--“disproportionate focus on hospitals and sub-specialization has become a 
major source of inefficiency and inequality, and one that has proved remarkably 
resilient” (World Health Organization, 2008, p. 11). Compared to primary care 
providers, hospitals are more likely to enjoy advantageous resources (Shi, 2012): 
Part I  Conceptualization 
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specialists that usually are more prestigious and better paid than generalists, advanced 
medical equipment, advanced and expensive pharmaceuticals, etc. In low- and middle-
income countries, hospitals and their professionals tend to have evolved into powerful 
entities that challenge reforms (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1999; World Health Organisation, 
2008). Disproportionate increase in the hospitals’ share of resources means reduced 
resources available for primary care strengthening (Mills, 1990). As the World Health 
Organization (2014, p. 6) pointed out, hospital spending accounts for half to two thirds 
of total government expenditures on health. World Bank Group President Jim Kim 
(2013) also criticised the “epidemic of hospital-building”: spending primarily on 
building hospitals while investment should be made in upstream prevention and 
disease management to prevent those complications that need hospitalization. In low- 
and middle-income countries, strengthening the primary care level is believed to be 
“the only efficient and effective way” (Chan, 2011) to achieve early detection, 
treatment and management of the growing burden of chronic diseases. 
1.2  Moving towards stratified health service delivery in China 
Although the issue of the distribution of resources between hospitals and primary 
care is of critical importance to most low- and middle-income countries, the 
geographical focus of the thesis is China. The reasons for studying this issue in the 
context of China are manifold. First, the balance between primary and hospital care is 
a central policy issue in contemporary China. Recently, “primary care level as the 
emphasis (基层为重点)” was not only included but also placed as the first among the 
government’s six guiding principles for health work. These principles were applied in 
the government’s middle and long term plan for health—“Healthy China 2020” 
(Xinhua, 2016b). In a top level national health congress, the last of which was held 
two decades ago in 1996, policy makers placed the establishment of “fenji zhenliao” 
(分级诊疗), roughly translated as “stratified health service delivery”, as a top priority 
for health system reform and development (Xinhua, 2016a). 
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Second, the role of primary health care in China’s health system development has 
been of interest to the international community. A key element in primary health care 
movements in China has been about the organisation of primary care providers to 
extend medical and public health services, yet relatively little is known about China’s 
history regarding the balance between hospitals and primary care providers (as the 
thesis will later address, primary care is not identical to primary health care). Back in 
the 1930s, the Ding County health system (involving a county health centre, district 
health stations and village health personnel) was regarded as one of the origins of the 
primary health care concept (Litsios, 2015). In the 1970s, development of primary 
health care in China involving barefoot doctors was reported in Health by the People 
(Newell, 1975), laying the empirical foreground of the Primary Health Care Movement 
launched in Alma Ata in 1978. Afterwards, China also featured as a success model in 
Good Health at Low Cost (Halstead, Walsh, & Warren, 1985). By the 1990s and the 
early 2000s, the country was heavily criticized for its neglect of primary health care 
under market-oriented reforms. In recent years, the existence of a network of primary 
health care providers in rural China has contributed to its successful development of 
the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (Meng & Xu, 2014a). With expanded 
health insurance coverage in recent years (Meng et al., 2015), the country’s renewed 
effort to increase the primary care might offer lessons that would be of interest to 
international audiences. 
Third, the size and the global role of China matter. The country was home to about 
one fifth of the world’s population (1.4 billion out of 7.3 billion) in 2015, and it had 
more people than the United States of America (321 million), the European Union 
(508 million), Russia (144 million), Japan (127 million), and Brazil (257 million) 
combined (World Bank, 2016b). China is also the world’s second largest economy 
(World Bank, 2016a) and the world’s leading exporter (World Trade Organization, 
2015, p. 25). Just as improved health of Chinese has direct impacts on global health, 
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increasing efficiency of health spending in China would have consequences for the 
global economy. 
Fourth, China shares a strong element of colonial/semi-colonial history with other 
non-Western countries. Introduction of Western medicine in such countries was 
associated with foreign powers and ideas, and usually through foreign actors (e.g. 
missionaries), who preferred to build hospitals (Hardiman, 2006). China is an example 
with such early focus on hospital construction, as I will address in Chapter 5. China 
also has a shared history with post-communist countries in terms of various political 
and economic elements. Many of these countries were considered to have a history of 
relatively poor primary care providers, as priority was given to specialists and hospitals 
(Saltman, Rico, & Boerma, 2005). These countries have also gone through similar 
economic reforms, which profoundly influenced development of primary health care. 
China therefore offers an opportunity to consider how such history influenced the 
relative development between hospitals and primary care facilities, as different styles 
of medicine were forced to co-exist and/or compete with each other. 
1.3 The approach of the thesis: from gatekeeping to history 
The central question of this study concerned the challenges of how to strengthen 
primary care in China. The study started with an interest in the value of measures to 
retain patients at primary care level, especially via gatekeeping. There has been a 
nearly dominant narrative in the country that patients’ irrational use of resources has 
led to a high concentration of patients at large and sophisticated hospitals, even though 
a large percentage of patients have relatively simple and mild conditions that could 
have been handled at primary care facilities (Lei et al., 1996; Song & Yin, 2010; Xu, 
Yin, & Jing, 2012). There have also been claims in Chinese and international academic 
papers that gatekeeping would be an effective solution to the issue of underuse of 
primary care in China (Chen & Zhou, 2007).  
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Evidence on the effectiveness of gatekeeping in China has been lacking, which 
will be apparent in the review in Chapter 2. As the ideas for the PhD study developed, 
a pioneering gatekeeping pilot was launched and became available for study. The 
thesis took the first step to study the effectiveness of this gatekeeping pilot programme 
using an impact evaluation, which identifies the causal effects of specific interventions 
(Gertler et al., 2011, pp. 7-8). For this purpose, this component of the thesis adopted 
the technique of difference-in-differences analysis, which has been found to facilitate 
studying net treatment effects by constructing counterfactuals when randomization is 
not feasible (Gertler et al., 2011: Chapter 6), which is usually the case in health systems 
research. Sutton et al. (2012) and Kristensen et al. (2014), for example, used the 
method to examine whether a pay-for-performance scheme reduced in-hospital 
mortality in England. 
The literature review in Chapter 2 on gatekeeping and other options to balance the 
relative growth of hospitals and primary care providers, as well as general 
development in methods of evaluating complex interventions, suggested multiple 
dimensions of complexity associated with strengthening primary care. Some of these 
issues were “within” the programmes of particular interventions like gatekeeping, 
others were related to a wider range of “contextual” factors, some of which can be 
historically shaped and restrict the development of particular institutions. Systems 
theories and system thinking have been advocated as useful for health systems and 
policy research (Adam & de Savigny, 2012; Bloom, 2014; Gilson, 2012). In order to 
address what became clear as the important issues of complexity, the thesis borrowed 
from recent development of different approaches to systems thinking in health systems 
research, and expanded the study to analyses of both the contemporary system, and of 
the historical system that the pilot was embedded within.  
To better understand the functioning of the gatekeeping pilot programme in the 
contemporary system where the gatekeeping pilot was embedded, the thesis drew on 
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a qualitative systems analysis tool (causal loop diagrams), a health systems building 
blocks categorization tool, and a qualitative data analysis tool. Combining qualitative 
methods with systems thinking has been shown to add depth to analysis of health 
systems issues, and visualization can help convey complex interpretations and findings 
(Adam, 2014). Causal loop analysis is a method for systems analysis that maps out and 
qualitatively models the dynamics between factors within a system (Williams & 
Hummelbrunner, 2010a: Chapter 1). It has been applied and found valuable in health 
systems research topics including studying an immunization system (Rwashana, 
Williams, & Neema, 2009), analysing factors contributing to stagnant neonatal 
mortality rates (Rwashana et al., 2014), studying medical dual practice (Paina et al., 
2014), and identifying systems determinants of integrated Community Case 
Management of malaria (Sarriot et al., 2015). 
To understand the historical logic of the evolution of the balance between primary 
and hospital care, the study took two steps. The first step was to describe the historical 
trends of the balance between hospitals and primary care providers. Metrics have been 
proposed for assessing health systems features in relation to the concept of the balance 
between primary and hospital care. White, Williams, and Greenberg (1961) studied the 
utilisation of different levels of care. Mills (1990) analysed the distribution of health 
expenditures by the level of care in a cross-national analysis. Starfield (1994) 
developed a comprehensive system of metrics of primary care orientation of health 
systems. More recent development includes the Primary Health Care Performance 
Initiative (2015) measuring percentage of government spending on primary health care. 
This component of the study followed these measurement tools previously developed 
and extended them further. 
The second step of the historical analysis was to explain how the changes took 
place. For this purpose, the thesis conducted a historical-institutionalist analysis of 
changes of institutional factors related to the relative balance between primary care 
Part I  Conceptualization 
23 
and hospital care. The historical approach has been advocated as useful for studying 
the institutional factors that underlie the evolution of health systems (Bloom, 2014; 
Peters, 2014) (including the changing the balance between primary and hospital care). 
For example, a framework of path dependence analysis within the political school of 
historical institutionalism has been shown useful for institutional development 
(Pierson, 2004) and health policy analysis (Hacker, 1998). A recent series of historical 
case studies on health system development used the framework of path dependence to 
facilitate an investigation on factors contributing to successful health system 
development (Balabanova, McKee, & Mills, 2011). 
As the scope of the thesis expanded to tackle an increasingly broad range of factors 
affecting the balance between hospital and primary care, the framing broadened from 
the initial focus on gatekeeping as a means to strenghten primary care, to a dynamic 
contemporary system containing interrelated policies and elements, and a historical 
system containing structures rooted in an institutional legacy that evolves over time. 
Correspondingly, the thesis employed four approaches, which constituted a set of 
analytical tools for a multi-level analysis of the issue of balance between hospitals and 
primary care providers. Trend analysis and historical-institutionalist analysis provided 
an empirical and theoretical basis for making sense of the development of hospitals 
and primary care providers over time and the forces behind such development. The 
historical-institutionalist analysis also encompassed multiple policies and institutions 
that closely interacted with one another, which would be much less meaningful if 
restricted to factors directly related to gatekeeping. The contemporary impact 
evaluation provided needed evidence on the effectiveness of a particular strategy. 
Combined in a case study, impact evaluation and qualitative systems analysis 
generated rich understanding of the barriers facing each intervention. As the thesis 
later argues, such a mix of multiple approaches has particular strengths in helping 
deepen our understanding of complex issues like the balance between hospitals and 
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primary care providers in the context of low- and middle-income countries. 
1.4 Organisation of thesis 
The remaining chapters of Part I further lay out existing knowledge and explain 
the conceptual basis of the thesis. Chapter 2 reviews literature related to the concepts 
and measurements relevant to the relative development between hospitals and primary 
care facilities, the evidence regarding gatekeeping in retaining patients at primary care 
facilities both internationally and in China, as well as complexity issues related to 
studying gatekeeping and other similarly-intended interventions. The chapter also 
reviews the relevant useful research approaches to study such interventions. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of gaps in knowledge. Chapter 3 explains the aim 
and objectives of the thesis, and provides an overview of methods and sub-studies 
corresponding to each objective.  
Although sub-studies were conducted in parallel, the results chapters are arranged 
in temporal sequence starting with quantitative results before qualitative analysis. Part 
II provides a historical account of the relative development of hospital and primary 
care facilities in China. Chapter 4 provides a description of the overall trends of the 
relative development of the hospital sector and the primary care sector in China 
between 1949 and 2013, in terms of human resources, assets, equipment and 
infrastructure, service utilization, and financing. Chapter 5 lays out the analytical 
approach of a path dependence framework and then uses it to analyse the emergence 
of the two sectors in China and their division in the context of the introduction of 
biomedicine from the West before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1949. Chapter 6 studies how the two sectors, including their institutional embedding, 
evolved from 1949 onward, when the country periodically underwent drastic political 
changes.  
Part III examines a contemporary gatekeeping pilot in China. Chapter 7 provides 
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an impact evaluation of the pilot programme on visits and expenditures at different 
levels of care based on difference-in-differences analysis using claims data. Chapter 8 
uses an approach of qualitative systems analysis based on causal loop diagrams, 
“Framework” analysis and the WHO categorization of health system building blocks, 
and uses the approach to analyse the systems factors involved in the functioning of the 
gatekeeping pilot.  
Part IV consists of a discussion chapter and a concluding chapter. Chapter 9 
discusses methodological advantages and limitations of the approach of the thesis, 
overall results of sub-studies (Chapters 4-8), and relevance and generalisability of 
thesis findings. Chapter 10 concludes the thesis by summarizing the key findings and 
contribution to knowledge, and suggesting implications for policy-making and further 
research priorities. 
Within each chapter, material under a primary subheading (e.g. 2.1) is referred to 
as a section, while material under a secondary subheading (e.g. 2.1.1) is referred to as 
a sub-section.  
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 Literature review  
2.1 Introduction 
The first purpose of the chapter is to review literature with a focus on knowledge 
and previous studies about the subject matter. Specifically, the review inquired about: 
the two closely related concepts--primary care and primary health care, and the 
definitions relevant to the balance between primary care and hospital care; the ways in 
which the balance between primary care and hospital care has been measured; the 
evidence regarding effectiveness of strategies to shift the balance between primary 
care and hospital care and particularly regarding gatekeeping (definition provided 
later); and the findings of previous Chinese studies regarding effectiveness of 
strategies to shift the balance between primary care and hospital care. The first stage 
of review was done through a systematic approach.  
The second purpose of the chapter is to identify useful approaches to study 
strategies to shift the balance between primary care and hospital care from the field of 
health policy and systems research. The review identifies three particularly promising 
approaches, namely, impact evaluation (difference-in-differences analysis), qualitative 
systems analysis (causal loop analysis), and historical institutionalism (path 
dependence analysis). The second stage of the review was conducted using an 
explorative approach. Finally, this chapter concludes with a summary of findings of 
the review and gaps in knowledge. 
2.2 Review process and search results 
A mix of automated and manual searches was used for reviewing knowledge about 
the subject matter, conducted in three parts. The first part of the search focused on the 
concept of the balance between primary care and hospital care. A number of electronic 
databases were used in the search via the platform of Ovid, based on suggestion from 
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the library of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine on relevant 
databases (see Table 2-1). A search was run for the period prior to September 2016. A 
list of all searched electronic databases and search engines are shown in Table 2-1. 
Search terms included key words for “balance of care” or for terms related to 
“hospital”, “primary care” and “balance” (see Table 2-2). A site search via google was 
conducted for the website of the World Health Organisation. A manual search was 
conducted to include key book titles on primary care.  
Publications that discussed the definition and/or the measurement of the balance 
between primary care and hospital care (including the related term “balance of care”), 
and/or the strategies to shift the balance between primary care and hospital care were 
included. Excluded were studies that 1) only provided viewpoints without description 
or evidence, 2) only dealt with either primary care sector or hospital sector, without 
addressing the balance between primary care and hospital care, or 3) were 
methodologically inappropriate (e.g. cross-sectional studies) or unspecified. 
Table 2-1. Electronic databases and search engines 
Databases searched on Ovid* 
9 Global Health <1910 to 2016 Week 34>  
9 HMIC Health Management Information Consortium <1979 to July 2016>  
9 LSHTM Journals@Ovid  
9 Northern Light Life Sciences Conference Abstracts <2010 - 2016 Week 34>  
9 Econlit <1886 to August 2016>  
9 Embase Classic+Embase <1947 to 2016 September 02>   
9 Epub Ahead of Print, In-Process & Other Non-
Indexed Citations, Ovid MEDLINE(R) Daily and Ovid MEDLINE(R) <1946 to Present>  
9 Social Policy and Practice <201607>  
Website searched on Google 
9 World Health Organization (http://www.who.int) 
Databases searched on China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) 
9 China Academic Journals Full-text Database (1994 onwards) 
9 China Doctoral Dissertations Full-text Database (1984 onwards) 
9 China Masters' Theses Full-text Database (1984 onwards) 
9 China Proceedings of Conference Full-text Database (1953 onwards)  
Databases searched on Wanfang Data 
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9 China Science Periodical Database (1998 onwards) 
9 China Dissertation Database (1980 onwards) 
9 China Conference Paper Database (1983 onwards) 
Note: *access to Ovid was provided by London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. 
 
Table 2-2. Search strategy for literature on Ovid 
No. Search terms 
1 balance of care.mp. 
2 balance.mp. 
3 hospital*.mp. or hospital/ 
4 community care.mp. 
5 community health care.mp. or community care/ 
6 community health service*.mp. 
7 health centre.mp. or health center/ 
8 primary care.mp. or primary medical care/ 
9 primary health care.mp. or primary health care/ 
10 primary healthcare.mp. or primary health care/ 
11 general practitioner/ or general practice/ or general practi*.mp. 
12 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 
13 2 and 3 and 12 
14 1 or 13 
15 gatekeep*.mp. 
16 14 and 15 
17 remove duplicates from 14 a 
18 remove duplicates from 16  
19 limit 18 to yr="2010-" b  
Note: a) search for balance of care; b) search for gatekeeping. 
 
The automated search identified 1872 results on Ovid (after automatic de-
duplication) (see Figure 2-1). After further excluding duplicates (n=17), the title and/or 
abstracts (if needed) of the resulting articles were read through to exclude 1744 
irrelevant articles. The full text of the remaining 111 articles were retrieved and 
scanned through, which reduced the number of included articles to 5. The search of 
the website of the World Health Organisation generated 455 results, which were 
reduced to 28 after a screening through the search results based on title/abstract. 
Further screening of the full text of these reduced the number of articles to 12. 
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Figure 2-1. Flowchart of search process of international literature 
 
The second part of the search focused specifically on gatekeeping (a concept that 
is elaborated later and became central as an opportunity to study a pilot emerged). A 
similar search process was used with different search terms related to both sectors 
(hospitals and primary care providers) and gatekeeping (see Table 2-2). As there has 
been a systematic review for gatekeeping which is considered to be of good quality 
(Centre for Reviews and Dissemination), the review here covered the articles included 
in the systematic review and conducted an additional update of the literature since 
2010. The search identified 461 results, which were reduced to 5 after screening titles 
and abstracts, and further reduced to 2 (including a systematic review, the studies 
reviewed by the systematic review were also read).  
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The third part of the search focused on studies in Chinese on the balance between 
primary and hospital care including gatekeeping (see Table 2-3 for search strategy) in 
two main Chinese academic publication databases, namely, China National 
Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) and Wanfang Data. The search identified a total of 
612 results in the two databases (218 in CNKI, 394 in Wanfang Data, see Figure 2-2). 
After excluding duplicates, 466 articles were screened by reading through the title 
and/or abstracts, which excluded 459 irrelevant articles. The full text of the remaining 
7 articles were retrieved and read, after which 1 was included in the synthesis.  
Table 2-3. Search strategy for Chinese literature on CNKI and Wanfang  
No. Subject 
1 基层 
2 卫生院 
3 社区 
4 村卫生室 
5 村医 
6 家庭医生 
7 全科医生 
8 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 
9 首诊 
10 守门人 
11 患者分流 
12 病人分流 
13 分级诊疗 
14 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 
15 效果 
16 8 and 14 and 15 
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Figure 2-2. Flowchart of search process of Chinese literature 
 
Review regarding theories and methods was conducted using an explorative 
approach recognized as important for the nascent field of health policy and systems 
research (McPake & Hanson, 2016; Sheikh et al., 2011) and involved two stages. In 
the first stage, I searched and read the key texts written on methodology related to 
health policy and systems research. The search led to three potentially useful 
approaches, namely, impact evaluation, systems analysis and historical 
institutionalism. The second stage of review then focused specifically on the theories 
and methods in relation to these three approaches. 
2.3 Conceptual review 
The section starts with articles using the specific term “balance of care” and others 
using terms related to the idea, then extends to primary care. The section concludes 
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with a summary of the findings from the conceptual review and clarification of the use 
of the concept in this thesis, particularly for the further review regarding measurement 
of the balance between primary care and hospital care in Section 2.4. 
2.3.1 The concepts related to the balance between primary care and hospital care 
The search identified three different understandings and uses of the concepts 
related to the balance between primary care and hospital care. The first group of 
publications focus specifically on the balance between primary care and 
hospital/specialty care (or secondary and tertiary care) (Battistella & Chester, 1973). 
White et al. (1961) studied the proportion of adults going to different levels of care 
and presented the demand for and utilisation of health care resources in a diagraph he 
called “the ecology of medical care”. McMillan et al. (1970) studied the proportions 
of general practitioners and specialists among physicians. Mills (1990) studied the 
allocation of funds among various levels of care. Starfield (1994) constructed a 
comprehensive index to measure the degree of primary care orientation of health 
systems. Overall, these studies represented focuses on the services utilised, the 
resources allocated, or the orientation of health systems.  
Godber, Robinson, and Steiner (1997) also discussed “shifting balance of care 
towards primary care”, which was defined as the situation when a service acquired 
additional attributes of primary care (defined as direct access, generalist care, 
longitudinal care and delivery in a community setting, the concept of primary care will 
be elaborated later in Sub-section 2.3.2). Depending on how many of the four attributes 
were displayed before and after the change, the shift can be either full or partial. Based 
on a workshop with staff working at the primary-secondary care interface and a 
literature review, Godber and colleagues identified the main forms of full shift as: 
substitution for hospital care by primary care (general practitioners (GPs) providing 
minor surgery, employing specialists), primary care access to diagnostic services, and 
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day surgery and/or early discharge arrangements; and the main forms of partial shifts 
as: shared/integrated care; home care, domiciliary care and/or early discharge with 
follow up by secondary care providers; and specialist outreach clinics. 
The second group of studies are a strain of literature more specifically associated 
with the “balance of care approach”. A recent systematic review (Tucker et al., 2013; 
Tucker et al., 2015) on the use of the approach summarised the lessons from this body 
of literature. Hence, here I draw from the review and the articles referenced by the two 
articles that came out of the systematic review. The concept of “balance of care” in 
this sense appeared in 1974 in relation to the development of mathematical models for 
resource allocation planning by the British government, and referred to “a balance 
between the major types of care and groups of patient” (McDonald, Cudderford, & 
Beale, 1974). The focus of the “balance of care approach” was the margin of care 
where alternative forms of care existed for specific patient groups. As Mooney (an 
early architect of the balance of care approach) explained: “to determine the balance 
of care it is not necessary to determine the costs and benefits of care for all individuals 
but merely those likely to be affected by small shifts in the existing boundaries of care, 
that is those of relatively high dependency levels in residential homes and those of 
relatively low dependency levels in hospital.” (Mooney, Russell, & Weir, 1986, p. 32). 
Due to this focus on the “margins of care” (Hughes & Challis, 2004), the field was 
also referred to as “marginal analysis” (Mooney & Drummond, 1982). Indeed, the 
overwhelming majority of studies using the balance of care approach were about older 
people and the settings of hospital, care homes, and community services, while some 
other special population groups like children, people with mental health problems, and 
people with HIV/AIDS were also included (Tucker et al., 2013). The balance of care 
approach is considered to have an advantage in helping service planners to consider 
the potential cost and outcomes involved in changing the delivery of services, which 
cannot be achieved by cost-effectiveness analysis of individual technologies (Tucker 
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et al., 2013). This approach arguably is limited in that it does not take into 
consideration the potential of effective primary care in preventing illnesses and 
dependency or reducing unnecessary referral for investigation in patients at low risk 
of serious disease. 
The third group of studies also used the concept of “balance of care” as a broad 
health system strategy, referring to balance across multiple dimensions in health (and 
social) care. Indeed, the first article that mentioned “altering the balance between 
primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of care” also discussed the balance “between 
curative and ‘carative’ services” (Battistella et al., 1973). The use in this case has also 
been more general in the dimensions of “balance”. As quoted below, Royston (1998) 
asked “why, when, where, how, what and who” about balance between various levels 
of care and observed that both changes in demand (driven by demographic, 
epidemiological and social-economic changes) and changes in supply (driven by 
medical, information and wider technological development) pushed for shift of 
“balance of care”:  
“When care is delivered: the balance between prevention and treatment. 
Where it is delivered: the balance between institutional and community care. 
How it is delivered: the balance between patient and professional involvement 
in care. 
What is delivered: the balance between knowledge and habit based care. 
Who is cared for: the balance between care of one group and another.”1  
A report by the Scottish Executive (2004) pushing for shifting “balance of care” used 
the concept in a similar sense. Although “shifting the balance of care” was not defined 
explicitly, it was used to refer to reducing reliance on hospital-based treatment 
                                                 
1 Underlines were used throughout the thesis for cited words italicized in original sources. 
Part I  Conceptualization 
35 
(increasingly through emergency admissions) to preventive medicine, supporting self-
care, greater targeting of resources on those at greatest risk and “a more proactive 
approach in the form of anticipatory care services”. The Scottish government later 
published a review of evidence on “shifting the balance of care” (Johnston, Lardner, 
& Jepson, 2008). In the report, “shifting the balance of care” included changes on three 
dimensions: shifting the focus of care towards long-term conditions, shifting the 
location of care towards more community-based facilities, and changing roles and 
responsibilities of patients and professionals.  
2.3.2 The concept of primary care 
As will be reflected below, primary care is a complicated concept with varied 
interpretations over time and space. The sub-section first briefly introduces the origin 
of the term, then presents the different approaches in which primary care has been 
defined, and finally discusses the relationship between primary care and primary health 
care. 
1) Origins 
The notion of “primary care” (and closely related terms) is generally believed 
(Frenk, 2009; Starfield, 1998) to have formally originated in the Interim Report on the 
Future Provision of Medical and Allied Services in 1920. In the report, “Primary 
Health Centre(s)” were proposed as “institution[s] equipped for services of curative 
and preventive medicine to be conducted by the general practitioners of that district, 
in conjunction with an efficient nursing service and with the aid of visiting consultants 
and specialists” (Lord Dawson, 1920: Section II). According to this report, these 
primary health centres would be treating more simple cases by general practitioners, 
while difficult cases would be referred to “Secondary Health Centres” staffed by 
consultants and specialists, and then to tertiary hospitals. As historical studies suggest, 
Dawson’s proposal of primary health centres was a reorganisation of general practice 
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and other facilities at that time (Honigsbaum, 1979: Chapter 6; Webster, 1993). 
Besides general practitioners and visiting consultants and specialists, the primary 
health centres would also include “[m]edical, surgical and maternity beds” (Lord 
Dawson, 1920: Section VII). This proposal did not materialise.  
In the United States, White claimed in an interview to have invented the concept 
of “primary care” (White, 1998), which originally appeared in 1961 as “primary, 
continuing medical care” (White et al., 1961). The article provided no definition for 
the concept. According to what White said during the interview, the term was coined 
as a euphemism for general practice, which was suffering from stigmatization as an 
inferior subject of medicine. In the same interview, White acknowledged the earlier 
existence of the ideas about primary care, which included the systematically organised 
rural health system in Ding County in China established by Chen Zhiqian, as well as 
the regionalization of health care in China lead by Chen’s colleague and teacher John 
Grant. 
2) Various definitions 
Over the years, the concept of primary care has had a range of definitions (see 
Table 2-4 for a list of representative definitions). This literature review found that most 
definitions of primary care were proposed by experts in North America (Institute of 
Medicine, 1996: Chapter 2; Muldoon, Hogg, & Levitt, 2006; Shi, 2012; Starfield, 
1998)2, though other definitions were also discussed by experts with the World Health 
Organisation and from European countries (Saltman et al., 2005; Vuori, 1985; World 
Health Organization, 1978, 2008). The review identified several approaches to which 
                                                 
2 A report by the King’s Fund (a British health policy think-tank) used the definition based on (Starfield, 
1998). 
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these definitions belonged. 
First, primary care can refer to a range of clinical professions or disciplines: 
closely associated with first contact care: general practice (Royal College of General 
Practitioners, 1972), or family medicine, general internal medicine, general paediatrics, 
obstetrics and gynaecology, and nurse practitioners (Shi, 2012).  
Second, primary care can refer to a level of care, a type of setting or a system of 
service delivery. As a level of care, primary care is a point of entry to a health delivery 
system, along with secondary care, tertiary care, and emergency care (Starfield, 1998, 
pp. 8-9). Primary care is also referred to as health services located in the settings of 
communities (Institute of Medicine, 1996, p. 32). According to a systematic review of 
the core dimensions of primary care (Kringos et al., 2010), primary care is also seen 
as a multi-dimensional system structurally consisting of governance, economic 
conditions and workforce development.  
Third, primary care has been used to refer to a set of services that are “person-
focused (not disease-oriented)” and cover “all but very uncommon or unusual 
conditions” (Starfield, 1998, pp. 8-9). In terms of services, the definition of primary 
care has gradually evolved from being a synonym with general practice (or indeed a 
euphemism of it) as defined by White et al. (1961) to a multi-disciplinary team that 
provides the first contact care, satisfies comprehensive health needs centring on 
persons (rather than diseases and specialities), and functions as a hub for services at 
other levels of care (World Health Organization, 2008). 
The fourth group of definitions saw primary care as services with a set of 
normative attributes which can be used to measure services at micro level: “accessible, 
comprehensive, coordinated, continuous, and accountable” according to the Institute 
of Medicine (1978), or “first contact, accessibility, longitudinality, and 
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comprehensiveness” according to Starfield (1992). 
Fifth, in relation to the previous category’s set of normative functions but at a more 
macro level, some have suggested primary care as a set of principles for health system 
or health system strengthening (Starfield, 1998, p. 9).  
Among the five approaches, the first three are more empirical definitions 
(focusing on service ranges or their providers) and the last two are more normative 
definitions (focusing on aspirational attributes). A single definition can cover more 
than one of these approaches listed above. The different approaches of definitions 
sometimes interrelate to each other. For example, the first approach of definitions 
based on primary care disciplines essentially describes the clinical staff under the 
disciplines that provide services falling under the third approach of definitions. One 
approach may also contradict another. For example, according to Saltman et al. (2005, 
p. 14), primary care can include services provided by secondary care and tertiary care 
providers, which seems to be incompatible with the definitions under the second 
approach based on levels of care. In relation to the various definitions, multiple criteria 
have been applied and/or proposed for distinguishing primary care from other types of 
health care. As Shi (1995) argued, primary care and specialty care (including 
secondary and tertiary care) can be distinguished by the time (first contact or not), the 
focus (diseases/organs or person as a whole) and the scope (comprehensive or episodic) 
of services. Godber et al. (1997) mentioned three other criteria for drawing such lines: 
key inputs (GPs vs. specialists), location of care (community settings vs. hospitals), 
and essential service attributes. 
3) Distinguishing concepts  
The review identified interchangeable use of the terms of “primary care” and 
“primary health care”, as well as efforts to distinguish them. The second column of 
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Table 2-4 provides some representative definitions of primary health care for 
comparison. The concept of primary health care was popularised by the Declaration of 
Alma Ata at the International Conference on Primary Health Care held in 1978. Like 
primary care, primary health care has also been defined in multiple ways, namely, as 
services with certain normative characteristics (World Health Organization, 1978), a 
range of specific services (World Health Organization, 1978), a development strategy 
for health services (Vuori, 1985), a philosophy of health (Vuori, 1985), and a set of 
policy orientations and reforms towards health for all (World Health Organization, 
2008, p. xvi). 
Table 2-4. Representative definitions of primary care and primary health care 
Definitions of primary care Definitions of primary health care 
¾ “accessible, comprehensive, coordinated and 
continual care delivered by accountable 
providers of personal health services.” (Institute 
of Medicine, 1978) 
¾ “care that is characterized by first contact, 
accessibility, longitudinally, and 
comprehensiveness” (Starfield, 1992) 
¾ “Primary care is the provision of integrated, 
accessible health care services by clinicians who 
are accountable for addressing a large majority 
of personal health care needs, developing a 
sustained partnership with patients, and 
practicing in the context of family and 
community.” (Institute of Medicine, 1996, p. 32) 
¾ “Primary care is that level of a health service 
system that provides entry into the system for all 
new needs and problems, provides person-
focused (not disease-oriented) care over time, 
provides care for all but very uncommon or 
unusual conditions, and coordinates or 
integrates care provided elsewhere or by others.” 
(Starfield, 1998, pp. 8-9) 
¾ “[P]rimary care is an approach that forms the 
basis for and determines the work of all other 
¾ “Primary health care is essential health care 
based on practical, scientifically sound, and 
socially acceptable methods and technology 
made universally accessible to individuals and 
families in the community through their full 
participation and at a cost that the community 
and country can afford to maintain at every stage 
of their development in the spirit of self-reliance 
and self-determination. It forms an integral part 
of both the country’s health system, of which it is 
the central function and the main focus and of the 
overall social and economic development of the 
community. It is the first level of contact of 
individuals, the family and community with the 
national health system bringing health care as 
close as possible to where people live and work, 
and constitutes the first element of a continuing 
health care process.” (World Health 
Organization, 1978)  
¾ a set of activities outlined in the Declaration of 
Alma-Ata, including “at least education 
concerning prevailing health problems and the 
methods of preventing and controlling them; 
promotion of food supply and proper nutrition; 
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levels of health systems. Primary care addresses 
the most common problems in the community by 
providing preventive, curative, and rehabilitative 
services to maximize health and well being. It 
integrates care when there is more than one 
health problem and deals with the context in 
which illness exists and influences the responses 
of people to their health problems. It is care that 
organizes and rationalizes the deployment of all 
resources, basic as well as specialized, directed 
at promoting, maintaining, and improving 
health.” (Starfield, 1998, p. 9) 
¾ “Primary care refers to directly accessible, first 
contact ambulatory care for unselected health 
(related) problems; offers diagnostic, curative, 
rehabilitative and palliative services in response 
to the bulk of these problems; offers prevention to 
individuals and groups at risk in the population 
served; takes into account the personal and 
social context of patients; is provided by a variety 
of disciplines, either within primary care, 
secondary care or related sectors; assures 
patients continuity of care over time as well as 
between providers.” (Saltman et al., 2005, p. 14)  
¾ “a multidimensional system… [including] ten 
core dimensions that constitute a primary care 
system. The structure of a primary care system 
consists of three dimensions: 1. governance; 2. 
economic conditions; and 3. workforce 
development. The primary care process is 
determined by four dimensions: 4. access; 5. 
continuity of care; 6. coordination of care; and 7. 
comprehensiveness of care. The outcome of a 
primary care system includes three dimensions: 
8. quality of care; 9. efficiency care; and 10. 
equity in health.” (Kringos et al., 2010) 
an adequate supply of safe water and basic 
sanitation; maternal and child health care, 
including family planning; immunization against 
the major infectious diseases; prevention and 
control of locally endemic diseases; appropriate 
treatment of common diseases and injuries; and 
provision of essential drugs.” (World Health 
Organization, 1978) 
¾ a strategy under which services would be 
“accessible; relevant to the needs of the 
population; functionally integrated; based on 
community participation; cost-effective; and 
characterized by collaboration between sectors 
of society; and a new distribution of resources 
between primary, secondary and tertiary care… 
a reorientation of health personnel (in terms of 
numbers, training and activities) towards 
primary health care.” (Vuori, 1985) 
¾ a philosophy of health: “social justice and 
equality; international solidarity; self-
responsibility; and an acceptance of a broad 
concept of health.” (Vuori, 1985) 
¾ a set of policy orientations and reforms needed 
for moving towards health for all: “moving 
towards universal coverage; shifting service 
delivery to people-centred primary care; 
ensuring health in all policies; promoting 
inclusive leadership and governance.” (World 
Health Organization, 2008, p. xvi) 
Note:  
1) Muldoon et al. (2006) listed some Canadian definitions of primary health care that are close to or 
included in the definition in the Declaration of Alma Ata and are not included in the table. 
2) Underlines were used for originally italicized words. 
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The two terms have been used interchangeably by some. The Institute of Medicine 
(1978) originally used the term “primary health care” when referring to what they 
eventually called “primary care”. Starfield (1998) occasionally used primary care to 
refer to primary health care, but also to an intermediate stage of “conventional primary 
medical care striving to achieve the goal of primary health care”. Atu (2004) used 
primary care and primary health care interchangeably. Treating primary health care 
and primary care as synonyms, the World Health Report 2003 pointed out that primary 
health care refers to the first level of care in high- and middle-income countries, while 
the same term is “seen more as a system-wide strategy” in low-income countries 
(World Health Organization, 2003: Chapter 7).  
Others see differences in the two terms and have tried to distinguish them. The 
Institute of Medicine (1996, pp. 30-31) later made the distinction that primary health 
care consists of population-oriented public health services (with the examples of 
sanitation and ensuring clean water for populations), and primary care focused on 
delivery of “personal health services in a context of family and community health”, 
while acknowledging increasing intersections and changing connections between 
public health and personal health care delivery (examples were immunization for 
children and tuberculosis outreach services). Saltman et al. (2005, p. 6) also noted that 
primary care was an intermediary concept, which was broader than the care delivered 
by a general practitioner or a family doctor, yet “more restricted than intersectoral 
concept of primary health care” in the sense of Alma Ata. Muldoon et al. (2006) argued 
that the two concepts were very different but unfortunately similar in language. They 
proposed that primary care be used to refer to “family doctor-type” services for 
individuals, while primary health care be used to describe “public health-type” services 
for both individuals and population. The World Health Organization Regional Office 
for Europe (2016) referred to primary care as a subset of primary health care. The case 
to clarify the definition of primary care was made strongly in the World Health Report 
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2008, which particularly criticized the unacceptable over-simplification of primary 
care in resource-constrained settings as:  
“only deal[ing] with a few ‘priority diseases’; … reduced to a stand-alone health post or 
isolated community-health worker; … restricted to a one-way delivery channel for priority 
health interventions; … just be about treating common ailments; … synonymous with low-
tech, non-professional care for the rural poor who cannot afford any better; … financed 
through out-of-pocket payments on the erroneous assumption that it is cheap and the poor 
should be able to afford it” (World Health Organization, 2008, p. 11). 
2.3.3 Commentary 
As the section has shown, the balance between primary and hospital care (or 
between levels of care more generally) has been studied in the context of margins of 
care, across a range of health services, and between the hospital (or specialist care) 
sector and the primary care sector. This finding suggests that the various approaches 
to conceptualization of the balance between primary and hospital care have been 
grounded in the policy issues of interest. Therefore, this thesis needs to pay attention 
to the situation in China in order to conceptualize balance of care in an appropriate 
way that facilitates addressing key policy issues. The development of the concept of 
primary care over the years has given rise to different understandings and emphases in 
different studies. While some have defined primary care more from a positive 
perspective, others have defined it in a normative sense. Again, the definitions of 
primary care appear to have been based on specific contexts and policy issues at 
stake. The review has also revealed that the origins of primary care were closely linked 
with efforts to improve the balance between primary and hospital care within health 
systems.  
The focus of literature on primary care seems to have at times slipped away from 
a system-wide perspective involving the balance between primary and hospital care to 
a narrower focus on primary care as a stand-alone field, which for instance constituted 
a solution to the overuse in hospitals. Such thoughts were clearly reflected in the 
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conclusion that White (1998) drew from the WHO International Collaborative Study 
of Medical Care Utilization: “no matter how many beds per thousand population, if 
there was adequate primary care and people had access to a general physician, the use 
of hospital beds was much lower.” On the other hand, there also seems to be some 
lasting attention to the issue of the balance between primary and hospital care. For 
example, in the World Health Report 2008, primary health care was defined as a multi-
dimensional orientation for health systems including “shifting service delivery to 
people-centred primary care” (World Health Organization, 2008). This thesis follows 
this latter tradition of understanding the balance between primary and hospital care as 
a system-wide concept. 
2.4 Measurement of the balance between hospitals and primary care providers 
This section reviews the tools used in previous studies to measure the balance 
between hospitals and primary care providers. The review has not identified any 
comprehensive measurement or categorisation for dimensions of the balance between 
hospitals and primary care providers. Instead, the section draws on a related set of 
measurement--primary care orientation of health systems--to inform the categorization 
of available measurement tools in this thesis. To measure the primary care orientation 
of health systems, Starfield (1994) developed structural indicators--five “health system 
characteristics”, which reflect the capacity to achieve the intended features of primary 
care; and performance/process indicators--six “practice characteristics”, which reflect 
the degree of success in attainment of these features. Inspired by this dichotomy, the 
review used the categorisation of indicators identified from the literature as indicators 
representing structural aspects of the balance between primary and hospital care--
referring to the comparison of the capital and the capacity between hospitals and 
primary care facilities, and functional aspects--referring to the comparison of the 
functioning and the performance between hospitals and primary care facilities. 
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2.4.1 Structural aspects 
Three out of the five system/structural characteristics contained in the scoring 
system for primary care orientation developed by Starfield (1994) could be seen as 
related to structural balance between hospitals and primary care providers: type of 
physicians designated as primary care doctors; the professional earnings of primary 
care doctors compared to specialists; and the number of primary care doctors compared 
to specialists. In other words, the quantity and quality of human resources have been 
used as structural aspects of the balance between hospitals and primary care providers.  
2.4.2 Functional aspects 
This review identified two main groups of studies that measured the functional 
aspects of the balance between primary and hospital care. One group looks at service 
utilisation/provision. The other group focuses on resource utilisation/allocation. 
General distribution of patient visits (i.e. types of provider that patients visit) has 
been frequently used as a key indicator of the functional balance between primary and 
hospital care. A landmark study in this area is the Ecology of medical care (White et 
al., 1961) mentioned earlier. Later White also led the WHO International Collaboration 
Study on Medical Care Utilization (Kohn & White, 1976), which described and 
analysed the geographical variations of service utilisation across a number of countries. 
Closely related to White’s studies of service utilisation were the six practice 
characteristics in the scoring system for primary care orientation developed by 
Starfield (1994). Four of these characteristics could be seen as directly pertinent to the 
functional aspects of the balance between primary and hospital care: “the extent to 
which people first sought care from their primary care physician”; “the strength of 
relationships between people and primary care physicians”; “the extent to which 
primary care practice dealt with common needs”; and “the degree of coordination 
between primary care and other health services”.  
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Other indicators/tools have been used to reflect the function of primary care or 
hospital care, or the effectiveness of referral systems, and are less obviously related to 
the balance between the two sectors. The remaining two practice characteristics 
contained in the assessment for primary care orientation of the scoring system 
developed by Starfield (1994) were “family orientation of primary care” and 
“community orientation of primary care”. Another related approach regarding the 
services utilised is the appropriateness of the setting where care is provided: the degree 
to which appropriate services are provided in appropriate settings (Lavis & Anderson, 
1996). Widely used tools for measuring the appropriateness of service setting include 
the Appropriateness Evaluation Protocol (Gertman & Restuccia, 1981) and the 
Intensity-Severity-Discharge review system (Inglis et al., 1995). Both tools measure 
the appropriateness of a hospital admission or a day of stay in hospital. Sanders et al. 
(1998) studied how well case-mix (in terms of severity of illness) matched the level of 
health care facilities in Zimbabwe. Another approach uses ambulatory care sensitive 
conditions (ACSCs) to reflect the function of primary health care. ACSCs are a set of 
diseases and health problems, for which good quality primary health care were 
considered able to reduce hospital admissions (Caminal et al., 2004). However, this 
approach cannot reflect the balance between the two sectors, indeed there is 
inconsistent evidence on how it well ACSCs are negatively associated with improved 
primary health care (Gibson, Segal, & McDermott, 2013; Rosano et al., 2013). Overall, 
these measurements reflect an attention to the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
services. 
Regarding financial resources utilized, a cross-national analysis by Mills (1990) 
mentioned earlier investigated the proportions of hospitals (and other types of facilities 
for some indicators) in total health sector expenditures, total health sector expenditures 
of government, annual development (capital) expenditures on health, national 
government health facility expenditures, and district health facility expenditures. 
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Nabyonga, Munguti, and Thomas (2002) studied public sector expenditures by level 
of care (hospitals, outpatient care centres, etc.) and the percentages of total 
expenditures on hospitals vs primary care facilities in particular in seven African 
countries. Mugisha and Nabyonga-Orem (2010) analysed the proportion and amount 
of recurrent expenditures that went to hospitals and the primary health care sector in 
Uganda from 1997/1998 to 2007/2008. The Primary Health Care Performance 
Initiative (2015) reported 25 PHC Vital Signs indicators, one of which was “Percent 
of government health spending dedicated to PHC”. 
2.4.3 Commentary 
The review identified a lack of a comprehensive system of metrics for the balance 
between hospitals and primary care providers. Previous studies measuring the balance 
between hospitals and primary care providers used indicators mentioned above that 
can be grouped into either structural or functional aspects. Indicators for the structural 
aspects include quantity and quality of human resources. Indicators for the functional 
aspects include service utilisation and provision, and resource utilisation and allocation. 
Left out in the dichotomy of structural and functional aspects seem to be the 
institutional factors that underlie the balance between hospitals and primary care 
providers. Two indicators in the five system/structural characteristics contained in the 
index for primary care orientation developed by Starfield (1994) are cases in point: the 
extent of regulations that allow health professionals and facilities to be distributed 
according to need; and risk pooling for health care services. Measurement for such 
institutional factors are obviously different from the quantitative measurement of the 
capacity and performance aspects of the balance between primary and hospital care 
and deserves special treatment. The thesis distinguishes between structural and 
functional aspects of the balance between primary and hospital care on the one hand 
and policies and interventions to change the balance (e.g. empowerment and 
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incentivisation of primary care providers as gatekeepers) on the other hand. 
2.5 Findings regarding strategies to shift the balance between primary and 
hospital care 
The section presents the findings on effective strategies, particularly gatekeeping, 
in shifting the balance between primary and hospital care, and extends to a synthesis 
of important issues related to complexity of the balance. 
2.5.1 Effectiveness of gatekeeping in strengthening primary care functioning 
This section reviews knowledge about “what works” in shifting the balance. 
Before proceeding, it should be clarified that the focus is whether and/or to what extent 
interventions are (likely to be) effective in causing a shift of the balance between 
primary and hospital care to happen, not whether and/or to what extent a shift in the 
balance is effective for a secondary purpose. It is obvious that this strict criterion would 
exclude a broad range of relevant studies focusing on strengthening primary care 
without incorporating analysis of hospital care.  
Findings from a systematic review in several high-income countries suggest that 
a range of interventions could contribute to shifting the balance between hospitals and 
primary care providers (as defined in this thesis): assessment of elderly people before 
case management, disease management (especially in relation to long-term conditions), 
early supported discharge with community-based rehabilitation for stroke and other 
patients, rehabilitation in the community for a range of conditions, care at home and 
hospital at home interventions (Johnston et al., 2008). Indeed, various interventions 
and policy approaches are possible in shifting the balance towards primary care. The 
remainder of this sub-section focuses on gatekeeping because of the claims made about 
its potential contributions and the need to keep the review manageable. 
Gatekeeping has been defined as an arrangement between primary care providers 
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and specialists which involves a generalist (primary care doctors, family medicine 
doctors, general practitioners, etc.) who acts as a gatekeeper for specialist care and 
coordinates care for patients, i.e. that in order to access specialist care patients have to 
be referred by a primary care practitioner, and is supposed to work as a mechanism to 
enhance greater efficiency in use of health care resources (Starfield, 1994). Historically, 
gatekeeping probably emerged in two ways: first employed by health insurers to 
approve sickness claims, and then to excess restriction of access to hospital care 
financially or administratively (Stone, 1978). The search on gatekeeping identified a 
recent systematic review (Garrido, Zentner, & Busse, 2011) considered by independent 
assessors at Centre for Reviews and Dissemination (2011) to be of good quality, which 
has provided a summary of empirical studies about gatekeeping before 2010. For years 
between 2010 and 2016 (September), the review here included another publication 
from Egypt (Ward, 2010), covering three indicators: visits to primary care providers, 
visits to specialists, expenditures for ambulatory specialist care. 
One study (Ferris, Perrin, et al., 2001) included in the systematic review was 
dropped due to severe selection bias3. Only three studies in the systematic review were 
thus suitable for comparison and provided limited information. A US study by Escarce 
et al. (2001) reported an additional 50.9% of primary care visits on average in 
insurance plans with gatekeeping compared to a plan without such requirements. 
Schwenkglenks et al. (2006) reported, based on a study in Switzerland, no change in 
primary care visits after introducing gatekeeping. While Escarce et al. (2001) reported 
a 77.4% reduction of visits to specialists in gatekeeping plans, a German study by Ose 
et al. (2008) reported little effect of gatekeeping in reducing specialist care utilisation-
                                                 
3 In the study of Ferris, Perrin, et al. (2001), beneficiaries were allowed to choose between plans requiring 
gatekeeping and without such requirement. As the author acknowledged, the reduction of utilisation and 
expenditures care in both primary care and specialist care was likely mainly due to selection bias since 
beneficiaries who expected lower utilisation of care tended to opt for the gatekeeping plan. 
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-a gatekeeping scheme saw a decrease of 4% of visits to specialists per year on average, 
while the reduction was 5.8% in a comparison group without gatekeeping. Using a 
survey from a pilot district with gatekeeping and a control district without gatekeeping, 
Ward (2010) reported about 63% reduction in visits to hospital outpatient departments, 
with 10.75% increase in visits to primary care facilities (in contrast to a decrease of 
29% in a comparison area without gatekeeping). 
Gatekeeping studies identified here could be generally categorized into three 
groups. The first group focused on gatekeeping as a feature of managed care, and 
mainly corresponds to the rise and fall of the managed care movement mainly in the 
US but also in other countries without gatekeeping policies such as Germany and 
Switzerland between 1980s and early 2000s (e.g. Ferris, Chang, et al. (2001) and 
Perneger, Etter, and Rougemont (1996)). The second group of studies were in countries 
with previously strict gatekeeping policies trying to respond to greater calls for choice, 
particularly in the case of National Health Service Scotland (Perneger et al., 1996). 
The study from Egypt (Ward, 2010) was the only study in the third group, addressing 
the challenge of hospital-centred care in developing countries. 
In the Chinese literature, despite repeated reports showing a large proportion of 
cases could be treated more cost-effectively at lower levels of care (Lei et al., 1996; 
Wang, Gusmano, & Cao, 2011a; Xu, Diwan, & Bogg, 2007), studies about the 
effectiveness of interventions aimed at shifting the balance between primary and 
hospital care were rare. The only article included was of low quality. Guo, Liang, and 
Jin (2012), pooled two cross-sectional surveys of residents in the catchment of a 
community health centre in Beijing that had implemented a payment reform which 
replaced fee-for-service with global budget, rendering budget independent from 
providing services. Without using a control group, the study found that the proportions 
of patients visiting primary care facilities for initial contact rose from 32.6% at baseline 
to 61%. The quality of the study was further compromised by not providing sufficient 
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details of methods. 
2.5.2 Issues of complexity in shifting the balance between hospitals and primary 
care providers 
As the guideline on evaluating complex interventions by the Medical Research 
Council (2008) pointed out, “[f]ew interventions are truly simple, but there is a wide 
range of complexity”. The guideline listed five dimensions that make an intervention 
complex, and all dimensions seem to apply to interventions on the balance between 
primary and hospital care:  
“·Number of and interactions between components within the experimental and control 
interventions 
·Number and difficulty of behaviours required by those delivering or receiving the 
intervention 
·Number of groups or organisational levels targeted by the intervention 
·Number and variability of outcomes 
·Degree of flexibility or tailoring of the intervention permitted” 
In response, the guideline suggested that 1) good theoretical understanding be 
developed about how the intervention causes changes, in order to address potential 
“weak links in the causal chain”, 2) the process evaluation be used to identify 
implementation problems (which could explain lack of impact); 3) sample size might 
need to be increased to be able to account for variability, while cluster- rather than 
individually-randomized designs might need to be considered; 4) studies should 
employ a range of measures and to identify unintended consequences; 5) interventions 
might need to adapt to local setting instead of strictly following protocols. The 
positions suggest a need to clarify complexity issues and reflect them in research 
approaches, though no example was found which used these guidelines in studying the 
balance between primary and hospital care.  
This review has identified some complexity issues involved in shifting the balance 
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between primary and hospital care (gatekeeping in particular) and their implications 
for studying strategies to shift the balance between primary and hospital care.4 First, 
interventions under similar categorization are implemented in varied ways. All 
gatekeeping studies have involved some other changes in what could be seen as 
complementary arrangements. The gatekeeping study from Egypt, for example, 
involved increased charges and co-payment for patients bypassing primary care 
providers, a marketing campaign to raise awareness, and an exemption policy for the 
poor who received care at the primary care level or received care at hospitals with 
referral from primary care (Ward, 2010). Indeed, the findings of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Health System Characteristics 
Survey 2012 showed varied arrangements of gatekeeping and cost-sharing policies for 
accessing outpatient specialist care across rich countries(Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2013). Studies on pro-coordination reforms including 
gatekeeping also found that coordination reforms were not self-sustaining but required 
supporting conditions at systems, professional, and practices levels (Rico et al., 2003; 
Saltman et al., 2005). 
Second, there are issues related to the context within and beyond health systems. 
A study in the Netherlands suggested that GPs use a “demand-satisfying” attitude when 
it comes to gatekeeping, even though they think patients are receiving unnecessary 
care (Wammes et al., 2014). Important contextual changes that drive policy changes 
include the increasing demand on coordination caused by rising prevalence of non-
communicable diseases, as well as pressures related to cost-containment (Rico et al., 
2003).  
Third, there are issues related to the various and interrelated impacts of the 
                                                 
4 The review draws from Greenfield, Foley, and Majeed (2016) and Rico, Saltman, and Boerma (2003). 
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gatekeeping policies. Financial incentives for general practitioners in the United 
Kingdom (UK) to reduce specialist referrals caused concerns about conflicting roles 
and ethical issues (Lauridsen, 2009; Matthews-King, 2016). While pro-gatekeeping 
financial incentives seemed to reduce access to specialist care in France, particularly 
for poor and uninsured people (Dourgnon & Naiditch, 2010), gatekeeping also reduced 
overall health care inequities in European countries (Biro, 2013; Reibling & Wendt, 
2013; Schnitzer et al., 2011), provided disadvantaged groups with assistance in 
decision making, and reduced specialist use by advantaged populations, who were the 
more frequent users of specialist care (Reibling et al., 2013). There have been different 
opinions regarding the influence of gatekeeping on the traditional divide between GPs 
and specialists, particularly in relation to the flow of information between the two 
groups (Bjornsson et al., 2010). Restrictions on patient choice are associated with 
lower patient satisfaction (Bjornsson et al., 2010; Dusheiko et al., 2007; Greenfield et 
al., 2012), though not everywhere (Gervas, Ferna, & Starfield, 1994), while low patient 
satisfaction has been shown to be associated with compromised outcome and 
compliance (Roter & Hall, 2006). Studies have also indicated that primary care 
gatekeeping may actually be associated with poorer cancer survival potentially due to 
delayed diagnosis (Crawford, 2014). In short, the results of policies to shift the balance 
between primary and hospital care (particularly gatekeeping) appear to include a range 
of interrelated consequences, some of which were not necessarily the intended 
outcomes of the interventions, highlighting the complexity of the interventions.  
Fourth, history and institutions also influenced the implementation of strategies 
to shift the balance between hospitals and primary care providers. A comparative study 
(Rico et al., 2003) referenced above analysed trajectories of development in relation 
to strengthening the role of primary care both in service provision and coordination 
(including gatekeeping) across health systems in European countries during the 1990s. 
The study showed that health systems in which primary care historically had strong 
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informal political power (particularly private ownership) and state had monopsonic 
control of health services tended to find it easier to implement primary care-focused 
pro-coordination reforms. The distribution of informal political power and state 
control were historically formed, and affected by policy feedback and societal 
pressures (cost-containment, market competition and increasing prevalence of chronic 
illnesses). In other words, this study indicated the importance of power dynamics in 
determining the outcome of policy interventions related to the balance between 
primary and hospital care. Such power appeared to come from historically shaped 
institutional factors that determined distribution of power and formation of coalitions 
among groups, as well as the political structure that affected the influence of these 
coalitions in driving or preventing policy changes.  
2.5.3 Commentary 
Section 2.5 has reviewed findings regarding strategies to shift the balance 
between primary and hospital care with a focus on gatekeeping. Research about 
gatekeeping has been especially rare, particularly in low- and middle-income settings. 
Studies on effectiveness of strategies to shift the balance in China have been rare and 
of low quality. The point about gatekeeping involving some concurrent arrangements 
deserves particular attention. 
The review has also identified complexity issues related to shifting the balance 
between primary and hospital care. Table 2-5 summarizes these complexity issues and 
extends to include their corresponding methodological implications. 
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Table 2-5. Complexity issues and methodological challenges 
No. Complexity issues Methodological implications 
1 Varied implementation of 
interventions under the 
similar categories 
Research on effective strategies needs to be able to isolate the 
impact of the component of interest, and be complemented with 
understanding of implementation details. 
2 Variations in the context 
both within and beyond 
health systems 
Research needs to deal with the variations within the context, 
including concurrent changes and unobservable factors. 
Challenges of isolating the effectiveness of interventions from 
complex contexts 
3 Multiple consequences, 
including interrelating and 
unintended consequences 
Research needs to address not only the immediately intended 
outcomes, but also to examine the consequences not directly 
intended and the interrelationships between consequences of 
the intervention. 
4 Historically formed 
institutional factors shape 
and interact with how and 
whether contemporary 
strategies might work 
Research needs to understand how historically formed 
institutional factors influence the power dynamics affecting 
policy and system changes. 
 
The issue of variations in implementation of intervention programmes suggests 
the need to go beyond the generic brands of certain intervention programmes and to 
identify the specificity of implementation. Methodologically, this means more ground-
level understanding of implementation details, including the barriers to and facilitators 
of implementation in the context of interest. The issue of variations in the context both 
within and beyond health systems also requires research designs to explore/control for 
the variations within the context, which may include concurring changes and 
unobservable factors.  
The issues about multiple consequences demand research methods to reveal the 
multitudes of interrelating consequences, and to be sensitive to interrelationships and 
unintended consequences. The important influences of historical and institutional 
factors on implementation of interventions also require a research approach to 
conceptualize and study such factors.  
Part I  Conceptualization 
55 
To sum up, it is difficult if not impossible to isolate effects of one intervention 
(or multiple interventions under one brand) embedded in multiple dimensions of 
complexity. Such complexity issues as discussed above pose methodological 
challenges that deserve attention to each one of them. 
2.6 Review of approaches used in thesis 
Besides the need to increase knowledge on measurement of the balance between 
hospitals and primary care providers, the review above suggests potential knowledge 
gains from three elements.  
First, because interventions happen as changes embedded in concurrent 
development of health systems, identifying the impact (defined as the causal effect) of 
policy interventions requires isolation of intervention mechanisms from 
implementation issues and more or less separable contextual factors. In this regard, an 
impact evaluation was conducted to identify the causal effect of the pilot programme. 
Second, understanding the mechanisms of interventions implemented, their 
contexts, and the interaction between intervention mechanisms and contexts 
contributes crucially to understanding why interventions had varied effects. To obtain 
in-depth information regarding the implementation processes, variation in context and 
the interaction between process and context, the study further adopted a systems 
analysis to understand the functioning of gatekeeping in the context of multiple on-
going changes in the health system.  
Third, understanding history can help elucidate the power dynamics within the 
parameters of institutional factors formed historically—this is crucial as the power 
dynamics determined the likelihood and directions of substantial changes in 
strengthening primary care. To address such power dynamics, the study also included 
an analysis using historical institutionalism.  
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The remainder of this section reviews the approaches used in the thesis 
corresponding to each of these elements. The rationale for choosing the research 
approaches is provided in Table 2-6. While an overview of how the thesis used the 
methods is provided in the next chapter, and the details of methods are provided in 
sub-study chapters, the remainder of this section reviews the literature regarding 
previous uses of the three approaches.  
Table 2-6. Justification for selection of research approaches 
Impact 
evaluation 
A critical justification of impact evaluation is the availability of a 
gatekeeping pilot in China. The pilot used a cluster design that matched 
the evaluation requirement.  
Difference-in-differences analysis in particular establishes the counter-
factual situation to assist calculating the net effects of an intervention. 
By the creation of a counter-factual, the method reduces the risk of 
distorting the effects of an intervention by including the effects of other 
changes and inherent trends. 
Qualitative 
systems analysis 
Impact evaluation on its own provides little information about the 
actual causal pathways, implementation process and unintended 
consequences. 
Causal loop analysis (a sort of qualitative systems analysis) combined 
with qualitative research methods allows the study to clarify the 
intended mechanisms, identify the implementation process, elucidate 
the dynamics among multiple components involved in interventions, 
and gather information about multiple and unintended consequences. 
Historical 
institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism emphasises the power dynamics set in forth 
in a wider temporal-spatial context, which drives policy change and 
build up institutional resilience. 
Path dependence analysis has been applied to health systems analysis 
and found potentially valuable. 
  
2.6.1 Impact evaluation 
Previous findings regarding the effectiveness of gatekeeping in shifting the 
balance between primary and hospital care are of generally low quality and focused on 
high-income countries, while evidence regarding effectiveness of gatekeeping in the 
context of China is also thin, as shown above. Indeed, given the existence of multiple 
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complexity issues that the previous section has alluded to, the effectiveness of 
gatekeeping in shifting the balance between primary and hospital care is likely to be 
influenced by the local context and implementation details. The mechanisms 
themselves may be compromised by the context, which also affects implementation. 
A particular challenge for evaluating effects lies in isolating the impact of interventions 
from the changing backgrounds, owing to the existence of multiple and interrelated 
influences of gatekeeping and concurrent changes. 
Evaluations are defined as “periodic, objective assessment of a planned, ongoing, 
or complete project, program, or policy” to answer questions regarding design, 
implementation and/or results (Gertler et al., 2011). In general, evaluations can address 
descriptive questions (e.g. what is happening, in what processes, under what conditions, 
relationships between actors and how people see the process), normative questions (e.g. 
gaps in inputs, implementation and outputs) and cause-and-effect questions (what 
difference in the outcomes of interest is caused by the intervention) (Imas & Rist, 
2009). Impact evaluation has a clear focus on the last group of questions and on 
demonstrating the existence (or absence) of causal relationship between an 
intervention (a programme, a policy, etc.) and its intended and unintended effects 
(Gertler et al., 2011, pp. 7-8).  
Impact evaluation essentially measures the impact (causal effects) of an 
intervention as the difference in outcomes for the same subjects with or without 
enrolment in the intervention programme. However, subjects are not identical, and one 
subject cannot be a participant of the programme and a non-participant at the same 
time. In other words, the outcome of a subject without participation of the intervention 
programme cannot be observed from a participating subject. To fill this information 
gap, the impact evaluation methods estimate the counterfactual typically by using 
comparison groups which have identical characteristics to the treatment group, except 
for the absence of the intervention of interest. There are two commonly applied though 
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usually problematic (sometimes called “naïve”) methods of constructing comparison 
groups: before-and-after (comparing the outcomes of participants pre- and post-
introduction of an intervention program, i.e. using the pre-intervention outcome of 
subjects as an estimate of the counterfactual), and with-and-without (comparing the 
outcomes of enrolled and non-enrolled, i.e. using the outcome of non-enrolled subjects 
as an estimate of the counterfactual). Before-and-after comparison risks neglecting the 
effects of changing environmental conditions, while with-and-without comparison 
risks neglecting the inherent differences between the two groups and potential 
selection bias. Neither methods provide a sound estimate of the counterfactual (Gertler 
et al., 2011: Chapter 3).  
Among the methods of impact evaluation, the difference-in-differences method 
offers and approach to study impact by constructing a counterfactual when 
randomization is not feasible (Gertler et al., 2011: Chapter 6). The difference-in-
differences method compares the changes in the outcome variables over a certain 
period between a treatment group—subjects that participate in a programme, and a 
control group—subjects that do not participate in the programme. The method 
essentially combines investigation of the before-and-after difference in the outcomes 
of the treatment group (through which factors constant over the period of study are 
controlled for) and the before-and-after difference in the outcomes of the control group 
(through which time-varying factors are captured). The most basic difference-in-
differences method assumes that the control group and treatment group exhibit “equal 
trends in the absence of treatment”, and constructs a counterfactual based on the 
change in outcomes of the control group. Therefore, net effects of intervention are 
calculated by “cleaning” the time-varying effects (the second difference) away from 
the before-and-after change in the treatment group (the first difference). By 
considering the time-varying effects, difference-in-differences analysis is capable of 
generating a better estimate of the counterfactual than simple before-and-after studies.  
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Difference-in-differences is widely applied. Using difference-in-differences, 
Duflo (2001) analysed the impact of school construction on the schooling and labour 
market in Indonesia; Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) studied whether an increase in 
staffing of police forces contributed to crime reduction. Examples of difference-in-
differences have also been seen in health systems research. For instance, Sutton et al. 
(2012) and Kristensen et al. (2014) used the method to examine whether the effects of 
a pay-for-performance scheme reduced in-hospital mortality in England. Thus, 
difference-in-differences provides a rigorous method to test the causal effect of a single 
intervention that would not be available in cross-sectional study, which is lacking in 
current studies about effectiveness of gatekeeping. None of the gatekeeping studies 
found used difference-in-differences analysis.  
Limitations of difference-in-differences methods include the assumption of equal 
trends, and calculation of an average treatment effect for all enrolled subjects, i.e. 
without sensitivity to variations of treatment effects amongst individuals (though this 
focus on overall impact could also be seen as a strength) in calculating average changes. 
Furthermore, the attention to causal effects might be restricted with a narrow view on 
the complexity involved in a programme. As Mackie (1965) has explained, causes are 
at a minimum, conditions which are “Insufficient but Necessary parts of a condition 
which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient” (INUS) for their effects. A classical 
example of INUS conditions given by Mackie is that an electrical short-circuit has 
caused the burning of a house. The short-circuit was a necessary part of this accident 
as it was indispensable in causing the fire, but it was not the necessary condition for 
the house to catch fire, as other conditions (e.g. a lighted oil stove as overturned) could 
have caused the fire. The short-circuit was not a sufficient condition for the house to 
catch fire, as other conditions (e.g. the absence of inflammable materials nearby) could 
have prevented the house from catching fire, but the short-circuit combined with a set 
of conditions constituted a complex condition which became sufficient for the house 
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to catch fire. As causes dealt by impact evaluation (and other similar approaches to 
causal inference) are INUS conditions, the evaluation technique focuses on only part 
of the causes and might end up providing oversimplified or even misleading results. 
In other words, impact evaluation should be complemented by more in-depth 
knowledge of the process of intervention embedded in a system of interrelated 
elements. 
2.6.2 Systems theory and causal loop analysis 
Issues related to the various arrangements, various contexts and multiple, 
interrelated impacts mentioned above, as well as the nature of gatekeeping which 
involves the two sectors of hospitals and priamry care providers suggested the need 
for an approach that allows sufficient sensitivity about and synthesis of the multiple 
factors in their interrelating dynamics. Knowledge derived from systems theory and 
system thinking (also known as “the systems field” (Williams, 2015), as “systems 
theories” vary) have been advocated to be useful for health systems and policy research 
(Adam et al., 2012; Bloom & Standing, 2008; Gilson, 2012). Systems thinking has 
been described as a mind-set which sees systems and sub-components of systems as 
interrelated to one another, and interpreting the interrelationships as the key to 
knowledge about how things function (Adam, 2014). Two recent supplement issues 
published in peer-reviewed journals Systems thinking for health systems strengthening 
in LMICs: seizing the opportunity (2012) (Adam et al., 2012) and Advancing the 
application of systems thinking in health (2014) (Adam, 2014) illustrate the developing 
application of systems thinking in health systems research. Based on these two journal 
issues, systems thinking appears to facilitate addressing a growing range of questions 
associated with the impacts of interventions. As the 2012 supplement demonstrated 
(Adam et al., 2012), systems thinking has proved valuable in revealing key elements 
of success and failure in implementing complex interventions, the role of relationships, 
the role of actors in health systems, the importance of environmental factors, the 
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importance of anticipating potential unintended consequences, and systematically 
evaluating the implementation process and reacting to feedbacks within the systems. 
As the 2014 supplement further showed (Adam, 2014), combining qualitative methods 
with systems thinking can add depth to analysis of health systems issues, and 
visualization can help convey complex interpretations and findings. 
Causal loop analysis is a method for systems analysis that maps out and 
qualitatively models the dynamics between factors within a system using causal loop 
diagrams (CLDs) (Williams et al., 2010a: Chapter 1). Through constructing CLDs, 
causal loop analysis helps identify the key elements/variables in the situation, the 
linkages/interrelationships among elements, and the feedback among interrelated 
elements. The basic unit of a causal loop diagram is a causal link. Each causal link 
between two variables has a direction and a polarity. Direction denotes the cause and 
the effect within a link, illustrated by arrows departing from the cause and arriving at 
the effect.  
There are two types of link polarity in CLDs: positive and negative. A positive 
link means that, all else being equal, a change of the cause variable will lead to a 
change of the effect variable in the same direction, compared to the situation when the 
cause variable is held unchanged; in contrast, a negative link means that, all else being 
equal, a change of the cause variable will lead to a change of the effect variable in the 
opposite direction, compared to the situation when the cause variable is held 
unchanged. Connecting the links generates feedback loops (closed circular causal 
relationships) that may be linked to relevant variables that do not fall in any feedback 
loop.  
There are two main types of feedback loops, namely, reinforcing loops, when the 
sum of negative causal links within the loop produces an even number, and balancing 
loops, when the sum of negative causal links produces an odd number (Richardson, 
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1986; Sterman, 2000: Chapter 5; Williams & Hummelbrunner, 2010b: Chapter 1). 
Compared to the linear model usually used for analysis of policy interventions, CLDs 
allow researchers to put together, in a visually accessible way, a multitude of 
interacting factors with feedback loops. 
Causal loop analysis has been found valuable in health systems research. 
Rwashana et al. (2009) used data collected through various sources including 
preliminary interviews, questionnaires, documents, and field studies to create CLDs 
and used them to generate a wide and holistic perspective of the issues related to an 
immunization system for stakeholders to prioritize and develop policies. Rwashana et 
al. (2014) developed CLDs about demand and supply side issues associated with 
neonatal mortality in two divisions of a district with high neonatal mortality rates in 
Uganda, based on literature reviews and interviews. The study found synthesis of 
concepts through constructing CLDs facilitated understanding of the interactions and 
feedback loops contributing to the stagnant neonatal mortality rates, and provided an 
initial step to develop potential intervention strategies.  
Paina et al. (2014) used CLDs to illustrate the interactions and feedback among 
actors involved in the development of medical dual practice in Uganda, and 
demonstrated the value of CLDs in visualizing the changes of policies and practice in 
relation to dual practice. Sarriot et al. (2015) constructed CLDs to identify systems 
determinants of integrated Community Case Management (iCCM) of malaria, 
pneumonia and diarrhoea from the perspective of the national health system. The study 
utilised CLDs to develop high-probability future scenarios and policy 
recommendations. In these studies, CLDs make explicit cause-and-effect relationships 
and facilitate understanding and interpretation of interacting factors and feedback 
loops that contribute to important policy issues in the field of health systems and policy 
research.  
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Williams neatly summarized three core concepts of systems theories in general: 
interrelationships, perspectives, and boundaries (Williams et al., 2010a; Williams, 
2015). Systems scholars started with the focus on a multitude of interrelationships in 
which an intervention is embedded; they also emphasised the existence of multiple 
perspectives (e.g. different interpretations of an apparently similar situation); more 
recently, the issue about decisions regarding the boundaries of a systemic inquiry or 
intervention has also been highlighted. The three concepts are dimensions where 
systems methods could help improve understanding of a complex intervention within 
a dynamic system like a health system.  
The advantage of CLDs has been clear in identifying and analysing 
interrelationships, however, s. Studies have also included multiple perspectives (e.g. 
Paina et al. (2014) examined the multiple perspectives of stakeholders) and broadened 
boundaries (e.g. Rwashana et al. (2009) examined the unintended consequences of the 
immunization system in Uganda). Causal loop analysis on its own does not provide a 
study design and is usually used in combination with qualitative methods (e.g. 
Varghese et al. (2014) used CLDs along with content analysis). In short, CLDs 
generally constitute an additional powerful tool to systematically incorporate systems 
thinking in along with qualitative methods, and therefore facilitate studying complex 
health systems issues. They have not yetso far been used to study balance of 
caregatekeeping or the balance between primary and hospital care. 
2.6.3 Historical institutionalism and path dependence analysis 
1) Rationale  
The following conceptual discussion and review regarding historical 
institutionalism and path dependence arises from the assumption that China’s 
configuration of hospitals and primary care providers cannot be understood without 
investigating the deep historical roots and dynamics through proper tools. The 
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historical approach has been gaining attention in the field of health policy and systems 
research. Bloom (2014) argued for the importance of situating health systems 
development in the context of its history and political economy. In the same 
commentary, Bloom drew from Leach et al (2011) to emphasise the need to understand 
the risk of powerful interests narrowing the options of questions asked about framing 
the complex reality of health systems. The historical approach focuses on the analysis 
of the process of change, and therefore has the potential to reveal the political economy 
of the health sector and the role of various actors. Path dependence theory and its close 
relative—“punctuated equilibrium” theory (in social theories) have been recognized 
as useful systems thinking theories for health systems research (Peters, 2014). A recent 
historical case study on health system development used the framework of path 
dependence to facilitate a study on factors contributing to successful health system 
development (Balabanova et al., 2011). No study has used historical institutionalism 
and path dependence systematically for studying the balance between primary and 
hospital care. 
2) Key theories and concepts 
Before the rise of historical institutionalism, there were multiple competing 
approaches to historical analysis of health and welfare policies. The structural 
functionalist approach explained the emergence of the welfare state as a result of 
industrialization, the Marxist explanation for the welfare state was based on class 
interests and the rise of the labour movement, the pluralist approaches to explain the 
welfare state focused on social interests treating the state as a neutral presence 
responding to external social actors (Skocpol, 1985). These approaches, however, have 
been found inadequate to explain the timings and configurations of national welfare 
states in health and in general. Historical-institutionalists particularly emphasised 
states as autonomous actors with bureaucrats of potentially varied capacities, who were 
not just strictly executing in the interests of certain social groups, or obediently 
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answering the call of certain ideologies (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Skocpol, 1985; Skocpol 
& Amenta, 1986). A group of historical-institutionalists focused on the structures of 
polities, and how much such structures allow interest groups to veto policies that run 
against their interests (Immergut, 1990; Steinmo & Watts, 1995).  
Although the state may have an autonomous role in policy making, it does so 
bounded by limitations imposed by earlier choices. Path dependence is a way of 
thinking systematically about how policy choices are circumscribed by past decisions 
(Pierson, 2000). In a sense, historical institutionalism fuses the explanation of the 
emergence of institutions and the constraining effects of institutions (Fioretos, Falleti, 
& Sheingate, 2016: Part I). The theory of path dependence originated as researchers 
tried to explain the endurance of inefficient technologies and found that technologies 
could be locked in due to accidental historical events: the initial technologies created 
network externalities, learning effects, adaptive expectations and high fixed costs that 
increased the cost of changing technologies by so much that it was rational for 
individual actors to stick to the inefficient technologies (Arthur, 1989; David, 1994).  
Later researchers also borrowed from the model of “punctuated equilibrium” 
(Gould & Eldredge, 1972) in evolutionary biology which challenged more incremental 
models of evolution (Krasner et al., 1984). The theory has been defined in different 
ways, some broader than others. Path dependence has been used to refer generally to 
“that what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a 
sequence of events occurring at a later point in time” (Sewell, 1996, pp. 262-263). It 
has also been defined narrowly as: “that once a country or region has started down a 
track, the costs of reversal are very high” (Levi, 1997, p. 28).  
Pierson (2004) pointed out that policy actors who might want to change the 
established institutions or policies would likely face three type of challenges: 
coordination difficulties, asset specificity and positive feedback. Coordination 
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difficulties involve the interaction among multiple policies widely seen in the health 
delivery arena, and are likely to exist in relation to the issue of the balance between 
primary and hospital care. For instance, all major reforms of professionalization-
related policy need to coordinate not only medical schools that produce graduates but 
also facilities who employ them. Coordination difficulties come from the adaptive 
expectation that in a fragmented decision-making environment, actors may have 
different opinions about what is the best outcome but would be eager to come to a 
shared acceptable outcome. Once this point is reached, the likelihood of deviating from 
the consensus would diminish, as it would entail formidable challenges (Hardin, 1989). 
A stronger form of coordination difficulties lies in the existence of multiple veto points 
in underpinning political institutions or institutions related directly to the balance 
between primary and hospital care. They constitute a conservative force that impedes 
further reform. The degree of coordination difficulties helps explain the fragility or 
resilience of institutions. Thus, the political institutions (both formal and informal 
structures) are important to path dependence analysis. 
Specificity of previously accumulated assets poses difficulties for change. Joskow 
(1988) drew from Williamson’s analysis of transactional costs and identified four types 
of asset specificity: site specificity (value of the asset is tied to its location), physical 
asset specificity (specificity is tied to its role as an integrated part of a transaction or 
product), human asset specificity (skills and knowledge that are specific to the position, 
or developed trust), dedicated asset specificity (value derives from continuing 
particular exchange). Assets in institutional studies take a wide range of meanings 
(relationships, expectations, privileges, knowledge of procedures) and are not readily 
reallocated.  
The above two points are more related to the structural or the nature of individual 
elements of policies. Policies are not only more difficult to roll back due to such 
institutional constraints, but are also likely to trigger a process of increasing returns 
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(Arthur, 1994; David, 2001; Pierson, 2004), or a self-reinforcing process. While the 
first two points tend to be partial on setting barriers to change in a certain direction, 
change that satisfies previous structures would further develop. Hence, the three 
mechanisms can be mutually complementary.  
Besides the reinforcing processes, reactive sequences were also identified, as 
chains of events that were temporally ordered and connected to one another in a causal 
relationship. Each event in a reactive sequence is “both a reaction to antecedent events 
and a cause of subsequent events.” Reactive sequences are characterized by “backlash 
processes which transform[sic] and perhaps reverse[sic] early events.” (Mahoney, 
2000) 
Building upon the theory of path dependence, researchers in the school of 
historical institutionalism tend to divide history into long periods of stability when 
institutions structure political outcomes, and intersecting short periods during which 
events external to the institutions in question make those institutions more malleable 
(Fioretos et al., 2016, p. 9) (illustrated as Type 1 in Figure 2-3). Two main concepts of 
such short periods featured prominently, namely critical juncture and conjuncture. The 
concept of critical juncture has been used to explain the formation or origin of 
institutions. According to Pierson (2004, p. 135), critical junctures “are ‘critical’ 
because they place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then 
very difficult to alter.” Various definitions exist for critical junctures, some emphasise 
structural factors constraining the options of actors (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Others 
emphasise the existence of contingency during and divergence after critical junctures 
(Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). Wilsford (1994) discussed “conjunctures” which 
focused on the coming together of events (war, crisis, major change of economic policy, 
etc.) that lead to change and the unravelling of institutions (illustrated as Type 2 in 
Figure 2-3). To sum up, critical junctures have been defined mainly to account for the 
locking of path dependence and the origins or formation of institutions, while 
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conjunctures have been defined mainly to account for the unlocking of path 
dependence and the termination or reforms of institutions (illustrated as Type 3 in 
Figure 2-3). 
Among historical-institutionalists in the field of health policy and systems 
research, studies that link research on health (usually as a welfare) politics and health 
service research seem to have moved beyond traditional territories of political 
scientists and ventured into an interdisciplinary field of health policy and systems 
research from a historical perspective. Two particular examples are illustrative. Hacker 
(1998) studied the historical logics of National Health Insurance in UK, US and 
Canada with the main question being why the United States, given its similarities with 
UK and Canada, did not have national health insurance. The study contained analysis 
of not only the critical junctures per se, but also the downstream increasing return, i.e. 
the delay in United States in establishing national health insurance at an early period 
of health system development created interests that frustrated the agenda of 
establishing national health insurance. Hacker also attended to political structures and 
argued that the different nature of federal structures in the US and Canada played a 
key role in the timing and extent of Medicare. Hacker observed that all these factors 
matter and that political institutions are not unchangeable and have varied impacts on 
policy development. As Hacker showed, it is the sequence of key historical events that 
really has determined the influence of all these factors and the outcome of political 
processes. 
The other example is the study by Tuohy (1999) on the effects of the 1990s policy 
period on the health systems of the same three countries. Tuohy proposed a dichotomy 
of “policy episodes” (similar to conjunctures) and “system logics” (see Type 4 in 
Figure 2-3), which indicated the discrepancy between the world of policy and the 
world of health systems. According to Tuohy’s construction, big changes of policies 
were only likely during short policy episodes opened by external forces. After the 
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policy episodes, the system logic plays out, which may or may not lead to 
major/intended changes in the health system. Tuohy’s framework highlighted the 
difference between the world of policy-making and the world of implementation. 
Particularly, Tuohy’s study demonstrated that even with major changes in policy (in 
the case of introduction of an “internal market” in the National Health Service), 
systems could be rather resilient and reduce the scale of impact of the changed policies 
in implementation. In short, the findings from studies on system changes pre-juncture 
and post-juncture reaffirm the common knowledge in health system and policy 
research that systems changes are somewhat independent from policy change, or it can 
be said that effects of policy change are bounded by entrenched factors within health 
systems. 
A potential limitation of reinforcing-path-dependence theory (including critical 
junctures) is its lack of appreciation for endogenous changes—the possible windows 
of change are relegated to special exogenous shocks. Besides conjuncture points, other 
theories about institutional changes propose mechanisms of change. These include the 
role of previously marginal groups, the significance of overlapping processes, and the 
role of institutional entrepreneurs. The literature on institutional change also identifies 
a range of typical processes of institutional changes: layering, institutional conversion, 
diffusion (Pierson, 2004, pp. 137-138). Problems of such mechanisms are that they 
have to defy the resilience of institutions to the degree they have been established. 
While attention to these “catalysts” of change are important, Pierson suggested that 
the focus should be on the resilience (ability to survive policy changes) of institutions 
and the long term process of their build up (Pierson, 2004: Chapter 5). The inclusion 
of reinforcing and reactive sequences and in the same theoretical framework may 
potentially address the issue of lack of appreciation of endogeneous hanges. Essentially, 
path dependence analysis allows policy analysis to connect history to contemporary 
policy studies not just by applying social science theories to empirical data to explain 
Part I  Conceptualization 
70 
history, nor by methodologically providing available or additional cases for developing 
theories. Instead, as Pierson (2004, pp. 4-5) pointed out, the use of history is theoretical 
and adds “a distinctly temporal dimension” to the analysis of institutions and 
institutional changes. 
 
Figure 2-3. Main types of path dependence analysis identified in the literature review 
 
3) Analytical methods 
Path dependence and critical juncture have been invoked by researchers in a vague 
sense when it comes to the analysis of historical processes. Recognizing this issue, 
Capoccia (2015) developed a multi-step analytical method to systematically study 
critical juncture (summarised in Table 2-7). This approach offers a sound basis for 
developing a rigorous approach for path dependence analysis in this thesis.  
Table 2-7. A multi-step analytical method for critical juncture analysis 
Step Content 
1 Clarify the unit of analysis 
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2 Identify “candidate” critical junctures  
3 Test for structural effects  
4 Select for analysis the most “critical” critical junctures 
5 Reconstruct the political process  
6 Counterfactual analysis 
7 Demonstrate lasting legacy of the institutions selected 
8 Cross-sectional comparison of critical juncture (at all steps if possible) 
Source: summarized from Capoccia (2015)  
 
First, by clarifying unit of analysis, critical juncture analysis can focus clearly on 
one institution or a set of institutions, rather than using critical juncture in a vague 
sense to indicate change. Second, by identifying candidates for selection, the approach 
also seeks to avoid bias in selection. Structural effects might rule out the possibility 
for alternatives, either by eliminating all but one option, or by selecting the actors and 
forcing them to adopt just one choice. According to some definitions (Capoccia, 2015 ), 
critical juncture should allow contingency (or a plausible alternative to the institutional 
outcome)—otherwise it would not be critical. Therefore, testing for structural effects 
(Step 3) would help narrow the range of candidate critical junctures. In the same vein, 
Step 4 further narrows the range to a very small number of the most “critical” 
candidates of critical junctures. Two criteria have been specified for judging 
criticalness: the probability that the institution acquires durable path-dependent 
characteristics by the end of the critical juncture; the relatively short duration of the 
critical juncture compared to the duration of its path-dependent legacy. 
As a main part of the analysis, Step 5 reconstructs the political dynamics during 
the selected critical junctures. This should be done by identifying the main actors and 
their interaction, reconstructing politically viable alternatives for institutional 
outcomes and the forces behind each options, identifying which decisions are most 
influential in forming the final intuitional legacy. Steps 6 to 8 include counterfactual 
analysis, demonstration of institutional legacy and cross-sectional comparison of 
critical junctures, which are all mainly about reconstructing the criticalness of the 
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critical junctures selected by comparing the path-dependent institutional outcome with 
the “the paths not taken”. For these steps, Capoccia (2015) emphasised the importance 
of negative cases (critical junctures where changes failed to happen). 
4) Relevance for China’s context 
The literature of historical institutionalism has developed based on experiences as 
well as concepts derived from Western societies. Just before concluding the literature 
review, it is worthwhile to ponder about the usefulness or relevance of the theories for 
the context of China. First, the polity of China has been apparently different from that 
of the West. As just discussed, the theory of path dependence and the school of 
historical institutionalism developed largely based on the assumption of fragmentation 
within an autonomous state. By contrast, political power in China has been centralized, 
and the country has had only one ruling party after 1949 without competition among 
different political parties. However, fragmentation of power always existed in the 
Chinese system including in the period after 1949 (this point will be elaborated on in 
Chapter 6). Those in power (or with access to power) had their own preferences, which 
tended to favour certain societal groups more than others. Preferences of certain policy 
actors do not necessarily agree with those of others.  
Another challenge to applying path dependence analysis to China is the degree of 
changes in the country as compared to the West. Theories from historical 
institutionalism like path dependence originated with the need to explain the 
observation that changes rarely happened in some countries, and then were extended 
to reveal mechanisms for both entrenchment of institutions and changes. Therefore, 
such theories (particularly when it comes to critical juncture analysis) were not limited 
to Western societies. That said, the parameters of the institutional changes, i.e. political 
and societal contexts, were generally stable. Although massive social changes took 
place in the West, which might be considered as critical junctures, including major 
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events like the two world wars, civil rights movement and so on, such changes seem 
less disruptive as compared to the breadth and depth of social changes in China.  
A review of studies on organisational and institutional change about China (Zhou, 
1999) concluded that there were generally two main tendencies in this field. Some 
researchers tried to explain the situation in China with existing Western theories. Their 
efforts tended to generate some “awkward” explanations, while also produced some 
novel insights. Other studies were based on the background and conditions of China. 
Such studies led to analysis with greater depth and appropriate analysis, but were 
generally limited in the power and range of theoretical explanation. Research that 
combined the advantages of both groups were exceptional. On the other hand, Zhou’s 
review also argued that social institutional infrastructure (socialist ideology, cultural 
tradition, pluralistic ownership) and complicated reform paths (incremental, multi-
layer, multi-aspects) of China were unique, and providesd important opportunity for 
theoretical innovation.  
Studies that explicitly used historical institutionalism for China suggested 
different results: that its high degree of authoritarianism overruled path dependence--
in the case of health insurance reform in Shanghai (Luk, 2014); and that historical 
institutionalism worked well to explain important parts of the history of health policy 
in China--a significant element of continuity existed in health service delivery after 
the launch of major economic reform in 1978 (Huang, 2000), and somewhat 
contradictorily, in the case of the different fates of continuity of urban risk pooling and 
collapse of rural health risk pooling over the same period of economic reform (Duckett, 
2012). Lessons from these previous studies seem to be twofold. There are risks of 
projecting Western theoretical propositions on China’s potentially different realities, 
but also potential value of building upon the Western-origin theories to explain a 
phenomenon in a varied context with some common denominators. While using 
theories and methods derived from Western societies, research on China should 
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perhaps focus on the areas where parallels exist, and maintain enough sensitivity to 
the differences and anticipate the variations caused by such differences.  
2.7 Conclusions 
This final section summarizes the key points reviewed and highlights the gaps in 
knowledge.  
First, this chapter has reviewed the concepts related to the balance between 
primary and hospital care, as well as primary care. The two concepts were found to be 
strongly related to each other. Both concepts have multiple interpretations, and this 
thesis adopts a systems-level definition for both. 
Second, there is a lack of a systematic measurement tool for the balance between 
hospital and primary care providers. Existing measurements generally fall into two 
groups: structural measurements and functional measurements. 
Thirdly, evidence regarding effectiveness of gatekeeping in changing the balance 
between primary and hospital care is limited overall and concentrated in high-income 
countries. Studies on the effectiveness of gatekeeping and other policies to shift the 
balance between hospitals and primary care providers in China have been rare and of 
low quality. Gatekeeping involves various dimensions of complexity that requires 
more than a “simple” evaluation on average difference between outcomes. 
Finally, the review has identified three particularly promising analytical 
approaches and the gaps they can fill: impact evaluation to study the effectiveness of 
intervention, qualitative systems analysis to understand the intervention in a system, 
and path dependence analysis to understand the institutional constraints. These 
approaches are yet to be applied to the research question raised in the thesis, though 
their application in related fields suggests potentially significant value.   
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 Aims, objectives and 
overview of methods 
3.1 Aims and objectives 
The primary aim of this thesis is to understand how to strengthen primary care in 
China, by looking at the effectiveness and functioning of a gatekeeping pilot, and more 
broadly at the history of the balance between primary and hospital care, in order to 
contribute to policy development in China as well as other similar settings. Through 
applying a mix of health system research approaches (trend analysis, historical 
analysis, qualitative systems analysis and impact evaluation), a secondary aim of the 
thesis is to explore how mixed methods can be used to study a complex system-related 
issue.  
Building upon the findings from the literature review, the thesis developed the 
research aims into six objectives (see Table 3-1). The ordering of objectives follows a 
temporal logic, which seemed best suited to develop the argument and analysis through 
the thesis. Objective 1 and Objective 2 concern the history of the balance between 
primary and hospital care; Objectives 3 and 4 focus on a contemporary gatekeeping 
pilot, which was a pioneering gatekeeping pilot in China available for study. Objective 
2 and Objective 4 also provide qualitative explanations for the quantitative analysis in 
Objective 1 and Objective 3, respectively. Objectives 5 and 6 draw from the four sub-
studies to discuss methodological, substantive and policy implications.  
 
Table 3-1. Objectives and research approaches  
No. Objectives Research 
approaches 
Main corresponding 
chapters 
1 to describe the historical trend of the balance 
between hospitals and primary care providers in 
China 
Trend analysis Chapter 4 
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2 to understand the historical logic of the 
coevolution of hospitals and primary care 
providers in China 
Historical 
institutionalism 
Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 
3 to evaluate the effectiveness of a gatekeeping 
pilot in strengthening primary care functioning 
Impact evaluation Chapter 7 
4 to understand how gatekeeping functions in the 
pilot in the context of China’s recent reforms 
Qualitative 
systems analysis 
Chapter 8 
5 to discuss the overall findings of the four sub-
studies 
Drawing on 1-4 Chapter 9 
6 to identify lessons for the policies on shifting the 
balance between primary and hospital care in 
China and elsewhere 
Drawing on 1-5 Chapter 10 
 
3.2 Overview of methods 
The section provides an overview of the research approaches and methods used in 
the thesis to address each objective, while full methodological details are provided in 
corresponding chapters or parts. Each objective is dealt with using a specific research 
approach, except for the last two objectives (methodological reflection and policy 
implications) which draw from all other sub-studies (see Table 3-1).  
3.2.1 The overall study design  
Figure 3-1 is a graphical summary of how the four sub-studies constituted a multi-
approach study on the balance between primary and hospital care. The thesis addresses 
the conceptual complexity of the balance discussed in Chapter 2 by dividing the issues 
involved into three levels (shown on the left side of the diagram). The three levels of 
issues involved in shifting the balance between primary and hospital care include: an 
identifiable policy intervention (represented as the thinner oval); a contemporary 
system (represented as the wider oval) involving a broad range of inter-connected 
health systems factors directly or indirectly related to the intervention, the interaction 
among which can be captured in a cross-section; and a historical system (represented 
as the shape of a large arrow, with a shaded arrow below representing the underlying 
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axis of time), where temporal sequence is critical in setting a long term dynamic. The 
two ovals and the large arrow overlap and are linked with circular arrows in the 
diagram, reflecting the embeddedness of intervention in the contemporary system and 
the contemporary system in the historical system. The diagram represented the 
recognition that the three levels are closely interrelated and need to be investigated 
together to form a comprehensive assessment of the situation and future strategies. 
 
Figure 3-1. Summary of overall study design  
 
Having conceptualized shifting the balance between primary and hospital care as 
involving three levels, the thesis relied on four sub-studies to address the three levels 
(shown on the right side of the diagram), and two “integrative analyses” to synthesize 
findings of all sub-studies. The first sub-study (trend analysis) measured the changing 
structural and functional aspects of the balance to provide a background for the 
historical-institutionalist analysis. The second sub-study (historical-institutionalist 
analysis) tried to explain the historical evolution of the balance, drawing from the 
theoretical lens of path dependence theory, and treating factors involved in the 
coevolution of primary and hospital care over the long term as a historical system. The 
third sub-study (impact evaluation) investigated the effectiveness of the gatekeeping 
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pilot, seen as an intervention. The fourth sub-study (qualitative systems analysis) dealt 
with the functioning of the gatekeeping pilot, seen as a contemporary system. While 
the four sub-studies were conducted in parallel, the remaining two integrative analyses 
drew on the findings of all four sub-studies, focusing on their interconnectedness 
(represented by circular arrows) and reflected on the methodological significance, 
substantive findings and policy implications.  
3.2.2 Describing historical trends of the balance between primary and hospital 
care 
To address Objective 1, a descriptive study assessed the historical trend of the 
balance between primary and hospital care in China. Due to data availability issues, 
the period studied was limited to the years from 1949 to 2013. As a systematic way of 
measuring the balance between primary and hospital care did not exist, the sub-study 
built on the findings of the literature review in the previous chapter, and developed a 
system of metrics, involving 11 indicators, to measure the structural and functional 
domains of the balance. The structural domain included indicators on human resources, 
assets, equipment and infrastructure. The functional domain include indicators that 
measure service utilisation and revenue. Data for both hospitals and primary care 
facilities were sourced from official national health statistics, including a statistical 
report that covered the 40 years between 1949 and 1988, the series of national health 
yearbooks that covered the years between 1949 and 2008, and the series of national 
health statistical yearbooks that covered the year between 1949 and 2013. 
3.2.3 Analysing the historical logic of evolution of the balance between hospitals 
and primary care providers 
To address the second objective of understanding the historical logic of the 
coevolution of primary and hospital care in China, a historical-institutionalist sub-
study was conducted. The sub-study covered the years from 1835 to 2013, divided into 
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three periods segmented by 1949 and 1978. For the analysis, a dynamic path 
dependence analytical framework was developed, building on the critical juncture 
analysis approach (Capoccia, 2015). Data about main actors were collected from an 
extensive range of sources, including: relevant historical studies/accounts; official 
documentations of history; local archives; anthologies, biographies, and memoirs; 
journals and newspapers; and three propagandist paintings.  
3.2.4 Impact evaluation of the gatekeeping pilot 
To address Objective 3—evaluating the effectiveness of a pioneering gatekeeping 
pilot in shifting the balance between primary and hospital care, a difference-in-
differences study design was applied. This impact evaluation used the pilot townships 
as a treatment group and non-pilot townships as a control group and compared the 
different trends of key outcome variables both before and after the start of the pilot and 
across intervention and control areas. Claims and enrolment data were used in 
econometric analysis. The study covered a population of around 21,000 in 17 
townships, in the 12 quarters from 2012 to 2014. The sub-study was limited by the 
small scale: two small rural townships in a vast and varied country. 
3.2.5 Systems analysis of the functioning of the gatekeeping pilot 
To address Objective 4--understanding the functioning of the gatekeeping pilot, 
the thesis developed and used an approach of qualitative systems analysis, which 
combined a categorisation of health system building blocks, a qualitative method for 
policy analysis and causal loop analysis. Over two years (2014 and 2015) during the 
gatekeeping pilot programme, 20 stakeholders (including patients, doctors, facility 
managers and health administrators) were interviewed. The health systems 
categorisation was used to develop question guides for the interviews. The 
“Framework” approach of policy analysis was used to analyse the data from the field 
work. A causal loop diagram was drawn and used to assist the analysis and present the 
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results. Again, the sub-study was limited by the small scale of implementation. 
3.2.6 Ethics 
Ethical approval for this study (impact evaluation and qualitative systems analysis) 
was provided by the Institutional Review Board for Biomedical Ethics at Peking 
University (IRB00001052-14024-MIAN) and the Research Ethics Committee at the 
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (PR/123/123). 
3.3 Summary 
This chapter has laid out the aims and objectives, as well as the methodological 
framework of the thesis. The study design included four sub-studies, which constituted 
a contemporary evaluation of a pioneering gatekeeping pilot and a historical study of 
the development of the balance between hospitals and primary care providers in China. 
Chapter 9 and 10 will revisit methodological issues of this study design. 
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Part II  History 
 Historical trends (1949-
2013) 
4.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to describe the historical trend of the balance 
between hospitals and primary care providers in China using a comprehensive system 
of metrics. As data before 1949 were neither routinely nor consistently collected and 
reported, the chapter is limited to the years between 1949 and 2013. Section 4.2 
presents a brief introduction to the historical and contemporary health delivery system 
in China. Section 4.3 lays out the rationale and process for selecting indicators, the 
nature of the data, and the justification and data availability for each indicator. Section 
4.4 describes the trend regarding each indicator. Section 4.5 discusses the methods and 
results. The final section concludes with key findings as well as their implications. 
4.2 Background about the health delivery system in China  
This section provides a brief background regarding the history and current 
situation of the health delivery system in China, mainly since 1949 but also with brief 
reference to earlier periods. Figure 4-1 is an overview of the main types of health 
facility in 2013, which provides a basis to explain the evolving structure over history. 
It is noticeable that almost each level of government had health facilities under its 
direct supervision, and these were classified by the government as facilities “under the 
health sector” as reflected in government statistical reports (Ministry of Health, 1989; 
National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2014). In other words, local 
territorial governments rather than a centralized health ministry ran health facilities. 
Besides, industrial sectors, collectives and other sectors also ran their own facilities 
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(classified as non-health sectors). The effects of such a structure will be revisited in 
later chapters.  
The health service providers consisted of the public health delivery system (shown 
with green background) and the medical care delivery system (shown with blue 
background). The two sub-systems converged at the primary care level, with primary 
care providers providing a mixture of public health and medical care services. Within 
the public health delivery system, there was a national system of centres for disease 
prevention and control (CDCs). The local CDCs used to be epidemic control stations 
and were restructured in the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 
2002, when the country’s Academy of Preventive Medicine became the national CDC 
(Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2012). Correspondingly, there was a 
nation-wide system of maternal and child health centres (MCH centres), except that 
the national centre for maternal and child health was a department under the national 
CDC. The precursors of CDCs and MCH centres were established nation-wide by the 
1950s. Some of these public health facilities might also provide specialized medical 
services (birth delivery, treatment for tuberculosis, etc.) and might have a simultaneous 
title of hospitals and are reported here as hospitals in such circumstances. In the post-
1949 Chinese health delivery system, Chinese medicine (i.e. traditional Chinese 
medicine) and biomedicine (i.e. Western medicine) are integrated at the facility level. 
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Figure 4-1. Main types of health service providers in China in 2013  
Note:  
a) CDC=Centre for disease prevention and control;  
b) MCH=Maternal and child health. 
c) The horizontal dash line represents the division between hospitals and primary care facilities. 
d) The vertical dashed line represents the division between rural and urban medical care delivery. 
e) Sub-district health centres were not shown in the graph due to limited space and their small role. 
f) The areas with blue slashed shading represent the medical care delivery system; the areas with the 
green dotted shading represent the public health delivery system; and the area with orange horizontal 
line shading represents the government hierarchy.  
The medical care delivery system in 2013 consisted of various levels of hospitals 
and primary care facilities. The categorical division between hospitals and primary 
care facilities here is based mainly on the current categorization of facilities by policy-
makers and official statistical reports (National Health and Family Planning 
Commission, 2014). The root of this distinction, however, goes back for at least eight 
decades. As Chapter 5 will further describe, a nation-wide county-based regional 
health delivery network had been advocated as a national policy around the 1930s to 
provide wide coverage of health services. The structure was fleshed out and evolved 
over the decades, while the centre of this structure in each region was always a county 
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hospital5. Two levels of facilities extended resources and services beyond the county-
seat and reached out to sub-county territorial units, i.e. townships/communes and 
villages. The medical services facilities at the three levels of county, township and 
village, along with the county MCH centres and CDCs, formed the rural health 
delivery system. A parallel urban system consisted of district hospitals as counterparts 
of county hospitals, and community health centres and stations as counterparts of 
township health centres and village clinics. The urban system also included three 
higher territorial levels of hospitals (i.e. municipal, provincial and ministerial), and 
other hospitals beyond the health sector. This organisational division between hospitals 
at county level (and above) and primary care at sub-county levels was established in 
the 1950s in official policy documents that specified sub-county/sub-district facilities 
as “grassroots health organisations” (jiceng weisheng zuzhi基层卫生组织) (Ministry 
of Health, 1957a). Categorization of health facilities including hospitals and primary 
care facilities was done in the statistical reports according to the types of facility 
registered (Ministry of Health, 1994b; National Health and Family Planning 
Commission, 2014). In reality, the two categories of facilities provided an overlapping 
range of services. This will be a repeating theme of this and following chapters. Figure 
4-2 provides the number of hospitals and primary care facilities in China between 1949 
and 2013.  
                                                 
5 In fact, county hospitals were initially established as county health centres, which incorporated public health 
services and administration in a county-level regional referral hospital. The county health centres later split into 
county hospitals and county epidemic prevention stations (Ministry of Health, 1956a). 
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Figure 4-2. Number of hospitals and primary care facilities in China (1949-2013) 
Data sources: (Ministry of Health, 1989; National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2014) 
Note:  
a) Number of primary care facilities before 2000 was calculated by summing up numbers of all types 
of primary care providers with available data. The number of village clinics was not reported until 1981.  
b) A log scale is used for the Y axis in this diagram. 
   
4.2.1 Hospitals  
After 1949, the state took over mission hospitals and built new public hospitals; 
industrial and other sectors (mainly factories), collectives and individuals also set up 
their own hospitals. The meaning of hospitals in official statistical reports also changed 
over the years. Statistical reports about hospitals published up to 1997 (including data 
up to 1996) included township and sub-district health centres; after 1997, township 
and sub-district health centres were separately reported (Ministry of Health, 1996, 
1997). The analysis here either used later sources that adopted the post-1997 
classification, or used data for only the hospitals at or above the level of county if 
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reclassified data were not available. 
Since the 1990s, hospitals have been classified, according to their technical 
capacity, into hospitals at primary level, secondary level, tertiary level and unassigned 
level. Starting from 2,600 in 1949, the number of hospitals increased steadily over the 
decades and reached 24,709 in 2013 (see Figure 4-2). Among all hospitals, the tertiary 
and secondary hospitals are the most important, as they jointly provided more than 80% 
of all hospitalisations in 2013. In the same year, there were 1,787 tertiary hospitals, 
generally consisting of ministerial, provincial and municipal hospitals, and teaching 
hospitals of medical colleges. There were 6,709 secondary hospitals, mainly consisting 
of county and district level hospitals (including traditional Chinese medicine hospitals). 
Although the hospitals (particularly the secondary and tertiary hospitals) were 
supposed to be referral hospitals that received only complicated cases, patients 
generally had direct access to hospitals. Hospitals also provide a significant amount of 
ambulatory services (a point elaborated in later sections). 
4.2.2 Primary care providers 
The primary care facilities/providers in China have always been a pluralistic group 
of providers. In recent national health statistical reports (from 2010), the term 
“grassroots health care facilities” (jiceng yiliao weisheng jigou基层医疗卫生机构) 
was used for the first time in national health (statistics) yearbooks to describe the 
categories of primary care providers (Ministry of Health, 2011). Those primary care 
facilities under government sponsorship are “grassroots public health care institutions” 
(jiceng yiliao weisheng shiyan danwei基层医疗卫生事业单位) (Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security, 2009). These public facilities have been the main target 
of government policies on primary care and are spread around the urban and rural 
communities of the country. The study here used the contemporary definition of the 
term primary care facilities to refer to the types of provider that have been 
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retrospectively identified as primary care providers.  
In 2013, the primary care facilities included township health centres and village 
clinics in rural areas, community health service centres and stations in urban areas, 
sub-district health centres, as well as other clinics (as these clinics were mostly private, 
they are referred to in the chapter as private clinics). Being the foundation for both the 
public health delivery system and the medical care delivery system, they provided the 
community-level work related to health education, preventive services, rehabilitation, 
family planning and treatment of common and prevalent illnesses (including a 
significant amount of inpatient services) (National Health and Family Planning 
Commission, 2014). 
The reported number of primary care facilities grew from 769 in 1949 to 0.9 
million in 2013. As shown in Figure 4-2, the increase was driven first by the rising 
number of clinics in the 1950s along with the organization of “united clinics” and then 
the inclusion of village clinics in 1985, when the number of primary care facilities 
reached almost 0.8 million. A nation-wide network of rural facilities similar to that of 
today came into being in the late 1950s with the emergence of commune health centres, 
and in the late 1960s with the popularization of barefoot doctors. In 1958, there were 
43,579 commune health centres (shown as township health centres in Figure 4-2 and 
the remainder of the text and all graphic representations in the chapter), in addition to 
132,894 private clinics (including united clinics and solo practices). After a decade-
long fluctuation, the number of commune health centres reached 50,341 in 1968. 
Commune health centres were reorganized as township health centres soon after 1978, 
and their number remained generally stable until 2001. Since then, the number of 
township health centres has declined and reached 37 thousand in 2013 (Ministry of 
Health, 1989; National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2014). In regard to 
village clinics, data were not available before 1985. Their number dropped from 0.8 
million in 1985 to 0.6 million in 2013 (Ministry of Health, 1989; National Health and 
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Family Planning Commission, 2014). 
Urban primary care facilities consisted of private or united clinics immediately 
after 1949, as mentioned above. Sub-district health centres (not shown in Figure 4-1) 
were formed during the 1950s (Ministry of Health, 1989). The number of sub-district 
health centres was small and increased from 446 in 1996, when first reported, to 593 
in 2013. Community health centres and stations came into being around the beginning 
of the 21th Century (Bhattacharyya et al., 2011). Community health centres were the 
urban equivalent of township health centres, and community health stations were 
generally outreach facilities of community health centres. The total number of 
community health centres and stations was 8,211 in 2002 (when the number was first 
reported) and reached 33,965 in 2013.  
4.3 Methods  
Metrics involving multiple indicators were developed and used to measure the 
balance of care in China between 1949 and 2013. This section explains the overall 
rationale and process of selecting and categorizing these indicators, the sources and 
nature of data, and finally the justification for all indicators and operational decisions. 
4.3.1 Overall rationale for developing the metrics 
Based on the findings from the literature review and conceptual discussions in 
Chapter 2, the two domains of functional and structural balance between primary and 
hospital care were established. Under each domain, sub-domains were developed, with 
corresponding indicators chosen for each sub-domain. The structural domain 
concerned with human capital and physical capital, each comprising an independent 
sub-domain. The functional domain concerned with service utilisation and financing, 
each comprising an independent sub-domain. The criteria for selecting indicators were 
that the indicators could reflect the nature of sub-domains and were available for 
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sufficiently long periods to allow meaningful analysis over time. The process of 
selection was iterative and resulted in multiple indicators under each of four sub-
domains shown in Table 4-1. The table also shows the sources and years for which 
data were available.  
Before getting into the details, one has to admit that no systematic measurement 
of the balance between hospitals and primary care providers over a long period of time 
can be satisfactory. First, the boundaries between hospitals and primary care providers 
were not always straightforward. This has been reflected in the literature review (in 
Section 2.3) on the various and overlapping definitions of primary care. The metrics 
used a level of care as the unit of analysis, zooming out and seeing primary care 
facilities and hospitals each as a whole, rather than zooming in and focusing on the 
margins of care. However, there could still be multiple approaches to operationalize 
the boundaries between the two levels of care. What the analysis needed to achieve 
was a feasible measurement with policy implications. 
Second, besides the issue of debatable boundaries, both primary care providers 
and hospitals involved a complex range of facilities. By categorizing these facilities 
into two sectors the variation within each category was lost. Furthermore, the value of 
each indicator would also be affected by the changing availability of data. Hence, the 
analysis included data on sub-groups of facilities when possible to allow greater 
flexibility and to capture some important details. 
Third, in relation to the debatable boundaries between hospitals and primary care 
providers, there was an inherent challenge related to the coexistence of similarities and 
differences between hospitals and primary care providers in the context of China, in 
terms of both the resources they utilised and the services they delivered. These 
similarities and differences challenged quantification of various dimensions of the 
balance between hospitals and primary care providers. As mentioned earlier, primary 
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care facilities and hospitals provided a significantly overlapping range of services. 
While primary care facilities provided inpatient services, hospitals provided a large 
proportion of ambulatory care. On the other hand, there were also quite substantial 
differences between the two sectors. Hospitals provided to a greater extent inpatient 
services and used technologies (including devices) much more intensively. Even for 
similar categories of services, medical treatment provided in different types of 
facilities was of a potentially very different nature. While some indicators may be less 
specific to one type of facility (e.g. financial resources), others would unavoidably be 
more so (e.g. beds), owing to the different nature of facilities at different levels of care. 
However, without a detailed look at these less generic indicators across different levels 
of care, one would lose the ability to appreciate fully the various details and 
dimensions of the balance between them. 
Fourth, the temporal dimension also influences both the mixture of resources and 
functions and the composition of facilities themselves. While developing the indicators 
systematically, the study also tried to reflect the issue of the balance between hospitals 
and primary care providers comprehensively in the historical context of China. When 
considered appropriate, the study used multiple indicators for one sub-domain, as well 
as multiple ways of measuring one indicator occasionally, though this did not solve all 
issues. However, simply making the measurement more flexible and complicated 
could not solve all the issues. While a marginal analysis might generate useful 
information for short-term policy modification and resource planning, it would not 
allow the analysis of overall structure and functional balance needed to understand an 
entire level of care. As the margins changed all the time, a narrow focus on marginal 
areas would fragment the analysis and make it difficult if not impossible to appreciate 
the long-term evolution of the health delivery system. A further problem about 
measuring the balance between the primary care providers and hospitals over a long 
time was the lack of continuous reporting of data, particularly in the earlier periods. 
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Fifth, the diversity of China means that any measurement at national level has 
little to say about local situations. The huge variations between coastal and western 
landlocked areas and between urban and rural areas would be inevitably missed in 
measurement at the national level.  
The next sub-section concerns the methodological issues related to the data used 
in this chapter.  
4.3.2  Data 
All data used in this chapter came from official sources and were at national level. 
Data sources consisted of Health Statistics information in China 1949-1988, the 
statistical sections of China Health Yearbooks (published annually from 1983 to 
2008—when the collection of the series ended), China Health Statistical Yearbooks 
(published annually from 2003 to 2012), and China Health and Family Planning 
Statistical Yearbooks (published in 2013 and 2014). All these sources were published 
by the Ministry of Health (National Health and Family Planning Commission). As the 
data were officially collected and reported, the way of reporting seemed to have been 
influenced by the historical changes of policies (and the emphases of policies during 
particular periods). The changes affected the availability of data and influenced the 
selection of indicators as well as reporting of their values. Two issues were particularly 
of concern. 
One issue concerned the changes in the items of data reported. This sub-study 
covered 64 years of dynamic changes in China’s health system. The Ministry of Health 
(and the later National Health and Family Planning Commission) did not collect and 
report all indicators for all years. For instance, financial information of health facilities 
was rarely reported (and in an inconsistent way when reported at all) before 2004. 
When necessary, substitute indicators for earlier periods were used along with 
necessary cut-offs between periods to make comparisons meaningful.  
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Another issue concerned the selection of types of facilities for reporting under 
primary care facilities. This issue was related to the pluralistic nature of health facilities 
in China mentioned above, as well as changes in categorization and reporting. As 
Section 4.2 has mentioned, the official term for primary care providers did not appear 
in national statistical reports until well into the first decade of the 21st Century. 
Therefore, the study here reconstructed the total number of primary care facilities 
based on reports about a range of providers that were retrospectively identified as 
primary care providers. As not all items of statistics were available for all types of 
facilities in all years, both the total of primary care facilities and their breakdown 
provide useful information and were included as much as possible. As the total 
information in earlier years were constructed by summing up available types of 
primary care facilities, a break sign (“//”) is added to the series with changed 
composition of types of facilities and indicate where the changes of composition take 
place. These issues are revisited in the interpretation of results in Section 4.4. 
A third issue was that indicators need to reflect the development of the quality of 
health system resources. For example, the indicators of quality of human resources 
needed to reflect the significant improvement of educational level between 1949 and 
2013. 
The original data came in various forms: paper-based books, electronic books, on-
line documents, scanned images, and Excel spreadsheets. Data were entered into a 
Microsoft 2013 Excel document and checked by the author with assistance from two 
Chinese master students in public health at Peking University. When data were 
available for the indicators for the specific types of facilities, they were directly 
harvested. However, as reporting about certain categories of facilities changed, 
original data of separated items were aggregated. Simulated values were used on one 
occasion, which will be noted in the results section. 
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4.3.3 Justification for indicators and their operational definitions 
Table 4-1 provides the list of all the indicators selected. The table also shows the 
sources and years for which data were available. 
Table 4-1. Indicators of structural and functional balance between primary and 
hospital care 
Domain Sub-domain Indicator Sources of data Available years 
Structure Human 
resources 
1.1 Number of staff 40YR, CHY (1990-2002), 
CHSY (2003-2014) 
1949-2013 
1.2 Qualification of 
health practitioners 
40YR, CHY (1990-2002), 
CHSY (2003-2014) 
1952-1988, 
2002-2013 
1.3 Average annual 
income of staff 
40YR, CHY (1990-2002), 
CHSY (2003-2014) 
2005-2013 
Assets, 
equipment and 
infrastructure 
2.1 Value of assets CHSY (2005-2014) 2004-2013 
2.2 Number of beds 40YR, CHSY (2003-2014) 1949-2013 
2.3 Number of valuable 
devices 
CHSY (2004-2014) 2003-2013 
2.4 Building space CHY 1991, CHSY (2004-
2014) 
1989, 2002-
2013 
Function Service 
utilisation 
3.1 Number of visits 40YR, CHSY (2003-2014) 1981-2013 
3.2 Number of 
admissions 
40YR, CHSY (2003-2014) 1981-2013 
3.3 Visits to admissions 
ratio 
40YR, CHSY (2003-2014) 1981-2013 
Financing 4.1 Revenues CHY (1997-2004), CHSY 
(2004-2014) 
2004-2013 
Notes: 40YR = Health Statistics Information in China (1949-1988); CHY = Chinese Health Yearbook; 
CHSY = Chinese Health Statistics Yearbook 
1) Indicators for human resources  
Human resources are a critical factor within the structural domain and featured 
prominently in previous studies (see Chapter 2). Under the sub-domain of “human 
resources”, indicators were selected to reflect the quantity and quality of staff. 
x Indicator 1.1: Number of staff 
Measuring quantity of staff involves the issue of the pluralistic nature of human 
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resources. While both total number of staff and number of selected types of staff 
(particularly doctors) provide useful information, data availability for the latter was 
more limited. Therefore, I decided to use the total number of staff for all types of 
facilities between 1949 and 2013. Availability of data for certain types of facilities was 
also restricted (see Figure 4-3). For total staff number of all hospitals, data were 
available only for the period between 1984 and 2013 and the sum of staff numbers of 
hospitals above the level of county under the government health sector and county 
hospitals were used for the years before 1984, implying underestimation of the number 
of hospital staff. It should be noted that each staff member was counted as one without 
distinguishing the proportion of time they spend working as health practitioners, as 
such data were not available. In particular, village health workers (barefoot doctors 
and health personnel) were supposed to participate in collective agricultural work 
besides health work. Hence, this measure could give an exaggerated impression 
regarding certain groups of practitioners who normally worked part time (particularly 
barefoot doctors). 
x Indicator 1.2: Qualification of health practitioners 
Measuring quality of staff involves again the issue of the plural nature of human 
resources, and there are also different ways to measure the quality of health 
practitioners. First, it was possible to compare both health practitioners of a specific 
type and health practitioners as a whole. Since comparison of the qualification of staff 
across the board could be difficult to interpret, it seemed reasonable to confine the 
analysis to doctors only, as they were the key decision makers in clinical care. Second, 
it is possible to compare the level of qualification using different criteria. There were 
two types of qualifications, namely professional qualifications and academic 
qualifications.  
Two systems of professional qualification existed during the past decades in China, 
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namely, a system of technical qualification (zhicheng 职称) and a system of licensing 
(zhizhao 执照). A policy document issued in 1956 clarified health professionals into 
three main grades of technical qualification. Correspondingly, three professional titles 
were given for each grade of practitioners: shi (师 , roughly translated as a 
“professional”) corresponded to high grade practitioners, shi (士, roughly translated as 
a “practitioner”) corresponded to middle grade practitioners, and yuan (员, roughly 
translated as “personnel”) corresponded to primary (i.e. low) grade practitioners 
(Ministry of Health, 1956b). The grading system reflected professional competence, 
generally a combination of academic achievement and work experience. Hence, the 
proportion of “professionals” was a good indicator of the quality of doctors. This 
regulation was revised in 1986, when the qualification system changed. From then on, 
the high grade corresponded to chief (or deputy chief) professionals, the middle grade 
corresponded to executive professionals, and the primary grade corresponded to 
(general) professionals and practitioners (Ministry of Health, 1986b). The change 
probably reflected the improvement in training of health practitioners in the country. 
However, it also meant that the proportion of “professionals” became less useful as an 
indicator of quality of staff, because both could be with a lower level of training.  
The percentage of professional doctors among all practitioners was thus a useful 
measurement of quality for the periods between the 1950s and 1980s. However, 
statistics on human resources were generally reported as either in urban or rural areas 
(i.e. within urban districts or rural counties), and were not distinguishable by hospitals 
and primary care facilities except for within rural areas only. As a result, two 
alternative methods were used for these years. The first method used urban facilities 
to represent hospitals, and rural facilities to represent primary care facilities. The 
rationale was that urban hospitals were the predominant health facilities in urban areas 
in terms of human resources, while primary care facilities dominated the rural areas. 
The other alternative method looked only at rural hospitals (county hospitals) and rural 
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primary care facilities. For both methods, data were available for the years between 
1952 and 1988. Except for a negligible fraction of professional doctors practising 
integrated Chinese and Western medicine in the 1980s, professional doctors practising 
Western medicine were the only professional practitioners (the total of practitioners 
could be practising Chinese medicine, Western medicine or integrated Chinese and 
Western medicine). Hence this measurement reflected the quality of doctors mainly 
from the perspective of biomedicine.  
An alternative way to measure professional qualification was related to the 
licences each level of doctor held. Various types of licences allowed different ranges 
(types and locations) of services. Available data on licences were restricted to more 
recent years (2002-2013). Above the level of village, doctors were required after 1992 
to have a licence or assistant licence in order to practice (Ministry of Health, 1993).  
Besides professional qualifications, there were academic qualifications, i.e. the 
level of educational qualification (e.g. secondary schools or university degrees). Data 
regarding educational level were also not available until recently (for selected years 
between 2002 and 2013). Therefore, the qualification of health practitioners between 
1989 and 2013 was operationalized as the percentage of professional grade doctors 
among all practitioners; percentage of practitioners with full practicing licenses; and 
percentage of practitioners with university degrees. Unfortunately, data about both 
percentage of professional doctors and percentage of practitioners with university 
degrees were unavailable for the years between 1989 and 2001.  
x Indicator 1.3: Average annual income of staff 
Earnings of primary care professionals as compared with specialists has been used 
as an indicator for the orientation of a health system towards primary care by Starfield 
(1994). Such data, however, were not routinely collected. Instead, national statistics 
available to the study reported the annual spending on staff (combining salary, bonus, 
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etc.) in various types of health facility between 2004 and 2013. This information could 
be used together with the information about the number of staff in each type of health 
facility to calculate average income. The income was adjusted for inflation using the 
price level of 2000 (see Appendix Table 1). 
2) Indicators for assets, equipment and infrastructure 
Assets not only are an important indicator of accumulated inputs but also represent 
the physical capacity of health facilities to provide services. The value of assets 
provides a representation of the overall non-human capital of a particular type of 
facility. Such factors have been particularly important in the historical and 
contemporary balance between primary and hospital care in China. As both primary 
care facilities and hospitals provided inpatient services, inpatient beds were important 
assets. Involvement in hospitalization-based services has been considered an important 
opportunity to improve doctors’ clinical experience and competence (Honigsbaum, 
1979). Similarly, equipment and infrastructure are important conditions for doctors 
and other health practitioners to expand clinical service capacity. As facilities generally 
did not share devices and infrastructure with each other, an important aspect of 
technical capacity of facilities was the possession of valuable devices (including 
diagnostic and other devices). As building space is an important measurement of the 
infrastructure of facilities, and the only one for which data were available, it was 
selected as an indicator for infrastructure. 
These indicators of non-human capital arguably favour hospitals 
disproportionately and imbalance in such factors is expected. Nevertheless, including 
non-human capital serves to balance the bias towards primary care when only human 
resources are concerned. Hence, under the sub-domain of “assets, equipment and 
infrastructure”, four indicators were chosen regarding the value of assets, number of 
beds, number of valuable devices, and building space. Except for the number of beds, 
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the data under this sub-domain were available only for the recent decade. 
x Indicator 2.1: Value of assets 
Data were available for the years between 2004 and 2013 for hospitals and primary 
care facilities (with a break down consisting of township health centres, community 
health centres and stations, sub-district health centres and private clinics). The value 
of assets was adjusted for inflation using the price level of 2000. 
x Indicator 2.2: Number of beds 
The number of beds were reported for hospitals, township health centres, and 
community health centres and stations. While data for hospitals were available from 
1949 onwards, data for township health centres and community health centres and 
stations were available only for the period after these types of facility became popular 
(i.e. from 1959 and from 2002, respectively).  
x Indicator 2.3: Number of valuable devices 
The total value of all devices above 10,000 yuan (price unadjusted) was used as 
the indicator of possession of high-value devices. Data were available for the period 
between 2003 and 2013 for hospitals, primary care facilities as a whole, and township 
health centres. An alternative measure was the number of all devices valued above 10 
thousand yuan each. However, data for this covered only the years between 2007 and 
2013, and the value of each device for inflation could not be adjusted. Therefore, the 
number of devices with value above 10,000 yuan at the price level of corresponding 
years was used.  
x Indicator 2.4: Building space 
The working definition for the indicator is the total construction space of all 
buildings (including rented space) under each type of facility. Data were reported for 
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hospitals, township health centres, village clinics and community health centres 
(stations), sub-district health centres, and private clinics, first in 1988 and then 
generally continuously between 2003 and 2013.  
3) Indicators for service utilisation 
The sub-domain of service utilisation consisted of three indicators, namely, 
number of visits, number of admissions, and visits to admissions ratio. Patient visits 
(consisting overwhelmingly of ambulatory patient visits, but also including emergency 
care, home visit, health check-up, and health consulting) were a key indicator of 
services utilized by patients in both hospitals and primary care facilities. Changing 
proportions and absolute number of visits reflected the change in the functional role 
of a particular level/type of facilities. Inpatient services had been a significant function 
of primary care facilities in China as mentioned above. Township health centres, 
particularly, had been a significant provider of inpatient services. It should be expected 
though that the nature and severity of inpatient services would be different between 
hospitals and primary care facilities, but such data were not available. Therefore, the 
numbers regarding service utilisation were not adjusted for changes in population, as 
different population groups (particularly rural vs urban residents) appeared to be using 
different types of facility at varied frequencies.  
x Indicator 3.1: Number of visits  
Annual patient visits were used to measure number of visits. Data availability for 
different types of facility varied. While the number of visits was reported for hospitals 
as early as in 1952, the number of visits to township health centres was not available 
before 1981. Comparison between 1952 and 1980 was not meaningful and therefore 
omitted. Visits to village health clinics and to community health centres and stations 
were reported from only 2003/2004 onwards. 
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x Indicator 3.2: Number of admissions 
The operational definition for the indicator of inpatient services was the number 
of hospitalisations at hospitals and township health centres from 1981 to 2013. Data 
for the years before 1981 were dropped from the analysis, because admissions to 
hospitals only were reported. 
x Indicator 3.3: Visits to admissions ratio 
The visits to admissions ratio measured the number of ambulatory visits per 
inpatient for each type of facility. This indicator reflects the overall trend regarding 
balance of outpatient and inpatient care in hospitals and primary care facilities between 
1981 and 2013. Among primary care facilities, data were available only for township 
health centres between 1981 and 2003. Data for other primary care facilities were 
included only between 2003 and 2013.  
4) Indicators for financing 
Chapter 2 suggested that resource allocation was an important measure of the 
functional balance that has featured in previous studies. Here total revenue of facilities 
was used as an indicator to reflect the resources utilised for patient services. Revenue 
also complemented indicators on quantity of services as a better reflection of service 
function in terms of intensity of services from a financial perspective. 
x Indicator 4.1: total revenue 
Total revenue measures the annual total amount of revenue of health facilities. 
Data for total revenue by type of facility were reported for 2004 and 2013. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Human resources 
The study selected and analysed three indicators to reflect the balance between 
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hospitals and primary care facilities in terms of human resources (see Figure 4-3). 
1) Indicator 1.1: Number of staff 
As mentioned in Section 4.3, the situation of human resources was complicated 
over the period from 1949 to 2013, and influenced by inconsistent reporting of data. 
The analysis here is segmented by 1984/1985, after which data become more available. 
Over the first three decades or so, the number of staff at hospitals (represented by 
hospitals under the government health sector, for which data were available) grew 
steadily from 0.1 million in 1952 to 1.97 million in 1984. Among primary care 
facilities, the number of staff at township health centres amounted to 0.39 million in 
1958 and then decreased to 0.25 million in 1965. When data about the staff of township 
health centres became available once again in 1972, their number had jumped up by 
three times, to 0.75 million. Data for staff number of village clinics became available 
from 1970 with the rise of barefoot doctors. The number of village clinic staff (mainly 
barefoot doctors around this time) fluctuated around 5 million before decreasing by 
half to 2.4 million in 1984. Due to the overwhelming number of barefoot doctors, the 
trend of primary care staff generally followed the trend of village clinic staff from 1970 
to 1984. 
Since 1984, both hospitals and primary care facilities have seen significant 
development in the number of staff. The total number of hospital staff increased 
significantly from 2 million in 1984 to 5.4 million in 2013, by 2.7 times. Amongst 
these three decades, the growth was slowest in the second decade (1994-2003) and 
fastest in the last decade (2004-2013). The number of primary care staff rose from a 
similar starting point at 2.2 million in 1984 to 3.5 million in 2013, by 1.6 times. Growth 
of total primary care staff number was generally less significant compared to hospitals. 
Rapid growth of total primary care staff numbers happened only between 2003 and 
2010 and with smaller magnitude compared to the growth of hospitals during these 
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years.  
The breakdown of primary care facilities showed a generally stagnant situation of 
staff numbers at township health centres and private clinics, when compared to 
hospitals. Staff numbers grew from 1 million in 1984 to 1.2 million in 2013 in township 
health centres, and remained stable at 0.4 million in private clinics between 2003 and 
2013 (data were not available before 2003). The staff numbers of village clinics 
reduced by half almost overnight, from to 2.4 million in 1984 to 1.3 million in 1985. 
The decline reflected a reclassification of barefoot doctors and health personnel. In 
1985, barefoot doctors were required to take an examination, about half who passed 
were certified as village doctors. The other half became the post-1985 village health 
personnel. Former (i.e. pre-1985) village health workers were no longer included in 
the statistics after 1985, though it was not clear how many of them continued to work 
on village health activities. The number of village clinic staff reduced further to 1 
million in 2013. The only types of facility that saw significant growth in staff numbers 
were the nascent community health centres and stations whose number of staff grew 
from 0.1 million in 2004 to 0.5 million in 2013, by 5 times. Overall, staff were 
increasingly concentrated in hospitals, with the proportion of staff in hospitals rising 
from 48% in 1985 to 60% in 2013. 
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Figure 4-3. Number of staff at hospitals and primary care facilities (1952-2013) 
Data sources: (Ministry of Health, 1985a, 1986a, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990a, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994a, 
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012; National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2013, 2014) 
Note:  
a) Number of staff at all hospitals in the years between 1952 and 1985 were not available. For these 
years, sum of numbers for hospitals above the level of county under the government health sector 
and county hospitals is shown. Hence, hospital staff under industrial and other sectors were not 
included. The sharp increase of hospital staff in 1985 reflected the inclusion of staff of these hospitals. 
b) Number of staff at all primary care facilities was not available for years before 2011. For these years, 
sum of numbers for all types of primary care facilities with available data is shown. 
 
2) Indicator 1.2: Qualification of health practitioners 
The trend in the qualification of health practitioners revealed long-lasting gaps 
between hospitals and primary care facilities, which were still widening up to 2013. 
As mentioned in Section 4.3, data about doctors’ qualifications by level of care (or 
types of health facility) were not available until the 2000s. The sub-study used two 
alternative measurements for this period. First, the proportion of professional doctors 
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between urban areas and rural areas was compared, and the number for urban areas 
was used to represent the hospital sector, while the number for rural areas was used to 
represent the primary care sector. Then, the proportion of professional doctors between 
rural hospitals (i.e. county hospitals) and rural primary care facilities was compared. 
Figure 4-4 presents professional doctors as a proportion of all practitioners. 
Professional doctors accounted for 39% of all practitioners in urban facilities and 6% 
in rural facilities in 1952. The percentages remained at 41% in urban areas and 7% in 
rural areas by 1962. The next decade saw the percentage increase in urban areas to 50% 
in 1972, and more rapidly in rural areas rising to 25% in 1972. By 1985, just before 
the qualification system changed in 1986, percentage of professionals reached 55% in 
urban areas and 30% in rural areas. The final year saw a jump in both urban and rural 
areas, however, it probably reflected the change of qualification system more than the 
qualification of staff. 
 
Figure 4-4. Percentage of professional doctors in all practitioners in urban and rural 
health facilities (1952-1988)  
Data sources: (Ministry of Health, 1989) 
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Note: Data for village doctors (or barefoot doctors before 1985) were not available for the period 
before 1970. 
 
A similar situation is observed when only rural hospitals and primary care 
facilities were assessed (see Figure 4-5). There was a fluctuation in the percentage of 
professionals in county hospitals during the decade between 1952 and 1962, which 
was likely caused by the increased allocation of middle grade (practitioner-level) 
practitioners before 1958, and increased allocation of high grade (professional-level) 
practitioners after 1958, in county hospitals. Overall, the percentage of professionals 
in county hospital doctors increased slightly from 48% in 1952 to 52% in 1978, and 
further increased to around 60% in 1986. The percentage of professional doctors at 
primary care facilities (mainly township health centres) increased from around 5% 
between 1952 and 1965 significantly over the decade between 1966 and 1975 to 18% 
and slightly increased to 23% by 1986. When barefoot/village doctors were included, 
percentage of professionals among doctors in primary care facilities dropped to below 
10% between 1975 and 1986, varying between 2% and 7%. In other words, the 
emergence of barefoot doctors significantly diluted the percentage of professionals 
among all rural doctors by about 16 percentage points. Overall, the gap between the 
proportions of professionals among doctors in county hospitals and rural primary care 
facilities over the three decades or so varied between 25 and 34 or 50 percentage points, 
depending on whether village doctors were excluded or not.  
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Figure 4-5. Percentage of professional doctors in all doctors in rural primary care 
facilities and county hospitals (selected years between 1952 and 1988) 
Data sources: (Ministry of Health, 1989) 
Note: Data for village doctors (or barefoot doctors before 1985) were not available for the period 
before 1970. Percentage of professionals in doctors in rural primary care facilities was calculated as 
the total number of primary care professionals (i.e. total rural professionals minus county hospital 
professionals) divided by the total number of primary care doctors (i.e. total rural doctors, with or 
without village doctors, minus county hospital doctors) 
 
For the period between 2002 and 2013, the proportion of doctors with a full licence 
was used. The results are shown in Figure 4-6. Hospitals saw their percentage of fully 
licenced doctors rose steadily from 88% in 2002 to 93% in 2013. The percentage of 
fully licenced doctors at primary care facilities excluding village clinics increased 
steadily from 69% in 2002 to 74% in 2013. The percentage of fully licenced doctors 
at primary care facilities including village clinics remained stagnant over the period, 
and reduced slightly from 35% in 2002 to 34% in 2013. Between 2002 and 2013, the 
percentage rose from 78% to 80% at community health centres and stations, and from 
77% to 84% at private clinics. Other facilities saw the percentage of fully licenced 
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doctors slightly dropping over the same period: sub-district health centres, from 67% 
to 66%; township health centres, from 61% to 58%; and village clinics, from 7% to 
5%. 
 
Figure 4-6. Percentage of fully licenced doctors in all doctors at various types of health 
facilities (2002-2013)  
Data sources: (Ministry of Health, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; 
National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2013, 2014) 
Note:  
a) Data for village clinics for the years between 2002 and 2009 were projected based on data for the 
years between 2010 and 2013 for village clinics, assuming a continuous trend. 
b) Values for primary care facilities were calculated both including and excluding the village clinics. 
 
As mentioned earlier, a large proportion of doctors in China did not have a college 
degree. After 2002, an increasing proportion of doctors had full medical training, but 
many practitioners still had only 3-year associate degrees, or graduated from even 
shorter training programmes. As shown in Figure 4-7, the percentage of doctors with 
university degrees was 43% in hospitals in 2002. Over the years it grew rapidly, and 
reached 66% by 2013. In contrast, staff members with university degrees accounted 
for a very small share of township health centre staff, from 3% in 2002 to 9% in 2013. 
The staff quality of community health centres improved, as reflected in the increase in 
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the proportion of staff members with a college degree from 32% to 37% between 2010 
and 2013, though this still lagged far behind that of hospitals.6  
 
Figure 4-7. Percentage of health professionals with a university degree in selected years 
between 2002 and 2013 
Data sources: (Ministry of Health, 2005, 2009, 2011; National Health and Family Planning Commission, 
2013, 2014) 
Note: Data are not available for community health centres in 2002 and 2005, and not available for all 
years for community health stations. 
 
When Figure 4-4, Figure 4-5, Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-7 are examined together, it 
is clear that the qualifications of doctors in both hospitals and primary care facilities 
have improved since 1949. However, the stratification of quality of doctors at different 
levels of care, i.e. good quality doctors were associated primarily with hospitals, has 
                                                 
6 The gap between hospitals and primary care facilities in terms of doctors with a university degree was 
wide, as shown in Appendix Figure 5-1, and the gap in terms of the proportions of college graduates between 
doctors at hospitals and township health centres particularly increased, from 39.7 to 56.8 percentage points.  
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been stable over the past six decades. 
3) Indicator 1.3: Average annual income of staff 
The real average annual income per staff member showed a similar stratification 
between 2004 and 2013. The average annual staff income (Figure 4-8) rose from 
26,500 yuan in 2004 to 71,000 yuan in 2013 in hospitals, by 2.7 times; and from 10,700 
yuan in 2004 to 19,800 yuan in 2013 in primary care facilities, by 1.9 times. The gap 
particularly widened after around 2010. By the year 2013, the average staff income in 
hospitals was about 3.6 times that in primary care facilities, as compared to 2.5 times 
in 2004. Among primary care facilities, community health centres and stations, sub-
district health centres and township health centres tended to do better than other 
primary care facilities throughout the period. From 2004 to 2013, the average annual 
staff income at community health centres, for example, increased from 29.5 thousand 
yuan to 36.2 thousand yuan; at the bottom of the chart is the average annual staff 
income at village clinics, which increased from 4.8 thousand to 6.6 thousand yuan. 
Despite some spikes in the income of staff at primary care facilities between 2007 and 
2009 caused by no obvious reasons, the general trend was stable from 2004 to 2013. 
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Figure 4-8. Average annual income of staff at various health facilities (2004-2013) 
Sources: Author’s calculations: average annual income of staff=(annual spending on staff)/(number of 
staff in the same year). Original data were collected from the China Health (and Family Planning) 
Statistical Yearbooks (2005-2014) (Ministry of Health, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; 
National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2013, 2014). 
Note: Values were adjusted for inflation using price deflators calculated based on the price level of the 
year 2000. The price deflators were calculated from gross domestic product at constant prices and 
nominal gross domestic product reported by National Bureau of Statistics of China in China Statistical 
Yearbook 2015. 
 
4.4.2 Assets, equipment and infrastructure 
Indicators for assets, equipment and infrastructure measured the disparity between 
the two sectors in terms of non-human capital. They complemented the indicators on 
human resources in measuring the structural balance. Four indicators under this 
category are reported here: value of assets, number of beds, number of valuable 
devices, and building space. 
1) Indicator 2.1: Value of assets 
As reflected in Figure 4-9, almost all types of health facility saw steady and 
 -
 10,000.00
 20,000.00
 30,000.00
 40,000.00
 50,000.00
 60,000.00
 70,000.00
 80,000.00
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Av
er
ag
e 
re
al
 a
nn
ua
l i
nc
om
e 
of
 st
af
f (
yu
an
)
Hospitals
Primary care
providers
Community health
centres and
stations
Sub-district health
centres
Township health
centres
Clinics
Village clinics
Part II  History 
111 
significant growth in terms of value of assets. The real total value of hospital assets 
increased rapidly, from 493 billion yuan in 2004 to 1.2 trillion yuan in 2013, by almost 
2.4 times. Primary care facilities had total assets valued at 68 billion yuan in 2004, 
which increased to 149 billion yuan in 2013, by 2.2 times. Over the decade from 2004 
to 2013, the value of assets of hospitals was stable and around 88% of all assets of all 
facilities. Among primary care facilities, community health centres and stations saw 
their value increased fastest, by 8 times, while township health centres had the 
predominant share of all primary care assets, varying between 57% and 81%. Private 
clinics and sub-district health clinics saw some fluctuations over the years, their total 
share of value of assets among primary care facilities increased from 13% in 2004 to 
20% in 2007 and fell to 10% by 2011 (after which the value of assets of private clinics 
was not available). 
 
Figure 4-9. Value of assets of selected facilities (1 billion yuan) (2004-2013) 
Data sources: (Ministry of Health, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; National Health 
and Family Planning Commission, 2013, 2014) 
Note:  
a) Numbers for sub-district health centres are negligible compared to other types of facility and thus 
are not shown in the graph, other than being included in the total quantity owned by primary care 
facilities.  
b) The numbers for primary care facilities were summed from all types of primary care facility with 
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available data from 2004 and 2009, after which the numbers reported by the MOH were used.  
c) Data for clinics in 2012 and 2013 were not available. 
d) Values were adjusted for inflation using price deflators calculated based on the price level of the 
year 2000. The price deflators were calculated from gross domestic product at constant prices and 
nominal gross domestic product reported by National Bureau of Statistics of China in China Statistical 
Yearbook 2015. 
 
2) Indicator 2.2: Number of beds 
Figure 4-10 shows the trend regarding the number of beds in hospitals and primary 
care facilities between 1949 and 2013. Both levels saw a steady growth in the number 
of beds before 1980. Hospital beds rose from about 80,000 in 1949 to 1.2 million in 
1980. The number of beds at primary care facilities started at around 30,000 in 1959 
following the emergence of township health centres (known as then commune health 
centres) and reached 0.8 million in 1980. In 1980, while hospitals controlled 61% of 
all beds, primary care facilities controlled 39%. 
The years around 1980 appear to be a turning point when the trend diverged. The 
number of beds in hospitals maintained rapid growth during the 1980s. The rise slowed 
down only during the 1990s and beds reached 2.2 million by 2002. In the last decade, 
the number of beds in hospitals has grown faster and amounted to 4.6 million in 2013. 
By contrast, the number of beds in primary care facilities kept dropping slowly after 
1980 and reached a minimum in 2002 and 2003 at 0.7 million, before doubling in 
recent years and reaching 1.4 million by 2013. The overall trend of beds in primary 
care facilities basically represented that of township health centres, though in the last 
decade (2002-2013) the emergence of community health centres and stations added 
0.2 million beds by 2013. In general, the gap between hospitals and township health 
centres regarding inpatient beds has continued to widen over the past 35 years. By 
2013, hospitals controlled 77% of all beds, and primary care facilities controlled 23%. 
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Figure 4-10. Number of beds in hospitals and township health centres (1949-2013) 
Source: (Ministry of Health, 1989, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; 
National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2013, 2014) 
Note: Other types of primary care facilities (sub-district health clinics and clinics) had negligible 
number of beds and are omitted in the figure. 
 
3) Indicator 2.3: Number of valuable devices 
Figure 4-11 shows the trend in number of valuable devices. The number of devices 
valued above 10,000 yuan increased more than 3 times in hospitals, from 1 million in 
2003 to 3.2 million in 2013. During the same period, the number increased by 2.4 
times, from 0.2 million to 0.5 million in primary care facilities. Although both 
hospitals and primary care facilities saw rapid growth in numbers of valuable devices, 
the gap between the two sectors was widening. 
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Figure 4-11. Number of valuable devices at hospitals and primary care facilities (2003-
2013)  
Data sources: (Ministry of Health, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; National 
Health and Family Planning Commission, 2013, 2014) 
Note:  
a) Primary care facilities here consist of township health centres, village clinics, community health 
service institutions and other private clinics. 
b) Value of devices not adjusted for inflation. 
 
4) Indicator 2.4: Building space 
Total building space saw tremendous growth in both hospitals and primary care 
facilities from 1988 to 2013. The most rapid development for both levels happened 
between 1988 and 2003, when total building space of hospitals grew from 82.3 million 
square metres to 227.1 million square metres, by 2.8 times, and building space of 
primary care facilities (primarily township health centres) increased from 8.9 million 
square metres to 88.3 million square metres, by about 10 times. Primary care facilities 
represented a growing proportion of total building space during this period, from 9.8% 
to 28% (a proportion that would be much greater if village clinics were included).  
During the last two decades, the building space of township health centres was 
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rather stable. However, with the emergence of community health centres and the 
inclusion of data from village clinics, the gap between the building space of hospitals 
and that of primary care facilities continued to shrink. By 2010, the gap was at its 
narrowest, when primary care facilities accounted for 38.8% of all building space. The 
proportion declined to 32.9% in 2013. 
 
Figure 4-12. Building spaces of hospitals and primary care facilities (1988 and 2003-
2013) 
Source: (Ministry of Health, 1991, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; 
National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2013, 2014) 
Note:  
a) No data were available for the period between 1989 and 2002. 
b) No data were available for village clinics in years 2003-2008. 
c) Compared to the types of facility listed in the figure, the space of sub-district health centres and 
ambulatory clinics was negligible and hence not reported here (though included in the sum of primary 
care facilities).  
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balance. The study analysed the number of patient visits, the number of admissions, 
and the ratio of patient visits to admissions. 
1) Indicator 3.1: Number of visits  
In terms of patient visits, the hospitals seemed to be playing an ever-larger role 
over the last three decades. The results are presented in Figure 4-13. Data were 
available from 1981 to 2013. The first two decades (1981-2003) showed divergence 
between hospitals and township health centres. The number of visits to hospitals 
increased from 1.1 billion to 1.3 billion by 2004. By contrast, number of visits to 
township health centres continuously declined, from 1.4 billion in 1981, and reached 
a minimum (0.68 billion) in 2004. Unfortunately, data were generally not available for 
other primary care facilities during these two decades. 
The years 2003 and 2004 were a turning point after which all types of facility saw 
rapid increase of patient volume. Visits to hospitals started to take off and more than 
doubled, reaching 2.7 billion by 2013. Total visits to primary care facilities also 
increased, from 2.6 billion in 2004 to 4.3 billion in 2013. Among primary care facilities, 
visits to township health centres grew from 0.7 billion in 2004 to 1 billion in 2013; 
visits to village clinics grew from 1.2 billion in 2004 to 2 billion in 2013; and visits to 
community health centres and stations also grew from an initial 0.1 billion to 0.7 
billion. However, the proportion of visits to primary care facilities among all facilities 
decreased, from 66.4% to 61.2%.  
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Figure 4-13. Number of patient visits to hospitals and primary care facilities (1981-
2013) 
Data sources: (Ministry of Health, 1989, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; 
National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2013, 2014) 
Note:  
1) Patient visits consisted mainly of outpatient visits and emergency care, but also included physical 
check-ups and health consultations.  
2) Data are not available for primary care facilities (except township health centres) before 2004.  
3) Primary care facilities here include township health centres, village clinics, community health service 
institutions and other private clinics. 
4) Sub-district health centres and clinics are not shown in the graph as their numbers were negligible 
compared to other facilities. 
 
2) Indicator 3.2: Number of admissions 
The number of inpatient admissions reflected a similar trend to patient visits, and 
can be described in two segments divided by 2003 (see Figure 4-14). Between 1981 
and 2003, the number of admissions in hospitals almost doubled, from 23.5 million to 
43.8 million. In contrast, the number of admissions in township health centres, which 
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started at a similar level to that of admissions in hospitals, declined by 24.1% from 
21.2 million to 16.1 million. Over the last decade, however, admissions rose 
significantly for both types of facility. The number of admissions in hospitals increased 
by 3.2 times from 2003 to 2013 and reached 39.4 million. The number of admissions 
in township health centres increased by 2.4 times from 2003 to 2009 and reached 38.1 
million. After a little fluctuation, the number climbed back to 39.4 million in 2013. 
This was in sharp contrast to the steady and rapid growth in hospitals. Admissions to 
other types of facilities were negligible compared to these two types of facility. 
 
Figure 4-14. Number of admissions at hospitals and township health centres (1981-
2013) 
Data sources: (Ministry of Health, 1989, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; 
National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2013, 2014) 
Note:  
a) Information for township health centres before 1981 was not available, so the figure compares only 
the period between 1981 and 2013.  
b) Compared to the township health centres, the number of inpatients at community health centres 
was negligible and thus is not reported here. 
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3) Indicator 3.3: Visits to admissions ratio 
Data were available only for hospitals and township health centres for the first two 
decades since 1986, while data for other primary care facilities were available for the 
years from 2004 to 2013. As Figure 4-15 shows, the visits to admissions ratio reduced 
consistently over the past three decades in both township health centres, from 67.7 to 
25.6, and hospitals, from 48.4 to 19.6, mainly due to the rapid increase in inpatient 
services, which favoured hospitals. As township health centres were the only group of 
primary care facilities providing substantial inpatient services, this underestimated the 
visits to admissions ratio at primary care providers. When other primary care facilities 
are included from 2004, the ratio became much larger for primary care facilities. 
However, the general trend of a decreasing visits to admissions ratio still held, and it 
fell from 159.9 in 2004 to 101.5 in 2013. Overall, there appeared to be a continuous 
phenomenon of an increasingly hospitalized style of medical care across both primary 
care facilities and hospitals over the past three decades. 
The graph also reflects the similarity of township health centres to hospitals in 
general. Indeed, the visits to admissions ratio in township health centres closely 
followed that of hospitals throughout the period for which the data were collected, and 
particularly around 1991 and after 2007.  
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Figure 4-15. Visits to admissions ratio in hospitals and primary care facilities (1981-
2013)  
Data sources: Original data were collected from national health statistical reports (Ministry of Health, 
1989, 2004; National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2014). 
Note:  
a) Visits to admissions ratio=annual patient visits ÷ annual inpatient admissions;  
b) Prior to 2004, only data for township health centres were available; from 2004, data for all other 
primary care facilities were included. 
 
4.4.4 Financing 
1) Indicator 4.1: Revenues 
All types of facility saw significant growth in revenue over the last decade, while 
total revenue continued to be concentrated in hospitals. Between 2004 and 2013, 
revenue of hospitals increased rapidly, from 340.7 billion yuan to 1,039.2 billion yuan, 
by 3 times, while primary care facilities saw revenue increased from 103.9 billion yuan 
to 206.8 billion yuan, by 2 times. Hospitals accounted for 83.4% of total revenue of 
health facilities in 2013, compared to 76.6% in 2004. Within primary care facilities, 
community health centres saw the greatest growth, by 6.4 times, while township health 
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centres maintained the lead in the share of overall revenue of primary care facilities, 
which increased from 41% in 2004 to 52% in 2013. Despite a temporary upturn of 
township health centres in 2007, the trend of primary care facilities has been generally 
stable. 
 
Figure 4-16. Total revenue of hospitals and primary care facilities (billion yuan) (2004-
2013) 
Data sources: (Ministry of Health, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; National Bureau 
of Statistics of China, 2015; National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2013, 2014) 
Note:  
a) Information about village clinics was not available for the years 2007 and 2008. 
b) Sub-district health centre revenue was negligible compared to other types of facilities and thus not 
reported. 
c) Revenue was adjusted for inflation using the price level of the year 2000. The inflation rates were 
calculated from gross domestic product at constant prices and nominal gross domestic product 
reported by National Bureau of Statistics of China in China Statistical Yearbook 2015. 
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describe and analyse the trend of the balance between hospitals and primary care 
providers from 1949 to 2013. This section discusses the strengths and limitations of 
the methods and the findings of the study.  
4.5.1 Strengths and limitations 
The chapter has attempted to analyse the trends of the balance between hospitals 
and primary care providers between 1949 and 2013. In order to address a lack of 
comprehensive measurement of the balance identified in the literature, the sub-study 
has built a system of metrics based on previously used indicators found in the literature 
which measured the two categories of structural and functional balance between the 
two sectors.  
For the structural domain, the metrics included not only indicators related to the 
previous attention regarding human resources in the literature but also new indicators 
to cover non-human capital, to provide a more comprehensive view of the structural 
balance. Under human resources, the metrics included both quantity and quality 
measurements, following Starfield (1994) and adapting her comparison between 
primary care doctors and specialists to the comparison between primary care providers 
and hospitals. Under non-human capital, the sub-study added value of assets, number 
of beds, number of valuable devices, and infrastructure (building space).  
For the functional domain, the sub-study used the previous categories identified 
regarding service utilisation and financing. Under service utilisation, the metrics 
adapted previous attempts to measure distribution of service utilisation found in the 
literature (particularly White et al. (1961) and Starfield (1994)), to include numbers of 
visits and admissions, as well as the visits to admission ratio, in order to reflect the 
reality in China that primary care providers and hospitals have been providing a 
significantly overlapping range of services in terms of both inpatient and ambulatory 
care. Under financing, the metrics followed Mills (1990) and some more recent studies 
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and compared the total revenues of primary care providers and hospitals. 
Retrospectively constructing the historical trends of the structural and functional 
balance between hospital and primary care for China has major inherent challenges. 
Section 4.3 has raised issues related to both the nature of the subject and the nature of 
the data. The sub-study involves various aspects of structural and functional balance 
between the two groups of various types of facility, over a dynamic period of history. 
The study tried to develop a comprehensive system of metrics with a degree of 
flexibility. However, it is not possible to capture all dimensions of the structural and 
functional balance between hospitals and primary care providers using a limited 
number of indicators. A key limitation of the metrics is the lack of indicators that 
reflect the value and quality of care. Such data were not available.  
There were also issues about comparability between hospitals and primary care 
providers. This perhaps makes interpretation of some aspects of balance more difficult 
than others. Several indicators are biased towards hospitals, i.e. beds, expensive 
equipment, space, which are not directly vital to primary health care. The visits and 
admissions to hospitals and primary care facilities probably were of different illness 
severity, but again the information could not be captured in this analysis. The chapter 
has attempted to compare the two sectors as holistic entities rather than looking at the 
margins with more obvious overlaps.  
Data availability issues existed for almost all the indicators used in the study, but 
to differing extents. The functional aspects and certain types of primary care facilities 
were more likely to have been under-represented, particularly in earlier periods. The 
original data were collected and reported by the Ministry of Health (National Health 
and Family Planning Commission since 2013), which generally compiled data from 
provincial annual statistics. They shared the strengths and weaknesses of officially 
collected and reported data. The data were checked multiple times by multiple layers 
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of public servants, but might have been manipulated for their own interests (e.g. 
potential over-reporting to show achievements or under-reporting to justify policy 
changes).  
4.5.2 Discussion about findings 
Table 4-2 pulls together the results to show the changes in all indicators across 
hospitals and primary care facilities over the years with available data. The table also 
presents the ratio of changes between hospitals and primary care facilities over three 
specific periods (see rows with “H:PC”), namely from 1952 to 1985, from 1985 to 
2013, and from 2003 to 2013. Besides accommodating varied availability of data 
across different indicators and years, these periods were chosen to allow comparison 
of trends across roughly the first three decades by the early 1980s, roughly the second 
three decades from then until 2013, and the most recent decade. The punctuation 
around the early 1980s was based on both the above analysis but also the analysis in 
Chapter 6 where the history after 1949 was segmented by the year 1978. The last 
decade was also highlighted to have a sense of changes more recently. The remainder 
of this sub-section draws from both the results section and Table 4-2 to discuss 
structural and functional balance between hospitals and primary care providers from 
1949 to 2013. 
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Table 4-2. Comparison across indicators over time 
Indicator   1985:1952a 2013:1985 2013:2003 
1.1 Number of staff 
Hb 9.72  (1985:1957) 2.62 1.75 
PCc 5.70  (1985:1958) 1.60 1.37 
H:PC d  1.71 1.64 1.28 
1.2 Qualification of 
health practitioners e  
H 16 p.p.f   23 p.p. (2013:2002) 
PC 6 p.p.f   6 p.p. (2013:2002) 
H:PC 2.67   3.71 
1.3 Average annual 
income of staff 
H    2.68  (2013:2004) 
PC    1.86  (2013:2004) 
H:PC    1.45 
2.1 Value of assets 
H     2.40  (2013:2004) 
PC     2.20  (2013:2004) 
H:PC     1.09 
2.2 Number of beds 
H 2.85   (1985:1959) 3.08 2.02 
PC 23.84  (1985:1959) 1.87 1.90 
H:PC 0.12 1.64 1.06 
2.3 Number of 
valuable devices 
H     3.06 
PC     2.43 
H:PC     1.26 
2.4 Building space 
H   4.43   (2013:1988) 1.60 
PC   20.04  (2013:1988) 2.03 
H:PC   0.22 0.79 
3.1 Number of visits 
H   3.03   (2013:1988) 1.83  (2013:2004) 
PC   0.92   (2013:1988) 1.68  (2013:2004) 
H:PC   3.31 1.09 
3.2 Number of 
admissions 
H   5.52 3.20 
PC   2.22 2.45 
H:PC   2.48 1.30 
3.3 Visits to 
admissions ratio 
H   0.40 0.70  (2013:2004) 
PC   0.41g 0.64  (2013:2004) 
H:PC   1.10 1.10 
4.1 Revenues 
H     3.05  (2013:2004) 
PC     1.99  (2013:2004) 
H:PC     1.53 
Data sources: author’s calculations based on original data from Health Statistics information in China 
1949-1988, the statistical sections of China Health Yearbooks (1983-2008), China Health Statistical 
Yearbooks (2003-2012), and China Health and Family Planning Statistical Yearbooks (2013 and 2014). 
Note:  
a) For each period, the ratio is between the value of a certain level of care in the year at the end of the 
period and the value of the same level of care in the year at the start of the period. 
b) H: hospitals. 
c) PC: primary care facilities. 
d) H:PC stands for the ratio between the magnitude of changes of hospitals and primary care facilities 
for a certain indicator over a specified period. 
e) Qualification of health practitioners refers to percentage of high quality doctors (professionals for 
1985:1952, doctors with university degrees for 2013:2003) in all doctors by types of facility. Change in 
percentage points (p.p.) is measured here. 
f) Urban value was used for hospitals, while rural value was used for primary care facilities.  
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g) The value for township health centres was used here for primary care providers. 
Within the structural domain, data about human resources covered most periods 
from 1949 to 2013. The growth of hospitals in terms of both quantity and quality was 
more stable over the years, while there was greater fluctuation in primary care facility. 
Despite a drastic emergence of a vast number of barefoot doctors during the 1970s, the 
number of staff at hospitals increased faster overall than at primary care facilities (i.e. 
1.71 times that of primary are facilities from 1952 to 1985 and 1.64 times from 1985 
to 2013). The number of staff at hospitals overtook that at primary care providers in 
1987. Afterwards, the gap widened, and hospitals had 1.5 times the number of staff of 
primary care providers in 2013.  
Hospitals maintained superiority regarding quality of practitioners over primary 
care providers, with clear stratification and a widening gap across levels of care over 
the period studied. Three processes seemed to be associated with hospital dominance 
in quality of staff. First, the township health centres, which emerged in the late 1950s, 
consistently had less qualified practitioners compared to hospitals over time. Second, 
the recruitment of de-professionalized barefoot doctors during the 1970s further 
lowered the level of overall qualification of primary care staff. Third, in the last decade 
(2003-2013), hospitals developed much more rapidly, and increasingly absorbed 
doctors with university degrees. This recent development was also encouraged by the 
continuously widening gap between the salaries of staff at hospitals and primary care 
facilities. 
In terms of physical assets, data were available only for more recent decades. The 
lead of hospitals over primary care facilities was more dramatic. The analysis 
demonstrated at first a parallel and then diverging development between the two 
sectors. Primary care facilities (solely represented here by township health centres) 
followed the pattern of hospitals in accumulating a substantial number of beds. The 
catching up was conspicuously reflected in the much faster growth of beds in primary 
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care than in hospitals from 1959 to 1985 (H:PC=0.12). In the last three decades, the 
increase in number of beds at primary care facilities slowed down and fell behind 
hospitals. Over the last decade, hospitals accumulated assets both rapidly and steadily, 
and hospitals’ lead over primary care facilities widened. However, primary care 
providers saw their building space developing much faster than that of hospitals in the 
last three decades. Both primary care facilities and hospitals saw growth in terms of 
indicators on assets (number of beds from 1952 to 2013, and value of assets from 2003 
to 2013, and building space from 1985 to 2013) which was which was faster than 
growth in human resources. This relatively slower development in human resources 
perhaps reflected a lack of human-centeredness critical for primary care development.  
Among functional indicators, available data were again limited to the last three 
decades for service utilisation. During the years between 1981 and 2002, there was at 
hospitals an increasing number of inpatients vis-a-vis generally stable ambulatory 
visits, pushing down the visits to admissions ratio of hospitals. Meanwhile, at township 
health centres, a rapidly decreasing number of ambulatory visits and a slowly 
decreasing number of inpatients led to a decline of the visits to admissions ratio there. 
The last decade saw substantial growth of both visits and admissions to both hospitals 
and primary care facilities; however, hospitals were playing an increasing role in both 
respects. While both hospitals and primary care facilities were becoming more oriented 
towards inpatient care, hospitals accounted for almost 2 in 5 ambulatory visits (up from 
about 1 in 3 in 2004) and 3 in 4 inpatients (up from 1 in 2 in 1981) by 2013. As an 
increasing proportion of patients flowed to hospitals, funding was also distributed 
predominantly to hospitals, increasing from 76.6% in 2004 to 83.4% in 2013.  
Overall, the dominance of hospitals on structural and functional dimensions 
seemed to be an enduring issue from 1949 to 2013. Hospitals were staffed with a large 
number of practitioners (overtaking primary care providers since the 1980s) who were 
much more likely to be well qualified and better paid, as compared with primary care 
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providers. Hospitals also had stronger physical assets, including beds and devices, than 
primary care providers. Functionally, the share of hospitals in both ambulatory and 
inpatient care was substantial. Hospitals have also been taking an increasingly large 
share in total spending on facilities. The increasing dominance of hospitals was 
obvious after 1978, associated with two decades of deterioration of primary care 
providers (particularly township health centres) in ambulatory care provision and the 
recent boom of hospitals in both inpatient and ambulatory care. 
The metrics obscure the reality that hospitals and primary care providers were not 
easily discernable. Hospitals have been a key provider in ambulatory care throughout 
the last three decades when data were available, and were increasingly so. Primary 
care providers as a whole seemed to have been mimicking the practice of hospitals, 
particularly in terms of the development of hospital beds and provision of inpatient 
care in township health centres. There was an almost parallel increase in focus on 
inpatient care in both hospitals and primary care facilities. Meanwhile, primary care 
also developed a large sector of de-professionalized staff at the village level. What was 
formed appeared to be less like two levels of differentiated specialist vs generalist care 
and more like a two-tier delivery system with a similarly hybrid structure of inpatient 
and ambulatory care with a stratified quality of practitioners. With average income of 
hospital staff increasing significantly faster than that of primary care staff, hospitals 
were more likely to be able to hire and retain better-qualified staff. At the end of the 
period studied, hospitals appeared to be enjoying an environment, including premium 
staff quality and pay, superior assets, increasing share of ambulatory care, and 
orientation towards inpatient care, that fundamentally gave them an edge over primary 
care facilities.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the objective to study the historical trend of balance 
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between primary and hospital care in China by developing a system of metrics 
consisting of 11 indicators regarding balance of care adapted to the Chinese context, 
and using it to collect and analyse data. Despite limited and inconsistent availability 
of data, the analysis has shown that the bias of balance of health delivery towards 
hospitals was continuous over the past six decades. Over time, hospitals were staffed 
with a larger number of practitioners both better qualified and paid, and equipped with 
a greater value of physical capital, as compared with primary care providers. 
Functionally, the share of hospitals has been disproportional in ambulatory care, and 
dominant in total spending on facilities.  
Apparent from the analysis was that the hospitals and primary care providers were 
not easily distinguishable. While hospitals have been an increasingly substantial 
provider in ambulatory care, primary care providers delivered both ambulatory and 
inpatient care though with relatively under-professionalized staff. The definition of 
primary care facilities used here followed the definition of relatively recent 
government policy documents. However, as will be clear from the coming chapters, 
this is not just a matter of different definitions. Explaining the historical roots of such 
a strange situation is central to understanding of contemporary difficulties in 
strengthening primary care in China. This is the task of the next two chapters.  
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 Historical roots of hospital 
dominance (1835-1949) 
“It is difficult to convey to a person who has not witnessed the scenes of the 
hospital, a just idea of them. He needs to be present on a day for receiving new 
patients, and behold respectable women and children assembling at the door the 
preceding evening, and sitting all night in the streets, that they might be in time 
to obtain an early ticket, so as to be treated the same day. He needs to behold in 
the morning the long line of sedans extending far in each direction; see the 
mandarins, with their attendant footmen, horsemen, and standard-bearers; 
observe the dense mass in the room below – parents lifting their children at arm’s 
length above the crowd, lest they should be suffocated or injured; stand by during 
the examination and are registered and prescribed for; in urgent cases being 
admitted at once, while others are directed to come in five or ten days, according 
to the ability to attend to them.” (Parker, 1842, p. 22) 
5.1 Introduction 
The scene of the Canton Ophthalmologist Hospital (better known as Canton 
Hospital) that Parker founded in 1835 would seem oddly familiar to ordinary Chinese 
today, if the sedans were replaced with cars, and attendant footmen and other 
companions were replaced with family dependents. Even more striking is that such a 
form of health care provider set up by foreigners two hundred years ago stayed and 
became a significant part of ordinary lives in China today, despite the fact that health 
policy making had long been under the control of Chinese nationals and that several 
waves of effort to shift the balance towards primary care. This chapter and the next 
seek to explain how hospital-centralism came into being as a set of institutions, and 
how it became resilient over periods of major changes in China since 1835. The 
rationale for the longue durée came from the hypothesis of the theory of path 
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dependence—that earlier events at critical junctures had huge influence over 
establishing long-term feedback that became difficult to challenge, and individual 
events were influenced by the long-term processes (Pierson, 2004). The two chapters 
are punctuated by 1949, the year when the People’s Republic of China was founded. 
The methods used for the two chapters are explained in this chapter, and an overall 
conclusion of the two periods is given in Chapter 6.  
The two chapters use an analytical framework based on historical institutionalism 
set out in Section 5.2 along with other methodological details. Section 5.3 further 
provides the overall historical context necessary to understand the later analysis. 
Before starting the main story, Section 5.4 explains the development of medical 
services and health-related philanthropy from the late Ming (1572-1644) to before 
China’s engagement with Western medicine via the Canton Hospital in 1835. Section 
5.5 describes development from 1835 to 1928, the year the Ministry of Health was 
established. Section 5.6 describes the rise of a state medicine agenda and its impact 
from 1928 to 1949.  
5.2 Methods 
Based on the theoretical lens of path dependence and the approach of critical 
juncture analysis (see Chapter 2: sub-section 2.6.3), the sub-study developed the 
logical steps of a path dependence analysis for understanding the historical co-
evolution of hospitals and primary care providers in China. After laying out the 
analytical steps, the section will provide a brief account of data collection. 
5.2.1 Analytical framework  
Path dependence theory has been shown useful for understanding complex and 
long-term health systems changes. Sub-section 2.6.3 reviewed the theories related to 
historical institutionalism and path dependence and summarized four types of path 
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dependence model (see Figure 2-3). An iterative process of analysis of historical data 
(documents, archives, secondary sources, etc.) has led to the following model that fit 
with the theoretical prediction of path dependence in health policy and systems 
analysis (see Figure 5-1). The model starts with the pre-juncture where contingency of 
paths was possible. At a critical juncture, events take place and shape the 
developmental path. The critical juncture is followed by a post-juncture period of 
reinforcing. Then at a point of time (conjuncture) when multiple factors gathered, 
external forces opened up an opportunity for major changes (“policy episodes” 
according to Tuohy (1999)). After the conjuncture, policies normalized and the 
systems previously created will exhibit elements of their resilience to some extent. 
 
Figure 5-1. A model of dynamic path dependence 
 
5.2.2 Protocol 
Table 5-1 lists the analytical steps developed based on this framework. The 
protocol was modified based on an approach for critical juncture analysis (Capoccia, 
2015). The first two steps clarified the focus of the study: the institutions and 
timeframes of interests. Step 3 and step 4 provided the context regarding wider history 
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and political structure. Step 5 was the main step of data gathering: preliminary 
identification of main actors and extraction of what they had done regarding the policy 
and system dynamics during the periods of interest. 
The theoretical analysis started with Step 6. Step 6 and 7 identified candidates for 
critical junctures and conjunctures, and then selected the most consequential critical 
junctures and conjunctures. Step 8 reconstructed the temporal sequence of key 
historical processes using the sequence template of pre-critical-juncture, critical 
juncture, post-critical-juncture path dependence, conjuncture, and post-conjuncture 
development. The components regarding counterfactual analysis was dropped due to 
the lack of comparative cases. The significance of events and processes was judged by 
their historical consequences. 
Table 5-1. Analytical steps for path dependence analysis  
Step Content 
1 Clarify the unit of analysis 
2 Clarify chronological scope and periodization 
3 Extraction of historical background 
4 Extraction of political structure 
5 Preliminary identification of main actors and extraction of their actions and interactions 
during the periods of interest 
6 Identify “candidate” critical junctures and select for analysis the most consequential critical 
junctures 
7 Identify “candidate” conjunctures and select for analysis the most consequential conjunctures 
8 Reconstruct the key historical processes following their temporal sequence 
Source: adapted from (Capoccia, 2015) with substantial modification 
 
5.2.3 Unit of analysis: institutional complex behind the coevolution of primary care 
and hospital sectors 
For historical institutionalism, the unit of analysis is usually a policy or institution 
or a number of inter-related institutions. The two history chapters studied the 
institutional complex related to the balance between primary and hospital care, which 
involves a set of interrelated institutions associated with hospitals and primary care 
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providers. Informed by a categorization of health system building blocks (World 
Health Organization, 2007) (i.e. service delivery, health workforce, health information, 
medical technologies, health financing, and leadership and governance), and the major 
institutions governing decision making in health proposed by Tuohy (1999) (namely, 
hierarchy, market and collegiate), the thesis proposed four categories of institutions 
related to hospitals and primary care facilities (and therefore the balance between the 
two): professional, organizational, financial and governance institutions. 
First, professional institutions referred to institutional arrangements related to 
human resources and the medical education policies which determined not only the 
human capital of health facilities, but also what levels of practitioners were associated 
with the facilities. Professional institutions are particularly prone to path dependence 
as health care is a highly specialized field and professional training comprises specific 
assets not easily transferrable to other occupations. Besides, the professional 
institutions also involve construction of identities and trust, which takes time to build. 
Second, organizational institutions referred to institutional arrangements related 
to the organizational boundaries between hospitals and primary care providers. 
Whether or not hospitals contained large outpatient departments, whether the primary 
care facilities provided significant hospitalization functions, whether the primary care 
facilities provided primarily public health services, and whether there were functional 
referral arrangements between hospitals and primary care providers, were the key 
factors of concern here.  
Third, financial institutions referee to institutional arrangements related to the 
sources and mechanisms for paying hospitals and primary care facilities. Through 
different historical periods, the sources of finance varied greatly, ranging from private 
philanthropy to public finance and private out of pocket payment, or through kickback 
or mark-up from drug sales, etc. 
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Fourth, governance institutions referred to institutional arrangements that 
determine the relationship between facilities and the actors to whom they are 
responsible. The actors could be government, private individuals, organizations, 
collectives, or a group of multiple players, etc. These institutions determined the 
facilities’ access to political power and therefore how powerful or vulnerable they were 
politically. 
The four categories of institutions characterised the institutional underpinning of 
the accumulation of resources in hospital and primary care sectors. Two points should 
be made before proceeding. First, focusing on these institutions does not mean ruling 
out the importance of other institutions (e.g. pharmaceuticals, technologies, 
information, etc.). Other relevant institutions were considered as attached to and 
dependent on the above-mentioned four institutions. For example, the availability of 
certain technologies at a certain level of care was considered as influencing 
coevolution of hospital and primary care sectors through enhancing the professional 
influence of such level of facility. Second, within the four categories of institutions, 
there would likely have been variations within a particular sector (for example, 
hospitals at different levels might face different policies). Given the diversity in China, 
any generic analysis is problematic. However, the focus on sectors was determined by 
the thesis’s interests in the comparison between hospitals and primary care providers 
as two sectors, and how they converged or diverged from each other. 
5.2.4 Chronological scope and periodization 
Part II covers more than a century and a half in the history of the health delivery 
system in China. Periodization was crucial in making sense of such a long history, for 
allowing both an in-depth discussion of the most significant processes within each 
temporal segment, and the ability to make sense of the stages of the long-term process. 
The historical study originally divided the chronological scope into three main periods, 
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based on two important time points: the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949, and the Reform and Opening-up in 1978. 
5.2.5 Issues about collection and critical reading of texts  
There were methodological issues related to the nature of documents (see Table 
5.2). A basic principle for documentary analysis is that documents may not be truthful 
records of what happened. Instead, documents are the central carriers of human-
produced “documentary realities” (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004). Critical reading of the 
sources collected was conducted with attention to the following four aspects identified.  
Table 5-2. Key issues of documentary analysis 
x Authenticity: soundness and authorship 
x Credibility: sincerity and accuracy 
x Representativeness: survival and availability 
x Meaning: literal and interpretative understanding 
Source: based on (Scott, 1990: Chapter 1) 
 
First, I considered issues related to the authenticity of documents. Validity of 
documents is a crucial concern in documentary analysis (Green & Thorogood, 2004: 
Chapter 7), Scott (1990: Chapter 1) distinguished authenticity and credibility under 
validity. There are two main ways to judge the authenticity of documents, namely, 
soundness and authorship. Soundness refers to whether the document is original or a 
good copy of the original document. Authorship concerns whether the documents was 
really produced by the person or organisation who claimed it. As most of the primary 
sources came from official archives or public libraries or archives with general 
soundness and clear authorship, authenticity of documents was not a concern for this 
thesis.  
Second, I paid attention to the credibility of sources. Credibility means whether 
the account is distorted, consciously or unconsciously. To judge credibility, one has to 
check for sincerity and accuracy. Sincerity refers to whether the document’s producer 
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actually thought what was recorded to be true. This judgement usually involves an 
appreciation of the underlying motivation of the author—why the author chose to 
produce the document. Assessing accuracy is important as sincere authors could have 
documented things inaccurately due to limits of observation and documentation, and 
the proximity of the document producer to the event. Both “primary sources” (defined 
as reports by people involved in the events) and “secondary sources” (defined as 
reports by people who did not participate in the events but relied on second-hand 
information) can have issues of inaccuracy. Whenever possible, primary sources were 
collected and compared with secondary sources. The motivation of the document 
producers was also considered, while the documents were interpreted. 
Third, the sub-study attempted to achieve representativeness of documents (Green 
et al., 2004: Chapter 7; Scott, 1990: Chapter 1). There might be issues of survival and 
availability regarding representativeness. Therefore, the sample of documents might 
be biased. Important historical events might not be documented, or might be lost 
during storage. This study concerned complex processes across a prolonged period of 
time, a vast country as well as numerous actors. Statistical representativeness was not 
achievable. The study addressed this issue by pooling a large range of national and 
local data. For each period, I tried to include data for the most consequential actors. 
The main issue in this regard was the dominance of the perspectives of those 
controlling power: government authorities, professional elites, and non-governmental 
organizations (particularly missionary and philanthropic groups). Following the 
practice of “heuristic” of early German historians (Scott, 1990: Chapter 1), I scanned 
through the full lists of the catalogues of archives to identify the underlying logic of 
the construction of archival documents to identify relevant documents that appeared 
to be representative of the materials. In the process of searching two local archives, it 
appeared to me that the archives mainly kept the official documents that were produced 
by the specific agencies. These documents included policy documents, annual work-
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plans, annual work summaries, special statistical reports, budgets, summary and 
speech scripts and transcripts of participants of important conferences. They generally 
represented the key external bureaucratic processes, with relatively few useful 
materials regarding daily internal document-based communications, which potentially 
could have contained more credible information about important events. 
Fourth, the meanings of documents were understood and interpreted in their 
context. The documents can be seen as “social facts” produced by a claimed authorship 
for an intended readership, with both the production and reception taking place within 
a social/cultural context (Atkinson et al., 2004). There are two levels of understanding 
of meaning. A basic level concerns literal understanding. Issues regarding this include 
the change of “terms” and dating (how dates were represented). Interpretative 
understanding concerns the definition of concepts and genre (style of the document: 
public documents or memoir). The sub-study contained concepts which had varied 
meanings over time and used a broad range of different genres of documents, and took 
such issues into consideration during the analysis.  
More importantly, interpretation is a process of appreciating the meaning that the 
document producers (historic contemporaries or later writers) relied on to understand 
their experiences, the meaning that influenced the creation of the documents, as well 
as the meaning at the receiving end--the “three moments of text” according to Scott 
(1990: Chapter 1). The meaning involved is crucial in reconstructing the social world 
beyond the immediate documents. Researchers need a sufficient knowledge of the 
wider worlds of the historical actors to be able to carry out “explanatory 
understanding”. Therefore, I not only immersed myself in the various sources, but also 
went through a series of general historical books on the period, events and people 
studied. Attention was also given to the partiality of some primary sources, which were 
produced not by dispassionate researchers but by policy actors with a specific agenda 
and perspective.  
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5.2.6 Sources 
The study used a range of different types of sources. The first were history books 
on history of medicine in China, which provided a general timeline to follow. Three 
particularly important longitudinal books included the History of Chinese Medicine 
(Wong & Wu, 1936)-- a chronicle of medicine-related events in China from ancient 
times to the present period, the General History of Medicine in China (Deng & Cheng, 
2000) and the Chinese Medical Encyclopaedia (Chen & Xu, 1984). The History of 
Chinese Medicine was a case in point where I maintained caution while using sources, 
as one of its authors, Wu Liande was a passionate reformer and considered the founder 
of modern public health and scientific medicine in China. The motivation of co-
authoring the book was likely to link Chinese history with his contemporary medical 
reform initiative, arguing that there was an inherent tradition of state-sponsored health 
care lost in history and to be revived with new knowledge. The works of other 
historians and social scientists who studied history on more specific periods or topics 
were also included. A wide range of contextual books was also consulted to allow 
interpretation of actors and events in their historical context.  
Second, official documentations of history, statistics and compiled policy 
documents provided by the Ministry of Health (National Family Planning and Health 
Commission since 2013) were included. These consisted of the series of the China 
Health Yearbooks (published annually from 1983) which provided an official account 
of information on key events of that year, with the first volume (1983) including an 
overview of the years between 1949 and 1982. Policies related to rural health were 
drawn from a compiled book that contained policies from 1949 to 2010. The advantage 
of official chronicles and compiled documents was that they contained systematically 
collected key information on what happened each year. Therefore, such information 
provided a continuous timeline to make sense of the key events and development of 
key indicators, as well as key speeches by leaders of health authorities and/or state 
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leaders whose job division included health affairs. Three provincial health gazettes 
from eastern, central and western China (Shandong, Jiangxi, Guangxi) were selected 
to complement the national yearbooks (Guangxi Provincial Health Gazette Compiling 
Committee, 1998; Jiangxi Provincial Health Gazette Compiling Comittee, 1997; 
Shandong Provincial Health Historical Gazette Compiling Committee, 1992). Local 
Health Gazettes, usually compiled by local health bureaux, provided a local official 
account of history. 
Third, although national archives are inaccessible for post-1949 periods (Gao, 
2010), local archives kept a rich source of detailed historical documents. For this study, 
I accessed two local archives: the Beijing Municipal Archive and the Pinggu (a district 
of Beijing and a rural county before 2001) District Archive. At the Beijing Municipal 
Archive, an online electronic catalogue was available. I searched all items containing 
the title of yiliao (medicine) and/or weisheng (health) and screened the resulting list 
for potentially relevant sources, and identified and took notes of relevant sources. 
Some of the documents were scanned and stored on an intranet system, and could be 
read directly on the computers at the archive. Others were not scanned, and I submitted 
a list of titles I would like to read each time. As there was a daily cap of 10 files to 
copy, I only made copies when necessary, and took notes of the other relevant ones. At 
the Pinggu District Archive, archival documents were kept for district-level agencies 
and access was limited by requiring official permission (in the form of an official letter 
of reference) from the agencies which generated the documents. There was no 
electronic system to search documents within the catalogue of the local health bureau. 
Therefore, I manually screened the catalogue books to identify potentially relevant 
documents. Then I asked the archive administrators to help retrieve them, read and 
made copies of the relevant ones. Archival materials were also searched on and 
acquired from a second hand book website (www.kongfz.com) which contained 
materials regarding the Maoist period. 
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Fourth, anthologies, biographies and memoirs of important actors and people who 
had experienced the history were collected and analysed.  
Fifth, journals and newspapers were searched. Missionary publications, including 
the Chinese Repository and the China Medical Missionary Journal, were the earliest 
periodicals used in this study. For the early half of the 20th Century, the Chinese 
Medical Journal and the National Medical Journal of China provided longitudinally 
rich sources of information, though these journals generally reflected the viewpoints 
of elite Western medicine doctors (both Chinese and foreign). Newspapers and 
journals provided a rich volume of both primary and secondary sources of information 
that could be searched through electronic bibliographic databases (e.g. China National 
Knowledge Infrastructure). Journals also contained research and reflection on 
contemporary or historical events. The newspaper Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), the 
mouthpiece of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, preserved rich 
information regarding the political elites’ perspective on health issues.  
Finally, three propagandist paintings were also included in the analysis, to reflect 
the way the forces behind the policies sought to (re)construct their intended rhetoric.  
5.3 Overall historical context (1835-1949)  
China was a country closed to the outside world by the Late Ming Dynasty and 
the early Qing Dynasty (see Appendix Table 2 for a standard periodization of Chinese 
history). Through the First Opium War (1839-1842) and ensuing invasions, Britain and 
other foreign powers forced China to sign a number of unequal treaties, which opened 
ports and concessions, mainly in coastal regions (Fairbank, 1978: Chapter 4). The pro-
modernization Self-Strengthening Movement was organized between 1861 and 1895 
with limited success, ending with a humiliating defeat by Japan in the First Sino-
Japanese War (1894-1895) (Fairbank, 1978: Chapter 10). Another wave of pro-
modernization movement took place in 1898 and quickly failed, only to prompt the 
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Boxers’ Rebellion against foreigners, which ended with the occupation of Peking 
(Beijing) by the Eight-Nation Alliance and the payment of a huge indemnity fund. The 
Qing Dynasty, and along with it the millennial cycle of imperial history, was ended by 
the 1911 Revolution that the resulted in the establishment of the Republic of China. 
However, the country soon fell into fragmentation during what was known as the 
Warlord Era (1916-1928), and control of the country was divided among its military 
cliques (Fairbank, 1978: Chapter 6). 
After unification through the North Expedition (1926-1928), a national 
administration controlled by the Chinese Nationalist Party (founded in 1912) was 
formed in 1928. With about a decade of peace and development, the country again fell 
into war due to the Japanese invasion in 1937 (Fairbank & Feuerwerker, 1986: Chapter 
3). While the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Nationalists had joined up in the 
1920s, the CPC was excluded from the Nationalists and purged, driven away from its 
base area in Jiangxi in 1927, and eventually to embark on the Long March (1934-1936) 
and resettle in the North West with Yan’an as its capital (Fairbank et al., 1986: Chapter 
4). The country won the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese 
Aggression in 1945, and then a civil war broke out between the Nationalists and the 
Communists. Four years later, the Nationalist Government fled to Taiwan, while 
Chairman Mao declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China at Tian’anmen.  
Before the end of imperial history in 1911, the imperial court was a high 
conservative national state actor. The imperial state was very limited in both tax 
extraction and its public services, and the limited resources it extracted were spent 
primarily on hydraulics, as well as military defence and rebel suppression (Balazs, 
Wright, & Wright, 1966). After 1928, a national administration was set up in Nanjing. 
A nation-wide system of local governments was also established, with counties 
functioning as self-sufficient and significantly autonomized governments responsible 
for establishing and delivering local health services.  
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Traditionally, China had a large and overwhelmingly rural population. Research 
suggested that traditional China was already divided into an urban privileged 
population and a rural population (Kuhn, 2002). Industrialization was slow before 
1949 and foreign trade benefited the treaty ports, which were highly concentrated in 
coastal areas. Most people were living in rural areas and in dire conditions, particularly 
during the 1930s and the 1940s, with a vast number of preventable deaths (Štampar, 
1936). Foreigners and foreign organisations played an important role in China’s 
modernization from the 1840s to the 1940s, as demonstrated below in relation to health.  
5.4 Organisation of health services in traditional China (1572-1835)  
In Western societies, charitable organizations, religious organizations, and 
medical practitioners, played central roles in the rise of modern health systems (Risse, 
1999: Chapter 5). What China had developed by the period of encounter with Western 
medicine became an important default for policy actors. Examining this default 
therefore provides important clues to understanding the initial set up of modern 
medicine in China. This section traces the organisation of health services in traditional 
Chinese society before the introduction of modern medicine. Particularly, the section 
attends to the development of institutional care (including but also going beyond 
medical care) and the status of medical practitioners in the society. 
Institutional care had a very long history in China and was documented as existing 
widely before the late Ming period (from 1572-1644). One of the essential teachings 
of Confucius mentioned an ideal society where “all widowers, widows, orphans, the 
childless, the handicapped are taken care of” (Anonymous, circa 200 B.C.). As early 
as the Han Dynasty (202 B.C. to 220), there was a record of hospitals built for 
epidemics (Fan, 1951). In the Epoch of Division of North and South (420-589), “house 
for people with the six types of ailments” (liujiguan) were built by the state (Zhang, 
2006, p. 79). During the Tang Dynasty (618-907), such institutions were supported and 
Part II  History 
144 
popularized by Buddhist activities and named “house of the sad field” (beitianfang) or 
“house for caring of the sick” (yangbingfang). They provided places for the sick and 
the destitute to stay (Leung, 1987). Then they were taken over by the imperial state 
when Buddhist monasteries7 were purged between 842 and 846 (Chen, 1991).  
The state sponsorship of infirmaries continued in the ensuing Song Dynasty (960-
1279), when the name of these institutions was changed into “wards for peace and 
relief” (anjifang). Besides hospitals were other types of state-sponsored welfare and 
medical institutions which developed during subsequent dynasties. Charity pharmacies 
started to distribute free medical formulas: e.g. “pharmaceutical bureaus for people’s 
benefits” (huimin yaoju) became popular in Song. The government also distributed 
free medicines through public pharmacies (the Imperial Medical Service (taiyiju)) and 
regulated drug prices (Taiping Prescriptions for the Benefit of the People from the 
Office of Pharmacy (Taiping huimin hejiju fang)) in the Song Dynasty. There were 
also medical agencies providing medical training, medical relief and professional 
regulation: e.g. “official medical promotion bureau” (guanyi tijusi), “universal aid 
promotion bureau” (guangji tijusi) and “medical bureau” (yixue) set up in the Yuan 
Dynasty. During Yuan, the state also widely built “Temples of the Three Sages” 
(sanhuangmiao) to promote the worship of the Yellow Emperor as patrons of medicine 
(Leung, 1987). 
From the Ming Dynasty, state-sponsored organisations of health activities 
generally fell into decay. Compensating to the declining role of the state, local 
communities started to organize various kinds of benevolent societies with official 
endorsement since the Ming Dynasty. Some scholars set up private funds with 
donations from “societies for sharing goodness (tongshanhui)”, and created the so-
                                                 
7 These infirmaries were located in monasteries, parallel with Japanese and Western societies where 
prototype hospitals were set up within religious premises. 
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called “universal relief halls (pujitang)” (Leung, 1987). Based on Leung’s study of 
local gazettes from the Yangtze River delta (a relatively rich area) before the Opium 
War (1840), almost every county seemed to have a benevolent society (Leung, 1987). 
In the late Qing, an expanding base of lower ranking Confucian scholars became the 
key sponsors behind local benevolent societies, and the network of benevolent 
societies was decentralized to township level (Liang, 2012).  
The medical function of benevolent societies was very limited. As Lockhart 
(1861), a prominent medical missionary, observed in Shanghai, there was a 
hospital/alms-house for the old and infirm and a foundling hospital, with little medical 
function. The only “establishment for gratuitous medical relief” (She-e-kung-keuh 
[sic]) was created after the establishment of a missionary hospital in 1845. Wong et al. 
(1936, pp. 137-138) also commented that the Chinese prototype of a hospital “was 
more of the nature of a benevolent institution where there was very little medical 
attention or trained nursing”. Study of local gazettes showed that these organizations 
might have some basic medical function during times of epidemics, including 
segregation of the seriously ill, as well as government subsidized medicines and 
provision of doctors. However, the nature of these efforts was more disaster or 
epidemic relief than routine medical care delivery (Leung, 1987). This low level of 
medicalisation (from both a modern perspective and a historical perspective before the 
late Ming) probably reflected the preference of their sponsors. Benevolent societies 
became a vehicle for the vast number of low ranking scholars to reinforce their values 
and acquire social influence, and also suited the government’s need of societal control 
with minimal state responsibility (Liang, 2001). In her extensive study of local gazettes, 
Leung (1987) found only one dispensary with a sick ward, which she suggested was 
quite an outlier. 
In traditional China, there was generally no clear boundary between medical 
professionals and lay medical practitioners, and the social status of doctors was 
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generally low. In the Song Dynasty, almost none of the doctors in Fuzhou prefecture, 
Jiangxi were from notable families (Hymes, 1987). In the Jin Dynasty, a central level 
Imperial Medical College (taiyiyuan, also translated as the College of Royal 
Physicians) and local level medical bureaux (yixue) were responsible to promote both 
professional qualifications and popularization of officially verified medical literature. 
However, except for strict training for doctors for the imperial court, implementation 
of professional training was plagued with fraud and corruption.  
One piece of evidence for the low social status of doctors lay in the fate of the 
Temples of the Three Sages of the Yuan Dynasty mentioned above. Among the three 
sages was the Yellow Emperor, who was worshipped as the ancestor of the Han people 
(the majority ethnic group). To worship the Yellow Emperor as a key patron of 
medicine appeared to elevate the status of doctors. However, due to the low prestige 
of medical practitioners, this move of the Mongol rulers was considered a demeaning 
act to the Han people’s worship of the three sages, and was quickly abolished in the 
Ming Dynasty (Zhang, 2004). The kind of professional societies like guilds that 
formed a monopoly of medical training and disqualified lay people (Ramsey, 1992; 
Wear, 1992) did not develop in the Ming and Qing Dynasties.  
By the Ming Dynasty, the medical bureaux had become basically inactive and their 
medical officers tended to be poorly trained and county-level medical officers were 
not salaried. In addition, the Ming Dynasty saw rapid popularization of medical 
literature, which led to a further decline of the social status of medical doctors. 
Medicine was an alternative of lower status for scholars who had no prospects as 
officials or landlords (Leung, 1987). Official medical practitioners tended to be poorly 
trained and with no prospects unless elected into the Imperial Medical College. A local 
official proposed that reputable doctors should be trained to revitalise medical bureaus 
to supervise the practice and training of local practitioners to elevate standards (Liang, 
2012, p. 46), suggesting the weakness of existing professional institutions. To the 
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missionaries coming later, a Chinese doctor suffered from lack of trust by their patients, 
and except in rare cases (e.g. notable families), “never becomes a family physician” 
and “knows quite well that unless his prescription has given immediate relief a second 
and perhaps third physician will be called in after him, almost as soon as his medicine 
has been sampled” (Balme, 1921, p. 28). Along with learned doctors, there were a 
broad range of relief providers including demonological healers, Buddhist monks, 
itinerant herb vendors, priests, mediums and illiterate healing women (Andrews, 2014; 
Chapter 2). 
Opportunities for potential revolution of medical knowledge were missed. In the 
1600s, Jesuit missionaries brought with them several medical titles including Andreas 
Vesalius’ treatise on human anatomy. From 1622 to 1643, in the last years of the Ming, 
Terrenz translated a short text on anatomy into Chinese with the title of “Western 
explanations of the human body (Tai-si jen-shen sho-kai)” based on the European 
anatomy book of Anatomica corporis virilis et muliebris historica (1597). The 
translation was not disseminated. The Jesuits won the support of the open-minded 
Kangxi Emperor for Western medicine by curing the Emperor’s malaria with cinchona 
bark as early as 1693. In 1698, the court asked the Jesuits to translate two anatomy 
texts into Manchurian. Five years later, the translation ended up being shelved in the 
imperial library, as its materials were considered inappropriate for publishing (Fu, 
2011a). In the History of Chinese Medicine, Wong et al. (1936) lamented that the 
failure of the Jesuits to “grasp the opportunity offered to establish proper hospitals and 
medical schools” was a loss of a valuable historical time window for the popularization 
of Western medicine in China. While this remark was apparently made from a 
perspective similar to teleological history (i.e. assuming events were moving (or not 
moving) towards a desirable end-point), it did reflect the difficulty for Western 
medicine to develop based on intellectual enlightenment in the conservative climate of 
the late Ming and the Qing. 
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The section reveals a situation where official interests in medical affairs withered 
over time, despite what appeared to be a long previous tradition of health protection 
and benevolent activities for the weak and sick. The conservative state also refrained 
from publishing unorthodox new medical knowledge from the West. By the 1830s, the 
sponsors of the benevolent societies were mainly lower-ranking Confucian scholars 
with official endorsement, whose main interests were to conserve traditional values 
and rituals for their own values and status, while medical services if provided at all by 
these societies was more of the nature of rituals. Medical care was rarely hospital-
based in traditional Chinese society. The under-development of medical professional 
boundaries, popularization of medicine, and the low social status of doctors 
undermined the role of medical practitioners in influencing medical organisation and 
development, perhaps except for the Imperial Medical College. All these not only 
made indigenous adoption of new medical knowledge and practice difficult by the late 
Qing, but also became the context for the newcomers, who would need to carve out a 
new arena for their medical practice.  
5.5 Introduction of Western medicine (1835-1928) 
The state and Chinese practitioners of medicine were generally uninterested in 
Western medicine around 1835, and the introduction of modern medicine was taken 
on by foreigners, particularly Protestant medical missionaries. In consequence, the 
agenda of these foreigners at this specific historical period of early engagement with 
China largely decided the initial set up of providers of Western medicine in China, and 
thus the formation of the early institutions behind the coevolution of hospital and 
primary care sectors. Also important was how domestic actors, particularly the state, 
reacted to the activity of missionaries. In the later years (1901-1928), philanthropic 
and other groups also joined this movement of Western medicine, and responded to 
and redefined these initial structures. Therefore, understanding the perspectives and 
influences of these late-comers is also important for analysing the historical dynamics. 
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5.5.1 Introduction of mission hospitals (1835-1844) 
The years between 1835 and 1844, i.e. from the establishment of the Canton 
Hospital to the signing of the Treaty of Wangxia after the First Opium War, seemed to 
be a critical juncture where the seeds of hospital centrism were sown. The initial 
driving force behind the medical mission appeared to be a strong desire to establish 
civil engagement, which was a particular concern in the years approaching the 
outbreak of the First Opium War (1840-1842). By the early 1830s, a Protestant 
missionary foothold was established in Guangzhou (or Canton, the single port allowed 
for commercial trading before the Opium War), led by Bridgman of the American 
Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Dr. Colledge, once a ship’s surgeon for 
the British East India Company, operated a successful ophthalmological hospital in 
Macau (The Chinese Repository, 1834, p. 289). Colledge was convinced that eye 
diseases were prevalent, however, the indigenous doctors had no measure to deal with 
them, and surgery was not available to even the rich in China (Wu, 2000, pp. 301-310). 
In a summary of the initial years of medical missionaries in China, Lockhart (1861, p. 
113), another leading figure of medical mission noted:  
“The practitioners of surgery, or those who attend to external [sic] diseases, 
are of a lower grade than those who treat internal affections, chiefly because 
surgical manipulations are little understood. None but the most trifling 
operations are attempted, and, in fact, small attention is paid to this branch of 
practice, because the relief afforded is so insignificant.” 
Encouraged by the example of Colledge, Bridgman proposed the idea of a medical 
mission and sent Peter Parker to China. Parker established the Canton Ophthalmology 
Hospital in 1835. The focus on operations on eyes (including cataract surgery) proved 
a right decision. Parker’s report of the cases he treated during a quarter of 1836 showed 
that the hospital had treated 323 cases with eye diseases, 32 cases with ear diseases, 
and 66 other cases (Parker, 1836). Hospitals were important as a venue to demonstrate 
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the technical advantage of Western medicine, particularly in surgery.  
More importantly for the foreign powers, the success provided a channel of civil 
interaction. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions commended 
that “Dr Parker opened the gates of China with a lancet when European cannon could 
not heave a single bar” (Balme, 1921, p. 44). Colledge, Parker and Bridgman proposed 
the “Medical Missionary Society in China” to promote the medical missionary 
activities; they explained that the particular “good effects” of the medical mission were 
“to bring about a more social and friendly intercourse between them [Chinese] and 
foreigners, as well as to diffuse the arts and sciences of Europe and America, and in 
the end to introduce the Gospel of our Savior in place of the pitiable superstitions by 
which their minds are now governed” (Colledge, Parker, & Bridgman, 1835). This 
proposal prompted the establishment of the Society in 1838 (Lazich, 2006). After the 
Opium War (1840-1842) which further opened China to Western powers, Peter Parker 
called for “the maintenance of the Hospitals already established, and for the founding 
of others at every accessible and eligible part of China” (Parker, 1842, p. 4). The 
medical missionary enterprise expanded further, particularly after 1844, when the 
signing of the unequal Treaty of Wanghia allowed Americans to open hospitals, among 
other institutions, in five ports in China.  
The medical success of hospitals should not be exaggerated. Chinese were not 
used to hospitalizations and were quite suspicious of the motivation of medical 
missionaries, and the initial patients were not really hospitalized. After all, pre-20th-
Century Western surgery would have been both painful and dangerous, as this was the 
period before the invention of antiseptic and popularization of anaesthesia (Ellis, 2002). 
Indeed, the documents for the early years of the Canton Hospital suggested there were 
barely any record of hospitalizations (Liang, 2013).  
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5.5.2 Further development of mission hospitals (1844-1901) 
The initiation of this model of hospital-based medicine appeared to set in motion 
a post-juncture self-reinforcing process. As Renshaw (2003) pointed out, few medical 
missionaries had worked at hospitals before coming to China, nor were hospitals the 
dominant form of medical practice back in their home countries. The missionaries’ 
passion for building hospitals and the way hospital care was provided were rooted in 
both their missionary purposes and the need to “accommodate” Chinese. 
As the medical missionaries tried to expand their niche, they assessed different 
ways of providing care. Hospitalizations provided lengthy interaction between patients 
and missionary staff. As the ultimate agenda of the medical mission was to win over 
converts, the lengthy engagement of hospitalizations seemed ideal for preaching. For 
example, it was a world-wide practice among medical missions to extend hospital stay 
as much as possible to increase the length of religious interactions between providers 
and patients (Hardiman, 2006). The recommended protocol for organizing outpatient 
care at that time (Balme, 1921, pp. 72-74) also encouraged missionaries to mingle with 
patients, get to know them one by one, win their confidence, preach to and follow up 
with them in the hospitals. In other words, the outpatient department was a platform 
important for the hospitals to reach out to a wider range of potential believers.  
Table 5-3 summarizes the analysis of the pros and cons of different delivery 
options in the report of the China Centenary Missionary Conference (Conference 
Committee, 1907, pp. 256-257), which convincingly explained the reasons behind the 
preference for a hospital-based medical missionary. From a missionary perspective, 
hospitals provided the most effective means of religious engagement as they treated 
the most severe patients, for whom religious work was thought to be more influential. 
The spiritual work was considered to achieve maximal impact effective in hospitals 
even if medical intervention failed. It provided a place for continuous interaction, 
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which was usually missing in an ambulatory setting. Indeed, the hospitals were so 
much valued that dispensaries should be built mainly “to feed hospital(s)”. These 
missionaries “universally agreed that the hospital is the centre, and that all other work 
must, to a large extent, lead to or proceed from it” (Conference Committee, 1907, pp. 
256-257).  
Table 5-3. Comparison of the three types of medical missionary work  
 Itinerant (i.e. Mobile) Dispensary/ 
outpatient work 
Hospital 
Advantage Extended reach, in many 
cases the only way to 
approach some populations 
(particularly home-bound 
women) 
Deeper impression on 
beneficiaries.  
As diseases treated at hospitals were 
more severe than in ambulatory settings, 
hence medical mission's influence on the 
minds would be “much greater”.  
Every patient, “whether a cure is effected 
or not”, experienced close and lasting 
contact with staff and the atmosphere of 
the hospitals. 
When properly staffed, it could minimize 
the risk of breakdown of doctors, and 
provide continuity in case of holidays or 
sickness, etc. 
Disadvantage “very expensive”, not 
satisfactory professionally 
because of inability to 
follow up 
Ineffective if patients did 
not return. 
 
Values Indispensable in the early 
stages 
The greatest use was “to 
feed the hospital”. 
It gave “much better 
results” than itinerant 
work. 
“most satisfactory and fruitful part of the 
work” 
Implementation  In many places, workload 
from hospital and other 
station work made it 
impossible to conduct 
itinerant work. 
 A small number of well-equipped and 
supported hospitals would be more 
effective than several separated ones. 
Source: author’s summary of (Conference Committee, 1907, pp. 256-257) 
 
This hospital-centred model of care provision had enduring impacts on the 
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coevolution of hospitals and primary care providers in China by providing a new venue, 
a new organization, as well as a new profession. First, in terms of professional 
institutions, a professional link formed between Western medicine doctors and mission 
hospitals. To address the tension between professional and missionary activities, 
separation of their roles was encouraged (Lockhart, 1861, p. 119), which was the first 
step of developing a medical professional identity. The doctors were also tied up with 
hospitals. Doctors were not able to spend much time paying visits to patients at home 
(who paid much more generously) due to the workload at hospitals, as reflected later 
in the report of the China Medical Commission of the Rockefeller Foundation (1914, 
pp. 74-77).  
Second, in terms of organizational institutions, these hospitals integrated a large 
proportion of outpatient care. Outpatient work was frequently described as a reason 
that kept medical missionaries busy. The ambulatory department was both the main 
access point for patients to seek care at hospitals (Renshaw, 2003), and the dominant 
access for hospital-based medical missionaries to interact with local communities. The 
fusion of Western medicine doctors and open-access outpatient departments of 
hospitals formed a structure that has persisted all the way to today. Later sections will 
visit the other two pillars of the institutional complex underpinning the coevolution of 
hospitals and primary care providers.  
During the most part of the period covered in this sub-section, the state barely 
sponsored any Western medical education. Indeed, an effort to introduce Western 
medicine at national level was nipped in the bud in the latter half of the 19th Century. 
The Imperial Tungwen College, also known as the School of Combined Learning, was 
founded in 1861 during the Self-strengthening Movement (1861-1895), as an imperial 
school in Beijing under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to introduce Western science 
and technology. William Alexander Parsons Martin, a missionary and translator was 
recruited as the President of the Imperial Tungwen College from 1869 to 1895. Matin 
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(1896, p. 320) wrote one year after leaving the presidency on a failed attempt to 
organize Western medicine education at the college, revealing the political resistance 
from vested interests within the imperial bureaucracy.  
“Many years ago we formed a medical class, which was placed under Dr. 
Dudgeon, of the London Mission, who was and continues to be the best-known 
practitioner in the northern capital… The Yamen [meaning the imperial court] 
gave him [referring to Dr. Dudgeon], as I proposed, the title of professor, and 
invited him to lecture, but refused to permit our students to receive clinical 
instruction at the mission hospital. Ten years were thus lost, the lectures 
amounting to nothing more than the communication of ideas such as ought to 
form a part of a liberal education. A change of ministry occurring, I again 
proposed that the class should receive practical instruction at the hospital. The 
new ministers consented, but they declined to expand the class into a medical 
school for fear of encroaching on the domain of the Tai-i-Yuen [the Imperial 
Medical College], an effete college of medicine which has charge of the 
emperor's health and is supposed to possess a monopoly of medical science.”  
Based on Martin’s account, the opposition of conservative bureaucrats managing 
the Imperial Tungwen College and the royal doctors in the Imperial Medical College 
repeatedly frustrated his attempt to establish systematic Western medical training. In 
parallel, medicine was also neglected when the court sent students to learn science and 
technology in Western countries during the Self-strengthening Movement (Li, 1990, p. 
59). Before 1900, the government established only one medical school, in Tianjin, 
under the pro-reform Viceroy Li Hongzhang in 1881--the Viceroy’s Hospital Medical 
School led by an English medical missionary Dr. Mackenzie. Yet by 1888 when Dr. 
Mackenzie died of smallpox and the school was closed due to the ending of funding 
(Ho, 2012), there were only nineteen graduates, all of whom “did not get posts 
commensurate with their training” (Hume, 1922). Based on documents written by 
Part II  History 
155 
medical missionaries examined by Liang (2013), benevolent societies in China seemed 
to be inactive during this period, except for only a very small fraction mimicking the 
practice model of hospitals, with most still providing just Chinese medicine. More than 
a decade later, the China Medical Commission of the Rockefeller Foundation (1914, 
p. 8) reported that “[o]utside the mission hospitals and outside the treaty ports there 
were very few practitioners in China who have had any training at all in Western 
medicine and almost none who have been adequately trained”.  
The success of medical missionaries was limited, in both medical and missionary 
terms. They won few converts (Yang, 2006, pp. 1-44), and did not manage to establish 
fully the technological advantage of Western medicine (Balme, 1921, pp. 60-81). As 
Parker noticed, patients went only to Chinese doctors when they sensed acute illnesses, 
and tended not to visit a Western medicine hospital unless they needed surgery (Liang, 
2013). This was supported by Chen Zhiqian’s memoir, which mentioned that people 
in the 1910s generally believed Western medicine to be good at surgical cases, while 
traditional Chinese medicine was more trusted by the Chinese people when it came to 
non-surgical conditions (Chen, 1989, p. 20). While helping the Rockefeller Foundation 
design its strategy for health philanthropy in China, Welch commented that “Chinese 
appreciate Western surgery, but do not seem to consider Western drugs superior to their 
own” (Bullock, 1980a, p. 39). The China Medical Commission of the Rockefeller 
Foundation (1914, pp. 74-77) also pointed out that “[a]lmost all the foreign physicians 
have been interested primarily in surgery”, but even surgery was limited to the “simple 
and obvious” cases due to distrust of patients and potential risk of hospitalization “not 
safe in performing any operation which might end fatally”, and abdominal surgery was 
rarely performed.  
The Canton Hospital still relied on eye surgery to attract patients in 1894—60 
years after its establishment (Liang, 2013). Liang (2013) studied Chinese and Western 
medicine hospitals in Guangdong and Hong Kong in the late Qing period (1840—1911) 
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and showed that Chinese benevolent societies and medical providers had started to 
adopt the model of hospital-based care (with Chinese or Western medicine). However, 
in a hospital that used both Chinese and Western medicine, which the China Medical 
Commission of the Rockefeller Foundation (1914, p. 75) visited, patients exhibited 
clear preference for native medicine over Western medicine when given both options.  
As springboards of Western civil engagement with China, mission hospitals 
received support from religious organisations back home. In terms of governance and 
financing, the mission hospitals were primarily accountable to their home churches, 
though a significant proportion of funding would have come from local donations and 
paying patients. Hence, hospitals by 1901 were above all spiritual enterprises, focusing 
on saving souls, while medical services as an act of body-healing (curative by nature) 
were a secondary purpose. Despite a small reach and the limited medical function that 
to an extent resembled the native benevolent societies, these mission hospitals 
established an important transition in the Chinese medical world by not only building 
a new type of medical organisation but also embedding a new medical profession in 
hospital-centred facilities.  
5.5.3 Consolidation of hospital-based professionalization (1901-1928) 
The years between 1901 and 1928 saw further post-juncture strengthening of 
hospital-related institutions. As the country was in continuous chaos, e.g. the Boxer 
Rebellion (1899-1901, also known as the Boxer Uprising), the Xinhai Revolution 
(1911), and the Warlord Era (1916-1928), there was barely any national coordination 
of medical development by the government. Progress in establishment of health 
services under the state was limited to either local initiative or selected sectors (e.g. 
railways and customs). A number of medical schools under missionary organisations 
were established, reinforced by new sources of money, particularly brought first by the 
indemnity for missionary hospitals after the Boxer Rebellion, and then by the 
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establishment of the China Medical Board by the Rockefeller Foundation (Deng et al., 
2000; Wong et al., 1936). Emboldened by the newly found resources, and pushed by 
the rapid medical development in Western countries and China’s engagement with 
Japan, medical professionals started to demand modernization of hospitals and became 
increasingly assertive of professional values. As this sub-section argues, the arrival of 
the Rockefeller Foundation amongst a number of emerging trends emboldened a 
movement towards scientific medicine and further consolidated hospital-based 
professionalization of modern medicine. 
The unusual timing of the entry of the Foundation deserves attention. Around its 
entry to China, the Foundation was leading a far-reaching makeover of medical 
education in the United States (US), its home country, focusing on raising standards in 
a perceived situation of over-supply of doctors. In 1910, Abraham Flexner conducted 
a survey of medical education in US and Canada. The result was a report that classified 
American medical schools into three groups: the group that came out on the top were 
of a level similar to Johns Hopkins; the second group were substandard schools which 
required substantial reinforcement; the last group were of poor quality and deserved 
closure or consolidation (Flexner, 1910). Along with the following enactment of state 
licensing laws for medical schools and the carrot of funding support, in which the 
Foundation played a critical role, the Flexner Report triggered a fundamental medical 
reform through the US based on the Johns Hopkins standard. In the following quarter 
of a century, more than half of medical schools in America were closed (Cooke et al., 
2006). 
The Foundation transplanted the same vision of high standard medical education 
to China. In 1914, the Rockefeller Foundation sent the China Medical Commission to 
investigate the situation of health and medicine in China and to give recommendations 
regarding the Foundation’s activities in China. They visited 17 medical schools and 97 
hospitals, which they believed covered the most important and representative ones in 
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China. The conclusion was to focus on high standard medical education, including 
building two medical schools (one in Beijing and one in Shanghai), and providing 
assistance to medical schools in Guangzhou and Changsha. In terms of hospitals, the 
Foundation provided aid to mission hospitals to hire additional doctors and improve 
diagnostics and other services, in the hope that these would prepare them for clinical 
training of medical students (China Medical Commission of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, 1914, pp. 92-98). An illustration of the high standard adopted was the 
overspending on building palatial premises for the Peking Union Medical College 
(PUMC). PUMC opened in 1921, and its cost was among the main reasons why the 
medical college in Shanghai was never built. Besides luxurious facilities, the 
Foundation was also hiring world-class professors with very generous salaries and 
recruiting students who could afford a high tuition fee (Bullock, 1980a: Chapter 4). 
Such an elitist strategy could appear problematic (and was criticized later on) as 
the situations of US and China could not have been more different. The fact that the 
Foundation’s strategy was warmly received by some leading officials and medical 
reformers tells as much about the change going on in China as about the Foundation’s 
preference. While there was considered an oversupply of doctors in the US (1 doctor 
for every 568 people), in 1910, there were fewer than 500 trained doctors in China, 
and only between 45 and 55 were Chinese doctors trained in Western medicine serving 
more than 400 million Chinese (China Medical Commission of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, 1914, p. 8). Despite the apparently opposite situations of accumulation of 
Western medical doctors in China and US, the Foundation’s strategy resonated with 
the Chinese zeitgeist. The “May Fourth Movement” took place in 1919 and evolved 
into the New Cultural Movement, upholding science and democracy as key approaches 
to modernization while traditional values were condemned. With idealism in the air, 
Chinese medicine came under fierce criticism. In 1922, the leading leftist writer Lu 
Xun published the popular book Outcry (Nahan in Chinese), in the preface harshly 
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criticizing Chinese medicine doctors as “either unwitting or deliberate charlatans”. 
Scientific medicine at the high standard promoted by PUMC was accepted by Chinese 
officials, some of whom praised the Foundation for establishing scientific medicine 
(Bullock, 1980a: Chapter 1). Besides it appeared also a difficult time for developing 
other aspects of medicine, the Foundation dropped an idea of large scale public health 
effort, following the advice of the China Medical Commission of the Rockefeller 
Foundation (1914) which considered such effort not feasible in a fragmented nation. 
More importantly, the vision, and money of the Foundation reinforced the pressure 
towards modernization of missionary hospitals, which was already accumulating 
among medical missionaries. The reflection of a Canadian medical missionary Dr. 
McClure captured this momentum:  
“The big problem in the early days of medicine in China really was how scientific you 
would be. This was an ethical problem with the individual doctor and it was always a struggle. 
For instance, every time you raised your standards, you raised the cost and therefore the 
price to the patient. As medicine came into China, you first of all had antiseptic medicine, 
because that was what was being practised in Canada at the time. The sterilized sheet, the 
drapes, and that had not yet come into Canada. Then as antiseptic medicine was accepted in 
Canada and rapidly followed by aseptic medicine, with sterile techniques and scrubbed 
hands and sterilized drapes, you had this tremendous struggle. Should the mission hospital 
adapt and enter the new field that it made available? The new field of abdominal surgery and 
that sort of thing. At each of these stages of progress, some doctors opted out. They said, ‘We 
came here to preach the gospel and use medicine as a vehicle: it’s not necessary for us to 
use a scientific medicine.’ Very few did opt out, some merely dragged their feet.” (Austin, 
1986, p. 168) 
The Chinese Medical Missionary Association (CMMA)—an association covering 
80% of all missionary hospitals in China, produced a report, seemingly to expose the 
poor conditions of these hospitals. Just to list some indications of poor conditions from 
the report, only 25% of hospitals had good sanitary arrangement, 34% did not have a 
pressure steriliser, 62% did not have night nursing, and 34% did not even have a nurse. 
This situation was then reported through a book published in London seeking more 
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assistance in terms of financial and human resources (Balme, 1921, pp. 82-106). 
Balme’s report, published in the same year as the opening of PUMC, was likely to 
have been emboldened by the example of PUMC, and demonstrated a shift of strategy 
from focusing on “quantitative aspect” (e.g. services and winning converts) towards 
focusing on “qualitative aspect” (e.g. equipment and teaching). Balme expressed in the 
report the anxiety of medical missionaries and warning on sponsors:  
“mission hospitals are now no longer the only hospitals known to the educated classes in 
China… [I]f… the mission hospital is not to become discredited in the eyes of the educated 
Chinese from a professional standpoint…, it must attempt to keep pace with modern 
developments—in other words it must become, in fact as well as in name, a Christian hospital 
[sic]”.  
The Foundation’s annual report in 1922 showed that it had been supporting a 
number of missionary hospitals (Rockefeller Foundation, 1922) (see Figure 5-2). John 
Stenley’s study of Weixian in Hebei also showed that the coming of the Foundation 
brought both new funding and new pressure on missionary groups to raise the scientific 
standard of mission hospitals (Stanley, 2006). Medical graduates from prestigious 
universities also set up locally accommodated copies of their alma maters—“Harvard-
in-China, Yale-in-China, and Oberlin-in-China”. For example, graduates of the 
University of Toronto established, built and staffed the medical college of the West 
China Union University (Austin, 1986, pp. 169-170). Such governance institutions 
alienated the universities from local society and reasserted professional values. 
The missionary conference also allowed hospitals to charge patients money 
(Renshaw, 2003). According to the China Medical Commission’s report mentioned 
above, the mission hospitals had most of their non-staff expenditures covered by local 
sources by 1914. The high degree of financial self-reliance entailed the concentration 
of mission hospitals in urban and coastal areas where there was a rise of middle class 
and richer people. This was reinforced by the Foundation’s focus of financial 
assistance to areas which were perceived as strategically important by the 1914 report 
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(China Medical Commission of the Rockefeller Foundation, 1914, pp. 41-52). In other 
words, the overall accumulation of Western medicine was slow and highly inequitable 
geographically. 
  
Figure 5-2. Location of institutions receiving aid from the China Medical Board 
Source: (Rockefeller Foundation, 1922) 
Note: the China Medical Board was a main funding agency providing financial assistance in medical 
and health affairs in China from the Rockefeller Foundation from 1914, and later became independent 
in 1928. 
 
The consolidation of high standard teaching hospitals resulted in a concentration 
of relatively well-trained Western medicine doctors in hospitals. Building upon the 
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establishment of mission hospitals, this was a second step forward in hospital-based 
professionalization. At least from the perspective of Western medicine advocates, the 
central role of hospitals was obvious (Yin, 2013, p. 186). An article in a weekly popular 
Chinese medical journal sponsored by a student association of PUMC promoted the 
advantages of hospitals in both quality of care (attention to patients’ conditions, 
quarantine against infections, etc) and professional development (development of 
specialities, use of sophisticated technologies) (Anonymous, 1928). As the attention 
of medical modernization was focusing on mission hospitals in selected areas, medical 
care for the vast majority of Chinese was provided, if at all, by Chinese medicine 
practitioners of various sorts (China Medical Commission of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, 1914, pp. 6-8).  
The initial introduction of mission hospitals between 1835 and 1844 seemed to 
have set in motion a dynamic process that led to the step-wise development of hospital-
centrism. First emerging as a venue to showcase technological advantage and establish 
civil engagement, hospitals then became as a venue to preach, and later as a venue to 
train and employ modern medical professionals. By 1928, a hospital-based profession 
of bio-medicine had truly emerged, with all four institutional pillars distinct from the 
primary care sector based on Chinese medicine. As to primary care, there was no 
evidence suggesting much indigenous change. Therefore, it was a period of radical 
contrast, with islands of modern hospitals in an ocean of Chinese medicine 
practitioners.  
5.6 Two tracks of health services development (1928-1949) 
The state has so far been playing a minor role in medical services, arguably limited 
by the state’s capacity. By contrast, the period between 1928 and 1949 saw the state 
entering the centre of the policy stage. With this transformation of the state’s role in 
health, understanding how the state actors came to see the importance of primary care 
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and the strengths and limitations of state capacity in introducing changes became 
crucial to analysis of the coevolution of the two sectors. Using the path dependence 
analysis framework, this section focuses on whether (and in what way) this 
transformation led to a conjuncture of major change in coevolution of the two sectors 
of hospitals and primary care providers, and after this conjuncture, how such policy 
changes were actually implemented or modified, and whether (and in what way) the 
process led to a more balanced development between primary care providers and 
hospitals. 
5.6.1 The emerging agenda of state medicine (1928-1934) 
The period between 1928 and 1934 constituted a conjuncture and witnessed a 
major turn in the pervading agenda for medical development from focusing on high 
standard scientific medicine to a new vision of providing modern medicine to the 
people. Critical in explaining this change seemed to be four interrelated factors: the 
establishment of state-level health authority, the active role of key reform advocates, 
the contributions of international exchanges, and the development of local experiences. 
In 1928, the Nationalist Party of China (also known as Kuo-min Tang) put an end to 
the chaotic Warlord Era and unified China. Around the time of the establishment of 
the Ministry of Health, there was tension between graduates from an Anglo-American 
style of medical education and graduates from a German-Japanese style of medical 
education. In what appeared to be an effort to build consensus, Grant pushed for 
China’s engagement with the League of Nations Health Organisation (LNHO) 
(Bullock, 1980b: Chapter 6).  
The LNHO also offered important support for China to reclaim its sovereignty in 
quarantine services previously controlled by the British, and engagement with the 
LNHO was particularly valued by the Nationalist Administration (Yip, 1992). There 
was clear enthusiasm also from the side of LNHO, as its engagement with China 
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greatly enhanced its status in helping design a national health system (Borowy, 2009). 
The technical assistance from LNHO buttressed a domestic call for state medicine with 
international consensus and experiences. It should be noted that this was the heyday 
of social medicine. Štampar--a pioneer of social medicine--was sent to China, among 
other technical advisers, to help China establish its own health system (Grmek, 1966, 
p. 16). Štampar’ s experience in designing the Yugoslavian system was also introduced 
to China via LNHO (Borowy, 2009; Zylberman, 2004). The importance of 
international experience, and particularly the example of Yugoslavia, in the 
advancement of the agenda of state medicine was reflected in an article by Wu (1931). 
Arguing that the growth of public hospitals was replacing privately practising general 
doctors in the West, and acknowledging the limited number of qualified doctors 
(12,000 for a population of 450 million) in China, Wu said that 
“a more economical and perhaps more effective way of meeting this 
deficiency lies in the establishment of state and municipal clinics and health 
centres for the people, such as have been instituted in Jugo-Slavia 
[Yugoslavia]… Only trained experts in limited numbers need then be employed, 
each of whom can treat a large number of cases with more satisfactory results 
than if the same had been treated in private consulting rooms”. 8 
Lending crucial empirical support for the plan were several local pilots, in 
particular Chen Zhiqian’s experiment in Ding County. Chen was a favourite student of 
Grant at PUMC, and had been an activist for state medicine (Bullock, 1980a: Chapter 
7). In 1932, Chen took charge of the Department of Rural Health of the Mass 
Education Movement in Ding County, an ordinary poor agricultural county. Chen 
designed the rural health programme to address the villagers’ primary health problems 
which were mainly infectious diseases, e.g. smallpox, trachoma, dysentery, tetanus, 
                                                 
8 Health centres during this period were actually more than small hospitals. 
Part II  History 
165 
typhoid, etc., and to satisfy the low cost needed to win over the villagers who spent 
only 30 cents on average (based on an earlier survey in Ding County) on traditional 
medicine (Ch'en, 1933). While other local experimentations were organized, Chen’s 
experiment in Ding County was influential in turning the agenda of medical 
development towards rural areas (Lei, 2014: Chapter 10). 
Overall, the structure of the Ding County health programme included vertical 
health professional supervision and horizontal multi-sectoral community 
reconstruction (Grant, 1963 (1934)). The concept of community was critical in the 
Ding County model, which was represented best in the central role of village health 
personnel in the health programme. The village health personnel were selected from 
graduates of a local school organized by the Mass Education Movement and became 
village health workers after a short training course. The training lasted for about ten 
days and covered registration of births and deaths, small-pox vaccination and first-aid 
(Ch'en, 1933). Villagers organized through the school provided the supervision. Chen’s 
experiences showed that the minimal training was enough to address the most basic 
health needs and provide the most basic functions (disinfection, vaccination, etc.), 
while taking into consideration economic sustainability. Chen also acknowledged 
repeatedly that the expansion of health services in Ding County was built on organized 
local community efforts and “depends on the effectiveness of not only health 
programme alone, but of the all-round reconstruction programme, raising the general 
intellectual and economic level of the people” (Ch'en, 1933, 1934). 
The other concept was that of a well-coordinated organization of health services 
(Ch'en, 1934). Upwards from the core formed by village health workers, were the sub-
district health stations with doctors graduated from provincial medical schools, whose 
“first duty” was to train and supervise village health workers regarding both curative 
and preventive medicine, besides attending daily clinics (Ch'en, 1933). Chen put great 
emphasis on the supervisory role, and even criticized that the Yugoslavian practice was 
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inadequate in that there was no obvious professional supervision of village-level health 
workers (Chen, 1989); he argued that the training of medical school graduates needed 
to be reformed to enable them to work in rural areas. At the top of the technical ladder 
was the county health centre, which combined a hospital with fifty beds, a laboratory 
as well as administrative roles, and which coordinated and supplemented the activities 
of sub-district health stations. Originally, the hospital only accepted patients referred 
from sub-stations (Ch'en, 1933). Later about 50% of the inpatients were admitted 
through referral (Ch'en, 1937b).  
With these converging factors, state medicine soon became a national policy 
guideline in 1934, as the Public Health Technical Conference proposed 
implementation of state medicine (Jin, 1946): “For a unit of 5-10,000 population, there 
should be a rural sub-station to take care of simple medical and health work, and for 
every five or ten such sub-stations, there should be a district health station to render 
more fundamental health and medical services to the people. In a hsien (county), there 
should be a health centre which includes a hospital, a simple laboratory and an 
administrative organ for the supervision of medical and public health work under its 
jurisdiction.” (Wong et al., 1936, p. 801). 
Overall, the introduction of the plan for state medicine constituted a major turn 
not only in terms of health policy but also in the broad movement of medical 
development. First, state medicine involved the state’s responsibility, particularly for 
the previously ignored rural population. Second, attention shifted from high standard 
(Western) medical professionals to a more equalized distribution of a workforce 
sustainably trained and recruited. Third, there was consensus around the combination 
of preventive care and curative care. Within this was an assumption that low-cost 
preventive care should be prioritized. Fourth, village-level autonomy and 
reorganization was considered to be needed to support, deliver and supervise services. 
Fifth, a technical hierarchy would be needed for both supervision and technology 
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transfer. This change in the prevailing mind-set was well reflected in an editorial of 
the Chinese Medical Journal (Zhi, 1928), which proposed priorities for the newly 
founded Ministry of Health. In that article, medical reformers expressed regrets about 
the late adoption of Western medicine as compared to Japan. However, they were also 
abandoning the Japanese Westernization approach of medical modernization—
considering it unfit for rural China—in favour of the social medicine approach 
exemplified by Yugoslavia.  
By the 1930s, mission hospitals had also shown much progress. Table 5-4 
compares the findings of Balme’s report with those of Snell’s report. Obviously, 
mission hospitals were still generally very small and poorly resourced by 1933-1934—
hospitals on average had only 4.9 physicians, with 64.7 beds on average. The 
technological progress of hospitals was also obvious in comparison with 1919, with a 
much improved situation regarding equipment (e.g. 50% had an X-ray in 1933-1934, 
as compared to 13% in 1919) (Wong et al., 1936, p. 815).  
Table 5-4. Comparison between results of mission hospital surveys 1919-1933/1934  
 1919 1933-34 
Number of hospitals 189 214 
Total value (Mexican silver dollars, $) * 646,780  43,467,121  
Average value per hospital ($) 36,916  214,465  
Total bed numbers 11,900  16,930  
Total value of equipment ($) 850,761  6,582,443  
Percentage of hospitals with…   
  Pure water supply  8% 42~50% 
  Good sanitary arrangement  25% 43% 
  Regular bath of hospitalized patients  <50% 81% 
  Laundry   57% 80% 
  Food supply control 50% 94.50% 
  Standard hospital beds  <45% 80% 
  Adequate bedding  <63% 90% 
Percentage of hospitals without…   
  Clothing  58% 27% 
  Pressure sterilizer  34% 9% 
Part II  History 
168 
  Screening against flies and mosquitoes 37% 9% 
  Laboratory of any kind 31% 4% 
  Bacteriological incubator 82% 44% 
  X-ray plant 87% 50% 
  Nurse  34% 5% 
Night nursing 62% <16% 
Source: adapted from (Wong et al., 1936, p. 815) 
Note: * At that time, the Mexican silver dollar was a popular currency used in China. 
5.6.2 Splitting into two tracks (1935-1949) 
The momentum of state medicine continued to grow after the 1934 proposal for 
state medicine, however the implementation of the plan faced several challenges. This 
sub-section covers the post-juncture development of the state medicine programme, 
the challenges the programme faced, and its adaptation and results. As the sub-section 
argues, development of primary care level eventually emphasised epidemic control 
rather than general medical development, as epidemic control was a more pressing 
issue. The evolution of primary care formed a stark contrast with the increasingly 
secured institutionalization of hospitals as the place for professional medicine. 
Towards the end of this sub-section, a brief summary of the communist health 
programmes is also included. 
In 1937, the Chinese Medical Association organized a high-profile conference to 
discuss state medicine, and publicly endorsed the programme (Wu, 1937). In the issue 
of the Chinese Medical Journal that came out of this conference, Wu traced the history 
of state medicine to ancient China and argued that state-sponsored health services had 
existed and endured a long period of time, and that state medicine was a lost native 
tradition to be revived with new knowledge (Wu, 1937). This appeared to be an attempt 
to establish state medicine as part of a growing patriotic narrative at that time.  
The state medicine programme was continued, despite tight resource constraints 
and other harsh social conditions (Štampar, 1936). The total government (i.e. 
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combining central, provincial, municipal and county-level) budget for health was 10.8 
million yuan which represented only 0.7% of the total government budget, or 0.027 
yuan per capita (based on Reports of Minister of Finance and Director-General of 
National Health Administration for 1936 (Sze, 1943)). In 1940, during the War of 
Resistance against Japanese Aggression, the Nationalist Party Congress approved the 
proposal for state medicine, which became the fundamental policy in health 
governance during the Republic of China (Jin, 1946). At least at one point (1942), the 
county programme benefited from a county tax (Watt, 2013). The country’s top leader, 
Chairman Jiang (1943) of the National Military Council of the Nationalist Government 
of the Republic of China, published China’s Destiny during the Second World War, 
promising the biggest ever investment in the state medicine programme. After the war 
ended in 1945, Jin Baoshan, then director of the National Health Administration, called 
again for universal implementation of state medicine (Jin, 1946). In 1947, 
implementation of state medicine was written into the Constitution of the Republic of 
China (National Congress, 1947).  
The implementation of the national version of the Ding County health programme 
was limited and deviated from the original model. The emphasis on “community” 
development in the Ding County model was fundamentally hindered by unwillingness 
of the government to bring in social reform. Although advocated as a most important 
option for social reform with great potential to boost community development by 
medical reformers (League of Nations Health Organization, 1937), land reform was 
shunned by the Nationalists (while actively pushed by the Communists). Rural 
reconstruction was also restricted by the Nationalists and stopped by the invasion of 
the Japanese in 1937 (Hayford, 1990). Without the strong community that underpinned 
the Ding County model, recruitment and supervision of village health workers in the 
implementation of state medicine at village level encountered severe difficulty. 
Implementers of the state medicine programme resorted to discussion about replacing 
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village health workers (Lei 2014: Chapter 10).  
The “system” plank of the Ding County model was held back by the lack of work 
force, particularly at the middle level, which seemed to reflect the difficulties in 
changing professional institutions. First, there was a lack of accumulated quantity of 
Western medicine practitioners. In 1935, China had 5000 physicians, as many as there 
were in Yugoslavia, which had only 14.5 million people in contrast to China’s 400 
million. In addition, eighty percent of Yugoslavian doctors lived in rural areas (Watt, 
2013, p. 62). Second, the Chinese state lacked control over private practitioners, unlike 
in Yugoslavia, where most doctors were state-employed. According to the estimation 
of the Report of Director-General of National Health Administration for 1940, more 
than half of the 12,0009 Western style doctors in China were in private practice. 75% 
of private practitioners were concentrated in the main ports of the six coastal provinces, 
which created “extraterritorial difficulties of control” (Sze, 1943, pp. 18-19). 
Third, the reform of medical education was not coordinated with the state 
medicine programme. Bullock (1980a: Chapter 4) described the resistance at PUMC 
to call for revision of its elitist curriculum and educational arrangements. There were 
also various opinions on the criteria for training for the village health stations (Ch'en, 
1937b). Not only was the number of students trained small, the training was also not 
suitable for the pressing health needs of the Chinese population. As Chen pointed out, 
critical skills like birth control, diagnosis of prevalent diseases (e.g. trachoma), 
vaccination (e.g. for small pox) were not mastered, nor was the admission and 
education geared towards a rural career (Chen, 1935). Establishment of medical 
education in the Central Field Health Station, a national level demonstration project 
and training organisation for of health delivery, also focused primarily on preventive 
                                                 
9 There was a nation-wide reform of medical education in the 1930s, which probably explained the 
increased number of staff. 
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services and epidemic control (Dyer, 1936). Only during the war was the idea of using 
medical schools to train state medicine officers realized. In 1941, the Nationalist 
Government put all medical graduates under its command (Gao, 2012).  
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the champions of state medicine were 
generally reluctant to accept Chinese medicine practitioners. As the Western medicine 
practitioners attempted to recruit the state to ban Chinese medicine (other than the 
materia medica), the reaction of Chinese medicine practitioners led to increasing 
struggle between the two camps (Lei, 2014: Chapter 10). The scepticism about Chinese 
medicine practitioners was expressed by Oldt (1937). The system in Ding county 
developed by Chen was in a way aimed at dislodging Chinese medicine with a low-
cost version of scientific medicine combining public health and medical care (Chen, 
1935).  
Due to these challenges, the county health systems and hospitals split into two 
tracks of development. The county health systems benefited from the popularization 
of a nation-wide reform of government structure, which made each county government 
a highly autonomous local administration. The programme of establishing county 
health systems continued during wartime. After the systemic Japanese invasion in 
1937, Chen left Ding County but continued to organize county health systems in 
Sichuan (Watt, 2013, p. Chapter 6). The coverage of county systems expanded from a 
handful of demonstration areas plus Jiangxi to more areas around the country. The 
number of county health centres grew quickly from 181 in 1937, to 691 in 1940, 978 
in 1945, and 1440 in 1947 (Compiling Committee, 1984; Lucas, 1980, p. 156). The 
county health centres were isolated, however, as there were only 436 sub-district health 
stations under the county health centres by 1947, and almost all were of poor quality 
(Compiling Committee, 1984, pp. 9-16; Jin, 1946). The War of Resistance, despite 
bringing huge destructions to rural health programmes, drove a more even distribution 
as the capital was moved to inland China from coastal Nanjing (Watt, 2013) (see Table 
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5-5). Amid the social turmoil (including war and hyperinflation) during the later period 
of the War of Resistance, the leadership of county health centres deteriorated and 
administrators frequently resorted to “commercial behaviours” (Watt, 2013). With 
weak ability of hospitals to provide technical supervision to primary care facilities, 
there was a tendency for provincial and county hospitals (health centres) to serve only 
the provincial capitals or county seat (Lim & Chen, 1937; Štampar, 1936). In 1942, 
the government also shifted its priority from training physicians for county health 
centres to training village health workers (Watt, 2013). In the end, the county-system 
became virtually a network of poorly resourced state machinery focusing on 
prevention of epidemics. 
In terms of hospital development, the state medicine movement provided a 
rationale for an increasing role of the state. According to Sze (1943, p. 16), the 60 
government hospitals existing in 1943 had mainly been built after 1927. By 1947, there 
were 110 provincial hospitals, and 56 municipal hospitals. While the government 
started building new public hospitals, it engaged (or rather attempted to take over) 
mission hospitals. Mission hospitals also actively joined the medical education system, 
“[t]he Hopei Provincial Medical College has had but inadequate hospital facilities up 
to the present; and has lately entered into an arrangement with the Taylor Hospital of 
the Presbyterian Mission in Paoting by which groups of surgical students make 
teaching ward rounds at stated times in that hospital” (Hume, 1935). Mission hospitals 
were generally collaborative with the state, an encouragement for which was the 
conversion of Chairman Jiang to Christianity (Chatterton, 2010).  
The state also showed its eagerness to control hospitals under the name of state 
medicine during the War of Resistance. There was a retreat of missionaries after the 
Great Depression (the number of missionaries in general reduced from about 8,000 in 
1920 to 4,250 in 1936, and funding generally declined by a third (Deng, 2001)). With 
the rise of Chinese nationalism, leadership of missionary hospitals was gradually 
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transferred to Chinese practitioners of Western medicine (Hume, 1935; Spence, 1969, 
pp. 161-183). In the face of financial difficulty, Hume also pushed for the admission 
of private paying patients (Hume, 1935). Such localization processes contributed to 
the government’s case to take over mission hospitals. Speaking as a representative of 
the government for issues related to medical missionaries, Shi Siming (Szeming Sze) 
outlined a plan to take over all mission hospitals and make them either provincial 
hospitals or county health centres. Shi argued that the government was able to enforce 
the plan, as it controlled the ability to withhold or withdraw registration, and both the 
sources of financing and the managerial roles of mission hospitals had been largely 
shifted from foreign missionaries to Chinese (Sze, 1943, pp. 16-19). The cooperation 
between the mission hospitals and the Nationalists only foregrounded a full state take-
over once the Communists assumed power.  
Analysis of distribution of health facilities also revealed the institutional division 
between hospitals and primary care providers. Designed as the units of “a basic 
medical organization” (Ch'en, 1937b), the county health system, when scaled up 
during the difficult period plagued by social turmoil, became a track of medical 
development detached from the track of hospitals. A comparison between hospitals 
and county health centres in provinces with available data between 1935 and 1942 
showed drastically different distribution patterns (see Table 5-5). The province with 
the highest density of hospitals had 14.6 times the number of hospitals enjoyed by the 
province with the fewest number of hospitals between 1935 and 1936. More drastic 
differences are apparent, for example, the ratios of physicians, nurses and beds 
between the best resourced provinces and the least were 24.7:1, 65.5:1 and 24:1 
respectively. The distribution of county health centres appeared to be much more 
equalized—the number of county health centres in the province with the biggest 
number was 5.5 times that of the province with the smallest number. 
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Table 5-5. Comparison of distribution of hospital resources and county health centres  
(unit: per million population) 
 Hospitals 
(1935-1936) 
Hospital 
physicians 
(1935-1936) 
Hospital 
nurses 
(1935-1936) 
Hospital 
beds  
(1935-1936) 
County 
health centres 
(1942)  
Zhejiang 
(Chekiang) 
3.65 14.40 22.00 176.20 3.05 
Fujian 
(Fukien) 
2.40 5.70 26.20 183.50 6.40 
Guangdong 
(Kwangtung) 
0.74 4.23 10.61 59.97 2.32 
Sichuan 
(Szechewan) 
0.36 1.13 3.81 22.62 1.38 
Hunan 0.61 2.11 4.46 30.29 2.68 
Jiangxi 
(Kiangsi) 
0.45 1.09 4.49 33.21 5.32 
Shaanxi 
(Shensi) 
0.50 0.50 0.40 8.30 5.40 
Guangxi 
(Kwangsi) 
0.38 0.92 3.69 22.54 7.62 
Yunnan 0.25 0.58 0.75 7.33 6.42 
Max/min 14.6 24.7 65.5 24 5.5 
Source of data: author’s extraction from and calculation based on (Liu, 1936, p. 1577) cited in Wong 
et al. (1936), and (Sze, 1943, pp. 14-15) 
Note: * To allow comparison between hospitals and county health centres, only provinces with more 
than half of counties under Chinese control in 1942 were included in this table. 
 
To better appreciate the nature of the split, it is helpful to study Chen’s adapted 
proposal in 1937. The original Ding County Model constituted a technical hierarchy 
of hospitals (for inpatients only), health stations (for outpatient and preventive 
services), and lay health workers (for minor infections and preventive services). The 
idea seemed to embody a strong belief in the role of professionals in serving the public 
and also constituted a potential platform for developing general practitioners, perhaps 
reflecting Chen’s own training as a medical professional (shared by other leading 
medical reformers). As mentioned above, the implementation of this plan was 
challenged by the difficulty of mobilizing sufficient human resources. An important 
adaption was proposed by Chen himself in 1937 (Ch'en, 1937a). He questioned the 
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necessity of hospitals in the county health system for the next two decades, arguing 
that effectively functioning hospitals were expensive and beyond the means of 
counties. Chen also pointed out that the health centres were functioning as sub-district 
health stations in practice (Ch'en, 1937a). Lim et al. (1937) also proposed a redrawing 
of boundaries such that hospitals should be providing inpatient care only, while health 
stations provided both outpatient services (comparable to practitioners’ offices) and 
preventive services and public health administration. The “general practitioners for 
public health” (Ch'en, 1937a) at health stations therefore constituted a bridge between 
the professional medical sphere and that of mass public health work. However, Ch'en 
(1937a) further moved to the logic of focusing on de-professionalized health workers, 
as medical services were not the aim, but a condition for preventive services. In other 
words, hospitals were no longer considered the most pressing need in Chen’s county 
health system, and Chen’s focus of professional development shifted from hospitals to 
ambulatory health stations. Eventually, this professional bridge was also broken as 
mentioned earlier in this section. Thus through multiple steps of de-professionalization, 
an alternative track of local health services staffed by lay personnel was established 
and separate from the hospitals above the county level.  
This split reflected the lack of socioeconomic development, the reluctance of 
professional medical education to change course, and the challenges caused by 
coordination difficulties in bringing about institutional change. In reality, the 
importance of epidemic control and the limitations of development in local society 
replaced the idealism for comprehensive social medicine. The profound institutional 
division between hospitals above the county level and county health systems meant 
that primary care providers (in the form of county health systems) were developed as 
the antithesis of hospitals. Hospitals continued to be based on relatively high standard 
professional medical education, providing curative care, enjoying subsidy from either 
external funding agencies or urban private patients, with the sponsorship of higher-
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level government. County health systems were based on scant and usually lay health 
workers, providing mainly preventive services, severely challenged in fund-raising, 
and constrained by lack of wider rural development. Hence, the hospitals and the 
county health systems seem to have embarked on two separate tracks of development. 
Parallel to the county health systems, a low-cost model of medical and health work 
was central in the health work of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in response to 
the harsh conditions for survival. At the eve of the founding of the Nationalist 
Administration, Nationalists started to purge CPC members, killing more than 90% of 
them in 1927 (Lieberthal, 2004, p. 35). The CPC survived and managed to establish 
base areas mainly in Jiangxi (1927-1934), embarked on the Long March (1934-1935), 
established new base areas in northwest Chinese around Yan’an (1935-1947) before it 
became the ruling party of China from 1949. Medical cooperatives involving group 
financing of dispensaries were organized in Yan’an. In 1946, there were 43 medical 
cooperative societies in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region (Ouyang, 1984). In 
contrast to the Nationalists, CPC accepted Chinese medicine, Chairman Mao 
expressing his attitude towards inclusion of Chinese medicine (Mao, 1991 (1944)) as 
follows: “New medicine is of course better than old medicine, but if practitioners of 
new medicine don’t care about the people’s suffering, don’t unite with the one 
thousand odd old medicine practitioners and old-style veterans and help them make 
progress, then the new medicine practitioners are in fact helping the witches, and are 
in fact unconcerned about the enormous deaths of people and livestock.” The 
communist low-cost health work also reinforced the split between hospitals and 
primary care providers under the Nationalists, and paved the way for future 
development on the split tracks.  
The period between 1928 and 1949 therefore witnessed both disruptive changes 
and continuities. The previous development of hospitals was consolidated under the 
Nationalists, financially, professionally, and governance-wise. Organisationally, 
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hospitals also maintained direct access to ambulatory patients. The emerging track of 
primary care was separated from this professional sphere, which was almost 
synonymous with the hospital sector. 
5.7 Summary 
Over the years between 1835 and 1949, a hospital-biased model of health delivery 
was established in China. Initially established by medical missionaries during the 
critical juncture between 1835 and 1844, the hospital bias was reinforced by 1928 by 
both medical missionaries and foreign philanthropists that saw hospitals as a main 
vehicle to exert influence. When the country was reunited under the Nationalist 
Administration in 1928, medical reformers took the initiative and introduced a 
conjuncture that led to a surge of a state medicine programme by 1934. Extending 
modern health delivery through an increased attention to primary care level was a 
central feature of the state medicine programme. However, due to the difficulties 
involved in challenging continuing hospital growth, the coevolution of hospital and 
primary care fell into a divided two-sector track, with professionalized hospitals and 
de-professionalized primary care providers, foregrounding development after 1949. 
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 Path dependence of hospital-
centrism (1949-2013)  
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the historical coevolution of primary care providers and 
hospitals in China from 1949 to 2013, analysed using the approach set out in Section 
5.2. The following section provides an overview of historical context. Then, Sections 
6.3 and 6.4 respectively deal with the history from 1949 to 1978 and from 1978 to 
2013. The final sections of the chapter discuss the findings and conclude the whole 
Part II. 
6.2 Overall historical context (1949-2013) 
This section provides a brief introduction to historical context necessary for 
understanding the historical coevolution of primary care providers and hospitals in 
China between 1949 and 2013. The first decades after the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China witnessed massive socialization programmes, and assistance and 
lessons from the Soviet Union were heavily relied on, particularly after China broke 
its relationship with America in the Korean War in 1951. Rural collectivization was 
rapidly achieved in the 1950s, culminating in the communization of rural society in 
the Great Leap Forward launched in 1958. In 1966, the leadership of the Chinese 
government split and Chairman Mao launched the decade-long “Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution” (referred to as “the Cultural Revolution” from here on), which 
emphasized egalitarian ideology and advocated class struggle as the central policy 
(MacFarquhar & Fairbank, 1987, 1991). After 1978 when the Reform and Opening up 
was launched, China turned its focus away from the class struggle to economic 
development. The economy relied increasingly on market mechanisms, particularly 
after 1992. From 2003 to 2013, the Hu-Wen administration placed a much higher 
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emphasis on balanced development (so-called harmonious society and scientific 
development outlook). The years between 1949 and 2013 witnessed the 
industrialization of the country, with the period after 1978 seeing continuous rapid 
economic development, urbanization and technological innovation. The country saw 
rapid increase of life expectancy in the first three decades, with the disease burden 
shifting from dominance of infectious diseases to non-communicable diseases after 
1978 (Yang, Wang, et al., 2013). 
After 1949, the overall structure of the state was generally stable. There were two 
main lines of leadership. China’s official government system had five levels: central, 
provincial, municipal, county and township. At every level of government, there was 
a parallel leadership by the governing party—the Communist Party of China, which 
according to Hu (1998, p. 17) was a de facto part of government in the Western sense. 
Departments of a lower level of government reported vertically to the 
departments/ministries of a higher level of government on the same functional line, 
and horizontally to their corresponding level of government. This “matrix” generated 
difficulties in coordinating policies and was managed through informal leadership, 
small groups and other mechanisms (Lieberthal, 2004, pp. 234-242). In rare situations 
like the most tumultuous years between 1966 and 1968, Chairman Mao centralized 
power into a national system of Revolutionary Committees. After Mao passed away in 
1976, decisions were made by collective leadership in general. 
Vertically, the central-local inter-governmental relationship in post-1949 China 
can be described as a hybrid structure between a unitary state and federalism, which 
some have described as “de facto federalism”--“a system of multiple centres of power 
in which the central and local governments have the broad authority to enact policies 
of their own choice” (Zheng, 2007, pp. 38–39). Local governments were in charge of 
a significant proportion of health expenditures and administration and therefore were 
important in health (Gusmano, 2015). Most health facilities were locally managed, so 
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their local territorial government played a critical role in implementing central reform 
policies. Horizontally, while health agencies were the main agency in charge of issues 
related to health and health facilities, other ministries played an instrumental role in 
setting policies that influenced the health system profoundly (particularly agencies 
responsible for finance, social security, planning, etc.) (Bloom & Tang, 2004, p. 14). 
The state is not only a structure but also a self-interested actor in the political 
world, and its interrelationship with societal actors determined the influence of these 
actors. Professionals had little direct influence in the Chinese political system. As the 
main professional medical association, the Chinese Medical Association, was annexed 
by the Ministry of Health shortly after 1949 (Chen, 1989). The Association 
predominantly consisted of highly qualified doctors, and largely became a tool for the 
“united front”, a mechanism that the leading Communist party used to connect with 
non-party actors. In the early 1950s, Russian experts played an important advisory role. 
A household registration (hukou) system divided the country into rural residents 
(overwhelmingly peasants) and urban residents and effectively excluded the rural 
population from urban social welfare. People were organized under work units, 
residence committees or rural communes between 1949 and 1978. This urban-rural 
divide as will be seen in this chapter had substantial implications for the co-evolution 
of primary and hospital care sectors. After 1978, market-oriented reform introduced a 
greater degree of freedom in economic decisions. A national system of labour unions 
functioned as an instrument for the Communist party to engage urban workers (Unger 
& Chan, 1995), while there was no similar organisation for rural peasants.  
6.3 Development of the two-sector system of service delivery (1949-1978) 
This section presents the period between 1949 and 1978. State actors and 
parastatal local community actors (communes in particular) emerged as the country 
established a dualist urban-rural system based on a planned economy. As the two 
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sectors of primary care providers and hospitals evolved in this changing social, 
political and economic landscape, the question shifted from how the professionals 
recruited the state to promote health system development to how the state took change 
of the health system and rearranged policies related to the coevolution of the two 
sectors.  
The years between 1949 and 1953 witnessed urban-based industrialisation 
reinforcing the previous concentration of modern medicine in urban areas, which 
consolidated the interest coalition around urban hospitals. From 1953 to 1965, efforts 
to change hospital dominance seem to encountered enormous challenges. Between 
1965 and 1968, major policy changes took place to shift the health development 
priority from urban areas to rural areas, particularly by moving resources to rural areas, 
as well as setting up systematic health care programmes there. In the decade that 
followed (1968-1978), these policies were implemented and adapted, eventually 
evolving into a two-sector system covering almost everybody in the country. 
6.3.1 Launching exclusively urban welfare (1949-1953) 
The years between 1949 and 1953, the nascent socialist state introduced a second 
critical juncture in the direction of hospital centrism. After 1949, public hospitals 
previously under the Nationalist Administration were immediately taken over by the 
new Communist regime. The missionaries withdrew particularly after the start of the 
Korean War in 1950—as mentioned previously, the state medicine programme had 
paved the road for an eventual full nationalization of hospitals, and the formation of 
an urban-centred system of hospital dominance. For example, the provincial 
government of Jiangxi took over the Methodist Nanchang Hospital and seven other 
mission hospitals in 1951 and another one in 1953 (Jiangxi Provincial Health Gazette 
Compiling Committee, 1997, p. 221). The party also shifted its focus from rural areas 
to urban areas (Mao, 1949), and relied on the Soviet Union as a guide for economic 
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and social development. Following the Soviet practice, the Labour Insurance Scheme 
(LIS, covering formal employees of factories, mines, railways, etc.) and the 
Government Employees Insurance Scheme (GIS, covering employees of various 
levels of government and public institutions, as well as students) were established in 
1951 and 1952 respectively (Government Administration Council of the Central 
People's Government, 1951, 1952a, 1952b).  
The reform of the medical education system in 1950 to produce a large number of 
medical school graduates (Ministry of Health, 1951b) also reinforced the technological 
dominance of hospitals and the hospital-based professionalization of doctors. The 
government abolished the previous Western and Japanese systems, in which students 
underwent general medical training without specialization before graduation. Instead, 
it adopted the Russian medical education system with early specialization and 
shortened years of training (Qian, 1988). For instance, the training duration for internal 
medicine, surgery, paediatrics, obstetrics and gynaecology was reduced from six to 
five years, which also included one year of internship. Through this reform, students 
increased their training in their specialties, while “complementary disciplines” were 
less stressed (Zhang, 1953). The result was rapid expansion of numbers of doctors 
trained for the specialized needs of hospitals, and the abolition of general medical 
education. In the year 1951, the number of enrolled students at medical schools 
(excluding the military medical education system) was 19,770, larger than the 
accumulated number of medical graduates over the 69 years before 1949 (People's 
Daily, 1951). In other words, formal medical education became reformed so that it 
mainly produced graduates suitable for the demand of hospitals. Accompanying this 
development was the elimination of private practices in urban areas which mainly were 
generalist in nature (Ministry of Health, 1989). 
In the rural areas, the government stressed the prioritization of preventive 
medicine organized with local resources. Officially, the government prioritized the 
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restoration and construction of county health centres and qu health stations (Xinhua 
Agency, 1951). The Ministry repeatedly stressed that the priority of county and sub-
county health centres/stations was not to provide curative care but to function as a 
fulcrum of all aspects of health work and to organize a local health workforce to 
provide preventive-first health work (i.e. providing guidance and training in epidemic 
prevention and maternal and child health care besides clinical work) (Ministry of 
Health, 1950, 1951a). This focus was enduring as health campaigns were more 
difficult in rural areas due to the problems of illiteracy, superstition, poor transportation 
system, etc (Zhang, 1950). The focus on prevention was also reflected in Zhang 
Zikuan’s report on some rural health experiments organized by the government in the 
early 1950s (Zhang, 1952, 1955). However, the government refrained from 
nationalizing practitioners, allowing the continuation of private practice and the 
formation of group practices (essentially fee-for-service). This contrasted with the pre-
1949 state medicine programme which saw private practice as incompatible with 
public health services. Health committees and associations of health professionals 
were organized below the level of the county to carry out anti-epidemic and maternal 
and child health work under the supervision of local government. Chinese medicine 
practitioners were the dominant curative providers in rural areas.  
The resulting apparently urban-biased welfare system was a major turn away from 
both the previous rural-centric state medicine model, and the CPC’s pre-1949 reliance 
on rural revolution and cooperative medicine approach. It was justified in official 
propaganda as a short-term phenomenon:  
“immediate implementation of publicly funded medical and preventive care system for the 
entire population is impossible. [We] can only start from the partial, and gradually expand 
(the coverage) incrementally from now on” (Zhang, 1953). 
6.3.2 Self-reinforcing development of hospital dominance (1953-1965) 
The initial urban bias quickly saw a post-juncture process of financial self-
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reinforcement. While both hospitals and primary care facilities were able to generate 
extra-budgetary revenue from patient charges, hospitals enjoyed the demand-side 
subsidy from insurance payment as well as the greater affordability of urbanites—both 
strong and stable. The bias was reinforced in urban areas due to the prioritization for 
hospitalizations under GIS and LIS. According to the implementation document for 
the GIS, “30% [of the fund] is for outpatient medical and pharmaceutical devices and 
materials, and physical examination; 70% is for inpatient medical and pharmaceutical 
devices and materials” (Government Administration Council of the Central People's 
Government, 1952b). Such a reimbursement system favouring hospitalization 
contributed to the concentration of resources in hospitals. From 1954 to 1957, the bed 
occupancy rate of hospitals nationwide increased from 69.4% to 80.3% (Ministry of 
Health, 1989, p. 91).  
During the post-Great-Leap-Forward retrenchment period, government provided 
fully budgeted wages to hospital staff in 1960, and also started to request hospitals to 
lower charges for hospitalizations more than for outpatient services, in official terms 
“less reduction for minor illnesses, more reduction for major illnesses” (Ministry of 
Health & Ministry of Finance, 1960). Hospitals consumed 70% of total health 
expenditures in the 1960s (He, 2001). Pharmaceutical and materials sales mark-ups 
(i.e. “bought at wholesale prices from distributors and sold at retail prices to patients”) 
became an important way to finance hospital services, replacing previous 
commitments to fund the gap between expenditures and revenues of hospitals 
(Ministry of Health et al., 1960). 
The financial investment skewed towards hospital development resulted in 
institutional resilience related to powerful societal interests. The most obvious 
illustration was the government’s largely failed attempt to rein in deficits of medical 
spending. In the 1950s, spending on GIS and LIS surpassed the growth rate of the 
overall economy (Liu, 2009). In Shandong, affiliated institutions of the provincial 
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government suffered from an increasing deficit in the GIS: 18% in 1954, 33% in 1955 
and 42% in 1956. Similar or worse deficits existed widely in other provinces, such as 
Zhejiang, Shanxi, Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi (Wu, 2014). Jiankangbao (or Health 
News, a main mouthpiece of the Ministry of Health) in 1957 blamed the urbanites for 
allegedly excessive use of medical resources: “[y]oung cadres, students and workers… 
each year on average visit a clinic twelve or thirteen times” (Hillier & Jewell, 1983, p. 
81). The CPC’s principal mouthpiece--Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), as well as a key 
journal of the Ministry of Finance, also pointed towards poor fund management, use 
of GIS and LIS benefits by people not covered (relatives of beneficiaries), incentive 
of medical professionals to generate income from patient utilisation, and the 
“egalitarian attitudes” of some beneficiaries (thinking that everybody, sick or not, is 
entitled to the same amount of expenditures) (Cao, 1955; Huang, 1957; Liu, 1957; Yin, 
1955).  
In response to the overwhelming expenditures on urban health services, the 
government took four major actions: lowering the price of pharmaceuticals, setting up 
regionalized referral networks, establishing sanatoriums, and expanding hospital 
capacity, however, these efforts were not able to contain growing demand, and ended 
up tying hospitals even closer to urban users. The government ordered a decrease of 
pharmaceutical prices in 1957, feeding further increase in utilisation (Liu, 2009). 
Lessons from the Soviet model of “sectional medical service” (a system of 
regionalized referral) were introduced first in large cities and then rolled out nation-
wide. Reports about earlier pilots in Beijing and Shanghai showed that regional 
planning and referral systems were being organized and with some evidence of 
effectiveness. For instance, between 1955 and 1956, large hospitals in Beijing saw 
their average daily outpatient visits per physician reduced from 12.7 to 11.8, while 
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urban union clinics10 saw their daily outpatient visits increased from 16.1 to 27.6 
(Beijing Municipal Health Bureau, 1955; Wang, 1957). The Ministry of Health (1957b) 
issued a policy in 1957 to establish a regional heath delivery system with a technical 
hierarchy and referral mechanisms between urban health care facilities. Changes were 
made through the following measures: 1) moving and establishing new facilities; 2) 
establishing a technical and professional leadership relationship between health 
facilities at different levels; 3) taking advantage of the contract between health 
facilities and LIS plans to require gatekeeping; 4) establishing health care facilities 
specifically for industry workers; and 5) getting health care closer to the people and 
integrating preventive and curative care (Wang, 1957).  
The effects of the efforts to rein in the surging utilisation seemed limited. The 
MOH admitted that there were difficulties in shifting care: “the specialisation and 
quality of grassroots health facilities are highly uneven at present”, and a significant 
number of urban residents (who did not enjoy formal employment status) were paying 
out-of-pocket and therefore were hard to influence through reforming insurance 
payment policies (Ministry of Health, 1957a). The MOH also increased the supply by 
enlarging hospital-based outpatient departments and introducing simplified beds and 
family based beds to expand hospital service capacity (Ministry of Health, 1962). This 
further expanded the hospitals’ role in more general cases that could have been the 
basis for developing general practice.  
A large number of sanatoria, essentially rehabilitation beds, were also established 
(from 3,900 to 68,860 between 1949 and 1957) so that patients who needed 
rehabilitation could be transferred away from hospitals to ease the pressure on 
hospitals (Ministry of Health, 1989, p. 25). Also encouraged by the Soviet experience, 
                                                 
10 Union clinics were group-owned clinics set up in the early 1950s mainly consisting of previously private 
practitioners. 
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independent industrial health delivery systems flourished during this period. Between 
1949 and 1957, the number of health staff in industrial and other sectors rose from 
25,880 (6.5% of the total number of health staff) to 142,972 (15.1% of the total number 
of health staff), or about 40% of the number of staff working in the government health 
sector (353,538) in 1957 (Ministry of Health, 1989). However, the industrial health 
facilities served workers based in factories, and therefore were beyond the realm of the 
Ministry of Health. The demand on urban facilities made any significant shift of 
resources to rural areas in the future difficult, and gradually the intended nation-wide 
referral system was turned into a fragmented system of health service delivery and risk 
pooling. The limited achievement in developing urban primary care seemed 
overwhelmed by the urban demand on hospital services. As a result, the hospital sector 
became embedded in the urban socio-economy. 
The rural health system developed further on a diverged path from that of urban 
areas. In terms of ownership and responsibility for funding, the MOH constantly 
stressed the distinction between vertical professional leadership and horizontal local 
responsibility, throughout its changing policy language regarding rural primary care 
along with rural reforms (see Table 6-1). The lack of a country-wide development of 
state medical welfare following the coverage for urban populations, that some official 
propaganda promised in the early 1950s, was legitimized, as the lack of publicly 
owned facilities at sub-county levels was said to be compatible with the socialist 
system until 1965. Take for example the policy in 1957, the agricultural 
cooperativization movement was in full swing and leading some areas to form medical 
cooperatives. The MOH encouraged the development of self-reliant health stations 
based on agricultural cooperatives, but made it clear that while the county health 
agencies were to assume professional leadership, commune party secretaries were to 
be responsible administratively and financially for commune health centres. The state 
was not supposed to take over “united clinics” that were essentially joint private 
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practices and which charged patient fees for services under government regulation (in 
the price schedule and location of practices, and participation in public health services), 
stating the legitimacy of patient charges and private practitioners and discouraging 
“averagism” (i.e. equal pay for all staff members). It also discouraged annexing of so-
called half-peasants-half-doctors within united clinics (Ministry of Health, 1957a). 
After 1958, the formation of rural communes (a collective economic and political 
organization corresponding to townships) provided the economic and organizational 
basis for commune-funded medical care. After the Qishan County party secretary 
reported their collective rural health network as the first national model of commune 
health organization in the People’s Daily (Yi, 1958), the MOH organized a national 
field conference in 1959 to promote the experience (Ministry of Health, 1960). 
Structurally, commune health centres were formed as mini-hospitals and replaced 
private practice. The commune party secretary (or a commissioner of the commune 
party committee) usually assumed the directorship of commune health centres. Funds 
for commune health centres were collected through a collective welfare fund (Renmin 
Ribao, 1960). As the commune health policies embedded rural medical welfare within 
agricultural production, the naturally unstable revenue due to uncertain yields was 
passed onto rural primary care financing.  
Table 6-1. Policies on ownership of primary care facilities 
Year Policy 
1957 “union clinics emerged from the people… are health welfare institutions with socialist 
nature, the state should not take them over” (Ministry of Health, 1957a)--implying that 
private or collective provision of care based on user charges was not only legitimate but 
also good for the rural population 
1959 “for the medical expenditures of the people… it is best to mainly rely on individual 
payment, with appropriate subsidy from the state and communes” (Ministry of Health, 
1959) 
1960 “collective health and medical schemes are considered preferable” (Ministry of Health, 
1960) 
1962 “the main form of rural grassroots health organizations should be doctor-owned group 
practices for a very long period of time”(Ministry of Health, 1962) 
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1965 “doctors’ group practices are the most numerous and the most problematic, and should 
gradually move towards commune/brigade ownership” (Ministry of Health, 1965) 
1974 “the policy of ‘commune sponsorship with public aid’ applies for collectively-sponsored 
commune health centres” (Ministry of Health, 1974) 
 
The development of medical welfare was likely to have been affected by the 
continued focus on epidemic prevention and maternal and child health. In 1956, county 
health centries went through a separation of their public health functions (as county 
epidemic control stations) and medical care functions (as county hospitals) (Ministry 
of Health, 1956a). The constant effort to justify fee-charging private practice on the 
part of the MOH suggests that commune medical welfare was also driven by the 
commune leadership. Indeed, medical entitlement was among a pack of tangible 
benefits provided by the communes, in a way functioning as a reward/compensation 
for giving up private ownership (Huang, 2000, p. 64). The Great Leap Forward seemed 
to have unintended effects on medical welfare as well, as increasing rural workloads 
during the Great Leap Forward and a post-Leap famine contributed to infectious and 
nutrition related diseases in rural areas and in a way compromised the success of health 
campaigns (State Council, 1963). 
In terms of human resources in rural areas, a multi-tier strategy was adopted to 
train high, middle and primary grade practitioners as mentioned in Chapter 4. At the 
county level, health centres/hospitals were mainly staffed with midlevel graduates. 
These graduates received three-year training in Western medicine (as compared to 
generally five years for fully-trained doctors, and weeks or months of training for 
primary level health personnel) and became assistant doctors. The admission required 
elementary education only (compared to senior middle school education for university 
entrance and basic literacy for primary level heath personnel). At what gradually 
became the township level, half a million Chinese medicine practitioners were 
registered, and a large proportion of them were organized as united clinics (Ministry 
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of Health, 1989). Three-year Western medicine assistant doctors were added to the 
Chinese medicine practitioners from the Great Leap Forward. For example, between 
1958 and 1961, 4800 young graduates (clinical medicine graduates mainly trained in 
three year programmes) from medical schools were reported to be assigned posts in 
sub-county health facilities (Xinhua Agency, 1961).  
Despite the government’s rhetorical emphasis on unification of Chinese medicine 
and Western medicine, the training model for Western medicine appeared more 
productive as the number of Western medicine practitioners gradually overtook that of 
Chinese medicine practitioners. The institutionalization of village level health workers 
relied on training local peasants as half-peasant-half-doctors. Before the Great Leap 
Forward, union clinics with local Chinese medicine doctors trained local peasants for 
basic health work, and training was mainly done through apprenticeship following the 
tradition of Chinese medicine. The productivity of training was boosted after the 
construction of commune health clinics, which became the arena for training village 
staff. Support in training also came from urban hospitals. There formed a very long 
chain of knowledge transfer all the way from urban hospitals to county hospitals, from 
county hospitals to commune health centres, and from commune health centres to 
village health workers (Fang, 2012; Xu, 1960, p. 55). The apprenticeship model and 
the long training chain, however, limited the speed of developing quality and quantity 
of human resources. As the county health centre/hospital doctors were mainly three-
year medical graduates until 1960, there was also limited capacity for technology 
transfer (Ministry of Health, 1989). The development of rural human resources was 
not only lagging behind hospitals, but was also set on a completely different trajactory.  
6.3.3 Turning towards rural primary care (1965-1968) 
The convergence of major political events between 1965 and 1968 formed a 
conjuncture to strengthen primary care. In 1965, the “26th June Directive” prompted 
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the Ministry of Health to shift the focus to rural areas. Starting from 1965, urban 
hospital-based doctors were organized on a large scale as mobile medical teams to 
rural areas, with the crucial task of training village-based half-peasants-half-doctors, 
later known as the barefoot doctors (Commentator, 1965). This marked a drastic 
shortening of the knowledge transfer pipeline, with classroom-based education using 
a simplified textbook and clinical shadowing replacing the traditional apprenticeship, 
and greatly scaled up medical training at the village level (particularly regarding 
Western medicine) (Editorial Office of the Red Flag Magazine, 1968; Pinggu Health 
Bureau, 1986a).  
Change was halted during the start of the Cultural Revolution, when the country 
went through turmoil in the state bureaucratic machine, known as “bombarding the 
headquarters”, introduced by Chairman Mao and his radical followers. The chaos 
eventually led to a centralized political structure and policy making at the very top) 
(Lampton, 1977: Chapters 8 and 9), essentially inhibiting the potential “veto points” 
(urban officials, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education). This allowed not only 
a major reform of medical education to train barefoot doctors but also popularization 
of the Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS). In 1968, the two main articles respectively 
promoted CMS, and barefoot doctors and reform of medical education marked the 
peak of policy change (Editorial Office of the Red Flag Magazine, 1968; 
(Revolutionary Committee of Leyuan Commune, 1968).  
The policy change was not just about substance but also about discourse, 
representing the ideology of the Cultural Revolution. An illustration of such change 
was that according to an article promoting CMS in Renmin ribao in 1968, endorsed by 
Chairman Mao, “poor and lower-middle peasants should hold the power of rural 
medicine” (Revolutionary Committee of Leyuan Commune, 1968), essentially 
foregrounding not only the reinforcement of a community-based low-cost model of 
health delivery but also ruling out a state bureaucratic stake in rural health 
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development. The policy change was both partial and problematic as the quality of 
policy making seemed affected by the lack of representation of multiple interests and 
access to information.  
6.3.4 Resistance in implementation and development in rhetoric (1968-1978) 
Between 1968 and 1978, the most impressive post-jucture changes were perhaps 
the nation-wide coverage of CMS and barefoot doctors. This was both a break away 
from previous strategies for rural health development and a continuation of a two-
sector approach where hospitals and primary care providers were generally embedded 
in the urban-rural divide. Also critical for further development was how policies 
related to the two sectors of primary care providers and hospitals evolved, particularly 
how solidly the rural primary care providers were institutionalized. 
The early formation of an urban-based hospital-centric model of health service 
delivery meant constraints for policy development when rural health was prioritized 
in policy. Two sources from the Beijing Health Bureau illustrated the resistance that 
the policy of sending urban doctors to rural areas was faced with challenges even 
during the Cultural Revolution. In the two years of 1969 and 1970, 3619 medical staff 
(30% of total medical staff) were sent to settle down in rural or remote areas through 
becoming state employees (Beijing Municipal Health Bureau, 1973b). However, the 
“gap in urban hospital staff increased year-on-year, overload and chaos became a 
serious phenomenon, affecting the care-seeking of mass people of workers and 
peasants.” As a response, the document asked for delay in sending down hospital staff 
until “urban medical staff are appropriately replenished to allow for continuous 
sending-down of a proportion of medical staff”, suggesting an urban priority over rural 
areas. The document turned towards the need to address the weakness of rural primary 
care facilities by increasing training (Beijing Municipal Health Bureau, 1973a). 
National numbers of hospital doctors and staff also suggested that the ten years 
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between 1965 and 1975 witnessed generally continuous development of hospitals at 
the county level or above. The proportion of doctors in urban areas and urban hospitals 
was constantly higher than in rural areas, and was growing between 1970 and 1976 
(Ministry of Health, 1989, pp. 60-70). 
In a dynamic process influenced by resistance to change in urban areas, the rural 
health system (primary care providers in particular) were further developed based on 
a shift in rhetoric regarding rural self-sufficiency. The rhetorical reconstruction of what 
“shifting focus to rural areas” meant is reflected in three paintings/posters of rural 
health workers published between 1962 and 1974, exhibited in Figure 6-1. In the first 
painting (top left) just before rural health adjustment took place, the rural health worker 
presented an image of a lonely mobile health worker carefully holding Western 
medicine (the white medicine box seemed an alien object as the colour would be 
avoided in Chinese traditional culture as it was linked with funerals) with both her 
hands. The painting implied that the donkey-riding health worker with a serious look 
on her face was a deliverer of modern medicine from county or sub-county health 
facilities to the distant and poor rural areas, isolated by the mountains and enduring 
hardship.  
In the second painting (top right), the smiling health worker walks in the blooming 
rice field, carrying a medicine box in one hand and a hoe in the other. It highlights the 
identity of a half-peasant-half-doctor, and suggests that health care was now integrated 
with and contributing to the front line of agricultural production—the basis of 
industrialization represented by the high voltage transmission tower in the distant 
background. The flowers in the painting changed from those of wild grasses to those 
of a full-blooming peach tree, suggesting a promising spring and pending fruitfulness 
of the new model of village-based health services.  
In the last picture, several barefoot doctors are studying Chinese herbal medicine, 
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as these medicinal flowers and grasses replaced the centrality of the medicine box. The 
barefoot doctor programme was established based on the local village community. 
Professionally, barefoot doctors became the staff of cooperative medicine stations and 
earned work points as a member of the collectivized village (production brigade). The 
male peasants smiling along with the barefoot doctor seem to personify three points 
related to self-sufficiency: first, the shift towards the “treasures” of medical knowledge 
kept in the poor and lower middle-income peasants; second, the discovery of solutions 
to the sustainable development of CMS; and third, the firm grasp of the materials for, 
and the future and the power of, medicine in the hands of the peasants on the fields 
enclosed by the mountain ridges. The rhetorical reconstruction should be seen as both 
an integral part of providing an ideological basis for barefoot doctors and CMS, and a 
propagandist ideological packaging that was in a way blinded to the underlying 
predicament.  
Difficulties of rural primary care were obvious when sources in the local archives 
were examined. In terms of financing, the scarcity of economic resources in rural areas 
led to a low degree of accumulation of resources in the primary care sector which was 
exposed immediately afterwards. The cooperative medical schemes faced serious 
challenges in achieving self-sufficiency. As sources from the Pinggu County Archive 
show, in 1972, 51.03% of cooperative medical stations were in deficit. The situation 
continued and by 1978 still more than a third of cooperative medical stations were in 
deficit (Pinggu Health Bureau, 1973, 1979). Organizers of CMS emphasized the 
function of preventive care due to the need to use funds efficiently (Revolutionary 
Committee of Leyuan Commune, 1968). Contributing to the financial instablity 
seemed to be the fact that the popularization of barefoot doctors and CMS contributed 
to a rapid popularization of Western medicine. 
The lack of sustainability prompted a political campaign to reconstruct the value 
of local resources--Chinese medicine (also reflected in the last painting in Figure 6-1). 
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From 1972, with financial constraints and the scarcity of drugs, growing herbal 
medicine for self-sufficiency, along with training barefoot doctors in acupuncture, was 
encouraged. For instance, 67 native pharmacies were built in Pinggu County (Pinggu 
Health Bureau, 1986b, p. 39), and patients were encouraged to use native herbal 
medicines. Speech scripts of a local conference on the cooperative medical scheme 
during the Cultural Revolution in the archive of Pinggu suggested on paper that 
township health centres were complying with the official line described in the poster 
(Party Branch of Heidouyu Brigade at Huangsongyu Commune, 1977). As the archive 
was generated by the county (now district) health bureau, it reflected the documented 
reality that policies were adhered to on paper. However, the oral history conducted by 
Fang (2012) in a county in Zhejiang suggested that patients did not trust herbal 
medicines. Fang also reported problems with growing, processing and producing 
Chinese medicines, as well as patients’ growing preference for Western medicines 
which offered usually a faster fix.  
Related to weak financial instititions, rural primary care was established on weak 
governance institutions. CMS and primary care services were mainly managed at 
commune (township) and brigade (village) levels, which meant disconnect with the 
Ministry of Health and medical elites. Professionally, there was a lack of career 
prospects in medicine for the rural health workforce. Statistics of barefoot doctors in 
Pinggu County between 1965 and 1975 showed that out of 1652 barefoot doctors, 1182 
remained as barefoot doctors by 1975. Only 353 were able to leave the rural areas 
through the four key approaches of upward social mobility: 71 joined the army, 120 
were recruited by factories, 132 were admitted by colleges or schools (generally 
unrelated to medicine), and 30 became party or government cadres (Pinggu Health 
Bureau, 1975). In other words, a career as a barefoot doctor meant a dead end for 
someone aspiring to be a fully qualified medical professional. 
The post-juncture development was therefore limited by the rural challenge 
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associated with the weak institutional underpinnings for primary care and the urban 
resistance associated with the strong institutional underpinnings for hospital care. 
What was formed was not a harmonized structure of a system, but a system in which 
primary care development became an anti-thesis to hospital development. The 
institutional bias towards hospitals was legitimized by the nature of the propagandist 
rhetoric on rural health care, and eventually reinforced the divided track of urban 
hospital care versus rural primary care. By 1978, China had established nation-wide 
low-cost rural primary care based on barefoot doctors, CMS and three-tier delivery 
networks, while leaving weak institutional underpinnings for resource accumulation 
for primary care in rural areas as compared with hospitals in urban areas.  
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Figure 6-1. Three paintings featuring rural health workers in the 1960s and the 1970s 
Note: Top left: a painting with the title of “Rural Doctors”, published in the People’s Daily in 1962; top 
right: a poster with the title of “Health worker at the head of the field” published during the rural 
restoration and construction period (1961-1965); bottom: a poster with title of “Barefoot doctors all 
over the mountain village, cooperative medicine with new prospects”. 
Sources: (Li & Jin, 1964; Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1974; Zhang, 1962)  
 
6.4 Adaption and path dependence during reforms (1978-2013) 
The period between 1978 and 2013 saw continuous and rapid economic growth, 
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as well as rapid social transformation that contributed to increasing demand for health 
care, including the increasing prevalence of non-communicable diseases and 
population ageing. Critical questions for this period, therefore, include how polices 
about hospitals and primary care providers were made (or not made) and implemented, 
how such policies (or the lack of them) channelled increased resources to the two 
sectors of hospitals and primary care providers to address the increasing demand for 
health care. This section argues that how the government responded to some short-
term challenges immediately after 1978 was of critical importance to the coevolution 
of hospitals and primary care providers up to 2013. 
The years between 1978 and 1985 saw difficulties for financing hospitals and 
primary care facilities, as well as the response or lack of response of the state to the 
needs of each sector. From 1985 to 2002, a short-term health financing response to 
state financial difficulties turned into a lasting divergence in institutions related to the 
two sectors. Between 2002 and 2009, there was a conjuncture, where the political 
agenda turned towards constructing universal health coverage, with major health 
reform plans formulated. The section finally turns to the period after 2009, to 
investigate the implementation and adaptation of the health reform plans and their 
consequences for the coevolution of hospitals and primary care providers. 
6.4.1 Changes favouring hospitals and technology (1978-1985) 
The years betweeen 1978 and 1985 formed a third critical juncture in relation to 
the coevolution of hospitals and primary care providers. After 1978, the MOH actively 
restored the technical capacity of hospitals, which were believed to have been harmed 
during the Cultural Revolution (Bloom et al., 2004, p. 14). The MOH also tried to build 
hospitals into regional technical centres. In urban areas, a number of advanced medical 
centres were reinforced as regional technical centres (Henderson, 1989), benefiting 
from their sponsorship by relatively higher levels of governments. In rural areas, the 
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MOH launched a programme to strengthen health services in one third of counties. 
Although the stated goal was to strengthen county-wide health services, the document 
discussed mainly strengthening county-level facilities, and was followed by an 
operational policy on strengthening technological development in county hospitals, 
with no operational policy on primary care facilities (Ministry of Health, 1980a, 
1980b). While the initial government support soon faced fiscal challenge (State 
Council, 1985), the drive to advance medical technology was evident. Technological 
development of hospitals also benefited from the growing number of medical 
graduates after the restoration of higher medical schools in 1977 (Anonymous, 1977). 
The labour insurance scheme for retirees, a scheme which had disintegrated during the 
Cultural Revolution, was restored (State Council, 1978a, 1978b). These efforts to 
restore hospital-related institutions immediately after the Cultural Revolution 
suggested the resilience of the such institutions. 
Under the pressure of fiscal difficulties and inflation, the MOH and the Ministry 
of Finance started to push health facilities step-by-step towards seeking extra-
budgetary revenue and increasing efficiency. As early as 1979, Minister Qian started 
advocating “utilizing economic measures in managing health services” (Ministy of 
Health, Ministry of Finance, & State General Administration of Labour, 1979), giving 
public hospitals the right to redistribute residual income from services, though salary 
was still paid through public finance. One of the MOH’s top priorities was to address 
the perceived lack of access to hospital admission and the deficits of hospitals (State 
Council, 1981a, 1985), which were explained as the result of previous waves of price 
reduction (including the 1960 MOH policy mentioned above), lack of public financial 
compensation, and rising costs of materials. Accepting that the government was not to 
pay for the deficits through direct financial assistance, price adjustment became one of 
the key solutions. In 1981, the State Council approved a double standard fee schedule, 
allowing hospitals to charge patients with GIS and LIS at cost while keeping the prices 
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for other urbanites and the rural population unchanged (State Council, 1981a). In 1985, 
the government again avoided any general adjustment of prices in health care, while 
allowing price increases in new equipment, new medical procedures, and newly built, 
renovated and expanded facilities, and it reemphasized the need for separate fee 
schedules for insured and uninsured patients (Ministry of Health, 1985b; State Council, 
1985). The State Council also implemented a management responsibility system for 
hospital economic operation (State Council, 1985). In effect, hospitals were supposed 
to cross-subsidize among their own services; non-basic services started to be provided 
with a profit margin, while basic services were provided below cost (Liu, Liu, & Chen, 
2000). Hospitals, like other health facilities, also enjoyed the profit from drug price 
mark-up. In short, the post-1978 reform addressed the short-term financial needs of 
hospitals and service demand for hospital services by reinforcing preivous policies that 
enhanced their ability to generate extra-budget revenue and creating high-power 
incentives to increase service turnover. 
In rural areas, the primary care sector faced difficulties. The relatively lower 
bureaucratic stake in the rural delivery system and the collapse of the Cooperative 
Medical Scheme (Duckett, 2012) contributed to the difficulties of rural primary care. 
In a response to the collapsing Cooperative Medical Scheme, the government issued a 
policy on subsidy for barefoot doctors in 1981, at the same time allowing barefoot 
doctors who proved qualified to the level of specialized medical higher middle schools 
through exams to be certified as village doctors (State Council, 1981b). In 1985, when 
the Minister of Health Chen Minzhang announced the abolition of the title of barefoot 
doctors (Ministry of Health, 1988), the 1.2 million barefoot doctors were 
disaggregated as 643,022 village doctors and 650,072 health personnel (i.e. people 
working at village clinics without the certificate of a village doctor) (Ministry of 
Health, 1989, p. 79). The MOH also allowed “multiple forms” of practice, virtually 
endorsing the privatization of village clinics though still maintaining formal 
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government regulation of village doctors (State Council, 1985). 
For township health centres, there was an immediate human capital crisis due to 
an exodus of the rural health workforce in the early 1980s, exposing the mobility of 
human resources at the township level. In Pinggu, Beijing, 166 technical “backbones” 
(most of whom had been “sent down” from urban hospitals) left the county, almost 
eradicating its technical capacity (Pinggu Health Bureau, 1986b, p. 20). Similarly, in 
a township health centre in Heishan County, Liaoning, among the 11 graduates from 
specialized secondary school assigned there since 1962, only the director of the 
township health centre was still working there in 1982, while 13 of its 19 staff members 
were temporary employees (Liu, Xu, & Wang, 1996). Some of the local health 
administrators said the policies were “eradicating” rural health professionals (Liu et 
al., 1996). Zhang (1982) summarized the main reasons for the exodus as concerns for 
children’s educational and employment prospects, relatively low incomes and weak 
incentives, and lack of prospects for career development. Those who exited tended to 
be the more qualified professionals.  
6.4.2 Evolution of the two-sector structure (1985-2002) 
The reform between 1978 and 1985 seemed to have created a self-reinforcing 
belief in the role of pro-market mechanisms in managing health care. The government 
further issued autonomization policies, which drove hospitals to depend increasingly 
on service charges (based on fee-for-services with price distortion that allowed cross-
subsidies from expensive technologies priced above cost to physician services priced 
below costs) rather than on financial subsidies, as demonstrated in a declining share of 
public finance in total health expenditures (State Council, 1989, 1992, 2000). 
Revenue-based bonuses were adopted in hospitals to incentivize doctors to generate 
more revenue for the hospitals. Facilities could retain and redistribute profit without 
the need to transfer revenue and wait for appropriations. This, along with the subsidy 
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of medical services from drug mark-ups and technology and profit margins, created 
perverse incentives for over-prescription (Liu & Mills, 2005). The technology-biased 
price schedule, drug price mark-up, and increased hospital autonomy in redistributing 
revenue collectively formed a high-power incentive linking hospital managers and 
doctors in over-prescribing expensive technological procedures and medicines. They 
allowed public hospitals to develop with little direct government subsidy (from 12.6% 
of total hospital revenue in 1990 to 8.7% in 2002, calculated with data from China 
Health Yearbooks 1991 and 2002). The period also saw a medical equipment race as a 
result of the revenue that could be gained from high prices for high-technology 
medicine. While the quota of equipment distribution was one CT scanner for every 0.3 
million population according to a national policy, the number of CT scanners in 
practice was much higher and , for example in three cities (Yanjin, Anshan and 
Qingzhou), amounted to 3.4 (in 1993), 2.6 (in 1994) and 8 (in 1997) times the national 
quota (Li, 1997). Pharmaceutical sales accounted for 47% of all revenue of 
comprehensive hospitals under health departments (Ministry of Health, 2003).  
The former barefoot doctors also generally relied on profits from drug sales to 
earn their living. In 1989, 59.4% of all clinics operated by barefoot doctors were fee-
for-service private clinics, including 11.1% as group private practices and 48.3% as 
solo private practice. The remaining 40.6% were collective clinics, most of which were 
village clinics. Others went back to farm work (Liu & Cao, 1992). Barefoot doctors 
fell from the core of a village community-based health system, including being the 
guardian of the CMS, to the bottom level of auxiliary care extended from and 
supervised by urban-based formal and privileged health care professionals. Funding 
became a challenge not just for service, but also for training. The status of barefoot 
doctors within villages was also eroded as agricultural revenue increased, and some 
village doctors started selling “illicit drugs” (Huangsongyu Commune Health Centre, 
1989). 
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The poor capacity of township health centres created a vicious cycle of 
underutilisation and losses. Liu et al. (1996) discussed the poor conditions of township 
health centres in the 1980s and the 1990s as follows. Some township health centres 
went bankrupt, some found maintaining buildings and equipment a challenge, and 
others had to downsize the number of beds, close departments and reduce patient 
volume, or even rely on barefoot doctors to provide all services. Dangerous working 
space accounted for 12% of the total built space in township health centres on average, 
and the percentage could be as high as 31% in poor areas. Many township health 
centres still relied on the “lao san yang ” (three old items), i.e. clinical thermometers, 
stethoscopes and sphygmomanometers, to provide medical diagnosis. Liu concluded 
that low perception of quality of care affected patient demand, and exacerbated 
financial losses and brain drain. While hospitals were able to cross-subsidize using the 
reformed price schedule, the demand for relatively sophisticated technology was low 
at the level of township health centres. Price increase on technologies which benefited 
hospitals therefore further contributed to shrinkage of demand for township health 
centres. In one township health centre, for example, price reform had to be reversed as 
it had caused drastic decline of patient visits and the consequent loss was greater than 
50% of expenditures (Liu et al., 1996). Specialization of township health centres 
through integration with urban hospitals’ specialist clinical departments did not work 
out, as economic competition eroded the intended collaborative morale (Liu et al., 
1996). 40% of the staff at township health centres did not have professional education 
in 1983, and by 1988 the percentage was 58% (see Chapter 4). Township health centres 
generally could not benefit from the new opportunity to develop extra-budgetary 
revenue. As reflected in Chapter 4, the number of beds stopped growing in township 
health centres while the number of hospital beds grew steadily between 1978 and 2002. 
Weak institutional factors were also reflected in the delay and difficulty in 
addressing the chronic lack of finance, human resources and capital in primary care 
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with the collapse of the CMS and the end of state support (assistance to collectives). 
Minister of Health Cui Yueli, a more pro-market radical reformer according to 
previous analysis (Huang, 2000), noted in a speech to all directors of provincial health 
bureaus that 18.2% of township health centres could generate only 30-49% of 
expenditures from revenues (excluding government grants), while 33.11% could not 
even earn 30% of their expenditures. While Cui asked for more fiscal contribution 
from local government, he mentioned in the same speech that reform of their 
management should remain stable and along the same “autotomizing” principles 
(Ministry of Health, 1989). In 1990, the Ministry of Health managed to place primary 
health care on the policy agenda and issued a policy requiring establishment of a 
network of rural primary care facilities along with cooperative medicine nation-wide 
by 2000 (Ministry of Health, 1990b). However, the policy was quickly dropped on the 
ground that it could potentially add to the burden of peasants, which seemed 
particularly dangerous as tensions between local (i.e. county and township) 
governments and peasants were already tense due to tax collection and fee charging 
for various public services, as local government replaced communes (General Office 
of Central Committee of Communist Party of China & General Office of State Council, 
1993). When the Urban Employees Basic Medical Insurance Scheme replaced the 
Labour Insurance Scheme, the new scheme adopted policies introducing competition 
among empanelled health facilities, abolishing the previous requirement of referral 
from facilities at lower levels in order to claim expenditures in hospitals (State Council, 
1998). Hence, both frustration of efforts to restore rural health coverage and the 
developmend of insurance schemes encouraging patient choice and competition across 
different levels of care reinforced pre-existing dynamics of hospital bias. 
The dynamics of the health system reforms between 1978 and 2002 did manage 
to ensure the survival of primary care facilities, however, the short-term-oriented 
reforms (i.e. technology-focused price adjustment, the economic management system, 
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and the pharmaceuticals and materials sales mark-up policy) collectively biased the 
health system towards adoption of advanced technology, and discriminated against 
primary care facilities. Although the post-1978 reform brought new opportunities and 
challenges to both hospitals and primary care facilities, hospitals benefited relative to 
primary care facilities. Overall, this period witnessed a continuous downstream 
evolution of an institutional balance that favoured hospitals, as hospitals tended to 
adapt better to the changing social economic order.  
6.4.3 Turning towards universal health coverage (2002-2009) 
The period between 2002 and 2009 marked a U-turn in the government’s 
commitment to health and universal health coverage, and a conjuncture in the 
coevolution of hospitals and primary care providers. In the World Health Report 2000, 
China’s health system was ranked 188th in terms of fairness of financial contribution 
among 199 countries and regions (World Health Organization, 2000). Added to the 
pressure for reform was the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
in 2002, which exposed the weak health care coverage, particularly in rural areas. A 
policy window was opened with a change of administration, which shifted the 
development agenda from a single-minded focus on economic development to a 
balanced approach of socio-economic development. The Chinese government 
continuously put greater public funding into health care, and actively expanded social 
insurance schemes. Also, a series of rural health financing experiments provided the 
empirical evidence needed for designing new insurance schemes (Liu & Rao, 2006). 
In a rare move, a govenrment research organisation published a report criticizing the 
previous pro-market health system reform as “unsuccessful” (Ge & Gong, 2007). 
Following a series of debates and important conferences, the central government 
eventually produced a milestone policy document on comprehensive health system 
reform in 2009 (Central Committee of Communist Party of China & State Council, 
2009). The remainder of this sub-section deals with the three most relevant aspects of 
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the reform plans. 
In terms of financial coverage, two major schemes that covered population groups 
left out during the previous reforms were set up and expanded during this period: the 
New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (usually abbreviated as NCMS to distinguish 
it from the “old” Cooperative Medical Scheme) in 2003 and the Urban Residents Basic 
Medical Insurance in 2007. The reform brought significant increase in use and 
coverage of health services at all levels of care (Meng et al., 2012). However, at least 
in the short term, it seemed that policies were not well coordinated towards improving 
the balance between hospitals and priamry care providers. Health insurance schemes 
were biased towards reimbursement for hospitalizations, on the grounds that these 
were thought to be related to illnesses with catastrophic expenditures (Yip & Hsiao, 
2009). The new health insurance schemes encouraged competition between providers 
rather than establishing a referral chain, which also favoured hospitals as they were 
better-capacitated. Both the emphasis on reimbursement for inpatient services and 
competition fed growing demand for hospital care. In order to boost enrolment, even 
the recently established NCMS abolished referral requirements within counties in 
2007, so patients could access any facilities within their counties (Ministry of Health, 
Ministry of Finance, & State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, 2007). 
Similarly, when the Urban Residents Basic Medical Insurance Scheme was established, 
it did not require any form of referral from primary care facilities to hospitals, though 
the document did require reimbursement rates to be slightly higher for primary care 
facilities. 
In terms of strengthening of health service delivery, direct financial support was 
used to subsidize health facilities, besides increased subsidy from the demand-side via 
insurance payment. The reform policies since 2002 had sought to strengthen the basic-
level health delivery system, including both primary care facilities and county 
hospitals. However, county hospitals were prioritized as they were considered the 
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leading facilities within counties, and were supposed to trickle down support given to 
them (Central Committee of Communist Party of China et al., 2009). Efforts to 
establish urban community health centres, expand insurance funds and increase 
government support also improved the function and capacity of urban primary care 
facilities. Bhattacharyya et al. (2011) reported increasing policy emphasis on and 
growth of urban community health services (converted from primary and secondary 
hospitals in urban areas) through their inclusion in the empanelment of social health 
insurance between 2001 and 2008. The proportion of government subsidies in the 
revenue of primary health institutions increased between 12.4 and 17.7 percentage 
points on average to about a third of total expenditures in various types of primary care 
facilities (excluding village clinics) (Meng et al., 2011). The same study also reported 
improvements in training, equipment, human resources, preventive and curative 
functions, etc. 
Profit from pharmaceutical sales incentivised over-presciptions and accounted for 
an unusally large proportion in revenue of health facilities. Getting rid of drug price 
mark-up was thus a major potential area for effeciency gain. As early as 2007, the 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China had declared “separation between 
pharmaceutical sales profit and prescription” (yiyao fenkai) as one of the key principles 
of health reform (Hu, 2007). Two policies on tightening control in terms of 
pharmaceuticals, i.e. zero-mark-up policy and delinking practitioners’ income from 
service revenue, were promulgated nationwide by 2009 as key components of the 
essential drugs policy (State Council, 2009).  
6.4.4 Implementing health system reform (2009-2013) 
In the years after 2009, detailed plans for health system reform were formulated 
and implemented. The sub-section below focuses on how these policies responded to 
and reshaped the path of coevolution between hospitals and primary care providers in 
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the post-juncture years.  
The government continued to increase financial spending and extended coverage 
of social health insurance programmes. Medical insurance coverage rates rose 
continuously, from 29.7% in 2003 to 95.7% in 2011 (Meng et al., 2015, p. 188). Per 
capita funding of the NCMS rose from 30 yuan in 2003 to 370 yuan in 2013, which 
was almost the same as the premium level for the Urban Residents Medical Insurance 
Scheme (Meng et al., 2015). The increased funding covering both rural and urban areas 
created an opportunity to shift the balance towards primary care. While the 2009-
reform did change some of the financial difficulties of primary care facilities, hospital 
centrism built up and reinforced over previous decades seemed to have prevailed and 
was even further accentuated, as the trend analysis in Chapter 4 has shown. The sub-
section below focuses on development related to pharmaceutical policies and payment 
policies, since these were most critical as influences on the coevolution of hospitals 
and primary care providers. 
While the government declared a clear goal to strengthen primary care facilities, 
it had other pressing concerns, particularly the exploding demand due to rapid 
insurance coverage expansion as well as population ageing. The complexity of hospital 
reform and patients’ pressing need for health care seemed to affect the structural 
balance, and reform in hospitals became difficult and thus delayed. Separation of 
revenue from pharmaceutical sales with provider revenue was delayed. An effect of 
this delay allowed hospitals to become ever more important in pharmaceutical sales. 
Based on calculation of data from the Chinese Health Statistical Yearbooks on the drug 
revenues in urban community health institutions, township health centres and public 
hospitals between 2008 and 2012, only 11%-15% of all drugs revenue went to urban 
community health institutions and township health centres, while 85%-88% went to 
public hospitals. Another consequence of the hospitals’ role in pharmaceutical sales 
was their intertwining with other interests in the pharmaceutical sector (Ministry of 
Part II  History 
209 
Health, 2009; National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2013). Scandals 
about payments from drug manufacturers and distributers to providers in promotion of 
pharmaceutical sales exposed the lasting problem of reliance on informal payment 
from the drug distribution system to pay physicians (Huang, 2013; Zheng, 2013). 
Hospitals generally continued to enjoy drug price mark-ups of 15% and rights to sell 
non-essential drugs, with an unknown amount of kickback for staff from the 
distributors and manufacturers. Health bureaus appeared to lack the regulatory power 
to control hospital charges, except temporarily (He, 2012). 
Meanwhile, the previous lack of human capital accumulation in primary care 
seemed to factor in and led to challenge regarding patient confidence and satisfaction 
with community services. Even though patients recognized the convenience of 
community health services, they reported several barriers in increasing their utilisation: 
lack of capacity of service providers (which was also related to the lack of training in 
practical skills), low public awareness of the services, lack of evidence-based practice 
guidelines, lack of insurance coverage in some areas (Wang, Gusmano, & Cao, 2011b). 
Despite low levels of utilisation and staff qualification, govenrment agencies in charge 
of public subsidies, pressed by the need to demonstrate quick improvement, invested 
most subsidy in capital assets rather than human capital (Meng et al., 2011) (also 
reflected in Chapter 8). In addition, the difficulty in recruiting well trained medical 
graduates into primary care seemed to persist (Anand et al., 2008; Hou et al., 2014). 
Data on recruited medical graduates at primary care levels are not available nationally, 
but a survey of 546 medical graduates from Fudan University showed that none went 
to primary care facilities between 2007 and 2010 (Fu, 2011b). Furthermore, it appeared 
that the already biased professional dimension of the coevolution of hospitals and 
primary care providers was shifting further towards hospitals as an unintended result 
of the post-2009 reform policies (particularly essential drug policies and emphasis on 
preventive services). For example, the essential medicines policy and separation of 
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revenue and expenditures management removed drug price mark-ups at primary care 
facilities, but also led to reduced income of providers. This gave rise eventually to a 
brain drain of experienced doctors to county hospitals, taking with them the patients 
(Zhou et al., 2014). Evidence of issues about imbalance in terms of professional 
institutions as an interrelated set of policies are further reflected in Chapter 8. 
Overall, previous downstream development of hospital advantage seemed to 
continue playing out. Without addressing the two fundamental challenges in shifting 
the path of coevolution of hospitals and primary care providers, namely the profit-
driven incentive structures of hospitals, and the weak institutionalization of the 
primary care professions, the government’s response to some pressing concerns 
contributed to a self-reinforcing process of hospital centrism.  
6.5 Discussion 
6.5.1 Weaknesses and strengths 
The analytical approach of the sub-study involved four sets of institutions of two 
sectors including numerous health facilities over a long and dynamic period of time in 
a vast and diverse country. The volume of interesting detail was simply too large to 
handle in a single study. Therefore, the sub-study tried to strike a balance between the 
necessary level of detail and the necessary breadth, but is unavoidably limited in that 
details and variations were lost about decision-making processes. Interesting details 
were sacrificed to make the analysis feasible. However, the breadth of the study in 
terms of period and coverage of institutional factors seemed instrumental in allowing 
a systematic examination of the historical roots of the current balance between 
hospitals and primary care providers. 
The sub-study also had limitations regarding the sources it covered and the way 
these sources were interpreted. The central level archives were not accessible for post-
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1949 periods, and for the local archives, documents were not disclosed for years after 
2000, when collection took place. The complexity of the issue of coevolution of the 
hospitals and primary care providers also made it impossible to use all sources across 
all periods. In order to address the issue of “representativeness”, I systematically 
covered the journal dataset for the years between 1919 and 1949, national yearbooks 
and the local archives after 1949 up to 2000, and also tried to ensure no critical 
secondary references were left out. As each dataset had its own tendency to over-
represent certain actors’ perspectives, the other information from important historians’ 
works and journal publications helped reduce the limitations. Despite efforts to 
“immerse” myself in history, potential challenges in interpretation may still arise from 
the author’s upbringing in post-1980 China, where there has been a dominant narrative 
of a strong state in development. The approach of the study also had its strengths. The 
path dependence analysis facilitates the study of health system development in its own 
history and political economy as emphasized by Bloom (2014). The approach also 
enhanced understanding of complex historical dynamics through using a systems 
perspective (Peters, 2014). The development and application of the approach marked 
progress from recent use of path dependence on health systems development 
(Balabanova et al., 2011). 
6.5.2 Coevolution of hospitals and primary care providers  
Table 6-2 sums up the dynamics of coevolution of hospitals and primary care 
providers from 1835 to 2013 (including the precursor period between 1572 and 1835) 
seen through a framework of path dependance. Each period studied earlier, shown in 
a single column in the table, seems to constitute a cycle of coevolution of hospitals and 
primary care providers, with the theoretically informed stages of critical juncture, post-
juncture development, conjuncture and post-juncture development. First, a two-track 
structure evolved with the introduction of modern medicine in China from 1835 to 
1949, before which health care had been largely organized privately and focused on 
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ambulatory care. During the critical juncture between 1835 and 1844, missionaries 
introduced a hospital-centric model of the medical mission, effectively establishing 
the initial professional binding between hospitals and professionals trained in Western 
medicine. The model became a consensus and spreaded slowly. Then the 
philanthropists brought substantial additional funding and an agenda for medical 
modernization and reinforced the central role of hospitals in medical professionalism.  
During the conjuncture between 1928 and 1934, as the country was unified and 
with the rise of social medicine, a state medicine programme was launched to shift the 
focus of development to rural primary care. However, in the post-jucture development 
between 1935 and 1949, Chen Zhiqian’s failed proposal of using medical school 
graduates as rural doctors to supervise lay health workers marked the ultimate split of 
hospitals and primary care providers into two tracks. By 1949, the split had turned into 
two very different roads of medical development: repackaged hospitals based on 
upgraded mission hospitals focusing primarily on curative care with increasingly 
professionalized staff, hovering above a primary care network that was poorly 
resourced.  
Then, from 1949 to 1978, the previous two-tracks structure evolved into a two-
sector system, embedded respectively in agricultural rural and industrializing urban 
contexts. The years from 1949 to 1953 appeared to be a critical juncture in shifting 
government priority in health development towards an exclusively urban system of 
health welfare, along with an overall turn towards urban industrial development. 
Efforts to control costs in urban areas had limited success in the late 1950s.  
The conjuncture between 1965 and 1968 saw a major shift of focus towards rural 
and primary care, enabled by a centralization of political structures. The years after 
1968 witnessed popularization of a rural system with barefoot doctors and Cooperative 
Medical Scheme. However, this post-juncture development also demonstrated the 
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difficulty of moving resources away from urban areas, and saw the relatively weaker 
institutionalization of rural primary care in the poorly resourced Cooperative Medical 
Scheme and the absence of strong professional and beuraucratic stake. 
Finally, from 1978 to 2013, the dominance of hospitals expanded based on 
increased funding. At the critical juncture between 1978-1985, the government 
adopted policies which allowed generation of extra-budgetary funds through distorted 
incentives. Meanwhile, the already unstable CMS that financed rural primary care 
suffered from weakness in their institutions especially related to financing and 
governance and then collapsed. The loosening of financial control and the fast-growing 
private payment for the critial juncture reinforced institutions that favoured hospital 
development.  
When the next conjuncture happened between 2002 and 2009, policies were made 
with the intention to expand insurance coverage and strengthen primary care. However, 
distorted incentive structures at hospitals survived the reform, owing and contributiong 
to the continuous growth of new and complicated interests and a reliance on resource 
generation at hospitals to cover costs and meet demand. Both within the conjuncture 
and the post-juncture development, the increase of public money also 
disproportionally benefited hospitals.  
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Table 6-2. Historical logic of coevolution of hospitals and primary care providers in China (1835-2013) 
Path dependence 
stages 
First cycle (1835-1949) Second cycle (1949-1978) Third cycle (1978-2013) 
Pre-existing 
conditions 
1572-1835: indigenous medicine mainly based on 
ambulatory care 
-- -- 
Critical juncture 1835-1844: hospitals were established to provide 
institutionalized curative care to establish civil 
engagement, exhibit technical advantage and win 
over religious converts 
1949-1953: urban insurance and urban hospital 
construction created strong interest coalitions with 
hospitals, while rural health care focused on 
preventive care 
1978-1985: introduction of strong financial 
incentives to generate extra-budget revenue 
favoured hospital development, while rural reform 
left the collective-based rural primary care 
facilities in lasting difficulties 
Post-juncture 
development  
1844-1901: hospitals became the recognized 
model for developing missionary medicine 
1901-1928: hospitals were reinforced by well-
resourced philanthropists as centres of high 
standard scientific medicine, and became the base 
for modern medical professionalization. 
1953-1965: mediated by government policies, the 
two tracks started to develop into two sectors of 
health services embedded in China’s rural and urban 
division; while hospitals had large outpatient 
departments, township health centres became the 
rural equivalent of hospitals  
1985-2002: further autonomization of policies 
drove hospitals to develop a model based on heavy 
use of technologies and expensive medicines, 
while the primary care sector suffered from 
continued financial difficulties; rapidly widening 
gaps between primary care and hospital facilities 
Conjuncture 1928-1934: state medicine rose to the national 
agenda, thanks to establishment of a central 
administration, the influence of international 
experiences, local experimentation and a 
historical turn towards the importance of rural 
areas. A nation-wide plan was published to extend 
modern medicine to the level of primary care 
1965-1968: the “June 26th Directive” prioritizing 
rural health care and the centralized leadership 
structure during the Cultural Revolution led to policy 
changes that favoured coverage expansion based on 
cooperative medicine and barefoot doctors 
2002-2009: amid the crisis of SARS and change of 
administration, policy agenda shifted towards 
universal coverage, in which primary care was 
emphasized as a key area for strengthening  
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Post-juncture 
development 
1935-1949: the planned training of primary care 
professionals failed to materialise, further 
consolidating the split of hospitals and primary 
care providers into two trajectories with hospitals 
focusing on curative care and relying on 
professionals, and primary care mainly defined as 
epidemic control and provided by lay health 
personnel. 
1968-1978: policy makers failed to substantially shift 
professional doctors away from hospitals, and 
eventually placed a further emphasis on rural self-
sufficiency via rhetorical packaging, without solving 
the underlying weak institutions (financing, 
bureaucratic and professional stake, etc.) 
2009-2013: as reform of hospital incentives was 
delayed, rapid insurance expansion channeled 
funding disproportionately towards hospitals and 
relatively weakened primary care providers 
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The analysis suggests three cycles of coevolution between hospitals and primary 
care providers, and a comparison of the cycles reveals similar patterns. Each cycle 
started with a critical juncture (1835-1844, 1949-1953, and 1978-1985) that created a 
split between hospitals and primary care that was not symetrical but biased towards 
hospitals. After these critical junctures, the institutional complex underpinning the two 
sectors saw a process of self-reinforcement that enhanced hospital dominance, via 
strengthening the professional, bureaucratic/philanthropic or financial stake in hospital 
dominance and consolidating a hospital-centred model of medical services, alongside 
a relatively weakly institutionalized primary care sector.  
At a later point of conjuncture, major centralization of power in central leadership 
saw policies introduced to correct previous policy-bias towards hospitals. On the one 
hand, these change in policies towards greater primary care emphasis seemed to be the 
result of a political change external to the health delivery (i.e. the establishment of a 
national administration between 1928 and 1934, the Cultural Revolution (including its 
eve) between 1965 and 1968, and the shock of SARS and the change of political 
administration and agenda between 2002 and 2009. On the other hand, the 
conjunctures marked reactive processes against previous focus on hospitals.  
With reinforcing processes preceeding, the reactive processes came into the 
exisitng institutional environment that exhibited strong resilience that the reactive 
processes could not overcome and had to adapt. Therefore, the impacts of these 
reactive policies on the path of coevolution of hospitals and primary care provides 
were limited and further distorted the development of the two sectors. The result was 
repeated attempts to develop primary care as an antithesis of hospitals in all three 
cycles, with attempts to strengthen the four institutional pillars underpinning the 
coevolution of hospiotals and primary care providers (professional, organizational, 
financial and governance institutions). The weakness of such institutionalization 
turned into disadvantage for primary care. Overall, the existence of the three 
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conjunctures suggests that policy windows for change were not rare within the Chinese 
political system, however, the frustrated reforms after the conjuncture imply that the 
path dependence effects caused by policy details and feedback effects need to be 
attended to. 
Health system changes must be put in the broader context of each period. The first 
cycle was perhaps most important for the split between hospitals and primary care 
providers regarding types of professionals. This period saw the activism of medical 
reformers, coinciding with the rise of medicine as a professional realm, throughout the 
period when influence of modern medicine remained small and isolated in a world of 
traditional medicine. 
The second cycle appeared to have played the biggest role in distinguishing 
hospital and primary care governance structures and their embedding into urban-
biased state and rural communes by 1978. This period saw the strong force of political 
leaders coinciding with the radical extension of state power as carriers for an extensive 
health delivery system with basic modern technology. The previous division between 
hospital and primary care in relation to the dimension of traditional medicine vs 
biomedicine became less important as the two styles of medicine were integrated.  
The third cycle appeared to be the most responsible for the large financial gap 
between hospitals and primary care providers by 2013. This period saw the influence 
of financial incentives coinciding with the continuous and high-speed economic 
growth of the Chinese economy, producing massive and modern hospitals which now 
dominate the health system in China.  
To sum up, the institutional coevolution between hospitals and primary care 
providers in China seemed to be dynamic and cyclical. The reinforcing and reactive 
processes seemed to have formed the basis of cyclical policy shifts between emphasis 
on hospitals and emphasis on primary care providers, alongwith changing political, 
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social and economic landscape. However, as hospital-centric development was 
introduced earlier, the reactive processes were compromised by reinforcing path 
dependence which built hospital dominance on the urban-biased socio-political 
structure. The dominance of hospitals professionally, politically, organisationally, and 
financially persisted over all the three cycles, and seemed to build on each successfive 
cycle. The reinforcement seeemed particularly strong during the three critical junctures, 
when new powerful professional, political or financial forces were introduced. 
Together, they repeatedly benefited hospitals disporportionally, resulting in the 
eventual hospital dominance of 2013.  
6.6 Conclusion 
Chapters 5 and 6 have studied the institutional coevolution of hospitals and 
primary care providers between 1835 and 2013 through the lens of path dependence. 
First introduced by medical missionaries in 1835, the hospital-bias seemed to have 
experienced three cycles of “(pre-juncture—)critical juncture—post-juncture 
development—conjuncture—post-juncture development” and eventually resulted in 
the contemporary division of hospitals and primary care providers skewed towards the 
former. The development of institutional balance between hospitals and primary care 
providers suggested a dominance of hospitals in the four institutional pillars 
underpinning the coevolution of hospitals and primary care providers (professional, 
financial, governance-related and organizational). The approach of path dependence 
analysis seemed helpful in making sense of the persistence of hospital-centrism in 
China between 1835 and 2013 by identifying a long term and cycical logic grounded 
in history.  
While discussion of the implications of the findings is provided in Chapter 9, here 
it is worthwhile to note that by tracing the roots of current balance between primary 
care providers and hospitals over their long co-evolutionary history to 1835, the thesis 
is not seeking to assign blame to some foreigners that set in motion a perverse health 
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system structure that plagued China’s modern history. Instead, it has provided some 
rich understanding of the centrality of temporal dynamics to the issue of balance 
between primary care providers and hospitals.  
Indeed, the historical-institutionalist analysis of the coevolution of the hospitals 
and primary care providers over the history of China suggests that the apparent path 
dependence of hospital centrism was not rooted in foreclosing policy episodes, as key 
moments of major change emerged periodically. Instead, one key source of path 
dependence seemed to be the tendency to respond to short term policy needs at critical 
junctures, which ended up creating potentially adverse and irreversible consequences. 
The other key source of path dependence seemed to be the repeated frustration of 
implementing reform after the conjunctures, suggesting the crux of overcoming path 
dependence in this context lies in establishing mechanisms to maintain momentum, 
perhaps by increasing bureaucratic and professional stakes in primary care, and 
through coordinated and cumulative efforts to harness political, bureaucratic and 
professional dynamics to secure reform implementation. The thesis will revisit the 
findings from these historical analyses after examining a contemporary gatekeeping 
pilot aimed at strengthening primary care. 
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Part III  A contemporary gatekeeping 
pilot 
 Impact evaluation of the 
gatekeeping pilot 
7.1 Introduction 
Part II tracked the historical trends of the balance between hospitals and primary 
care providers in China and traced the historical coevolution of the two sectors. It 
revealed the challenges facing primary care strengthening. Part III turns the focus 
towards a contemporary pilot that attempted to strengthen the functioning of primary 
care via gatekeeping in the setting of two rural townships in China. Although initiated 
locally, the pilot was a national pioneer and drew considerable public attention. This 
part consists of two chapters, which together constitute a mixed-methods case study 
of the pilot. Chapter 7 provides a quantitative impact evaluation of the pilot, and 
Chapter 8 assesses qualitatively how the pilot functioned. 
As identified in Chapter 2, evidence regarding the effectiveness of gatekeeping 
has been scant and of low quality, and particularly so in low- and middle-income 
countries. Despite claims that gatekeeping would be an effective solution to the issue 
of weak primary care in China (Zhou et al., 2014), no empirical evaluation has been 
reported. In high-income countries, studies on gatekeeping generally focus on shifting 
care between specialists and generalists (i.e. general practitioners, internal medicine 
residents, and family medicine doctors), who are both qualified with full medical 
degrees. The context of China, as shown in previous chapters, involves a greater 
professional imbalance between hospitals and primary care providers, where 
practitioners usually do not have full medical training. Therefore, it is of interest to see 
how effective a Chinese version of gatekeeping could be in achieving a rational 
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distribution of patient care seeking. An impact evaluation of the effects of the pilot in 
shifting patient ambulatory visits and spending at primary care facilities is presented 
in this chapter. 
7.2 Methods 
7.2.1 The gatekeeping pilot 
The gatekeeping pilot took place in the context of the New Rural Cooperative 
Medical Scheme (NCMS) and in a suburban district of a large metropolitan city in 
northern China. The NCMS is a nation-wide rural insurance scheme (i.e. for people 
with rural household registration) with a heavily tax-subsidized premium and high co-
payment rates; it was launched in China in 2003 (Meng & Xu, 2014b). As in other 
areas, the NCMS fund in the pilot district (a suburban district of a large city) was 
pooled at district (comparable to county) level and managed by an NCMS service 
centre under the District Health Bureau11. Each county has been in charge of making 
its own policies, though counties usually adhere to the guidelines made by the central 
government and their superior provincial governments, and these need approval from 
their superior municipal government. 
The district had a population of 0.42 million, among which 0.2 million were 
registered as rural residents. Rural per capita income was 16,865 yuan12 in 2012. Over 
99% of the eligible population were enrolled in the NCMS. During the three years 
between 2012 and 2014, each enrolee paid a premium contribution of 100 yuan every 
year and participated through the unit of a household, while government subsidy in the 
                                                 
11 County and district are comparable and are the level of government immediately below municipality. No 
specific law or regulation was found regarding the differences between county and district. Generally speaking, a 
county has a higher proportion of rural residents, while a district has a higher proportion of urban residents. 
12 The annual average exchange rate between Chinese yuan and US dollars was 631.25 : 100 (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015). 
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premium increased from 540 to 900 yuan per year. Local government paid the 
premium for people entitled to a subsistence allowance or “five guarantees” (including 
food, clothing, fuel, education and burial expenses) and for other people to whom 
policies for subsistence allowance applied. 
Before the pilot, patients generally had unrestricted access to health care facilities 
within the municipality, including municipal and district level hospitals and primary 
care facilities (township health centres and village clinics, most of which had been 
integrated with township health centres). However, the district’s NCMS 
reimbursement policy for ambulatory services favoured care-seeking at primary care 
facilities, as NCMS schemes in other areas frequently did. To encourage utilisation of 
services at primary care level, favourable deductible and reimbursement rates applied 
if patients used ambulatory services at township health centres (community health 
centres) or village clinics (community health stations).  
The deductible for ambulatory services at primary care facilities was 100 yuan, 
while the reimbursement rate was 50%. The deductibles for ambulatory services at 
“secondary hospitals” and “tertiary hospitals” were 500 yuan, while the reimbursement 
rates were 35% and 30% respectively. It is worth noticing that the local policy’s 
classifications of “secondary hospitals” and “tertiary hospitals” were not strictly 
following their technical accreditation. According to local NCMS documents, policies 
for secondary hospitals applied for all district-level hospitals, including the District 
People’s Hospital, technically a tertiary hospital. Meanwhile policies for tertiary 
hospitals applied to all hospitals beyond the district. Special ambulatory services, 
including radio- and chemo-therapy for cancers, renal dialysis for terminal renal 
diseases, anti-rejection drugs used after kidney transplantation, combined liver and 
kidney transplantation and heart transplantation, and paediatric aplastic anaemia and 
haemophilia, had higher reimbursement rates (75% in secondary hospitals and 60% in 
tertiary hospitals). 
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The pilot was launched in 2 (among a total of 17) townships of the district in 2013. 
Some basic information about the pilot and non-pilot areas is shown in Figure 7-1. The 
2 pilot townships on average had 4,235 enrolees, and the 15 non-pilot townships on 
average had 15,345 enrolees. Both groups of townships saw a small decline of 
enrollment, as average enrolment fell to 14,793 in non-pilot townships and 4,116 in 
pilot townships by 2014. This was a continuation of a previous decline from 2012 to 
2013. According to local directors of township health centres, the decline in enrollment 
was due to a shrinkage of eligible population (i.e. a net emigration of population). In 
particular, some young people went to schools and colleges in the district seat or 
outside the district, graduated and found jobs in urban areas, became urban-based or 
changed their household registration type from rural to urban. A slightly larger 
percentage of these emigrants were male.  
Average percentages of female enrollees were 51.3% in both pilot and non-pilot 
townships in 2013, and both slightly increased from 2012 to 2014. Average age was 
45.5 years old in non-pilot townships and 44.2 years old in pilot townships, and both 
also slightly increased from 2012 to 2014. Each township had a township health centre. 
One of the pilot townships had no village-level community health station, while the 
other had three. As the non-pilot townships tended to be larger, they had on average 
8.6 village-level community health stations.  
In July 2013, two rural townships in the study district introduced a gatekeeping 
pilot programme. The pilot involved a change of incentives for both service users and 
providers. From the perspective of local beneficiaries of the NCMS, the reform 
required patients to obtain a referral letter from primary care providers (i.e. township 
health centres and their subordinate village health stations) for accessing care at 
ambulatory departments of secondary hospitals. To access ambulatory departments of 
tertiary hospitals, patients needed a referral letter from the District People’s Hospital 
if they wished to claim reimbursement for their expenditures.  
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Patients could opt out of the system through paying out-of-pocket and forego their 
claim for reimbursement, as health facilities accepted privately funded patients. In 
other words, the pilot differed from a strict gatekeeping policy where patients without 
referral letters from general practitioners would be denied access to hospital 
consultants. In case of emergency, patients could go directly to emergency departments 
in hospitals and would not need referral for reimbursement.  
On the supply side, the township health centres (including their subordinate 
village health stations) in the pilot areas were given an annual global budget for 
ambulatory services reimbursement and were responsible for all the expenditures 
covered by the NCMS for ambulatory services at both hospitals and primary care 
facilities. The annual budget was calculated according to the level of ambulatory 
reimbursement per enrolee in 2012 (235 yuan in one township and 133 yuan in the 
other)--the year prior to the start of the pilot, with a minor 5% increment year-on-year. 
In case of surplus at the end of the financial year, the remaining funds would be kept 
by the facilities as a bonus for gatekeeping and so-called family-practitioner-style 
services (i.e. chronic illness management, health records, etc), though not for salary 
(see next chapter). In case of deficit, the facilities would bear the cost of the amount 
needed to reimburse patients. Payment for primary care facilities was not related to 
number of referrals. By contrast, ambulatory services in district-level hospitals were 
reimbursed based on fee-for-service.  
While the referral requirement incentivized patients to go through service 
providers level-by-level, i.e. from primary care providers to secondary and then to 
tertiary if needed, the capitation-based ambulatory reimbursement budget incentivized 
(at least in theory) providers to retain and treat patients in their facilities. Combining 
the user and provider incentives, the policy was intended to rationalize patient flows 
and hence was expected to shift ambulatory patient visits and service expenditures 
from hospital ambulatory departments to primary care providers. In other words, the 
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expected outcomes included: ambulatory visits to primary care facilities would go up; 
ambulatory expenditures in primary care facilities would increase; ambulatory visits 
to tertiary hospitals would reduce; ambulatory visits to tertiary hospitals would reduce; 
ambulatory expenditures at tertiary hospitals would reduce in those facilities with 
reduced total ambulatory expenditures. It was less clear for the secondary hospitals, as 
they were intended to gain patients from tertiary hospitals, while patients that 
previously would have visited secondary hospitals were supposed to visit primary care 
facilities instead. 
Organization of the pilot implementation involved the municipal and district 
health bureaux, township health centres and village doctors in pilot areas. They mainly 
disseminated the information through brochures and health education lectures. Other 
reform pilot programmes in the study district in July 2013 included payment reform 
launched in July 2013 in the entire district, which changed reimbursement for inpatient 
expenditures from payment based on fee-for-service to payment based on diagnosis-
related groups for short-term hospitalizations and payment per inpatient day for long 
term hospitalisations (longer than 60 days).  
Reform policies both within and beyond the gatekeeping pilot townships 
underwent adjustment in the year 2014. In order to “compensate” the beneficiaries in 
the pilot townships for the restriction of choice, the reimbursement rate for primary 
care facilities in the pilot townships was slightly increased, to 52% in 2014. An 
intended scaling up of the gatekeeping pilot did not take place. However, for 
ambulatory services in hospitals outside the district, referral policies were 
implemented in non-pilot townships of the district in 2014. In other words, if patients 
sought ambulatory services in tertiary hospitals without a referral letter from the 
District People’s Hospital, only 80% of reimbursement would be paid to patients. It 
should be noted that patients in pilot areas would not get any reimbursement if they 
went to a tertiary hospital directly. 
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7.2.2 Difference-in-differences study design 
The study estimated the impacts of the gatekeeping pilot on utilisation and total 
expenditures at different levels of care. The original intention was to include an 
analysis of the effects on ambulatory care sensitive hospitalisations. This became 
problematic first due to data issues, as the claims dataset did not use international 
standard disease coding (e.g. ICD-10) for diagnosis but rather used string text. In an 
attempt to translate the diagnosis into ICD-10 coding, most of the recorded diagnoses 
were unmatched with ICD-10. In addition, there was another reform pilot, on inpatient 
services, launched in the same district where the gatekeeping pilot townships were 
located, potentially influencing the outcome. Hence, health outcome was not studied 
here.  
Ideally, for impact evaluation, participation in the gatekeeping intervention would 
have been assigned randomly. However, in this study, investigators were not involved 
in assigning the intervention. In other words, the study was observational. Indeed, the 
choice of two relatively smaller townships as pilots for gatekeeping was due to a 
concern about the potentially controversial nature of the pilot and intended to minimise 
risks. As Figure 7-1 summarises, the chapter adopted the study design of a difference-
in-differences analysis (introduced in Chapter 2). The enrolees in the two townships 
under the gatekeeping pilot programme formed the treatment group, and those in the 
15 other townships (sub-districts) formed a control group. Using data both before 
(including 6 waves, with each quarter as a wave) and after (also including 6 waves, 
with each quarter as a wave) the launch of the gatekeeping pilot, effects on outcome 
variables were tested through difference-in-differences analysis which compared the 
changes in outcome variables over time between pilot townships and non-pilot 
townships. 
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Figure 7-1. Schematic representation of study design  
Note: unless specified, all the numbers in the boxes are averaged numbers for all townships in the 
specific group. 
 
7.2.3 Data 
The sub-study covered the period from January 2012 to December 2014 and used 
claims and enrolment data regarding the enrolees of the district, provided by the 
Municipal Management Centre of the NCMS, where data were centralized. The claims 
database recorded information on each claimed episode of patient care, including total 
amount of expenditure, amount reimbursed, amount of expenditures not covered by 
the NCMS13, name and level of facilities, date of the visit, and personal information 
on the beneficiaries (age, gender, personal identification number, and village and 
                                                 
13 As actual reimbursement rate was an indicator of performance of NCMS, the expenditures not covered 
were routinely collected. 
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township of residence).  
From January 2012 to December 2014, the reimbursement procedure relied on 
manual settlement. In other words, patients had to pay the full amount of their 
ambulatory expenditure when they utilised ambulatory care at health facilities. 
Township health centres and village cadres then collected patients’ receipts and 
brought them to the township financial department, where eligible expenditures were 
reimbursed. Staff at the township level then manually entered the claims information 
into the same claims database following the same structure. This information was 
centralized at the municipal level and became the claims database used in the study. 
The municipal NCMS centre also maintained a full list of enrolees for each year, 
including information on age, gender, personal identification number, and village and 
township of residence.  
The list of enrolees was merged with the list of claims (each claim was taken as 
one visit) into a full list of enrolees with information regarding their utilisation of 
services. Data were then aggregated at the level of each quarter of a year so that 
seasonality caused by the change of claims process was relatively smoothed. The data 
were also aggregated at the level of townships, as the township health centres were the 
key unit of experiment, though the level of village was also used to test the robustness 
of the analysis.  
Outcome variables were defined and constructed as follows. Ambulatory visits to 
each level of (i.e. primary, secondary, and tertiary) facilities per enrolee per quarter, 
were the total number of patient observations with recorded visits to facilities at the 
corresponding levels of facilities in each quarter of the year in every township, divided 
by the number of enrolees in the township during for that year (it was not possible drop 
out or enrol during the year). Ambulatory expenditures at each level of (i.e. primary, 
secondary, and tertiary) facilities and at all facilities per enrolee per quarter were 
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defined as the ambulatory expenditures in the corresponding levels of facilities.  
7.2.4 Econometric analysis 
The following difference-in-differences model was used for the analysis of the 
effects of the pilot programme: 
Yit =α1 + ηi + vt + δ × Treatmenti × Aftert + βXit + εit      (1)  
Function (1) is a model of difference-in-differences analysis involving multiple 
periods (in this case 12 quarters over four years). α1 is a constant variable, ηi represents 
the fixed effects of each township, and vt represents the fixed effects of each time 
period (t representing the number of quarters since the start of the data period). The 
existence of vt also adjusts for seasonal effects. Treatmenti is a dummy variable, which 
takes the value of 1 if the township (i) was in the treatment group (among the 
gatekeeping pilot areas), 0 if not. Aftert is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the 
time period (t) was after the start of the pilot and 0 if before.  
The coefficient of the interaction term Treatmenti × Aftert , i.e. δ, captures the 
effects of the pilot policy. εit is a random error term with zero mean. The main effects 
of Treatmenti are omitted due to their perfect collinearity with ηi, while the main effects 
of Aftert are omitted due to their perfect collinearity with vt. In function (1) the 
covariates—available time-variant variables of township with possible effects on the 
outcome variables (Xit) are included (i.e. average age, and proportion of female 
enrolees). In addition, a simple difference-in-differences model (i.e. not including vt 
or βXit) and an unadjusted model (i.e. not including βXit) based on function (1) were 
used to estimate the effects.  
Three sensitivity analyses were conducted. The first verified that the results were 
not sensitive to alternative levels of aggregation by the use of the village level as the 
unit of aggregation. The second verified that observation weighting and clustering on 
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standard errors did not affect the results. The third was a pre-trend test to see whether 
the treatment group and the control group had similar trends before the pilot. For the 
pre-trend test, the following equation was used with data from before the pilot: 
Yit =α4 + ηi + β × T + ρ × Treatmenti × T + εit     (2)   
In function (2), β is the pre-pilot trend of the townships in the control group, while 
ρ captures the difference in the pre-pilot trend between treatment and control groups. 
T is a linear time variable taking the value from 1 to 12 for each quarter from the first 
quarter of 2012 to the last of 2014. 
7.3 Results 
Table 7-1 presents the average outcomes in the pilot and non-pilot townships 
before and after the launch of the pilot, as well as simple calculation of the difference 
in differences. From the descriptive results, the pilot had an obvious impact on 
increasing visits to primary care facilities, as well as expenditures at this level 
(although the growth in expenditures was small relative to the growth in visits). 
Average ambulatory visits per enrolee per quarter increased in primary care facilities 
in pilot townships from 0.261 to 0.429. 0.112 out of the increase (0.168) was 
attributable to the pilot programme. Ambulatory expenditures at primary care facilities 
in pilot townships also increased from 49.613 yuan to 57.612 yuan. 7.310 yuan out of 
the increase (7.999 yuan) was attributable to the pilot programme.  
The influence on secondary hospitals was less obvious. The ambulatory visits at 
secondary hospitals reduced from 0.093 to 0.075; 0.012 out of the decrease (0.018) 
was attributable to the pilot programme, while the ambulatory expenditures at this 
level increased slightly, from 67.054 yuan to 71.273 yuan, with 1.758 yuan out of the 
increase (4.219 yuan) attributable to the pilot programme. Average ambulatory visits 
to tertiary hospitals in pilot townships reduced from 0.011 to 0.007; 0.002 out of the 
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reduction (0.004) was attributable to the pilot; ambulatory expenditures at tertiary 
hospitals fell considerably, from 30.861 yuan to 14.195 yuan; 14.007 yuan out of the 
decrease (16.666 yuan) was attributable to the pilot programme.  
Overall, the pilot townships saw a reduction of 4.448 yuan in average total 
ambulatory expenditures at all three levels, from 147.528 yuan to 143.080 yuan (the 
net effect of the pilot programme would be 4.939 yuan, considering the average total 
ambulatory expendituress rose in non-pilot townships by 0.492 yuan). 
Table 7-2 reports the results of the statistical analysis for visits using three 
difference-in-differences models: simple difference-in-differences without covariates, 
multiple-period difference-in-differences without covariates, and multiple-period 
difference-in-differences analysis with covariates. The main text here shows only the 
results from the unweighted models using township as the level of aggregation. The 
results are similar to the results generated with the weighted model using township as 
the level of aggregation, as well as results for weighted model using villages as the 
level of aggregation. The unweighted model using villages as the level of aggregation 
showed some discrepancies in results compared with the other three models, due to 
the change in number of enrolees as a result of urbanization. The results from all three 
alternative models are shown in Appendix Table 3.  
Ambulatory visits at primary care facilities per enrolee per quarter saw a 
significant increase, by 0.101 or 38.7% of 0.261--the average number of visits to 
primary care facilities per enrolee per quarter in the pilot areas before the pilot 
(p=0.013). By contrast, the number of visits to secondary hospitals per enrolee per 
quarter reduced by 0.01, or by 10.7% from 0.093--the average number of visits in the 
pilot areas before the pilot, but the evidence is weak (p=0.332); visits to tertiary 
hospitals reduced by 0.001, or 7.8% of 0.011--the visits to tertiary hospitals before the 
pilot, but again the evidence is weak (p=0.428).  
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Table 7-3 shows the regression results regarding expenditure. As for visits, the 
main text here only shows the results from the unweighted model using township as 
the level of aggregation. Results from the weighted model using township as the level 
of aggregation, as well as results for weighted and unweighted models using villages 
as the level of aggregation, are shown in Appendix Table 4. Ambulatory expenditures 
at primary care facilities per enrolee per quarter increased by 7.445 yuan, or 15% of the 
49.613 yuan in pilot areas before the pilot, though evidence supporting this was not 
very strong (p=0.116). Ambulatory expenditures at secondary hospitals increased by 
5.225 yuan, or 7.8% of the 67.054 yuan in pilot areas before the pilot. Again, the 
evidence was not very strong (p=0.146). Spending at tertiary hospitals reduced 
significantly, by 13.17 yuan (p=0.020) per enrolee per quarter, or 42.7% from the 
30.861 yuan in pilot townships before the pilot. The total ambulatory expenditures 
were 147.528 yuan before the pilot.
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Table 7-1. Outcome variables of enrolees in pilot and non-pilot townships before and after the start of the gatekeeping pilot 
Characteristics Pilot townships Non-pilot townships Difference in  
differences 
(Per enrolee per quarter per township) * 
Before 
introduction 
After 
introduction 
Difference Before 
introduction 
After 
introduction 
Difference 
Ambulatory visits to primary care facilities 0.261 0.429 0.168 0.196 0.252 0.056 0.112 
Ambulatory visits to secondary hospitals 0.093 0.075 -0.018 0.095 0.089 -0.006 -0.012 
Ambulatory visits to tertiary hospitals 0.011 0.007 -0.004 0.014 0.011 -0.002 -0.002 
Proportion of ambulatory visits at primary 
care out of total ambulatory visits  0.602 0.814 0.212 0.587 0.696 0.109 0.103 
Total ambulatory expenditures at primary care 
(yuan) 49.613 57.612 7.999 62.000 62.689 0.689 7.310 
Total ambulatory expenditures at secondary 
hospitals (yuan) 67.054 71.273 4.219 71.632 74.093 2.461 1.758 
Total ambulatory expenditures at tertiary 
hospitals (yuan) 30.861 14.195 -16.666 21.535 18.876 -2.659 -14.007 
Total expenditures on ambulatory care  147.528 143.080 -4.448 155.167 155.659 0.492 -4.939 
Proportion of total ambulatory expenditures at 
primary care facilities out of all ambulatory 
expenditures 0.355 0.442 0.087 0.363 0.413 0.050 0.037 
Notes: * The numbers were calculated at the level of township per enrolee per quarter. 
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Table 7-2. Regression results on visits 
Regression models 
 
Ambulatory visits at primary 
care facilities per enrolee per 
quarter 
Ambulatory visits at secondary 
hospitals per enrolee per quarter 
Ambulatory visits at tertiary 
hospitals per enrolee per 
quarter 
Proportion of ambulatory visits at 
primary care in total ambulatory 
visits 
Simple difference-in-
differences (DD) 
0.112*** -0.0124 -0.00168 0.103 
(0.000) (0.369) (0.465) (0.318) 
Multiple-period DD 
0.112*** -0.0124 -0.00168 0.103 
(0.000) (0.380) (0.475) (0.329) 
Multiple-period DD with 
covariates 
0.101** -0.00999 -0.000862 0.0798* 
(0.013) (0.332) (0.428) (0.094) 
Pre-trend test 
0.000274 -0.00230 -0.00112** -0.0128 
(0.984) (0.587) (0.046) (0.238) 
Mean outcome in pilot 
townships before 
introduction of pilot 
programme 
0.261 0.093 0.011 0.602 
Note:  
a) p values are shown in brackets. 
b) *0.05≤p＜0.1; ** 0.01≤p＜0.05, *** p＜0.01. 
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Table 7-3. Regression results on expenditures 
Regression 
models 
  
Total ambulatory 
expenditures at primary care 
per enrolee per quarter 
Total ambulatory 
expenditures at secondary 
hospitals per enrolee per 
quarter 
Total ambulatory 
expenditures at tertiary 
hospitals per enrolee per 
quarter 
Total expenditures 
on ambulatory care  
Proportion of total 
ambulatory expenditures at 
primary care facilities in all 
ambulatory expenditures 
Simple DD 
7.310 1.758 -14.01** -4.939 0.0372 
(0.112) (0.831) (0.026) (0.784) (0.609) 
Multiple-
period DD 
7.310 1.758 -14.01** -4.939 0.0372 
(0.120) (0.835) (0.029) (0.789) (0.617) 
Multiple-
period DD with 
covariates 
7.445 5.225 -13.17** -0.499 0.0165 
(0.116) (0.146) (0.020) (0.965) (0.529) 
Pre-trend test 
-3.668 1.372 0.777 -1.519 -0.0123 
(0.251) (0.729) (0.856) (0.799) (0.523) 
Mean outcome 
in pilot 
townships 
before 
introduction of 
pilot 
programme 
49.613 67.054 30.861 147.528 0.355 
Note:  
a) p values are shown in brackets. 
b) *0.05≤p＜0.1; ** 0.01≤p＜0.05, *** p＜0.01. 
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The pre-trend test attempted to check for potential differences in the pre-pilot 
trends of the outcome variables between pilot and non-pilot areas. Regression results 
of the test are shown in Table 7-2 and Table 7-3. There were no significant differences 
between pilot and non-pilot areas in terms of ambulatory visits at primary facilities 
and secondary facilities, proportion of ambulatory visits at primary care out of total 
ambulatory care, and ambulatory expenditures at each and all levels of facilities per 
enrolee, and the proportion of expenditures at primary care facilities. For ambulatory 
visits at tertiary hospitals per enrolee, the coefficient representing the pre-trend was -
0.001 (p=0.046, with average number of visits at 0.011 per enrolee per quarter before 
the pilot), suggesting that visits to tertiary hospitals had been on a moderately declining 
trend compared to non-pilot areas. This appeared to further weakened the support for 
a declining trend of patient visits to tertiary hospitals. Overall, the results in general 
strengthened the confidence in results of the difference-in-differences analysis. 
7.4 Discussion  
7.4.1 Strengths and limitations 
The sub-study used the difference-in-differences method to evaluate the impact of 
the gatekeeping pilot. The approach has both strengths and limitations. The difference-
in-differences analysis established and used counterfactuals to calculate the net effect 
of the pilot intervention, and was therefore superior to the only previous study of the 
effect of gatekeeping from LMICs which used a before-and-after study. The study 
further controlled for covariates, while the previous study used aggregate level data. 
A potential limitation of the difference-in-differences approach is that it attributes 
any difference in trends between the pilot and non-pilot townships to the pilot 
programme. As in previous studies about gatekeeping, the gatekeeping pilot was 
among a package of payment reforms, as well as a range of other on-going policy 
changes. The sub-study analysed the key policy documents that might have influenced 
the pilot and information about the facilities, and checked their implementation across 
Part III  A contemporary gatekeeping pilot 
237 
pilot and non-pilot townships. No particular difference in policies and implementation 
seemed likely to have considerably affected the outcome.  
The sub-study used claims data, like several previous studies on gatekeeping in 
high-income countries (Garrido et al., 2011). A key problem with claims data in 
general, and in this sub-study, was related to the fact that they were collected for 
reimbursement rather than to answer the specific research questions (Ferver, Burton, 
& Jesilow, 2009). There were some key pros and cons regarding the use of claims data 
in this sub-study. 
First, if patients did not expect to be reimbursed for the services and medicines 
received at facilities, they might not bother to claim for reimbursement (particularly 
when the amount was small). Therefore, there might have been issues of 
underreporting of visits with small amounts of expenditure. Nevertheless, the 
likelihood of such “under-claiming” seemed mitigated by the network of 
reimbursement management team reached all villages.  
Second, another type of underreporting that potentially weakened the study was 
bundling. This was the situation where persons who processed the claims combined 
receipts together for more than one episode of ambulatory care visits. As the local 
NCMS managers admitted, bundling was a common practice particularly because 
claims were manually entered into the database during the study period. This might 
result in under-reporting of the number of visits.  
Data originally acquired covered the five years from 2010 to 2014. Based on 
claims data from the two years of 2010 and 2011, when an electronic system was used 
to automatically generate records of care seeking, the average number of ambulatory 
visits was 6.35 per year. The number decreased to 1.68 on average for 2012, 2013 and 
2014. Due to this radical change, the first two years were excluded from the analysis. 
The implication is that the actual change in number of visits would have been 
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substantially larger, though the proportion seemed likely to remain the same. 
The changed reimbursement procedure also gave rise to artificial seasonality, and 
the number of observations fluctuated during the study period. Another issue created 
by bundling was that the time of visits was affected. This issue of bundling affected 
both pilot and control areas, and hence it was assumed that the dataset would still be 
useful for the analysis. The bundling issue is unlikely to influence the information on 
ambulatory expenditures across different levels of care, as claims processing staff 
would need to calculate the amount of reimbursement according to the particular level 
of care. 
Third, the information regarding diagnosis and socio-economics of enrolees was 
problematic. As mentioned earlier, the diagnosis information was not standardized 
according to the international disease coding system, which prevented further analysis 
regarding the effects of the pilot programme on hospitalisations that would be sensitive 
to changes in primary care performance. Due also to the practice of bundling, the 
diagnosis information for ambulatory visits was confused, which also prevented 
potentially meaningful investigation. Socioeconomic information on claimants in pilot 
and control areas was not available, so their potential effects on the outcome variables 
could not be controlled for. 
Despite these drawbacks, there was also important advantage in using claims data 
here. A major advantage was generic to secondary data analysis, in that claims data 
were available electronically, and using claims data was economical (Ferver et al., 
2009). Few resources were needed in collection and entry of the data. Secondly, the 
use of claims data here had the advantage of automatic capturing of information about 
the “population”. Using claims data avoided the potential pitfalls of sampling, low 
response to surveys, loss of follow-up, etc.  
Thirdly, the claims data used here captured all recorded use of services (though 
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primarily for the purpose of reimbursement) of patients. Therefore, recall bias--a 
problem in surveys--was avoided in the sub-study. Fourth, the use of claims data also 
avoided the problem of relying on administrative data, which were prone to 
manipulation because of performance monitoring of public servants. Finally, the 
accuracy of the data (again from the perspective of reimbursement) was checked by a 
system of monitoring; as reimbursement was involved, both patients and the staff 
entering and managing the data were concerned to ensure data accuracy. 
7.4.2 Findings 
The findings of this first impact evaluation of gatekeeping in China add some new 
knowledge to the literature on gatekeeping. First, there is strong evidence (p=0.013) 
that more patients (an average increase of 38.7%) visited primary care facilities 
because of the gatekeeping pilot programme. Expenditures at primary care facilities 
also increased, by 15%, though the evidence is not very strong (p=0.116). The 
increased visits to primary care facilities (0.101 per enrolee per quarter) far outweighed 
the decreased visits to secondary hospitals (-0.001) and tertiary hospitals (-0.001).  
Furthermore, the treatment intensity in the additional primary care visits seemed 
to be low. Had gatekeeping been effective in shifting patient services to primary care 
facilities from secondary hospitals, then service expenditures at primary care facilities 
would be expected to increase more than the number of visits, as secondary hospitals 
are expected to treat sicker and more resource-demanding patients. The increased 
primary care visits exceeded the increase in primary care expenditures, suggesting that 
most patients shifting from secondary hospitals to primary care facilities were not 
receiving much treatment in primary care facilities. This could have been the case if 
the visit was mainly to get a referral letter to higher level of care. As the reimbursement 
rate was only marginally changed, it was unlikely that the increased visits were caused 
by increased demand due to lower cost. 
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The changes in secondary hospitals (district-level hospitals) were not significant 
in both patient visits and expenditures, suggesting that secondary hospitals could have 
been shifting some patients to primary care facilities while gaining from tertiary 
hospitals. There was no evidence of a decreasing number of patient visits to tertiary 
hospitals. However, the expenditures in tertiary hospitals (outside the district) reduced 
significantly, by 42.7% (p=0.020). The opposite effects on visits and expenditures at 
tertiary care facilities could have been due to the influence of bundling (mainly 
affecting information regarding visits), which could have become particularly 
problematic with the smaller number of visits to this level of care as compared to other 
levels. The effect of gatekeeping on total expenditures on ambulatory care was not 
obvious.  
The gatekeeping pilot programme therefore seemed to be effective in shifting 
expenditures from extra-district hospitals to facilities within the district. The 
significant decrease of treatment expenditures happened in extra-district tertiary 
hospitals, suggesting that the District People’s Hospital with tertiary facilities may be 
able to play a gatekeeping role in preventing care seeking at higher level. Since the 
reimbursement rate was higher for care at lower levels, it is likely that patients 
benefited from lower out-of-pocket expenditures. The decrease of expenditures at 
tertiary hospitals in this pilot was not a big issue for hospital income, as these patients 
were not their main customers. However, scaling up gatekeeping could potentially 
mean more challenge from hospital related interests.  
7.5 Conclusion  
Gatekeeping has been under-studied, particularly in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs). This first impact evaluation of gatekeeping in a LMIC used a 
difference-in-differences analysis to evaluate a gatekeeping pilot programme in rural 
China. The analysis suggests that gatekeeping between primary care and hospitals 
increased patient visits to primary care providers relative to hospitals; however, the 
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largely unchanged level of expenditures suggests that most patients may have been 
visiting for a referral letter. While a small proportion of patients did seem to move to 
primary care for treatment, the evidence was not strong. The drastic decrease of patient 
expenditures in extra-district tertiary hospitals implies that the District People’s 
Hospital may have had a strong role preventing care seeking at a higher level. This 
seems to suggest that strong service capacity is key for effective gatekeeping.  
Despite the enormous and growing amount of routinely collected and digitized 
claims data, health systems studies in China have rarely used this form of data. 
Methodologically, the study has made a contribution by demonstrating the possibility 
of doing policy-relevant research using such real world data.  
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  A qualitative systems 
analysis of the gatekeeping pilot 
8.1 Introduction 
Chapter 7 provided an impact evaluation of a gatekeeping pilot programme in two 
rural townships in a large municipality in northern China. The primary concern of 
Chapter 8 is to understand qualitatively how the gatekeeping pilot functioned, more 
specifically: the intended and the actual functioning of the gatekeeping pilot; factors 
that likely explained the gap between the intended and actual functioning; and 
consequences of the gatekeeping pilot. Drawing on recent developments in the field of 
health systems and policy research (Adam, 2014; Alliance for Health Policy and 
Systems Research, 2009), and expecting complexity of gatekeeping in rural China, the 
sub-study combined causal loop analysis with a health system building blocks 
categorisation and a qualitative policy analysis method to study the functioning of the 
gatekeeping pilot.  
Indeed, previous studies from China have suggested that a large proportion of 
patients treated in hospitals could be managed more cost-effectively at lower levels of 
care (Lei et al., 1996; Wang, Yin, & Song, 2011; Xu, Wang, et al., 2007), implying 
huge potential for gatekeeping. However, a literature review exposed a paucity of 
research articles about reform pilots in China involving gatekeeping (Li & Li, 2008). 
Furthermore, health system changes in recent decades that affected both the primary 
care sector and hospitals profoundly (Bloom & Wolcott, 2013; Sun, Wang, & Barnes, 
2015; Yip & Hsiao, 2015; Zhou et al., 2014) are likely to influence the functioning of 
gatekeeping. 
The various arrangements, context-specificity, multiple and interrelated impacts, 
as well as the nature of the gatekeeping pilot suggested the need for an approach that 
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allows sufficient sensitivity to and synthesis of the multiple factors in the interrelating 
dynamics. Systems thinking has been described as a mind-set which sees systems and 
sub-components of systems as interrelated to one another, and interprets the 
interrelationships as the key to knowledge about how things function (Adam, 2014). 
Advocated as useful for health systems and policy research, systems thinking has 
proved valuable in revealing key elements of success and failure in implementing 
complex interventions, including the role and importance of relationships, actors in 
health systems, environmental factors, anticipating potential unintended consequences, 
and systematically evaluating the implementation process and reactions to feedbacks 
within the systems (Adam et al., 2012; Adam, 2014; de Savigny & Adam, 2009; Gilson, 
2012). Combining qualitative methods with systems thinking can add depth to analysis 
of health systems issues, and adding visualization can help convey complex 
interpretations and findings (Adam, 2014).  
8.2 Methods 
Causal loop analysis is a method among the tools of applied systems thinking. It 
maps out and qualitatively models the dynamics amongst a number of interconnected 
factors using causal loop diagrams (CLDs). Recent application of CLDs was seen in 
the field of health policy and systems research (Rwashana & Williams, 2007), neonatal 
mortality (Rwashana et al., 2014), medical dual practice (Paina et al., 2014), and 
integrated Community Case Management (iCCM) of malaria, pneumonia and 
diarrhoea (Sarriot et al., 2015). In these studies, CLDs made explicit cause-and-effect 
relationships and facilitated understanding and interpretation of interacting factors and 
feedback loops that contribute to important policy issues. Causal loop analysis has not 
been used to study gatekeeping. 
As a tool, CLDs do not automatically generate the information needed for 
constructing them. Sterman suggested that data collection and analysis should be based 
on qualitative methods (Sterman, 2000), however, there has been little guidance on 
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how to rigorously generate CLDs from qualitative interviews. It has also been unclear 
how to cover the range of health systems issues that could influence the functioning of 
complex interventions like gatekeeping. Therefore, the sub-study linked causal loop 
analysis with the WHO classification of health system building blocks and the 
“Framework” approach for qualitative data analysis. The overall process of the study 
consisted of five stages as shown in Table 8-1. 
Table 8-1. Overall process of the qualitative systems analysis 
Stage Content 
1 Developing preliminary thematic framework and research tools 
2 Fieldwork and interviews 
3 Initial analysis of interview transcripts 
4 Interpretation of data and tabulation 
5 Construction of causal loop diagrams and analysis 
 
The first stage followed the “Framework” approach and developed a preliminary 
thematic framework and research tools, with the aid of the WHO categorisation of 
health system building blocks. National and local policy documents were collected 
from the municipal and district health bureaux and central government and analysed. 
Then a preliminary thematic framework was developed, leading to question guides 
that included questions about implementation and intended mechanisms of the 
gatekeeping pilot programme, as well as systems level factors that potentially 
influenced the gatekeeping programme. For systems level factors, the framework and 
question guide were constructed based on the WHO categorisation of health system 
building blocks (World Health Organization, 2007), with questions focusing on the 
interactions between building blocks (i.e. service delivery, health workforce, health 
information, medical technologies, health financing, and leadership and governance).  
For the second stage, the fieldwork was carried out in two phases (November 2014 
and July 2015) during the pilot gatekeeping programme. For this qualitative study, 
semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders were conducted to identify the 
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effects and mechanisms of gatekeeping and its constraints. Interviewees were selected 
based on the intention to cover the perspectives of all key groups of stakeholders, and 
ensure sufficient number of interviewees within each group to represent variations of 
views and information. The following categories of stakeholder were interviewed: 
ambulatory patients with experiences of the gatekeeping policies, physicians and 
managerial staff from a district hospital and three township health centres (two pilot 
township health centres and a non-pilot typical township health centre), and 
administrators of the municipal and the district NCMS agencies and the district health 
bureau.  
Table 8-2 presents the list of all interviewees and their main characteristics. Six 
patients in the pilot townships with experiences related to referral were selected among 
patients visiting primary care facilities. Ambulatory patients were asked randomly who 
had experience related to gatekeeping, i.e. patients who had requested to visit higher 
levels of care and were either referred or rejected, or patients who did not request but 
were referred by primary care practitioners on the practitioners’ initiative. As nobody 
was rejected, those who had been referred were recruited. Unfortunately, there was no 
way to identify patients referred from the two townships at the district hospital, due to 
both the small numbers and the fact that the referral letter was not presented by patients 
to hospital staff—it was used only for claiming reimbursement back in their townships. 
Eight doctors with experience of dealing with patient referral in the pilot district 
were interviewed. They included two from the district hospital who had handled the 
referral process, recruited through consultation with staff at the hospital’s department 
of medical affairs. The other six were from primary care facilities. As there were barely 
any independent village doctors in the district, only one village doctor employed by 
one of the pilot township health centres was available for interview. Five facility 
managers were interviewed, including two from the two pilot township health centres 
and two from a comparison township health centre in the same district—the 
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comparison township health centre was considered typical township health centre in 
the city. Similar responses regarding issues not directly involving gatekeeping 
enhanced my confidence about the relevance of findings from the pilot-related 
facilities to other areas. Three health administrators, from the district health bureau, 
the district NCMS agency, and the municipal NCMS agency (which initiated the pilot 
programme), were also interviewed. Within each group (except for patients), one 
interviewee was interviewed in both 2014 and 2015 to check for policy and 
implementation consistency over time. In total, 20 people were interviewed (see Table 
8-2). The interviews were recorded, then transcribed by a professional company, and 
checked by myself. 
Table 8-2. List of interviewees and their characteristics 
Interviewees Serial 
numbers 
Type of facilities 
/institutions 
Gender Age group Year of 
interview 
Patients P01 Primary care Male 51-60 2014 
P02 Primary care Female 51-60 2014 
P03 Primary care Male 61-70 2014 
P04 Primary care Male 51-60 2015 
P05 Primary care Female 51-60 2015 
P06 Primary care Female 61-70 2015 
Doctors D01 Primary care Female 41-50 2014 
D02 Primary care Female 21-30 2014, 2015 
D03 Primary care Female 41-50 2014 
D04 Primary care Female 41-50 2014 
D05 Primary care Female 41-50 2015 
D06 Primary care Female 41-50 2015 
D07 Hospital Male 41-50 2015 
D08 Hospital Female 41-50 2015 
Facility 
managers 
M01 Primary care Male 41-50 2014, 2015 
M02 Primary care Male 51-60 2015 
M03 Primary care Male 51-60 2015 
M04 Primary care Male 51-60 2015 
M05 Hospital Female 41-50 2015 
Health 
administrators  
A01 District health bureau Male 51-60 2014 
A02 District NCMS agency Male 41-50 2014, 2015 
A03 Municipal NCMS agency Male 41-50 2015 
Note: NCMS stands for New Rural Cooperative Medical Schemes 
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The third stage involved initial analysis of interview transcripts. This was done 
drawing from the “Framework” approach for data analysis developed by Ritchie and 
Spencer (2002), and using the qualitative data analysis software platform of NVivo 11 
for Windows Version 11.0.0.317 (QSR International, 2013). The analysis was carried 
out in 3 steps. First, I familiarized myself with the range and diversity of the data by 
listening to all the recordings and transcriptions, and making notes. Second, a thematic 
framework was developed based on both the preliminary framework and field notes, 
and transferred into a structure of nodes in NVivo. Third, the transcriptions were coded 
according to these nodes, and the nodes were further developed and refined in repeated 
rounds. 
The fourth stage involved interpretation of data and tabulation. I interpreted the 
coded data and identified factors related to the analysis, and associations between them. 
These factors were classified into causes and effects (either direct or indirect). For each 
set of causes and effects, key system variables were extracted and causal links were 
constructed correspondingly. A set of causal links included an upstream variable (cause) 
and at least one downstream variable (direct and indirect effects), as well as arrows 
denoting the direction and polarity of each individual causal link between the variables. 
The causes, effects, and the sets of causal links were then tabulated, along with the 
sources--the serial number of interviewees that provided the supporting evidence.  
For the fifth and final stage, a causal loop diagram was constructed and used for 
analysis. The constructed links were transferred into a draft of a causal loop diagram. 
First, the causal links were connected with each other via identical variables to get 
feedback loops. Second, delay marks were added for links that were associated with 
delays. Third, each feedback loop was given a specific name reflecting the general 
theme that it described and added the signs representing the nature (reinforcing or 
balancing) of the feedback loops. Fourth, the serial numbers of causal loops that each 
link fitted into was added to the table created in Stage 4, so that the process was easily 
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traceable. The finalized form of the intermediate results is presented in Appendix Table 
5.  
The workflow of these steps was iterative. The interviewees responded to 
questions constructed from the categorisation of the health system building blocks. In 
other words, there was no prior set of system variables to code their responses. Neither 
was the table created in Stage 4 constrained by a refined structure. The resultant draft 
diagram had several places where the effects did not link back to a cause directly or 
indirectly or where the effects and causes were at different levels of detail. The 
constructed links were re-evaluated, and the causes and effects in these links were 
refined when necessary and reasonable, by revisiting some of the source coding. 
Neglected logical stages were added if needed, based on logical reasoning.  
The diagram was drawn with Venism® PLE for Windows Version 6.4a (x32) 
(Ventana Systems Inc., 2016). Symbolic representation was used in accordance with 
Sterman (2000, pp. 138-139): an arrow denotes that there was a directional causal link 
between the two variables; positive and negative signs express the polarity of the 
causal links; “B” within a circular arrow represents that the loops were balancing, 
while “R” within a circular arrow represents that the loops were reinforcing. The only 
exception was that the colour green was used for links introduced by the gatekeeping 
pilot (the colour blue is used for other links), and dashed arrows for links that were 
intended by policy makers to happen, but which did not materialise in reality (see Table 
8-3). The diagram was used to analyse potential lessons for policy making from the 
study. 
8.3 Results 
This section presents the CLD (including the whole diagram and each feedback 
loop) and explains the functioning of the gatekeeping pilot using the CLD (see Figure 
8-1). It starts from the intended policy effects of the gatekeeping pilot programme (R1’ 
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and B1’). Then the section analyses related factors and the feedback loops they formed, 
which challenged the feasibility of the two intended feedback loops. This leads to the 
three feedback loops (R1a, R1b and R1c) related to primary care facilities and three 
feedback loops that involve hospitals (B2, R2, and R3). Finally, the section explains 
the policy resistance facing gatekeeping itself (B1).  
Table 8-3. Symbolic representation in the causal loop diagram 
Symbol Meaning 
X 
 
Y a positive causal link (all else being equal, a change in the variable X leads to 
a change in the same direction in variable Y, compared to when X is held 
constant) 
X 
 
Y a negative causal link (all else being equal, a change in the variable X leads to 
a change in the opposite direction in variable Y, compared to when X is held 
constant) 
X 
 
Y a causal link with delay (change in Y take place after change in X after a 
delay) 
X 
 
Y a causal link introduced with the gatekeeping pilot programme 
X 
 
Y a causal link that was intended by policy makers but not achieved 
 
 
 a balancing loop (sum of total numbers of negative causal links is odd) 
 
 
 a reinforcing loop (sum of total numbers of negative causal links is even) 
B1
R2
X2 Y2
-
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+
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Figure 8-1. Causal loop diagram for gatekeeping pilot 
hospital capacity
advantage hospital care
attractivenesshospital visits
PC visits
-
PC job
attractiveness
PC HR quality
PC capacity
+
PC revenue
+
balance of
equipment
+
-
R1'
PC brain drain
gatekeeping for
balance of care
hospital job
attractiveness
-
R1a
PC salary policy*
-
PC HR
sustainability
R1b
B2
gatekeeping
-
PC staff training
referral
balance
PC brain drain
-
-
syhponing of HR,
patients and resources
PC staff incentive
PC curative
service quality
bargaining power
+
hospital
bargaining power
+
-
+
PC doctors pivoting to
public health services
-
B1'
R2
R3
PC capacity
vicious cycle
hospital revenue
hospital salary
+
performance
bonus
+
+
PC salary policy
-+
inconvenience
+
-
-
B1
resistence
performance evaluation
focusing on public health
services
-
PC recruitment
+
+
+
hospital incentive
doctor-patient
tension
+
+
+
+
+
hospital-to-PC
referrals
+
+
hospital doctors lack
confidence in PC
capacity
-
doctor-patient
tension* reliance on
technology +
+
performance evaluation
focusing on public health
services*
+
clinical
experiences
+ +
-
hospital
recruitment
+
+
-
hospital capacity
expansion
+
+
+
lack of integrated
care arrangement
+
balance of
pharmaceuticals &
equipment*
-
+
-
hospital
performance
+
+
+
service restriction -
low patient perception
of PC doctor capacity
+
+
PC losing
patients' faith
R1c
pharmaceutical
policies
+
Legend
X2 Y2
-
X1 Y1
+
X0 Y0
X3 Y3
X4 Y4
Part III  A contemporary gatekeeping pilot 
251 
8.3.1 Intended dynamics 
The gatekeeping pilot programme was intended to influence the incentives of both 
providers and patients. From the demand side, the gatekeeping policy was expected to 
curb direct care seeking at hospitals without referral from lower levels of care, by 
preventing patients from claiming for their expenditures on such visits. Ideally, this 
would lead to reduced patient visits to hospitals, more patient visits to and more 
revenue of primary care facilities. From the supply side, the gatekeeping pilot 
programme installed a fundholding role in the township health centres. Potential 
savings and expenditures were supposed to be used as performance bonus for the 
facility and by facility managers to improve services. This was expected to reduce 
patients’ need to go to hospitals (simplified as “hospital care attractiveness” in the 
diagram). In short, the gatekeeping policy was intended to establish a reinforcing 
feedback loop (R1’, “gatekeeping for balance of care”, made of blue arrows in Figure 
8-2), and to a virtuous cycle towards improved functioning of primary care by reducing 
hospital care attractiveness and enhancing bonuses for primary care providers.  
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Figure 8-2. R1’, an intended reinforcing feedback loop regarding the effects of 
gatekeeping for balance of care 
 
Another intended feedback loop was on the referral interactions between hospital 
visits and primary care visits. While primary care visits were supposed to replace a 
significant but unknown proportion of hospital ambulatory visits, a portion of hospital 
patients were supposed to be referred back to primary care facilities particularly for 
follow up care. Therefore, there was an intended balancing feedback loop (B1’, 
“referral balance”) between the visits to hospitals and referrals back to the primary 
care facilities. If the feedback loop functioned as intended, it would contribute to the 
balance of patient visits between primary care facilities and hospitals. 
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Figure 8-3. B1’, an intended balancing feedback loop concerning referral balance 
 
8.3.2 Low incentive of performance-based salary 
The R1’ loop was obstructed due to several factors mentioned by the interviewees. 
First, within the loop, the facility managers had limited ability to use the performance 
bonus to incentivize service improvement. This was mainly due to a nation-wide 
change in the salary policy (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 2009; 
State Council, 2009). In order to maintain financial sustainability of primary care 
facilities and curb the profit-oriented over-prescription of drugs and services, a 
previous revenue-based salary system based on user fees had been replaced by a 
performance-based salary system based on a generally fixed total budget for salaries. 
While the policy change enhanced the financial sustainability of primary care facilities, 
it also minimized micro-economic incentives within the facility. The words of a 
director of a township health centre illustrated the ineffectiveness of using a 
performance bonus to stimulate doctors: 
“The performance bonus comes from a [fixed] sum of salary… [the staff] 
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believe the performance bonus is a portion of earning that one deserves… He 
[or she] actually consider the money as part of his regular entitlement. If you 
deduct his bonus, he [or she] would be very unhappy… If one gets more, others 
will get less… For those who receives extra bonus, the amount cannot be too 
large. As a result, the stimulus is small… The intended aim of the performance 
bonus could barely be achieved.” (M02, interviewed in 2015) 
The manager then recollected that before the reform in 2009, when the bonus for staff 
had been tied to their contribution to service revenue, the staff had been much more 
motivated. After the abolition of revenue-based bonus, he found it difficult to motivate 
his staff and had been relying on ineffective persuasion. The director of the other pilot 
township health centres used an increasingly objective performance index system to 
quantify the services and justify his decisions on salary distribution. The performance-
related payment was kept lower than 300-400 yuan per month, which had a small effect 
on staff motivation. He purposively kept the bonus variations small as higher 
variations would create within-group tension and undermine the much needed 
teamwork spirit (M01, interviewed in 2014). In other words, the leveraging power of 
the performance bonus appeared minimal. The expected incentive of fundholding was 
therefore obstructed and less effective than desired.  
8.3.3 Vicious cycle of primary care 
The R1’ loop was further weakened by a deterioration of primary care capacity, 
which appeared to be in a vicious cycle. A doctor at a pilot township health centre who 
previously had worked at a retail pharmacy selling drugs said:  
“I feel there is little difference with a pharmacy. In a pharmacy, one also 
asks patients about their conditions and then dispenses medicines. Here things 
are basically the same… For some patients I would suggest blood test, [but we 
cannot provide that]… I can only give them some drugs that fit with the 
symptoms. We have all the examination devices but nobody to operate them.” 
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(D04, interviewed in 2015). 
The township health centres were in the process of conversion to community 
health centres, therefore eliminating some main functions related to the mini-hospitals 
that they used to be. Inpatient care had been virtually eliminated, as had surgical 
operations. Reduced clinical experience and dysfunctional equipment of primary care 
facilities contributed to the decline of primary care capacity. The two township health 
centre managers complained that: 
“The skills of all our doctors have deserted.” (M03, interviewed in 2015) 
“We are not doing any [surgery]…Our director Liu used to do all kinds of 
surgeries from head to foot.” (M04, interviewed in 2015) 
The regulations unwittingly reinforced a process of breaking down the capacity and 
identity of what doctors meant at primary care level, and constructed a vicious cycle 
of primary care capacity. As primary care doctors were seen by both themselves and 
patients as losing their key competence, the patients who sensed serious illnesses just 
turned to hospitals without visiting township health centres. The vicious cycle was also 
reinforced by the unintended consequences of other policies that did not attend to the 
complexity involved in reforming primary care. 
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Figure 8-4. R1a, a reinforcing feedback loop concerning a vicious cycle of primary care 
capacity 
 
The imbalance between hospitals and primary care facilities, in terms of use of 
medical technologies and pharmaceuticals, further limited the ability of primary care 
practitioners (particularly in comparison with hospital doctors). This fed back towards 
patients’ preference for hospital care. Particularly, the nation-wide essential 
pharmaceutical policy (Ministry of Health et al., 2009), while reducing purchasing 
prices for patients, restricted the pharmaceuticals that primary care doctors could 
prescribe. The restriction was made worse by the difficulty of transport in the 
countryside. A patient complained passionately about the restriction of access to 
pharmaceuticals: 
“Now you have to go to large hospitals for serious illness. We also need to 
talk about the problem with pharmaceuticals… Even if [the primary care doctors] 
have the competence [of diagnosis and prescription], [they] cannot prescribe 
certain drugs… They are restricted by the level of facilities … As the saying goes, 
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a capable housewife cannot cook a meal without rice [note: a Chinese saying 
meaning nobody can make something out of nothing].” (P03, interviewed in 
2014) 
The performance evaluation system was also driving the primary care facilities 
further away from providing curative care. In both the offices of the chief directors of 
the pilot township health centres, there hung a huge board of performance indicators 
where curative care took only about 1/5 of the space, with the rest devoted to 
performance management for the other subjects—mainly essential public health 
services. The pressure was intensified by the need to report to two agencies—a 
community health management centre (an arms-length agency under the district 
bureau of health) and a disease control department under the bureau of health, who 
had overlapping supervisory roles on the performance of primary care facilities on so-
called “public health services” including managing health records, follow up of 
patients, etc. (M03 and M04, interviewed in 2015). Based on the interviews, there 
seemed to be variations on how much was achieved in reality, but the shifting focus of 
work from clinical curative care to disease management was clear. A young doctor in 
a pilot township health centre, who had trained in clinical medicine, spent most of her 
time in a department of community health, and was doing little clinical work because 
of the intense pressure of performance evaluation, and her youth (and hence lack of 
trust by patients, and low patient volume). She said: 
“I certainly regretted, because I studied (clinical) medicine and was 
prepared for that. But since it was the requirement of work, I had no choice.” 
(D02, interviewed in 2014) 
This pivot was also reinforced by the reduced patient visits and contributed to a 
downstream reduction of the attractiveness of jobs as a primary care doctor. None of 
the interviewed doctors who were spending their time in disease management were 
happy about the situation. This was also an issue of sustainability of human resources 
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at primary care facilities (R1b, “PC HR sustainability”). Recruitment in the facilities 
mainly targeted medical graduates with a four-year associate degree (a full medical 
degree would require minimally 5 years of training). Even such recruitment was 
difficult according to a district health administrator (M03, interviewed in 2015). 
 
Figure 8-5. R1b, a reinforcing feedback loop concerning the sustainability of primary 
care human resources 
  
Related to this was another reinforcing loop that further challenged the intention 
to move away from the situation of patients bypassing primary care facilities. As the 
focus of primary care doctors shifted towards public health services, the patients 
noticed that their service function was reduced. Low patient perception of the capacity 
of primary care doctors fed back towards hospital care attractiveness (R1c, “PC losing 
patients’ faith”). There appeared to be a breakdown of doctors’ professional status in 
the township health centres, not only from the perspective of the disillusioned doctors, 
but also of the nostalgic patients who said that in the past the township health centres 
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could deal with all kinds of cases including some major surgery: 
“they could cut out [diseased] lobes of lung, sections of breast”. (P03 
interviewed in 2014) 
 
Figure 8-6. R1c, a reinforcing feedback loop concerning primary care losing patients’ 
faith 
 
When considered together, R1a, R1b and R1c formed a very strong tendency 
towards further declining functions and capacity in primary care facilities, and erosion 
of the professional status of doctors. The feedback loop B1’ regarding post-
hospitalization referral to primary care was also not achieved, as the hospital doctors 
lacked confidence in the capacity of primary care facilities, rendering the feedback 
loop illusionary. The hospital manager interviewed said:  
“now almost every young person goes to college and gets a full degree, how 
could those who could not get enrolled in a full degree university programme be 
trusted to treat people’s illness?”(M05, interviewed in 2015)  
A doctor from the district hospital expressed a similar doubt: 
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“I don’t think they can solve any real problem. Those with real problems 
would be referred to tertiary hospitals… Regarding back referral [from hospitals 
to township health centres], to be frank, we operate according to the demand of 
patients… If the patients believe it is inappropriate, we have to give up… There 
are very few back referrals [in practice].” (D07, interviewed in 2015) 
8.3.4 Challenges from hospitals  
Besides the challenges within the primary care sector, difficulties for gatekeeping 
also came from the interface with hospitals. In order to improve the level of skills, 
there was a training system in which newly recruited medical graduates at primary care 
level underwent further training at hospitals. According to a hospital doctor and an 
officer of the district health bureau, many seemed ready to give up their position in 
primary care if they were offered a position in the hospitals. Therefore, there was a 
balancing loop of human resources at primary care level (B2, “PC brain drain”), in 
which those with better training and career prospects would leave primary care for 
hospitals. The lack of enforcement of a university medical education programme to 
train rural students as doctors targeted for specific rural primary care facilities (so-
called “order-based training programme”, or medical graduates admitted on such 
special programmes were required to work in primary care facilities in rural areas) was 
common, which facilitated the brain drain (A02, interviewed in 2015).  
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Figure 8-7. B2, a balancing loop concerning  brain drain from primary care 
 
The self-reinforcing nature of the balance between primary care facilities and 
hospitals becomes particularly clear, when the feedback loop R2 (“syphoning of HR, 
patients and resources”) is examined. Discussion with the district hospital manager 
(M05, interviewed in 2015) revealed that the brain drain of primary care was mainly 
limited by the already depleted reservoir of capable primary care doctors. In fact, the 
hospitals were actively recruiting graduates with not only a university medical degree 
but also masters graduates (three extra years of medical training). The result perhaps 
was not just reduction in recruitment at primary care level but also a deterioration of 
quality and a further divergence of professional status and aspiration. As the same 
manager in the district hospital argued, some who preferred to stay at primary care 
facilities tended to have low career aspirations. They were happy working at primary 
care facilities, because there was lighter workload and steadier income compared to 
working in hospitals. Related to this was the increasing hospital visits associated with 
the hospital incentive structure linked with revenue generation. The hospitals (mainly 
the district hospital) attracted a lion’s share of revenue (A02, interviewed in 2015). 
The hospital used it to build up its advantage in equipment and infrastructure. In short, 
the comprehensive structural advantage of the hospital fed back to its functional 
advantage in that it attracted ever more patients.  
hospital capacity
advantage hospital care
attractivenesshospital visits
PC visits
-
PC job
attractiveness
PC HR quality
PC capacity
+
PC revenue
+
balance of
equipment
+
-
R1'
PC brain drain
gatekeeping for
balance of care
hospital job
attractiveness
-
R1a
PC salary policy*
-
PC HR
sustainability
R1b
B2
gatekeeping
-
PC staff training
referral
balance
PC brain drain
-
-
syhponing of HR,
patients and resources
PC staff incentive
PC curative
service quality
bargaining power
+
hospital
bargaining power
+
-
+
PC doctors pivoting to
public health services
-
B1'
R2
R3
PC capacity
vicious cycle
hospital revenue
hospital salary
+
performance
bonus
+
+
PC salary policy
-+
inconvenience
+
-
-
B1
resistence
performance evaluation
focusing on public health
services
-
PC recruitment
+
+
+
hospital incentive
doctor-patient
tension
+
+
+
+
+
hospital-to-PC
referrals
+
+
hospital doctors lack
confidence in PC
capacity
-
doctor-patient
tension* reliance on
technology +
+
performance evaluation
focusing on public health
services*
+
clinical
experiences
+ +
-
hospital
recruitment
+
+
-
hospital capacity
expansion
+
+
+
lack of integrated
care arrangement
+
balance of
pharmaceuticals &
equipment*
-
+
-
hospital
performance
+
+
+
service restriction -
low patient perception
of PC doctor capacity
+
+
PC losing
patients' faith
R1c
pharmaceutical
policies
+
Legend
X2 Y2
-
X1 Y1
+
X0 Y0
X3 Y3
X4 Y4
Part III  A contemporary gatekeeping pilot 
262 
 
Figure 8-8. R2, a reinforcing feedback loop, concerning syphoning of HR, patients and 
resources 
 
The advantage of hospitals also fed back to the policy making process. The large 
patient volumes in hospitals provided them with strong bargaining power and reduced 
the prospects of strict gatekeeping policies (R3, “hospital bargaining power”), 
particularly as local government was required to provide care for most patients within 
the geographical range of the district. In other words, the opposition from the interests 
related to hospitals were challenging the sustainability of the gatekeeping pilot in its 
current design. Indeed, the municipal NCMS administrator was considering replacing 
the pilot programme by moving the capitation-based ambulatory care budget to the 
district hospital, as it was believed to be more capable of functioning as gatekeepers 
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(A03, interviewed in 2015). 
 
Figure 8-9. R3, a reinforcing feedback loop concerning hospital bargaining power 
 
8.3.5 Gatekeeping backfires 
Finally, the gatekeeping policy backfired due to weak primary care capacity (B1, 
“resistance”). Patients found primary care facilities to be very restrictive in services, 
technologies, and pharmaceuticals, and felt they received little extra benefit when they 
came to visit primary care facilities for referral. The extra visits became a burden to 
primary care facilities, too.  
“The patients came to us to be referred to the district hospital, [and then] 
to the district hospital to be referred to municipal hospitals. Will you say that is 
not troublesome for them? It is understandable that patient complained… They 
are not willing to come here to get referral. [They would say] I see doctors 
elsewhere but [why do] I need you to give me a certificate.” (D06, interviewed 
2015) 
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Figure 8-10. B1, a balancing feedback loop concerning resistance to the gatekeeping 
policy 
 
Most doctors and patients considered the policy an inconvenience, though some 
also acknowledged that the policy brought additional opportunity to make contact with 
patients. The tension was also increased by the lack of patient awareness, despite 
government’s effort to publicize the policy change. In several cases, patients went to 
hospitals first and when they wanted reimbursement they found that they had to get a 
referral from primary care doctors. Pressured by patients (with whom doctors had a 
potentially tense relationship) and limited by the capacity to provide clinical services 
that could replace patients’ care seeking at hospitals, primary care practitioners usually 
just wrote referral letters for patients (P01, interviewed in 2014). Furthermore, there 
was little arrangement (e.g. priority access compared to self-referred patients) to make 
it easier for patients to see doctors in hospitals. Even if they got a referral from primary 
care facilities, patients still went through the same process and joined the same queue 
as other patients (D02, interviewed in 2015). The referral requirement thus became 
largely ritualistic and indeed an extra trouble for both doctors and patients, which 
added to their resentment of the policy. In particular, gatekeeping hurt local elites who 
had more say in the political process (e.g. people’s representatives), and these people 
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pressured local leaders to abolish strict gatekeeping policies (A02, interviewed in 
2015). With the weak capacity of primary care and other issues of the policy’s 
implementation, the value of gatekeeping became mostly an inconvenience that turned 
into resistance against the pilot policy. 
8.4 Discussion  
8.4.1 Limitations and value of the approach 
One limitation is that the sub-study did not let interviewees or independent experts 
validate the model, which has been recommended (Carey et al., 2015). After a failed 
attempt to explain an earlier draft of the CLD to some municipal policy makers, it was 
considered difficult to use the CLD as a communication tool to policy makers who had 
little prior training, and to explore this further was beyond the capacity of the study. 
The findings should therefore be seen as the understanding of the researcher, generated 
through a rigorous process.  
The approach used in this sub-study seems to have advantages in understanding 
the complexity involved in shifting balance of care through interventions like 
gatekeeping. The use of the WHO categorisation of health systems building blocks 
facilitated a systematic mapping of factors related to gatekeeping. In the sub-study, 
applying the categorisation facilitated the identification of issues directly related to the 
mechanisms of gatekeeping such as financing (e.g. the ineffective performance-based 
bonus), but also less directly related to gatekeeping such as pharmaceutical policies 
and technologies (e.g. restriction of access to medicine).  
Using the CLD has allowed the sub-study to bring together the separate analyses 
to understand the interrelationships between different factors within and across 
categories of building blocks. One particular advantage is related to dealing with 
unintended consequences of policies indirectly related to gatekeeping (e.g. the 
restriction and change regarding the service functions of primary care practitioners 
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contributed to a deterioration of service capacity of primary care facilities). The CLD 
also allowed the sub-study to identify both local patterns of feedback loops and how 
these feedback loops formed a holistic picture of all the key factors related to 
gatekeeping.  
The approach bridged analysis of the gatekeeping pilot with analysis of the system 
within which the gatekeeping pilot was embedded. The approach thus brought into the 
qualitative evaluation of gatekeeping the three dimensions of interrelationships, 
perspectives and boundaries, highlighted in the systems literature (Williams, 2015). It 
revealed the richness of interrelationships among different factors within the health 
system that were directly or indirectly related to gatekeeping functioning, reflected the 
multiple perspectives of different groups of stakeholders, and encouraged a deeper 
understanding of the boundaries by highlighting the linkages between the intervention 
and the system, as well as by examining unintended consequences of the gatekeeping 
pilot.  
Furthermore, the approach of qualitative systems analysis developed in this sub-
study was explicit and transparent. A systematic review of the recent use of system 
science and systems thinking for public health suggested that studies using systems 
modelling methods should make the formulation of models (in this case a CLD) 
explicit enough for readers to judge the rigour of the studies or to repeat the process 
(Carey et al., 2015). The complicated process and lack of transparency of interim 
stages made causal loop analysis prone to issues regarding accountability. The danger 
of misunderstanding the system based on a model with suboptimal rigour is amplified 
by the assumed interconnectedness of the factors. However, there has been little 
guidance on how to develop CLD based on rigorous qualitative methods and data. This 
sub-study has established an example of a transparent and rigorous approach to 
qualitative systems analysis of a complex health systems intervention.  
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8.4.2 Findings regarding gatekeeping and implications beyond 
The chapter has presented the first evidence on the intended and actual functioning 
of gatekeeping in a pilot in rural China. The sub-section here discusses the findings 
regarding both the intended and the actual functioning of the gatekeeping pilot; factors 
that likely explained the gap between the intended and actual functioning, both due to 
historical legacies and the consequences of recent other policies. 
Within the study context, the intended mechanisms of gatekeeping in changing 
patients’ utilisation pattern of care were only partially realised. The intended supply-
side incentive on treating a greater number of patients at local facilities did not seem 
have functioned as expected, as the salary policy was too rigid with a level of pay too 
low to either attract or incentivise gatekeeping-related clinical work. On the demand 
side, a large number of patients appeared to be going through primary care reluctantly 
to get referral in a generally ritualistic process. This helps explain the findings from 
the previous chapter, which found that patient visits to primary care facilities increased 
by a large proportion but spending increased much less. The implementation of the 
approach of gatekeeping in the studied pilot led to dissatisfaction of both doctors and 
patients. This contradicts a patient survey done in Shenzhen (Gan et al., 2016) that 
showed willingness of local residents to accept community health centres as 
gatekeepers.  
Besides public resentment, potential adverse effect is delay of diagnosis or 
misdiagnosis (Crawford, 2014). The sub-study did not investigate this issue directly, 
but the weak primary care capacity suggests that this would be hard to avoid, if a 
significant number of patients rely on the current primary care providers. Furthermore, 
given the different capacity of primary care facilities and hospitals, implementing 
gatekeeping only for the NCMS could potentially exacerbate inequity by restricting 
their access to facilities of lower service quality. 
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The sub-study identified three aspects that led to the sub-optimal functioning of 
gatekeeping. First, the weak conditions of primary care, particularly regarding the 
skills of primary care doctors in comparison with those in hospitals, seemed to be a 
fundamental barrier facing the reform. The nation-wide gaps in qualifications and 
income between primary care doctors and hospital doctors were sustained over the 
recent decade when social health insurance coverage was extended to the whole 
population (see Chapter 4). Therefore, it was understandable that patients in the pilot 
townships were not satisfied when their eligibility for direct access to ambulatory 
services in hospitals were taken from them. 
Second, the study has further revealed reinforcing feedbacks that turned into a 
series of vicious cycles for primary care development, in terms of the weakened service 
capacity of primary care, the decreasing patients’ trust of primary care and 
questionable sustainability of human resources for primary care. The study has shown 
the danger of neglecting the professional aspiration of primary care practitioners and 
patients’ appreciation of their competence, which seems still to hinge on the ability of 
primary care practitioners to provide curative care. 
The lack of progress in reforming hospitals exacerbated the imbalance between 
the two sectors. Despite reform in primary care, the inflationary incentive structure in 
hospital care remained unchanged. Hospitals were systematically absorbing human 
resources, patients, and other resources, contributing to greater imbalance in the 
system. Hospitals (particularly the district hospital in the pilot area) have become 
increasingly the main provider of curative care and received most of the total medical 
expenditures. This is corroborated by findings of Chapter 4. The self-reinforcing 
nature of the imbalance between hospitals and primary care facilities could mean 
increasing difficulty in future reforms. 
Third, the effectiveness of gatekeeping was hampered by the unintended 
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consequences related to conflicts among different priorities required of primary care 
development. Primary care facilities have been loaded with much aspiration for the 
ultimate goal of universal health coverage in low- and middle-income countries. There 
coexisted multiple policy initiatives in the pilot as well as China-wide: strengthening 
the function of primary care facilities in curative primary care, strengthening the 
function of primary care facilities in preventive primary care for the increasingly 
prevalent noncommunicable diseases, curbing over-prescription related to the previous 
incentive structure, and reducing pharmaceutical prices. These intersecting reforms 
provided plenty of scope for clashes and inconsistences. The findings suggested 
challenges in changing the functions of primary care facilities, as primary care 
facilities have relied for years on mechanisms similar to those in the hospital sector 
(revenue generation, recognition of professional status focused on treating diseases, 
etc.). 
Technological regulations, some of which aimed at standardizing primary care 
facilities and improving the alignment of their service with a primary care orientation, 
appeared to undermine the basis of trust in primary care providers’ technical capacity. 
The effort to strengthen chronic disease prevention (e.g. focus on performance 
indicators of “public health services” including follow up care of chronic patients) was 
important as a corrective action to the previous focus on curative care. However, it 
might undermine efforts to provide more and better curative care at primary care 
facilities, and even break down the appreciation of professional status and competence 
of primary care practitioners by both patients and colleagues. 
In relation to this, the performance-based salary policy reform and a virtually fixed 
budget payment system, by eliminating the previous incentive to over-prescribe, 
seemed to have affected the facility manager’s entrepreneurship and ability to motivate 
staff. The essential drug policies, which seemed to have unintendedly led to limited 
access to pharmaceuticals at primary care facilities, also restricted the range of services 
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available at this level. Previous studies have suggested these were common challenges 
facing primary care facilities in China (Zhou et al., 2014), though this sub-study further 
elucidated the underlying dynamics. 
8.5 Conclusion 
This sub-study has used a qualitative systems analysis to understand how 
gatekeeping functioned under constraints in a pilot in rural China, and the factors that 
affected its functioning. The approach combined the WHO categorisation of health 
system building blocks, a causal loop analysis, and the “Framework” approach for 
qualitative data analysis. Using this approach, the sub-study developed a CLD based 
on information collected from semi-structured interviews and used the CLD to 
facilitate further analysis of the functioning of the gatekeeping pilot in the context of 
its system. The qualitative systems analysis found that the pilot policy lead to a 
substantial proportion of patients visiting primary care simply to get a referral, which 
resulted in dissatisfaction of both doctors and patients. 
The study has suggested that the gatekeeping pilot failed to alter the dynamics 
involved in an increasingly imbalanced local health system. The current salary policy 
was too rigid with a level of pay too low to either attract or incentivize gatekeeping 
related clinical work. If scaled up and strictly adopted in settings with weak primary 
care, gatekeeping of the kind implemented in the pilot could lead to other undesirable 
outcomes. These might include public resentment and other unintended consequences 
in equity and quality of care (e.g. delayed diagnosis), which could undermine the 
momentum for shifting the balance from hospitals to primary care providers. 
The study has suggested a number of underlying systems factors that restricted 
the functioning of gatekeeping in the pilot area. The weakness of primary care capacity 
(particularly in terms of human resources) lay at the heart of ineffective gatekeeping. 
Primary care facilities were also trapped in vicious cycles. Particularly dangerous was 
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the phenomenon that the primary care doctors were losing patient trust and 
professional aspirations. Unintended consequences of a number of concurrent policies 
also impeded strengthening of primary care functioning. Strict regulation on 
pharmaceuticals and the technological imbalance between primary care and hospitals 
limited the medicines and technologies available to primary care facilities. The delayed 
reform of perverse hospital incentives also contributed to the barriers to successful 
functioning of gatekeeping. 
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 Discussion 
This chapter addresses the following topics: the methodological issues regarding 
synthesizing findings from all four sub-studies; the overall findings when all sub-
studies are considered together; relevance and generalizability of findings; and 
methodological reflections. 
9.1 Methodological issues regarding synthesizing findings from sub-studies 
The journey of the thesis started from treating gatekeeping as an intervention to 
achieve stronger functioning of primary care in China and expanded to a complex 
health system issue—the balance between hospitals and primary care providers. 
Eventually, the thesis became a multi-methods mix of sub-studies. Overall, the 
research design encompassed two historical sub-studies: a descriptive study to assess 
the structural and functional balance between hospitals and primary care providers 
(between 1949 and 2013) and a historical-institutionalist analysis of the coevolution 
of hospitals and primary care providers (between 1835 and 2013), and two 
contemporary sub-studies: an impact evaluation of a gatekeeping pilot since 2013, as 
well as a qualitative study of functioning in configuration with other elements in a 
dynamic system.  
The task of this section is to discuss some key methodological issues about 
synthesizing the findings from the four sub-studies, covering the following points: 
First, the section discusses the overall conceptualization of balance between hospitals 
and primary care providers, which was the conceptual basis for all four sub-studies. 
Second, the section discusses the synthesis of the historical sub-studies. Third, the 
section discusses the synthesis of the contemporary sub-studies. Fourth, the section 
discusses the thesis’s combined use of historical analyses with contemporary 
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evaluation.  
9.1.1 Conceptualization of balance between hospitals and primary care providers 
This framework contains hospitals and primary care providers as two sectors 
within a single dualist health system structure and provides the conceptual basis for all 
four sub-studies and their synthesis; how the framework was used in the thesis 
therefore deserves attention. 
A central cross-cutting issue was the meaning of and distinction between primary 
care providers and hospitals. As reviewed in Chapter 2, there are multiple dimensions 
to define primary care (and thereby primary care providers): based on a range of 
clinical professions or disciplines, a type of setting or a system of service delivery, a 
set of services provided by primary care providers (e.g. general practices), or services 
with a set of normative attributes at micro or macro level. It has also been clarified in 
Chapter 4 that this thesis used the government policies’ operational definition of 
“jiceng weisheng jigou” (literally basic level health facilities), which included 
township health centres and village clinics in rural areas, and community health centres 
and stations in urban areas. This indeed has been the general approach commonly used 
in studies about China, though not always. For example, in 2015 alone more than one 
thousand Chinese research papers were published on “jiceng weisheng jigou”. On the 
other hand, in trying the Chinese version of the Primary Care Assessment Tool, Shi 
included as primary care providers doctors at tertiary hospitals who were used by 
patients as regular first point of contact (Yang, Shi, et al., 2013).  
The underlying rationale behind previous mainstream studies on primary care 
providers in China appeared to be that the perceived weakness of primary care 
providers constituted a serious policy issue. This has been conceptualized in Chapter 
4 as structural and functional balance between primary care providers and hospitals. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, the institutional dimension was further included in the analysis. 
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The analyses therefore linked description of the situation with both major policy issues 
and the potential policy targets at the operational level. Had the thesis focused on 
“primary care provided by hospitals” then increasing the primary care attributes of 
hospital services would likely lead to further weakening of the functioning of primary 
care providers. 
The thesis also looked at the combination of the two sectors within a single dualist 
structure. As mentioned earlier, this combination brought analysis of hospitals and 
primary care providers under a single framework. It facilitates the discussion of the 
interrelationship between the systems factors that relate to both sectors. The 
framework highlighted the fact that the two sectors share related sources of inputs 
(human, physical and political resources) and serve related functions. Their division, 
professionally, politically, and organizationally and financially, mattered greatly in 
affecting the structural and functional balance between them. Such issues would be 
difficult to capture in analysis only on hospitals or primary care providers. 
To sum up, the conceptualization of hospitals and primary care providers as two 
sectors within a single structure, and their operationalization with a consideration of 
contemporary impactful policy targets, constituted the common conceptual ground for 
all four sub-studies and the synthesis of their findings.  
9.1.2 Synthesis within the historical part 
The historical trend analysis described the trend of structural and functional 
balance between hospitals and primary care providers. The second historical sub-study 
analysed the coevolution of hospitals and primary care providers, focusing on the four 
sets of institutions (professional, organizational, financial, and governance). The 
historical-institutional analysis provided an explanation of the findings of the 
quantitative historical trend analysis of structural and functional balance between 
hospitals and primary providers. Synthesizing findings from the historical trend 
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analysis and historical-institutionalist analysis therefore focused on generating a 
historical narrative, which then acted as a basis for generating policy implications.  
9.1.3 Synthesis within the contemporary part 
The qualitative systems analysis provided an approach to see gatekeeping 
functioning under constraints of the pilot. Meanwhile, it also provided a “whole-
system” view of the factors that constituted the constraints. By linking the evaluation 
of the pilot with evaluation of the system containing the intervention of the pilot, the 
analytical approach recognized that the system dynamics were working with and 
without the intervention. The quantitative impact evaluation could be seen as an 
outcome evaluation. The contemporary qualitative systems analysis provided not only 
an explanation for the results of the quantitative impact evaluation, but also a deeper 
understanding of the functioning of the contemporary system relatively unaffected by 
the gatekeeping intervention.  
9.1.4 Synthesis across the two parts 
1) Rationale of synthesis 
Purposes of historical studies and contemporary evaluation are usually divergent. 
While historical studies rarely tries to prescribe solutions, programme evaluation 
focuses on relatively specific factors that can be altered to generate specific impacts. 
The discussion considers a way to synthesize and the potential benefits of combining 
the two parts in a single framework. 
Occasionally, studies have suggested potential areas of convergence. Evaluation 
has generally come to recognize the existence of complexity, one of which is the 
temporal dimension. Policy analysts have also been drawing results from evaluation 
to build arguments related to path dependence. “Every programme is a complex system 
inserted into a complex system” (Pawson, 2013, p. 82), where “[c]omplexity comes 
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because about because inputs, stakeholders, institutional features and outputs are all in 
a state of constant change, with or without the help of the programme” (Pawson, 2013, 
p. 49). Following this logic, framing the issue of balance between hospitals and 
primary care providers in a health system as a historical system provided a basis for 
synthesizing these two strands of investigation. The contemporary systems analysis 
provided a cross-sectional snapshot of the systems dynamics where the pilot unfolded. 
The synthesis focuses on the benefit of historical analyses.  
2) Added value of history 
x Function 1: Broadening the scope of investigation 
History offers insights that transcend the temporal barrier of the contemporary 
world “historical amnesia”. It provides a temporally rich understanding of the “causes 
of causes” and particularly traces the contemporary phenomena to historical 
events/processes and sequences. Rather than seeking answers from contemporary 
associations between potential policy targets and outcomes, a historical study looks 
for the consequences (or policy feedback in historical-institutional terms) of past 
events and their sequences. As Berridge (2011) suggested, a key function of history in 
public health is to make people rethink. 
While they highlight historical factors and sequences not malleable in the current 
period, historical studies also highlight the contemporary dynamics set in motion 
historically. Some such dynamics may replicate themselves, while others may face 
impediments that lead to breakpoints. From the perspective of “a pure historical study”, 
it is appropriate to just trace backwards towards identification of historical factors and 
dynamics that cannot be influenced, identifying the historical roots/causes of 
contemporary policy issues. However, from the perspective of contemporary policy 
interests, this is not adequate. A historical academic effort, by facilitating reflection 
and demonstrating the plasticity of some current factors, should open up new 
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opportunities or new insights that will adjust our understanding by removing 
preconceptions. From a policy perspective, the interpretation of history should 
ultimately be geared towards helping contemporary actors develop better interventions 
to either change the course of history or to ride the tide of history. 
Re-identifying causes prompts reconsideration of solutions. Historical sub-studies 
therefore help propose new theories on the key drivers of change, and these new 
theories may lead to new interventions that can potentially be tested in evaluation. By 
developing theories that explain the coevolution of hospitals and primary care 
providers, the historical sub-studies (particularly the historical-institutionalist analysis) 
could highlight the mechanisms that institutions become path-dependent (coordination 
difficulties, asset specificity, reinforcing and reactive feedback). Evaluation within 
conventional health service research has been criticized as being generally 
technocratic with little consideration of power (Mills, 2012). Developments in 
programme evaluation have also been urged by system thinking experts to go outside 
the boundary of contemporary intervention and particularly to engage consideration of 
power in developing evaluation projects (Williams, 2015). The historical-
institutionalist analysis in particular highlights the critical role of power and politics.  
From the perspective of history, evaluation can only capture piecemeal and limited 
processes. Major changes are more likely processes of social transition that may well 
be beyond the conceptual framework of a project of evaluation. What comes out of the 
historical analyses might not fit in the framework of a programme intervention. This 
is discussed in Section 9.3. Here it suffices to say that what historical research can add 
is to bring in a critical perspective on the role of evaluation and indeed policy 
interventions in terms of impact. 
x Function 2: Building a systematized narrative 
Historical research can “systematize” the various aspects of interest into a single 
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historical narrative. This is different from the whole-system approach that claims to 
address all relevant factors within a system and the interrelationship among these 
factors. Systems analysis has been criticized for sacrificing depth for breadth. The 
contemporary evaluation has identified a range of systems level issues that went 
beyond the mechanism pathway of gatekeeping. They also seem to reflect numerous 
challenges that are difficult to handle. The findings of historical analyses could be used 
to reinterpret findings from contemporary evaluation in order to suggest how to 
introduce systematic change. They also provided a temporal frame in developing 
reform strategies. In a sense, this combination can better address the inter-linkages of 
a complex reform that would be difficult to capture in separate programme intervention 
evaluations. The historical studies provide a historical narrative that helps bind 
contemporary issues together as the joint effects of institutional evolution.  
The historical-institutionalist analysis has also captured the interplay between 
politics and systems/policy, by focusing on feedback effects where policy changed the 
rules of politics by preconditioning the preferences of actors and the coalitions they 
formed. The historical-institutionalist analysis, by focusing on the feedback effects of 
policies made in earlier periods, also highlighted the interrelationship between policies 
and politics. In addition, the historical-institutionalist analysis (reinforced by the 
quantitative trend analysis) distinguished the long-term “stable” period and short-term 
“dynamic” period. Findings from historical analyses facilitated a judgement of the 
temporal context of policies and therefore helped optimize policy suggestions. By 
bringing the numerous contemporary factors together, bringing the policies and 
politics together, and bringing evaluation of a policy implemented at a particular time 
point into a continuous historical process, the thesis allowed an integrated and yet 
focused analysis of key policy issues, while capitalizing on the comparative 
advantages of multiple research approaches. 
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3) Barrier to synthesising 
A key barrier to synthesising findings from the historical and contemporary parts 
lay in the different levels of data representativeness. The historical and contemporary 
studies dealt with different geographical ranges. The historical study utilized data 
about the entire country, while the study of the pilot was restricted to the local district. 
As mentioned before, the pilot was chosen as a site for this case study due to its pioneer 
nature. Despite the obvious limited scope of the contemporary pilot, none of the key 
contemporary factors in the system seemed to be confined to the local pilot. A certain 
degree of theoretical generalizability can be drawn for similar settings in China, though 
there is much room for strengthening with further evidence. Findings from the 
historical studies act as a triangulation and generally support the contemporary 
evaluation, as will be clear in Section 9.2.  
9.1.5 Summary 
The thesis constituted a multi-level mixed-methods study. The contemporary 
qualitative systems analysis provided not only an explanation for the results of the 
quantitative impact evaluation, but also a deeper understanding of the functioning of 
the contemporary system relatively unaffected by the gatekeeping intervention. The 
historical-institutional analysis provided a theoretical narrative behind the quantitative 
historical trend analysis of structural and functional balance between hospitals and 
primary providers. The two historical sub-studies also constituted a historical 
explanation and deepened understanding of the contemporary system related to the 
balance between the two sectors, and in combination with the contemporary evaluation 
generated a historical narrative relevant to contemporary policies. 
9.2 Discussion on results 
This section discusses the results of the thesis in three sub-sections. The first 
describes the situation and evolution of the balance between hospitals and primary care 
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providers; the second evaluates the effectiveness of and challenges facing the 
gatekeeping pilot in shifting balance towards primary care providers; the third 
interprets the overall results and discusses the diagnosis, prognosis and solutions of 
the balance between hospitals and primary care providers. 
9.2.1 Situation and evolution of the balance between hospitals and primary care 
providers 
This sub-section draws mainly from the results of the historical chapters and the 
qualitative systems analysis. 
1) Situation 
In Chapter 4, a system of metrics was used to measure the structural and functional 
balance between hospitals and primary care providers in China between 1949 and 2013. 
As compared with previous studies (for example, Starfield (1994) and Mills (1990)), 
the sub-study expanded horizontally to cover a systematic range of indicators closely 
related to the balance and also longitudinally to a longer period (64 years). There 
seemed to be a diverging trend of the development of hospitals and primary care 
providers in terms of structural balance by the late 1950s. Hospitals acquired a much 
higher quantity and quality of practitioners, as well as number of beds, than primary 
care facilities. From the late 1950s, primary care providers (solely represented by 
township health centres) started to be equipped with a fast growing number of beds, 
which was approaching. After the late 1960s, the quantity of primary care practitioners 
started to increase dramatically, particularly with the huge number of de-
professionalized barefoot doctors, and surpassed to that of hospitals around 1978. Due 
to the absence of data regarding service utilisation, there is a gap of information 
regarding functional balance of care before 1978.  
The years between roughly 1980 and 2002 seemed to witness a stagnation of 
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development of structural capacity in primary care facilities and deterioration of their 
functional role, while hospitals maintained stable development in general. Significant 
gulfs grew between hospitals and primary care providers in terms of human resources, 
beds and other assets. For example, the number of hospital staff increased by 50%, 
while the number of primary care staff increased by only 16%. The years after 2002 
saw a major boost of both sectors; however, additional resources seemed to have been 
absorbed primarily by hospitals, and hospitals played an increasingly larger functional 
role. Hospitals accounted for about 80% of revenue and 88% of value of assets 
between 2002 and 2013. Hospital admissions more than tripled between 2002 and 
2013, while admissions at primary care facilities doubled. Hospital visits increased 
more than 100%, while primary care visits grew by about 80%. The stratification of 
quality of doctors and other aspects of technical capacity between primary care 
faculties and hospitals also worsened in this period.  
The sub-study found a similar situation regarding focus of resources in hospitals 
to that found by Mills (1990) and World Health Organization (2014, p. 6). The thesis 
also exposed the overlaps of function and resources between hospitals and primary 
care providers in the context of China, reflected in the huge proportion of 
hospitalisations provided at township health centres in particular, as well as the large 
proportion of ambulatory care provided at hospitals. Quantitatively, earlier 
development of hospitals, was followed by development of the primary care sector 
with much fewer physical resources but similar number of doctors, providing by the 
1980s a similar amount of care. Hospitals became increasingly dominant in the recent 
three decades. Qualitatively, the primary care sector has a huge number of 
rural/barefoot doctors with significantly lower qualification and lower pay. Primary 
care providers were more like a separate sector of basic medical services. 
The qualitative systems analysis of the gatekeeping pilot demonstrated weak 
conditions of primary care in the pilot, particularly regarding the clinical skills of 
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primary care doctors in comparison with those in hospitals. The sub-study further 
revealed reinforcing feedbacks that turned into a series of vicious cycles for primary 
care development, in terms of weakened service capacity of primary care, decreasing 
patients’ trust in primary care and questionable sustainability of human resources for 
primary care. The lack of progress in reforming hospitals also exacerbated the 
imbalance between the two sectors as far as the local pilot was concerned. 
2) Evolution 
The balance between hospitals and primary care providers was not the effect of a 
clearly discernable policy. On the one hand, the balance was the accumulated effect of 
a number of institutions and policies; on the other hand, the balance fed back to the 
policy-making arena via pre-allocated resources and pre-shaped preferences and 
interests. The study structured the investigation of these institutions and policies to a 
pair of four sets of key institutions. In light of these theoretical tools, the balance 
between hospitals and primary care providers resembled a social structure that had 
stable characteristics and law-like regulating effects on a range of human individual 
and organisational behaviours. This point was particularly clear in the study of the 
evolution of this structure. 
The thesis was not interested in judging whether the development of a de-
professionalized primary care sector was the right thing to do. It was mainly concerned 
with the contemporary legacies. The historical-institutionalist analysis suggested the 
existence of three dynamic cycles (1835-1949, 1949-1978, and 1978-2013) of a path 
dependent process of institutional balance of care.  
In the first cycle started in 1835, hospitals were selected as the ideal organizational 
structure of Western medicine institutions to both showcase technological advantage 
and support the preaching mission. Overtime, there developed a binding of 
professional doctors with hospitals, which were also in addition relatively decently 
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resourced and governed. Between 1928 and 1934, a national health service agenda 
emerged in a conjuncture, with policy commitment to public provision of modern 
medicine to the entire population, particularly those in rural areas. The original policy 
blueprint developed during this period included a professional primary care sector 
doctor as a supervisor of community health personnel. However, such a design was 
dropped in the implementation after 1935, mainly due to lack of human resources and 
resource mobilisation to fund professional primary care, but also because of the lack 
of cooperation from medical schools. Hospitals and primary care split into two tracks 
of medical modernization. The curative aspect of primary care remained largely 
traditional.  
The cycle then repeated twice, first between 1949 and 1978, then between 1978 
and 2013. Each period saw the initiation of a medical development programme that 
favoured hospitals, which further strengthened hospitals and then was challenged by a 
major policy turn towards an agenda of improving balance of care through attempting 
to strengthen primary care. The second and third cycles witnessed hospitals and 
primary care facilities growing into a system of two sectors—professionalized urban 
insurance-based medicine and de-professionalized cooperative medicine by 1978, and 
hospitals growing into the dominant providers of health services by 2013.  
The history suggests the working of two main feedback mechanisms: reinforcing 
and reactive. The initial development of hospital-centred Westernization of medicine 
established a privileged status of hospitals that was repeatedly strengthened. Hospitals 
saw consolidation of professional status, increasing links with patients with higher 
entitlement or affordability, strong political interests and organisational consolidation 
in housing large ambulatory service departments. However, the hospital-centric model 
was not suitable for the whole of China as it was primarily an urban model, had too 
few positions of doctors, and served a very small proportion of the total population.  
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In each cycle, the small reach and high cost of the hospital-centric model laid 
grounds for a reactive process where the value of primary care was emphasized (during 
the three historical conjunctures identified). The schism between primary care 
providers and hospitals became the clarion call for revisionary efforts in favour of 
primary care. However, such efforts were confronted by issues related to coordination 
difficulties (particularly facing strong network effects in managing multiple 
interrelated aspects of reform), as well as asset specificities (particularly in terms of 
human resources for primary care), and self-reinforcing processes, as the demand at 
hospitals (serving urban privileged population) was realized first, and they tended to 
resist changes. The two-way movement eventually saw the strengthening of primary 
care blurred with political rhetoric. The reactive process eventually witnessed the 
distortion of primary care to an antithesis of hospitals-- a de-professionalized path of 
development that also mimicked the hospitals’ practice of comprehensive ambulatory 
and inpatient care.  
From a historical perspective, the findings from the descriptive history and the 
analytical history (for the last two cycles, i.e. 1949-1978 and 1978-2013) seemed to 
converge and corroborate each other. The development path of the balance between 
hospitals and primary care providers since 1949 was deeply rooted in the changes 
between 1835 and 1949, which as just mentioned both formed a hospital-centric initial 
introduction of modern medicine and initiated a track of primary care development 
where curative care was side-lined by epidemic control. The years between 1949 and 
1978 saw the development of two relatively comparable sectors in terms of quantity 
of services, human resources and beds, despite huge gulfs in institutional underpinning 
and quality. The post-1978 period saw the centralisation of care and resources in 
hospitals.  
The cost of Western medicine and the coalition between hospitals and more 
powerful and usually urban interests meant that low-cost primary care was the only 
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feasible historical option for rural coverage. The decision set in motion a development 
path with poorly resourced primary care, and this hospital dominance seemed to be 
very difficult to shift.  
As the qualitative systems analysis revealed, efforts to strengthen human resources 
of primary care providers faced the challenge of syphoning towards hospitals of patient 
demand (and the financial accompanying revenue), human resources, etc. The causal 
loop analysis identified the interrelated feedback loops that kept benefiting hospital 
development disproportionately. Combining findings from the qualitative systems 
analysis and historical-institutionalist analysis, the historically created development 
path of hospital centrism remained in place in the pilot which also led towards a weaker 
role of primary care providers in curative care. 
9.2.2 Can the gatekeeping pilot shift the balance towards primary care 
Despite previous claims about the potential of gatekeeping in deflecting patient 
flows towards primary care providers, evidence about effectiveness of gatekeeping in 
low- and middle-income countries has been rather thin. In this thesis, the impact 
evaluation of a gatekeeping pilot found a significant increase of ambulatory visits to 
primary care facilities (an average increase of 38.7%, p=0.013), while increase of 
spending at that level was not significant. The changes in secondary care (district-level 
hospitals) were not significant in both patient visits and expenditures, suggesting that 
secondary facilities could have been shifting some patients to primary care facilities 
while gaining from tertiary care facilities. There was no strong evidence of a 
decreasing number of patient visits to tertiary care facilities. The expenditures in 
tertiary care facilities (outside the district) reduced significantly, by 42.7% (p=0.020), 
though the district hospital was a tertiary hospital. 
The qualitative systems analysis identified two aspects that led to the sub-optimal 
functioning of gatekeeping. First was the pre-existing weak capacity of primary care 
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service providers and the dynamics related to an increasingly hospital-centric balance 
of care, including the inflationary incentives in hospital care. Second, the effectiveness 
of gatekeeping was hampered by the unintended consequences of other related policies, 
particularly the reform of the primary care sector around 2009, which put in place a 
management arrangement that basically weakened the incentive for provision of 
primary medical care, and served to reorient primary care doctors to public health work 
without securing their professional status. The sub-study showed the danger of 
neglecting the professional aspirations of primary care practitioners and patients’ 
appreciation of their competence, which seemed still to hinge on the ability of primary 
care practitioners to treat patient illnesses. Findings also shed light on some unintended 
consequences that are likely to come with gatekeeping. For example, the 
implementation of gatekeeping in the studied pilot led to resentment by both doctors 
and patients. This finding contradicts the optimistic results of a patient survey done in 
Shenzhen (Gan et al., 2016), which showed willingness of local residents to accept 
primary care facilities as gatekeepers. 
The results of the two contemporary sub-studies complemented each other. While 
the difference-in-differences analysis isolated the effects of the gatekeeping pilot on 
functioning of primary care, it had some self-contradictory findings, particularly the 
increase of visits to primary care facilities without significant extra spending. The 
difference-in-differences analysis could only suggest that the resource utilisation of 
such visits seemed to be lower. I speculated that it was because large numbers of 
patients were visiting for referral. This was supported by interviews for the qualitative 
systems analysis. Furthermore, the qualitative systems analysis provided a rich 
representation of the causal relationships that restricted the effectiveness of 
gatekeeping. The causal loop analysis presented the interrelated feedback loops that 
kept benefiting hospital development disproportionately, while primary care 
development was stuck in vicious cycles. The feedback loops seemed to be driving a 
destruction of the professional career of primary care practitioners. Combined, the two 
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contemporary sub-studies provided not only empirical evidence regarding the limited 
effectiveness of gatekeeping in shifting balance of care but also the factors that limited 
effectiveness. From a systems learning perspective, the contemporary sub-studies used 
the gatekeeping pilot as a case and gained important knowledge regarding challenges 
facing shifting the balance towards primary care in the current health system.  
9.2.3 Diagnosis, prognosis and solutions 
The discussion here follows the logic of earlier methodological discussion in 
Section 9.1 on how the historical analyses add to the contemporary evaluation.  
1) Diagnosis 
x Unclear role of primary care providers 
A challenging issue for sustainable development of primary care is the lack of a 
clearly defined role of primary care providers. The historical and contemporary 
analyses converged on the confusion related to the overlapping resources and functions 
between primary care providers and hospitals. The thesis has shown in the metrics of 
balance between hospitals and primary care providers that both sectors provide a large 
volume of ambulatory care and hospitalisations, and primary care facilities had a 
significant number of beds. Other elements of the confusion relate to the fact that 
primary care was also a carrier of public health work. The qualitative systems analysis 
suggests that the drastic pivoting to public health services is potentially both an 
adaptation to the weak functioning of primary care in serving patients and a result of 
unclear definition of the role of primary care doctors.  
The continuing overlaps on functions and resources between the two sectors, and 
lasting weakness of primary care providers seemed to fit the criticism of World Health 
Organization (2008, p. 11) in regard to over-simplification of primary care in resource-
constrained settings that primary care has been “reduced to a stand-alone health post 
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or isolated community-health worker” and “synonymous with low-tech, non-
professional care for the rural poor who cannot afford any better”. The thesis has 
shown that the situation was formed and reinforced historically. From the introduction 
of Western medicine, primary care has found it increasingly difficult to find a proper 
place in modern medicine. Primary care has been designed as a low-cost substitution 
of professional medicine defined by hospitals. The study also reflected the gap 
between the rhetorical importance of primary care providers to cover a range of 
functions at low cost and the expectations of good doctors in the mind of patients and 
providers. Both historically and contemporarily, there seems to have been a tendency 
that other priorities crippled the development of a primary care profession. 
x Repeatedly distorted momentum of primary care strengthening 
The role of the sequence of historical events seems central in the analysis, 
reflected particularly in its effects on the post-juncture periods. This finding is 
consistent with the work of Hacker (1998). Historical situations played a significant 
role in predisposing the dominance of hospitals. The first critical juncture was defined 
as much by the missionaries’ agenda to set up a place of preaching as by the pre-
existing traditional medicine world that had left a niche for Western medicine hospitals. 
The latter two critical junctures reflected the relatively weak institutionalization of the 
primary care sector as compared to hospitals. The fact that a hospital-centric model of 
increasingly professionalized medicine was set up at the critical junctures with the 
absence of attention to the primary care level before the conjunctures of attempts to 
shift balance towards primary care seemed central to the continuing development of a 
hospital-centric modern health system. The three critical junctures of the establishment 
of mission hospitals between 1835 and 1844, the formation of the urban-only 
entitlement between 1949 and 1953, and the collapse of the cooperative medical 
scheme between 1978 and 1985, marked significant changes in the agenda of health 
system development. The three critical junctures all led to subsequent periods of 
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increasing returns when hospital-related institutions were rapidly strengthened, 
particularly in the four aspects of professional, financial, organizational and 
governance institutions. Most conspicuous of the four seemed to be the professional 
institutions, which were rooted in the first critical juncture initiated by medical 
missionaries.  
Path dependent development seemed unable to foreclose opportunities to change 
policies, suggested by the repeated conjunctures that aimed at shifting the balance 
towards primary care, seen in the state medicine programme between 1928 and 1934, 
the cooperative medicine scheme between 1965 and 1968, and the health system 
reform between 2002 and 2009. The repeated constraints seen on the agenda to shift 
the balance of care in favour of primary care that came out of the conjunctures during 
the post-juncture periods also suggested the importance of the logic within the system 
that was continued. By the end of the conjunctures, hospital-related institutions had 
grown stronger while primary care-related institutions remained weak. The post-
juncture periods also saw processes of normalization of such primary care institutions, 
first ceding priority to epidemic control in post-1935, then to rhetorical reconstruction 
in post-1968, and finally to public health functions in post-2009. On this note, the focus 
of Hacker (1998) on how history affects the moments of key decision making seems 
inadequate for complex issues like balance of care, while the attention to systems logic 
proposed by Tuohy (1999) seems an important complement. 
The historical analysis indicated room for optimism about the availability of 
opportunities for major policy changes as well as scepticism that a single bold 
movement could simultaneously address all the issues. While the repeated emergence 
of conjunctures to change policy suggested the biggest problem is not the lack of policy 
opportunity at key moments of change, the repeated frustration of efforts to shift 
balance towards primary care providers after historical conjunctures suggested the 
critical importance of making suitable policies, which required good empirical 
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evidence regarding both the effectiveness of specific interventions and in-depth 
understanding about the policy process needed to bring changes to the system.  
The distorted reform initiatives ended up reinforcing the previous contrast 
between hospitals and primary care providers. The post-1935 implementation of the 
state medicine programme contributed to the diverged track of primary care from 
comprehensive care involving professional doctors towards primarily focusing on 
epidemic control. The post-1968 implementation of the cooperative medical scheme 
also led to the normalization of weakly financed and de-professionalized primary care 
under a revolutionary rhetoric. The two processes were historical precedents of the 
post-2009 process of de-professionalizing primary care practitioners, and the 
resistance to change in hospitals. The contemporary challenges all seemed attributable 
to the historically strong institutionalization of the hospital sector versus the weak 
institutionalization of the primary care sector. Particularly, the strengths of hospitals 
were embedded in a wider social context (e.g. urban-rural gap). Through the lens of 
path-dependence analysis, these contemporary challenges were not independent and 
should not be considered separately. 
The problems are unlikely to be solvable with one wave of reform. As previous 
experience and the theoretical analysis of path dependence suggest, the strong hospital 
dominance is likely to establish network effects that will challenge reform and obstruct 
policies developed in isolation to address fragmented issues. Problems with 
professionalization of primary care is likely to face particular challenges due to the 
asset-specific characteristics of both professional skills and patients’ trust. With the 
challenges in terms of self-reinforcing effects getting ever stronger, the absence of a 
strong primary care coalition (discussed in the following paragraphs) is likely to make 
it difficult to address asset specificity. Hence, the primary-care-oriented reformers 
need to take a long-term perspective with respect to policy making and implementation.  
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Consistent with the hypothesis of state-centric theorists (Hall et al., 1996; Skocpol, 
1985; Skocpol et al., 1986), the state was a key agent that, through both action and 
inaction, encouraged a hospital-centric development path of balance of care. The 
complexity of the modern health system seemed to generate a convergence towards 
greater government interference with third party payers. The complexity of balance of 
care, which encompasses professional, financial, organisational and governance 
institutions, was also intertwined with the growing and changing role of the state. The 
conservatism and inaction of the Qing court were apparently a key factor that enabled 
missionaries’ preference for hospitals to become the mainstream model of modern 
medicine. Since the establishment of the central government in Nanjing in 1928, the 
centralized state played an increasingly bigger role in deciding policies related to 
balance of care. Since then, the state’s periodic shift towards attention to a greater role 
for primary care suggested its ability to stand rather independent from the interference 
of vested interests that predominantly benefited from a bigger role of hospitals. 
However, the state’s capacity in carrying through changes seemed significantly 
compromised.  
The state’s changing preferences seemed to have created interests and power 
entities that fragmented the decision making arena and made coordination difficult. 
The analysis has shown that the lack of a strong bureaucratic stake in primary care 
seems to be a major impediment to shifting the balance towards primary care. This is 
seen in the post-1928 conflicts between the aspiration of medical colleges for high 
standards and the requirement of low cost human resources for health, in the post-1968 
conflicts between urban demand for hospital care and rural requirements for doctors, 
in the post-2009 exposure of difficulty in reforming extra-budgetary (pharmaceutical-
related) payment for hospitals and hospital doctors. As changing balance of care 
involves daily decision making of actors with direct influence over both sectors, the 
state’s role extended from that of a negative one involving blocking the influence of 
vested interests to a positive one involving navigating changes among the various 
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vested interests, adapting to the power structure regarding daily decision making and 
adopting policies to fit the situation.  
The structural factors were important as backgrounds, and their influences were 
shown as the balance of care favouring hospitals became embedded in more deeply 
rooted societal structures. The critical juncture between 1835 and 1844 linked 
hospitals with the semi-colonial/imperialist footholds of Westerners, while primary 
care was rooted in rural agriculture. The embedding of a particular balance of care in 
the rural-urban division was reinforced between 1949 and 1953 with the development 
of urban-only insurance schemes. The embedding of a hospital-biased balance of care 
in pro-market reforms with distorted incentives was also key for the period after 1978. 
The findings of the historical-institutionalist analysis suggested that the changing 
context was not directly defining the balance of care. The fact that these structural 
factors did play an important role was because the critical junctures provided the 
platform for extra-health-system forces to be introduced through the active or passive 
role of the state in the health system. The predisposition of the balance of care inherited 
from history shaped the effects of such external structural factors, and was also shaped 
by such forces.  
x Absence of a strong primary care coalition 
Related to the unclear role of primary care providers and repeated failure of 
strengthen professional primary care, there was an absence of a strong primary care 
coalition. Policy makers needed to know in particular how ready the system was for 
the intervention to be effective, and how to drive institutional changes. As the post-
juncture development involved a series of dynamics among multiple factors including 
complex historical legacies, building the basis for sustained efforts seemed to be 
important in navigating through changes of key institutional pillars related to primary 
care strengthening. This point is reflected in the self-reinforcing development of 
mission hospitals and the collapse of the cooperative medical scheme. What seemed 
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to be important is to have strong and sustainable stakeholders to maintain the 
momentum of primary care development. 
The current trajectory of balance between hospitals and primary care providers is 
a result of the earlier development of hospitals, which triggered three cycles of path-
dependent development biased towards hospitals. The history generated a strong 
bonding between highly qualified human resources and hospitals. The relatively 
privileged patients that utilised services of hospitals and pharmaceutical industries that 
depended for their sales on hospitals further reinforced this professional bias. The 
contemporary unintended consequences of problematic reform of primary care and 
normalization of weak curative primary care both seemed to be repetition of historical 
processes. Without a strong primary care coalition, the problems of hospital-centrism 
will unlikely be solvable. 
x Summary 
The above three points boil down to the historically created lack of a strong 
primary care coalition. The lack of a strong professional stake in primary care, the lack 
of a continuous state bureaucratic stake, the service user/funder relationship, and the 
organisational boundary between hospitals and primary care providers, fed back to 
each other. They also confined historical choices and reformers became demoralized 
(in post-1935), politically radical (in post-1968), or disoriented (in post-2009). As 
discussed in Chapter 6, this process was also embedded in the unequal social structure 
of the past, external to the dualist structure. 
2) Prognosis 
This section discusses the interpretation of results to attempt to extrapolate what 
is likely to happen. This analysis draws in the expected trajectory based on the 
diagnosis as well as the changing condition. This process is highly speculative and 
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contingent on the prediction of factors within and beyond the dualist health system 
structure. 
x Endogenous trajectory  
As discussed above, the lack of clear definition of primary care providers and the 
reinforcing and reactive process set in motion a cyclic process. According to the 
prediction of this internal logic, the current hospital dominance will likely trigger 
further action to both contain hospitals’ growth and strengthen primary care 
development. Whether the conjuncture will actually shift the balance of the health 
system towards primary care depends largely on how the transition during the 
conjuncture happen.  
The historical lack of a strong primary care coalition has been a critical problem 
facing successful transition towards a primary-care-oriented health system. This 
contributes to the lack of clearly defined role for primary care, which in turn makes it 
difficult for primary care coalition to form on a strong basis. Forces behind primary 
care are going to have very different interests and preferences, easily pulling primary 
care towards different directions, represented in the history as de-professionalization 
of primary care, elimination of university-based higher educational track for primary 
care, and the repeated confusion with public health services. The historically inherited 
lack of a strong primary care coalition is likely to have consequences in the coming 
period and be a significant obstruction for its strengthening. 
Despite the grim outlook, the coalition for primary care across stakeholders is also 
likely to receive some strong new allies. There has been an increasing awareness of 
the importance of high quality general practitioners. Indeed, a number of high-level 
universities are expanding university degree programmes on general practice, some of 
whose graduates are being employed at community health centres by some urban 
government willing to pay generous salaries. This new cohort of professional primary 
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care doctors may eventually form the basis of primary care professionalism. The 
government is also trying to make it easier for doctors to open private clinics, to 
encourage a great number of specialists to undertake services with greater primary care 
attributes.   
x Exogenous factors 
For the first time, the state is directly organizing three social medical insurance 
schemes that essentially covers the whole population. This has implications in terms 
that financially and governance-wise, the state will have a bigger stake in 
strengthening primary care. Ongoing reform of public hospitals is finally detaching 
pharmaceutical sales profit from facility service revenue. While study is needed to 
evaluate the development, one can specular that this will lead to organizational 
containment of hospitals. Overall, the analyses suggest that the next critical juncture 
will likely work within the constraints and opportunities of government’s 
responsibility. Chinese populations are ageing with a large number of patients 
suffering from multiple chronic diseases that can be better managed at primary are 
facilities, and urban need for good primary care has been increasing.  
New technology may be disruptive and may blur the organisational boundary 
between the two sectors. The increasing accessibility provided by information and 
communication technology may have similar effects to that of the expansion of 
insurance coverage increasing access to hospitals. Meanwhile, it may also enhance the 
ability of primary care providers to deliver on “person-centeredness, 
comprehensiveness and integration, and with a regular point of entry into the health 
system” (World Health Organization, 2008, p. 42). However, if primary care continues 
to be weakened without a strong professional basis, technological development might 
very likely strengthen hospital-centric development yet again. 
Urban-rural gap is a lasting characteristic of Chinese society. Previously the issue 
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of balance of care largely resemble a sub-issue of gap between the urban privileged 
and the rural underprivileged. In the future, professional primary care is likely to 
emerge first in urban areas, where the patients’ demand can be generated and trust is 
likely to be created with the rise of the primary care profession. However, rural areas 
are likely to suffer continuously from lack of strong primary care. Indeed, if the pilot 
reflects a wide-spread issue, the primary care providers in rural areas are suffering 
from a collective career crisis. The urban-rural gap would likely be sustained if no 
special rearrangement is made for rural primary care. 
x The fourth critical juncture? 
If the above analysis holds, we are likely to be seeing the fourth critical juncture 
soon. One can speculate that there will be greater divergence between rural and urban 
areas in development of the balance between hospitals and primary care providers. 
Primary care is likely to gain a stronger professional foothold and greater stake 
financially, organisationally and governance-wise in urban areas. However, such 
changes are unlikely in the rural areas. Therefore, we are going to see a trichotomy of 
health service delivery: an urban-based hospital sector serving both urban and rural 
populations, a professionally stronger primary care sector in urban areas and a still de-
professionalized primary care sector in rural areas. 
3) Solutions  
Here the discussion about solutions draw from previous analysis regarding the 
diagnosis of problems as well as the prognosis of further development of the balance 
between hospitals and primary care providers.  
x Facilitating the development of primary care profession 
While there are positive signs that the primary care profession may have some 
welcome beginning rooted in the medical university, one cannot be sure when this 
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fundamental shift will take place. The conflicts among multiple reform initiatives 
suggest grave danger of further weakening the basis of primary care particularly in 
rural areas. The destruction of the current primary care profession will need to be put 
to an end, via reform of salary policies and improved access to technologies and 
medicines. 
Further challenge is likely to lie in the problem of asset specificity. A primary care 
profession is a highly specific asset, as are most medical specialties. Developing a 
strong cohort of primary care professionals requires more than political diktat but also 
the willingness of doctors and would-be-doctors to take primary care as their specialty. 
Experience from the UK suggests the importance of securing the professional 
independence of primary care (as general practice) as a speciality-like discipline, 
empanelment of patients etc. as well as the construction of a strong professional body 
(the Royal College of General Practitioners) to maintain high standards of training and 
practice (Kmietowicz, 2006).  
Here I draw from the five elements of professionalism identified by Freidson 
(2001) to suggest a number of policy options:  
First, general practice needs to be defined clearly as a specialized clinical 
discipline. Further recognition of the status of general practice (including its own 
professional and academic body) on an equal footing to other specialities is needed.  
Second, contract and salary systems for primary care doctors need to improve their 
pay to attract well-qualified professional primary care doctors. Given the diverse 
situation in China and the meagre number of well-trained general practitioners, a 
feasible solution maybe to have some higher level general practitioners to supervise a 
large number of relatively less well trained ones, particularly in the rural areas.  
Thirdly, a “sheltered” position for primary care providers providing security 
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through a contract with patients based on the number of enrolees seems suitable. 
Patients referred by primary care doctors should be given rapid access in seeing 
hospital specialists. 
Fourth, a formal schooling and continuous education programme based on 
universities that produces qualifying credentials is needed. Such credentials should 
carry equal weight as credentials for training in other medical specialties. Again, a 
tiered system may be necessary in adapting to the variations of conditions within China.  
Fifth, a primary care ideology needs to be fostered that asserts greater value and 
commitment to the core primary care attributes, i.e. “first contact, accessibility, 
longitudinality, and comprehensiveness” (Starfield, 1992). In other words, the value 
of maintaining community health rather than providing advanced specialized services 
needs to be recognized.  
As the study has shown, the issue of redefining the role of primary care requires a 
systems change, including a recognition of a gradual transition of primary curative 
care, a process of trust building, etc. To address such coordination difficulties, the 
governance for primary care will likely need to adopt two changes. On the one hand, 
a more streamlined and coherent administrative structure to manage these multiple 
reform initiatives. On the other hand, the primary care development will also need to 
utilise to a greater extent professional autonomy that can respond to patients’ need and 
professional requirements more adequately. 
x Facilitating transition towards primary care strengthening 
There are likely to be forces holding back the primary care strengthening process 
during the coming critical juncture. History provides a critical perspective on the role 
played by contemporary intervention and evaluation. As the historical study suggests, 
primary-care-oriented reformers need to harness the power of reinforcing and reactive 
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feedbacks and put the temporal dimension into the design and implementation of 
intervention. 
Internally, strong dominance of hospitals will trigger a reactive backlash as 
happened during previous conjunctures. Some external factors beyond the dualist 
structural also provides additional opportunities: changing demand, slowdown of 
economic growth and rapid ageing might tilt the balance towards greater role of 
primary care providers. An emerging middle class might also buy into the services 
provided by a new breed of primary care providers. A hospital-centric model to take 
care of the medical need of an ageing society is simply unlikely to be financially 
feasible for China.  
In the past, however, efforts to strengthen primary care have been shaped/inhibited 
by the reinforcing feedback towards greater hospital dominance from earlier period. 
Frustration of efforts to shift resources to primary care has led to development of 
primary care on a de-professionalized path. The privatization of primary care by 
increasing the role of private clinics might lead to a breaking down of solidarity and 
eventually give rise to two-tier primary care even within urban areas. While rich people 
are likely to enjoy good quality primary care, the less well-off are likely to be confined 
to greater reliance on hospital care.  
In the past, policy shifts towards primary care have been seen to be closely linked 
with the agenda to provide universal health coverage. What has been missing is the 
necessary change in financial allocation to overcome the challenge placed by structural 
inequality (particularly in terms of the rural-urban divide). Development of professions 
require the support of government (Freidson, 2001). Primary-care-oriented reformers 
need to form a strong coalition around the primary care professionals and use the 
currently strong government commitment to universal health coverage to usher in a 
strong social movement towards strong primary care. This coalition needs to be 
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politically strong but not over-politicized such that reform is replaced by rhetoric. The 
role of evaluation in facilitating historical changes needs to be reconsidered. Tasks for 
evaluation is further discussed in Chapter 10. 
The historical-institutionalist analysis shed light on the importance of the role of 
the state, particularly, in responding to innovative technology (progress in bio-
medicine) and in influencing health system arrangements (progress in expansion of 
coverage). The pre-1928 absence of the government’s role reinforced the development 
of hospital-centric modern medicine in China. The post-1949 development of urban-
only insurance schemes tied the bureaucratic interests with hospitals, contributing to 
impediments to reform after 1965. A mistake of policy makers during the cooperative 
medical scheme period was to focus on propagandist packaging of primary care as the 
antithesis of professional medicine and bureaucratic control, without addressing the 
difficulty regarding cooperative medicine (e.g. unstable and inadequate financing), 
which foregrounded the post-1978 process of rapid hospital-centric development. The 
post-1978 reinforcement of incentives for revenue generation with the government’s 
distorted intervention on pricing favouring technology and reimbursement based on 
pharmaceutical mark-up also favouring hospitals proved difficult to roll back. The 
gatekeeping sub-studies also provided a case showing that well intended government 
policies may end up in suboptimal outcomes or unintended consequences, and that 
policy makers need to be informed by empirical evidence.  
9.3 Relevance and generalizability of findings of sub-studies 
This section discusses the relevance of the study’s findings for China as a whole, 
as well as whether aspects can be generalised to other low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs). 
9.3.1 Trend analysis of structural and functional balance of care 
The descriptive history of structural and balance between hospitals and primary 
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care providers used data from national statistics and represented the situation of the 
entire country, though data on some indicators were not available during the first few 
decades after 1949. Some of the indicators were more relevant to the history of China 
than other countries. In particular, primary care providers in China had a large number 
of inpatient beds (the number of beds in primary care facilities was almost comparable 
to that of hospitals around 1980). China also had a complicated system of medical 
qualification, and many doctors did not have a full medical degree. However, the 
overall structure of metrics and the process of generation of the structure may still have 
value for other LMICs, as this seems to be the first attempt to systematically develop 
metrics of the structural and functional balance of between hospitals and primary care 
providers outside the high-income world. 
9.3.2 Historical-institutionalist analysis of coevolution of hospitals and primary 
care providers 
The use of a path dependence framework in the historical analysis may limit the 
transferability of findings to other countries. The historical logic of coevolution of 
hospitals and primary care providers in China was a combination of unique sequences 
of historical events, unique state actors and unique structural factors. As the historical-
institutionalist analysis suggested, the sequences of key historical events, in particular 
the earlier institutionalisation of hospitals, were among the central explanatory factor 
for understanding changes in balance of care over time. The state actors were agents 
of change, who mediated the sequence of events. The societal factors (such as the 
urban-rural divide) were the canvas of the historical process but did not determine the 
shape of institutions and the structural and functional balance between the two sectors.  
Despite the unique socio-political structure of China, modernized hospitals and 
de-professionalized primary care providers have been common historical legacies of 
health systems in low- and middle-income countries (Abel-Smith, 1994; Bloom, 1985). 
A large number of developing countries have gone through similar historical stages. 
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Western missionaries were the main force behind building medical facilities, 
particularly hospitals, while the colonial state mainly focused on combating epidemics 
and generally did not spend heavily on medical facilities (Hardiman, 2006, p. 5); health 
coverage was usually provided initially only for privileged population groups and 
usually in urban areas; and there have been major pro-market reforms in recent decades. 
All these processes were conducive to the development of path dependence of a 
hospital-centric model. This hospital-centric model, as reflected in the Chinese 
experience, was difficult to change and poses challenge in the movement towards 
universal health coverage, and resources are likely to be disproportionally funnelled to 
a privileged hospital sector. In short, while the dynamic path dependence analysis 
implies caution in generalization of findings across countries, it also suggests that the 
existence of some common features of LMICs makes the analysis relevant to them.  
The analysis of conjunctures in China approximately coincided with the three 
waves of the international primary health care movement (the 1930s, the period around 
1978, since the 2000s). All three waves of movement rejected a Western and hospital 
focused model of health care for developing countries. The historical-institutionalist 
analysis of China may be relevant to the body of literature regarding the primary health 
care movement internationally.  
9.3.3 Qualitative systems analysis and impact evaluation of the gatekeeping pilot 
The case study of the contemporary gatekeeping pilot used information from the 
rural population of a district in a metropolitan city in North China. Therefore, 
generalizability of the study’s findings from the case data to larger geographical units 
cannot be achieved through statistical inference. However, most of the policies 
involved (with the exception of gatekeeping) were made nationally and implemented 
nation-wide. The issue of structural and functional imbalance between hospitals and 
primary care facilities has been a nation-wide phenomenon as reflected in the 
references cited above from nation-wide studies. On the basis of what Yin (2009) 
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defined as analytical generalization, which builds generalization upon theoretical 
comparability [58], this first qualitative evaluation about a pioneer gatekeeping pilot 
is relevant to comparable settings in rural China, which faces essentially similar 
challenges.  
9.4 Methodological reflection: a cross-disciplinary mixed-methods study 
approach in health policy and systems research 
The section discusses the innovativeness, strengths and weaknesses of the 
methods used in this thesis. The discussion starts with the overall study design and 
then covers each of the sub-studies. 
9.4.1 Overall study design  
1) Innovation 
The thesis used an innovative cross-disciplinary research framework; combined 
the analyses of historical processes and a contemporary pilot; and studied the 
development of hospitals and primary care providers in a unified framework.  
2) Strengths 
The research framework reflects the holistic, complex and multi-dimensional 
nature of health systems that differs from general health technology and program 
intervention.  
As Adam et al. (2012) have argued, systems thinking has proved valuable in 
revealing key elements of success and failure in implementing complex interventions, 
the role of relationships, the role of actors in health systems, the importance of 
environmental factors, and the importance of anticipating potential unintended 
consequences, and systematically evaluating the implementation process and reacting 
to feedbacks within the systems. As Adam (2014) has further discussed, combining 
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qualitative methods with systems thinking can add depth to analysis of health systems 
issues, and adding visualization can help convey complex interpretations and findings.  
By dividing the contemporary part into an impact evaluation and a qualitative 
systems analysis, the study allowed both components to use advanced research 
methods. While the quantitative component revealed the effect size, the qualitative 
component revealed the dynamics of the mechanisms and the contexts from which the 
separation of intervention mechanisms was possible only theoretically and with 
problematic simplification. Through the combined use of both approaches, the thesis 
addressed the several issues of complexity mentioned by the Medical Research 
Council (2008) guideline on evaluating complex interventions. The qualitative 
systems analysis facilitated good understanding of the many details of the causal chain, 
implementation problems and unintended consequences, suggested in the MRC 
guideline. It further noticed indirect factors that are easily neglected but potentially 
very important, and placed these factors in a dynamic system.  
The study design had the benefits of taking advantage of state-of-the-art research 
approaches from different disciplinary background. Bloom (2014) argued for the 
importance of situating health systems development in the context of history and 
political economy. By separating the historical part from the contemporary part, the 
study allowed a sufficiently sophisticated development of a theoretical framework 
based on historical institutionalism, which was used to study historical changes 
rigorously. On the other hand, the separation also allowed a relative simplification of 
political, social and economic issues when it came to the qualitative systems analysis, 
in which attention was devoted to the complexity within the immediate contemporary 
health systems building blocks. By separating the trend analysis and historical-
institutionalist analysis, the study allowed a systematically constructed and quantified 
measurement of the development of primary care facilities and hospitals from 1949 to 
2013, but also provided the factual basis for in-depth historical analysis of the 
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institutional balance of care.  
The study minimised the potentially complex issue of merging data from multiple 
types of data sources, by keeping separate sets of data for individual sub-studies and 
conducting sub-studies separately. This overall design therefore allowed each method 
to play out to its full potential without complicating the process of data management 
and analysis. In aspects where the methods used intersected with one another, e.g., 
both qualitative and quantitative components addressed the outcome of the 
gatekeeping pilot, they allowed the thesis to construct explanatory understanding of 
the social world of patients and practitioners, to better understand why and how some 
stakeholders did not appreciate the gatekeeping policy. 
The method represents an impact-oriented research approach as policy 
implications feature critically in the conceptualization of the balance between hospital 
and primary care providers. 
3) Weaknesses 
The broad conceptualization of balance between hospitals and primary care 
providers sacrificed the internal diversity of health delivery. The different research 
approaches were not directly coherent and required a complex mix of skills. Variation 
in levels of geographical representatives of sub-studies made synthesis of findings 
difficult. 
9.4.2 Sub-study 1: historical trend analysis of the balance between hospitals and 
primary care providers 
1) Innovation 
The study developed a system of metrics of the structural and functional balance 
between hospitals and primary care providers; and used the system of metrics to 
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quantitatively describe the development of the hospital-primary dualist structure of the 
health system from 1949 to 2013. 
2) Strengths 
The sub-study quantitatively reflected the changing trends of structural and 
functional balance between the two sectors. 
3) Weaknesses 
Not all data were available, particularly for the earlier periods. Indicators that 
reflect the value and quality of care were lacking. 
9.4.3 Sub-study 2: Historical-institutionalist analysis of the coevolution of 
hospitals and primary care providers 
1) Innovation 
The sub-study innovatively used historical-institutionalist analysis to study the 
history of health systems; identified three cycles of dynamic path dependence, and the 
historical-institutional challenges and opportunities facing primary care strengthening 
in China; provided some groundwork for further study on developing theories of health 
system development based on China’s experience. 
2) Strengths 
The sub-study analysed historical changes using a rigorous in-depth historical 
analytical framework and protocol. 
3) Weaknesses 
Details were sacrificed to some extent for breadth.  
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9.4.4 Sub-study 3: Impact evaluation 
1) Innovation 
Innovative use of real world data (medical insurance claims data) to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the pilot, contributed to filling the gap of lack of impact evaluation of 
gatekeeping in low- and middle-income countries 
2) Strengths 
Used counterfactuals to calculate the net effect of the pilot intervention and 
controlled for covariates. 
3) Weaknesses 
Any difference in trends was attributed to the pilot programme. The scale of the 
gatekeeping pilot was limited. The quality of claims data was affected by changed 
reimbursement procedure.  
9.4.5 Sub-study 4: Qualitative systems analysis of gatekeeping pilot functioning 
1) Innovation 
Innovative use of systems dynamics in a qualitative health systems analysis, 
provided an example of a standardized protocol of qualitative systems analysis in 
health systems research 
2) Strengths 
Revealed the complexity involved in shifting balance of care, the dynamics of the 
mechanisms and the contexts. The causal loop diagram was explicit and transparent. 
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3) Weaknesses 
The system dynamic model was not validated with the interviewees or 
independent experts. The scale of the gatekeeping pilot was limited. 
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 Conclusions and 
recommendations 
10.1 Critical reflection of overall methods 
The primary aim of this thesis has been to understand how to strengthen primary 
care in China, looking at the effectiveness and functioning of a gatekeeping pilot, and 
more broadly at the history of the balance between hospitals and primary care 
providers, in order to contribute to policy development in China as well as other similar 
settings. Through applying a mix of health system research approaches (trend analysis, 
historical-institutionalist analysis, qualitative systems analysis and impact evaluation), 
a secondary aim of the thesis was to explore how mixed methods can be used to study 
a complex system-related issue. To accomplish these aims, the thesis has employed 
four sub-studies: sub-study 1 described the historical trend of balance between 
hospitals and primary care providers in China; sub-study 2 tried to understand the 
historical logic of the coevolution of hospitals and primary care providers in China 
using a dynamic path dependence analytical framework; sub-study 3 evaluated the 
effectiveness of a gatekeeping pilot in China; sub-study 4 sought to understand how 
gatekeeping functions in the pilot in the context of China’s recent reforms using a 
qualitative systems analysis.  
The thesis used an innovative cross-disciplinary research framework; combined 
the analyses of historical processes and the evaluation of a contemporary pilot; and 
studied the development of hospitals and primary care providers in a unified 
framework. The research framework reflected the holistic, complex and multi-
dimensional nature of health systems that differs from general health technology and 
program intervention. The method represents an impact-oriented study, as policy 
implications feature critically in the conceptualization of the balance between hospital 
and primary care providers. The study design had the benefits of the comparative 
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advantage of state-of-the-art research approaches from different disciplinary 
backgrounds. However, the broad conceptualization of balance between hospitals and 
primary care providers sacrificed the internal diversity of health delivery. The different 
research approaches were not directly coherent and required a complex mix of skills. 
Variation in levels of geographical representativeness of sub-studies made synthesis of 
findings difficult. 
Nevertheless, the use of multiple methods for multiple levels of complexity 
allowed the thesis to tap the comparative advantage of rigorous and innovative 
research approaches and methods that have been shown to be useful for understanding 
health policy and systems issues. Multiple methods allowed the study much deeper 
understanding—an advantage of mixed-methods research (Bazeley, 2004) and a 
concrete appreciation of the gatekeeping pilot as an intervention among multiple social 
processes that affected balance of care. 
10.2 Summary of findings 
10.2.1 Findings of the historical trend analysis 
The number of staff at hospitals overtook that of primary care since the 1980s, 
while the quality of doctors at hospitals was consistently much higher than the usually 
under-professionalized primary care providers. Hospitals also had stronger physical 
assets. Functionally, the share of hospitals in both ambulatory and inpatient care was 
substantial, along with a growing share of total health expenditures in hospitals. The 
increase in hospital dominance was obvious after 1978, associated with two decades 
of deteriorating primary care (particularly township health centres) in ambulatory care 
provision and a recent hospital boom in both inpatient and ambulatory care. 
Hospitals and primary care providers were not easily distinguishable. Hospitals 
had been a key provider of ambulatory care in the last three decades, while primary 
care providers as a whole provided a substantial amount of inpatient care in township 
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health centres. However, primary care also developed a large sector of de-
professionalized staff at the village level. What was formed seemed a two-tier delivery 
system with a similarly hybrid structure of inpatient and ambulatory care but a 
stratified quality of practitioners. At the end of the period studied, hospitals appeared 
to be enjoying an environment, including premium staff quality and pay, superior 
assets, increasing share of ambulatory care, and orientation towards inpatient care, that 
fundamentally gave them an edge over primary care facilities. 
10.2.2 Findings of the historical-institutionalist analysis  
The coevolution between hospitals and primary care providers seemed to have 
experienced three path-dependent cycles (1835-1949, 1949-1978 and 1978-2013). 
Each cycle started with a critical juncture leaving or exacerbating a split between the 
two sectors biased towards hospitals. Afterwards, the underpinning institutional 
complex went through self-reinforcement processes strengthening the professional, 
bureaucratic/philanthropic or financial institutions in hospital dominance. At a later 
point of conjuncture, major centralization of power in central leadership (i.e. the 
establishment of a national administration between 1928 and 1934, the Cultural 
Revolution (including its eve) between 1965 and 1968, and the shock of SARS and the 
change of political administration and agenda between 2002 and 2009) saw reactive 
policies introduced to correct previous policy bias towards hospitals. 
With reinforcing processes proceeding, the reactive processes came into an 
existing institutional environment that exhibited strong resilience that the reactive 
processes could not overcome and had to adapt to. Therefore, the impacts of these 
reactive policies on the path of coevolution of hospitals and primary care providers 
were limited and further distorted the development of the two sectors. The result was 
repeated attempts to develop primary care as an antithesis of hospitals in all three 
cycles, with attempts to strengthen the four institutional pillars underpinning the 
coevolution of hospitals and primary care providers (professional, organizational, 
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financial and governance institutions). The weakness of such institutionalization 
turned into disadvantage for primary care. 
The existence of the three conjunctures suggests that policy windows for change 
were not rare within the Chinese political system, however, the frustrated reforms after 
the conjuncture imply that the path dependence effects caused by policy details and 
feedback effects need to be attended to. Historical sequence played a central role in 
the evolution of the balance between the two sectors within and across the three cycles. 
10.2.3 Findings of the impact evaluation of the contemporary gatekeeping pilot 
The impact evaluation suggested that the gatekeeping pilot had a modest impact 
on shifting patient and revenue from hospitals to primary care facilities in the pilot 
areas, while the most significant shift of treatment revenue took place within tertiary 
hospitals rather than between hospitals and primary care facilities. The impact 
evaluation demonstrated significant results in increased ambulatory visits to primary 
care facilities and reduction of expenditures at extra-district tertiary hospitals. More 
patients (an average increase of 38.7%) visited primary care facilities because of the 
gatekeeping pilot programme, while their spending was less obvious. The changes in 
secondary care (district-level hospitals) were less clear in both patient visits and 
expenditures. There was no strong evidence about a decline of patient visits to tertiary 
care facilities, probably due to data issues. The expenditures at the tertiary level 
declined significantly, suggesting stronger ability of doctors to enforce referral 
mechanism at the district hospital with tertiary care facilities. 
10.2.4 Findings of the qualitative systems analysis of the gatekeeping pilot 
The qualitative systems analysis found that a large proportion of patients visited 
primary care simply to get a referral, leading to dissatisfaction of both doctors and 
patients, after the implementation of the pilot policy. The sub-study identified three 
issues behind the sub-optimal functioning of gatekeeping. First was the pre-existing 
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weak conditions of primary care service providers and the dynamics related to an 
increasingly hospital-centric balance of care. Second, there were a series of vicious 
cycles for primary care development, in terms of weakening service capacity of 
primary care, decreasing patient trust in primary care and questionable sustainability 
of human resources for primary care. Lack of progress in hospital reform exacerbated 
the imbalance between the two sectors. Third, the effectiveness of gatekeeping was 
hampered by the unintended consequences related to conflicts among different 
priorities required of primary care development.  
The sub-study showed the danger of neglecting the professional aspirations of 
primary care practitioners and patients’ appreciation of their competence, which 
seemed still to hinge on the ability of primary care practitioners to treat illnesses. 
Findings also shed light on some unintended consequences that are likely to come with 
gatekeeping, including resentment by both doctors and patients. 
10.2.5 Findings regarding combined research approaches 
The thesis, with its combination of four sub-studies, has systematically addressed 
different levels of complexity: from studying a single intervention relatively out of 
context, to a comprehensive analysis of a contemporary system in which the 
intervention is embedded, and a historical system spanning across a prolonged period 
of time. The use of multiple approaches has allowed the study to capitalize on the 
comparative advantages of different methods. The thesis has demonstrated the 
feasibility and value of combining programme evaluation and historical analysis to 
address a complex health system issue.  
10.2.6 Overall interpretation of results 
The gatekeeping pilot led to the increase of visits to primary care facilities without 
significant extra spending. This seemed to be the result of patients visiting primary 
care practitioners only for referral to hospitals. Besides existing weak conditions of 
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primary care, the factors underlying the ineffectiveness of gatekeeping included 
feedback loops that kept benefiting hospital development disproportionately and that 
were driving a destruction of the professional career of primary care workers, as well 
as unintended consequences caused by ill-coordinated policies. The dominance of 
hospitals within health delivery has been a long-term issue since 1949, with 
institutional roots dating back to 1835. The current dynamics between hospitals and 
primary care providers were the result of the unclear role of primary care providers, 
repeatedly distorted momentum of primary care strengthening, and absence of a strong 
primary care coalition.  
According to the prediction of this internal logic, the current hospital dominance 
will likely trigger further action to both contain hospitals’ growth and strengthen 
primary care development. While urban areas are likely to see development of primary 
care strengthening based on professionalization, rural areas are likely to get stuck in 
the currently de-professionalized situation. Therefore, there may be a trichotomy of 
health service delivery: an urban-based hospital sector serving both urban and rural 
populations, a professionally stronger primary care sector in urban areas and a still de-
professionalized primary care sector in rural areas. 
10.3 Policy implications 
10.3.1 Policy implications for China 
This sub-section deals with policy implications for China in six aspects: the 
implication regarding the situation and trend of balance between hospitals and primary 
care providers in China; gatekeeping; reform of the primary care sector; reform of the 
hospital sector; sequence and coordination of reform policies; and supporting 
institutions. 
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1) Situation of balance between hospitals and primary care providers 
The thesis has implications regarding the nature of the situation of balance 
between hospitals and primary care providers in China. The trend analysis suggests a 
worsening balance between hospitals and primary care providers in recent decades, 
which strongly supports the ongoing policy agenda on shifting the balance towards 
primary care. The thesis also suggests that the issue of hospital centrism developed 
over a prolonged period of time and involved complicated institutional factors. 
Therefore, policies aiming at short-term solutions without addressing underlying 
dynamics may have limited effectiveness. The thesis also suggests that the 
development of primary care providers and the development of hospitals were not 
independent processes, but instead closely interrelated. Policies need to be devised 
with both sectors considered as within a single system. 
2) Gatekeeping 
Under the current situation, systemic gatekeeping is not likely to be as effective 
in shifting balance between hospitals and primary care providers as previously claimed 
and would probably incur public resentment. The main barrier to successful 
gatekeeping is the lack of service capacity of and patient trust for primary care 
providers. Given that the situation of weak primary care is not limited to the local 
pilots, gatekeeping across the board seems undesirable. Further piloting of gatekeeping 
should be considered in combination with more specific arrangements adjusted to local 
situation. For example, gatekeeping for particular diseases can be piloted with support 
from high level hospitals in terms of lending experts in the specialty and establishing 
referral partnerships, and more targeted capacity building of primary care providers. 
3) Primary care sector 
The thesis findings suggest the need for serious policy attention to the potentially 
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worsening trend in the primary care sector’s function in providing curative care. As 
strong primary care is critical to deal cost-effectively with the growing burden of non-
communicable diseases and population ageing, the weakness of primary care as a 
medical profession will mean lower performance of health systems. Two kinds of logic 
are needed to improve the underlying conditions of gatekeeping. On the one hand, the 
vicious cycle that primary care facilities are facing requires bold and timely measures 
or experiments. The recent restriction on revenue distribution may need to be loosened 
to allow primary care facility managers a greater degree of freedom to motivate staff 
to provide curative care. In particular, it seems necessary and urgent to elevate the 
competence of primary care doctors, who should also be provided with career 
prospects.  
On the other hand, the findings suggest attention to some fundamental aspects of 
reforms regarding primary care. There still lacks a clear vision of a professional career 
for primary care practitioners, which contributed to policy incoherence and even 
undermined the sustainable development of primary care as a medical profession. 
Drawing from British experience, formation of a strong independent professional body 
representing general practice seems a helpful step forward. Rather than shuffling of 
functions, the policy makers should design reform in which primary care doctors can 
consolidate their professional basis and the trust of patients and colleagues. Raising 
salaries and enhancing professional career prospects in general practice at primary care 
level thus is the priority. In the short run, in order to encourage hospital doctors to 
move to primary care facilities, pilot programmes may be needed to pay primary care 
doctors at a higher level to overcome the initial uncertainty. It is likely that urban and 
rural primary care will diverge as professionalization seemed more likely to happen in 
urban areas, while rural primary care facilities is likely to be continuously stuck in a 
de-professionalized situation. 
Overall, primary care reform needs a more radical experiment with the aim at 
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building up professional status in terms of career prospects, the level of training, 
income, and trust by patients and other health professionals. Lessons can be drawn 
from the efforts and failure of the 1930s and 1970s, when policies or pilots were made 
to place highly trained medical professionals in rural primary care settings. A team-
based approach using a mix of variously trained staff seems necessary in satisfying 
both the need to establish a primary care profession and the increasing requirement for 
multiple functions at primary care level, particularly in rural areas. 
4) Hospitals 
The thesis suggests the need to push for further hospital sector reform, particularly 
addressing the payment scheme oriented towards technology (related to devices and 
pharmaceuticals). As resources have accumulated disproportionately in hospitals, 
addressing the problem of balance between hospitals and primary care providers 
should tackle the reform of hospitals and allow greater financial and human resources 
to flow to primary care facilities. Without addressing rapidly increasing demand on 
hospital services, it would also be unlikely to be possible to rely on hospital doctors to 
help strengthen primary care capacity. Financially, the reimbursement scheme related 
to technology needs to be reformed, perhaps through both adjustment of the price 
schedule to reduce the reliance of physician income on technology and 
pharmaceuticals, and greater regulation of hospital technology based on regional 
planning and health technology assessment. Human resources are a fundamental factor 
in causing the resource accumulation in hospitals. The bonding between hospitals and 
professional doctors needs to be loosened to allow a greater number of doctors to flow 
to primary care.  
5) Sequence and coordination of reform 
The thesis suggests the need for rethinking of reforms regarding the temporal 
dimension. Reform of hospitals and the primary care sector should be taken in proper 
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sequence. Improving primary care professional status and revenue should take place 
while controlling the unnecessary use of technology in hospitals. Otherwise, hospitals 
would monopolise the supply of good doctors. Sequence of reform measures needs to 
take into consideration both the historical legacy and the dynamics in the contemporary 
system. Part of the implementation failure of the gatekeeping pilot was due to the lack 
of provider incentives. The providers seemed to have been motivated by a fee-for-
service scheme. Thus the reform on payment incentives weakened the motivation to 
provide services, and undermined entrepreneurship in providing more curative care. 
Thus, policy makers need to design a process of transition, and not forgo financial 
incentives directly. The reform of hospital payment mechanisms should also take place 
before primary care reform to inhibit the worsening brain drain caused by the reform 
sequence favouring hospitals. 
In relation to sequencing reform measures, coordination of reform policies is 
critical. Addressing the interlocking problems should require attention towards the 
long term goal and a series of interrelated changes, rather than focusing on the 
immediate and fragmented issues. Measures should be taken to address the loss of trust 
of primary care doctors in relation to the change in their service functions. Long-term 
construction of trust will likely depend on development of primary care as a medical 
specialty, with equal professional status. Urgent actions will also be needed to restore 
and strengthen some key curative functions. Services like surgery, appear to be key in 
determining professional status at township health centres for a long period, and thus 
need to be carefully handled during a transitional period. Coordination of reform will 
also require better understanding of the perspectives of patients and doctors, e.g. in 
relation to the trust in primary care doctors’ professional competence. 
6) Supporting institutions 
The thesis suggests that a supportive institutional environment is crucial. History 
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suggests that major critical junctures or conjunctures for policy changes were not rare 
in China. The impacts of previous conjunctures were compromised by the weak 
institutional legacies of primary care. Reform should therefore focus on enhancing the 
bureaucratic and professional stake in primary care, along with institutionalizing 
sustainable financial and organizational changes mentioned earlier.  
Regarding creating professional institutions conducive to improved balance 
between hospitals and primary care providers, history offers important lessons: During 
the 1930s, it was professional medical elites who embodied the agenda of social 
medicine, which combined social reform with medicine, professional medicine with 
public health, curative medicine with preventive medicine, hospitals with primary care 
providers. The post-1949 reduction in the role of these professional medical elites 
seemed a loss to the long term momentum of professional primary care. During the 
1960s and 1970s, the establishment of the vast Cooperative Medial Scheme and 
Barefoot Doctors programme did not lead to consolidation of institutions needed to 
build a sustainable professional or bureaucratic stake in the primary care sector. Instead, 
as ideological zealotry replaced pragmatic and accountable reform, the rhetorical 
reconstruction of weakly institutionalized rural primary care paved the way for the 
post-1978 rapid increase of hospital centrism. Based on the findings from the local 
pilot, there is risk that this lesson regarding problems related with ideological 
packaging was not fully learned. The role of the state needs to be developed in 
partnership with professional and societal interests, with the aim of strengthening the 
bureaucratic stake in primary care sector.  
10.3.2 Policy implications for other low- and middle-income countries 
The sub-section deals with policy implications for other low- and middle-income 
countries, in the following aspects.  
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1) Situation of balance between hospitals and primary care providers 
The thesis quantified the issue of hospital centrism in the case of China, providing 
evidence to the international agenda on shifting balance from hospitals towards 
primary care providers. It has suggested that there is value in monitoring and 
evaluating the situation and trend of balance between hospitals and primary care 
providers using a system of metrics. Furthermore, the issue of balance between 
hospitals and primary care providers is likely to involve complicated institutional 
factors and deserves a long-term perspective in designing policy interventions. 
Balance between hospitals and primary care providers is an issue across the primary 
care and hospital sectors, and policies designed solely for one of the two sectors would 
likely be limited in effectiveness. 
2) Gatekeeping 
The thesis suggests that gatekeeping is unlikely to be effective in shifting balance 
between hospitals and primary care providers in settings similar to rural China with 
weak primary care capacity, and would likely invoke public resentment. Policy pilots 
need to be attempted in areas with better conditions, and combined with supporting 
policies, including collaboration with hospitals, perhaps selectively for specific health 
problems.  
3) Primary care providers and hospitals 
The thesis has highlighted the need to be clear on the role and content of primary 
care. Policy makers should focus on the central issue of human resources for primary 
care, and patient trust of primary care staff. A team-based approach for primary care 
involving both professional primary care doctors and other grassroots staff of different 
training will likely be conducive to institutionalizing primary care profession and 
addressing the multiple expectations for primary care providers. Development of 
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primary care sector requires the containment of hospital expansion. 
4) Sequence and coordination of reform 
Given the strong role of historical predisposition of balance between hospitals and 
primary care providers demonstrated in the thesis, policy makers in other low- and 
middle-income countries should take existing institutional legacies and entrenched 
interests into consideration in designing policies to shift the balance between hospitals 
and primary care providers. At critical junctures of change, policy makers probably 
need to anticipate and avoid losing opportunities. Policy makers should not only attend 
to the big moments of radical change, but also address the daily decision making in 
order to institutionalize policies that benefit the primary care sector. 
Lessons should be learnt from China’s flaws in reforming its health system, e.g. 
its extension of insurance coverage before addressing distorted incentives in hospitals, 
and the combination of delay of hospital reform with rapid primary care reform. 
Extension of insurance coverage should be informed by consideration of its 
consequences for balance between hospitals and primary care providers, and should 
take place alongside strong primary care improvement efforts, to avoid reinforcing an 
existing hospital-centric model of health service delivery.  
10.4 Areas for further research 
10.4.1 Metrics and trend analysis of balance between hospitals and primary care 
providers 
Future studies should continue to develop a system of metrics to measure and 
compare the balance between hospitals and primary care providers in countries. Given 
the increasing attention to the issue of hospital centrism in low- and middle-income 
countries, international comparison may be a useful next step for research. Monitoring 
balance between hospitals and primary care providers at different levels of temporal 
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and spatial units (from historical to contemporary, and from global, to national and 
local) may offer valuable information and push for further development of knowledge 
in this area, e.g. forming and sharing knowledge regarding how to shift balance 
between hospitals and primary care providers. 
10.4.2 History 
The historical study about the balance between hospitals and primary care 
providers in China will be enriched by more local archival work and oral history. This 
would allow researchers to develop one or more case studies to examine further 
whether the cyclical model of the development path of balance between hospitals and 
primary care providers in China proposed in the thesis successfully explains the 
development of local or regional hospital systems.  
Historical institutionalism offers an important lens to develop studies that can help 
understand contemporary health system issues, and the functioning of interventions. 
There is the possibility to go deeper with regard to the role of interests (the medical 
profession, the insurance funds, the teaching hospitals, the different factions in the 
bureaucracy, etc.).  
Third, comparative analysis could be of value both within China at a subnational 
level and between China and other countries with similar contexts. 
10.4.3 Strategies to shift balance towards primary care 
More empirical studies are needed about other methods, besides gatekeeping, to 
shift balance towards primary care. Particularly, studies need to include specific 
outcomes related to the balance between hospitals and primary care providers, and 
policy processes related to efforts to strengthen the bureaucratic and professional 
stakes in primary care and balance between hospitals and primary care providers. 
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10.4.4 Qualitative systems analysis 
The qualitative systems analysis approach shows value in building rigorous study 
of interrelated issues to understand the functioning of interventions in the system in 
which interventions are embedded. From this perspective, the qualitative systems 
analysis approach developed in the thesis seems a valuable addition to impact 
evaluation. From a systems learning perspective, systems analysis about local cases 
might offer important opportunities to gain additional learning about the systems the 
interventions were intended to improve. Hence, qualitative systems analysis could be 
applied further in combination with intervention studies. 
10.4.5 Impact evaluation 
The thesis indicated prospects regarding the use of routine data in health systems 
research. Given rapid increase and digitization of claims and other routine data, this 
area is likely to see radical growth in the coming years. Researchers should be prepared 
to make full use of this new opportunity, given the importance of the issue of referral 
and the ineffectiveness of gatekeeping without strong primary care. There are likely to 
be more opportunities for future studies in other areas and on a larger scale. Future 
impact evaluation in relation to balance between hospitals and primary care providers 
should seek to test the effectiveness of combining referral/gatekeeping with 
interventions regarding strengthening primary care service capacity. 
10.4.6 Using history and systems analysis for health policy and systems research 
The thesis exemplifies a possible approach of using a multi-methods research 
design, involving theories and methods from multiple disciplines, to address a specific 
issue. Further research might build on this approach and combine different methods. 
In particular, future studies should further explore the value of combining historical 
institutionalism and systems analysis as useful tools to increase understanding of 
complex health system issues.  
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10.4.7 Research agenda for health policy and systems research 
Health policy and systems research is a nascent field, drawing on different 
approaches rooted in different disciplines and fields. The thesis has sought to acquire 
deep knowledge by employing different approaches to study a specific topic. Such 
problem-based mini-fields are likely to be ideal grounds for different approaches 
rooted in different disciplines to converge while maintaining rigour. In particular, the 
thesis demonstrates the feasibility and value of combining a historical study with a 
contemporary evaluation. This is in line with a more sophisticated understanding of 
health systems as a continuously changing complex system with both internal and 
external influencing factors. 
10.5 Conclusions  
This thesis has attempted to evaluate a gatekeeping pilot aimed at strengthening 
primary care functioning, and studied the history of the balance between primary care 
providers and hospitals in China, in order to contribute to policy development in China 
as well as other similar settings. The thesis has developed and used a comprehensive 
system of metrics to analyse the trend of balance between hospitals and primary care 
providers in China from 1949 to 2013; developed and used a historical-institutionalist 
(path-dependence) analytical framework to investigate the coevolution of hospitals 
and primary care providers from 1835 to 2013; conducted a difference-in-differences 
analysis of the effectiveness of a nationally pioneering gatekeeping pilot in shifting 
care from hospitals to primary care settings; and developed and used a qualitative 
systems analysis approach to study the factors behind the functioning of primary care 
gatekeeping. Through using these methods, a secondary aim of the thesis has been to 
explore how mixed methods can be used to study a complex system-related issue. 
Ambulatory visits to primary care facilities increased substantially (an average 
increase of 38.7%), because of the gatekeeping pilot programme, while change in their 
spending pattern was less obvious. A large proportion of patients visited primary care 
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simply to get a referral, after the implementation of the pilot policy, leading to 
dissatisfaction of both doctors and patients. Expenditures at extra-district tertiary 
hospitals decreased substantially, apparently ceding patient expenditures to a local 
tertiary hospital within the study district.  
There were three issues behind the sub-optimal functioning of gatekeeping. First, 
the conditions of primary care providers were very weak and situated in increasingly 
hospital-centric dynamics. Second, a series of vicious cycles continued to trap primary 
care development, in terms of weakening service capacity of primary care, decreasing 
patient trust in primary care and questionable sustainability of human resources for 
primary care. Third, conflicts among different priorities required of primary care 
development gave rise to unintended consequences, which further hampered the 
effectiveness of gatekeeping. 
The dynamics between hospitals and primary care providers in the pilot were the 
contemporary manifestation of a long-term hospital-centric structure, which was path-
dependent. The bias of balance of health delivery towards hospitals was continuous 
during the period from 1949, though the rapidly increasing dominance of hospitals was 
more recent. The historical coevolution of hospitals and primary care providers 
witnessed three cycles, each of which started with an initial preference for hospitals 
that triggered both reinforcing and reactive processes, eventually leading to a 
dominance of hospitals in the four institutional pillars underpinning the dualist 
structure (professional, financial, governance-related and organizational). 
Contemporary interventions are unlikely to have substantial effects, unless these 
historical dynamics are addressed and newly emerging contemporary opportunities 
seized upon. 
The study adds weight to the arguments for methodological innovation in health 
policy and systems research. The thesis has demonstrated three interrelated dimensions 
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of methodological innovation to address the complexity involved in a health policy 
and systems issue by adding systems thinking into evaluation. First, evaluation can be 
strengthened “horizontally” along the line of the increasingly seen use of systems 
theory. Second, evaluation can be expanded “vertically” along the less trodden path of 
historical studies. Third, evaluation can be strengthened “intersectionally” via 
combining both historical and contemporary components in studies. The study 
suggests that knowledge about how contemporary challenges in health systems are 
historically grounded enhances researchers’ ability to critically assess contemporary 
issues and identify policy implications in a constantly changing world. 
The thesis has made a number of policy suggestions. It reaffirms the agenda of 
attending to the current balance between hospitals and primary care providers in China 
while highlighting the need to focus on long-term underlying dynamics and institutions. 
The findings of the study suggest the importance of building a strong primary care 
profession and the value of a political coalition for primary care strengthening. 
Contemporary interventions, such as gatekeeping, are unlikely to have substantial 
effects, unless these historical dynamics are addressed and newly emerging 
contemporary opportunities seized upon. 
The thesis has suggested some areas for further research, including more detailed 
analysis of the history related to balance between hospitals and primary care providers; 
more empirical study of other ways of shifting balance between hospitals and primary 
care providers; and continued methodological innovation including the use of 
historical approaches in contemporary evaluation of health system interventions or 
changes. 
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Appendices 
Appendix Table 1. Calculation of price deflator 
  Nominal GDP (100 
million yuan) 
GDP at constant prices 
(100 million yuan) 
Base 
year* 
Price deflator  Base 
year** 
2001 110270.4 108062.5 2000 1.020432 2000 
2002 121002.0 117879.7 2000 1.026487 2000 
2003 136564.6 129693.7 2000 1.052978 2000 
2004 160714.4 142763.2 2000 1.125741 2000 
2005 185895.8 158963.9 2000 1.169421 2000 
2005  -- 185895.8 2005  --  -- 
2006 217656.6 209478.4 2005 1.215077 2000 
2007 268019.4 239223.2 2005 1.310189 2000 
2008 316751.7 262238.8 2005 1.412515 2000 
2009 345629.2 286459.4 2005 1.410972 2000 
2010 408903.0 316907.9 2005 1.508892 2000 
2010  -- 408903.0 2010  --  -- 
2011 484123.5 447696.4 2010 1.631664 2000 
2012 534123.0 482381.9 2010 1.670739 2000 
2013 588018.8 519454.6 2010 1.708055 2000 
Data sources: (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015) 
Note:  
a) Base year* refers to base year used for GDP at constant prices. 
b) Base year** refers to base year used for calculating price deflector. 
c) Calculation of price deflator price deflator in year X: 
If 2000＜X≤2005, DEFLATORX=GDPX ÷ GDPX_2000price 
If 2005＜X≤2010, DEFLATORX=GDPX ÷ GDPX_2005price × DEFLATOR2005 
If 2010＜X≤2013, DEFLATORX=GDPX ÷ GDPX_2010price × DEFLATOR2010 
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Appendix Table 2. Standard Periodization of Chinese History 
Dynasty/Regime Years 
Age of Five Rulers B.C. 2953- B.C. 2208 
Xia Dynasty B.C. 2207- B.C. 1766 
Shang Dynasty B.C. 1765- B.C. 1122 
Zhou Dynasty B.C. 1121- B.C. 249 
Warring States B.C. 248- B.C. 222 
Qin Dynasty B.C. 221- B.C. 207 
Han Dynasty B.C.206 -A.D. 220 
The Three Kingdoms 221-264 
Jin Dynasty 265-419 
Epoch of Division of North and South 420-589 
Sui Dynasty 589-618 
Tang Dynasty 619-907 
Epoch of the Five Dynasties 907-960 
Song Dynasty 960-1279 
Jin Dynasty 1115-1233 
Yuan Dynasty 1206-1368 
Ming Dynasty 1368-1644 
Qing Dynasty 1644-1911 
Republic of China 
  Nationalist Administration 
1912-1949 
  1927-1949 
People’s Republic of China 
  Cultural Revolution 
  Reform and Opening-up 
1949 onward 
  1966-1976 
  1978 onward 
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Appendix Table 3. Regression results on visits 
Weighted model at township level 
 
Ambulatory visits at primary 
care facilities per enrolee per 
quarter 
Ambulatory visits at 
secondary hospitals per 
enrolee per quarter 
Ambulatory visits at tertiary 
hospitals per enrolee per 
quarter 
Proportion of ambulatory 
visits at primary care in 
total ambulatory visits 
Simple difference-in-differences (DD) 
0.101*** -0.00854 -0.00131 0.0705 
(0.000) (0.516) (0.554) (0.475) 
Multiple-period DD 
0.101*** -0.00854 -0.00131 0.0705 
(0.000) (0.525) (0.563) (0.485) 
Multiple-period DD with covariates 0.0984** -0.00796 -0.00114 0.0665 
(0.033) (0.373) (0.255) (0.235) 
Pre-trend test 
0.00337 -0.00271 -0.00134** -0.00917 
(0.780) (0.576) (0.010) (0.531) 
Mean outcome in pilot townships before 
introduction of pilot programme 0.2856709 0.088252 0.0107624 0.6397892 
Unweighted model at village level 
 
Ambulatory visits at primary care 
facilities per enrolee per quarter 
Ambulatory visits at 
secondary hospitals per 
enrolee per quarter 
Ambulatory visits at tertiary 
hospitals per enrolee per 
quarter 
Proportion of ambulatory 
visits at primary care in 
total ambulatory visits 
Simple difference-in-differences (DD) 0.171** -0.0254 -0.00349 0.0856* 
(0.003) (0.133) (0.266) (0.026) 
Multiple-period DD 0.156*** -0.0295 -0.00349 0.0926** 
(0.000) (0.130) (0.268) (0.013) 
Multiple-period DD with covariates 0.157*** -0.0297 -0.00365 0.0926** 
(0.000) (0.127) (0.244) (0.012) 
Pre-trend test 0.0332 0.00725 -0.00275** 0.00792 
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(0.289) (0.488) (0.042) (0.388) 
Mean outcome in pilot townships before 
introduction of pilot programme 0.3640666 0.1383391 0.0139499 0.5681763 
Weighted model at village level 
 
Ambulatory visits at primary care 
facilities per enrolee per quarter 
Ambulatory visits at 
secondary hospitals per 
enrolee per quarter 
Ambulatory visits at tertiary 
hospitals per enrolee per 
quarter 
Proportion of ambulatory 
visits at primary care in 
total ambulatory visits 
Simple difference-in-differences (DD) 0.105*** -0.00748 -0.00110 0.0566 
(0.001) (0.342) (0.360) (0.270) 
Multiple-period DD 0.105*** -0.00759 -0.00110 0.0567 
(0.001) (0.336) (0.356) (0.269) 
Multiple-period DD with covariates 0.104*** -0.00760 -0.00109 0.0565 
(0.001) (0.328) (0.343) (0.246) 
Pre-trend test 0.00509 -0.00346 -0.00164*** -0.000730 
(0.641) (0.299) (0.001) (0.945) 
Mean outcome in pilot townships before 
introduction of pilot programme 0.2846467 0.0880593 0.0107551 0.6108143 
Note:  
a) p values are shown in brackets. 
b) *0.05≤p＜0.1; ** 0.01≤p＜0.05, *** p＜0.01. 
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Appendix Table 4. Regression results on expenditures 
Weighted model at township level  Total ambulatory 
expenditures at 
primary care per 
enrolee per quarter 
Total ambulatory 
expenditures at 
secondary hospitals per 
enrolee per quarter 
Total ambulatory 
expenditures at 
tertiary hospitals per 
enrolee per quarter 
Total 
expenditures on 
ambulatory 
care  
Proportion of total 
ambulatory expenditures at 
primary care facilities in all 
ambulatory expenditures 
Simple DD 
8.257* 4.662 -12.76** 0.158 0.0226 
(0.067) (0.558) (0.034) (0.993) (0.746) 
Multiple-period DD 
8.257* 4.662 -12.76** 0.158 0.0226 
(0.073) (0.567) (0.038) (0.993) (0.751) 
Multiple-period DD with covariates 8.151 5.590** -12.49*** 1.248 0.0187 
(0.221) (0.037) (0.002) (0.891) (0.478) 
Pre-trend test 
-3.046 0.888 -0.328 -2.486 -0.00529 
(0.263) (0.847) (0.946) (0.736) (0.672) 
Mean outcome in pilot townships before 
introduction of pilot programme 54.32007 65.68258 29.39126 149.3939 0.3913123 
Unweighted model at village level Total ambulatory 
expenditures at 
primary care per 
enrolee per quarter 
Total ambulatory 
expenditures at secondary 
hospitals per enrolee per 
quarter 
Total ambulatory 
expenditures at tertiary 
hospitals per enrolee per 
quarter 
Total 
expenditures on 
ambulatory care  
Proportion of total ambulatory 
expenditures at primary care 
facilities in all ambulatory 
expenditures 
Simple DD 30.04* 9.734 -9.657* 30.12 0.00888 
(0.064) (0.133) (0.070) (0.144) (0.773) 
Multiple-period DD 28.68** 10.42 -9.352* 29.75 0.0128 
(0.040) (0.116) (0.079) (0.136) (0.673) 
Multiple-period DD with covariates 29.32** 10.09 -9.666* 29.74 0.0141 
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(0.037) (0.122) (0.065) (0.131) (0.646) 
Pre-trend test -0.443 1.336 -0.847 0.0460 -0.00273 
(0.865) (0.649) (0.822) (0.995) (0.762) 
Mean outcome in pilot townships before 
introduction of pilot programme 62.35645 77.46709 26.71046 70467.11 0.3955969 
Weighted model at village level Total ambulatory 
expenditures at 
primary care per 
enrolee per quarter 
Total ambulatory 
expenditures at secondary 
hospitals per enrolee per 
quarter 
Total ambulatory 
expenditures at tertiary 
hospitals per enrolee per 
quarter 
Total 
expenditures on 
ambulatory care  
Proportion of total ambulatory 
expenditures at primary care 
facilities in all ambulatory 
expenditures 
Simple DD 9.086*** 5.451 -12.39** 2.151 -0.0160 
(0.003) (0.269) (0.012) (0.834) (0.649) 
Multiple-period DD 9.025*** 5.422 -12.39** 2.055 -0.0159 
(0.003) (0.272) (0.012) (0.841) (0.651) 
Multiple-period DD with covariates 8.920*** 5.464 -12.37** 2.012 -0.0164 
(0.003) (0.241) (0.011) (0.843) (0.625) 
Pre-trend test -2.793** -0.158 -0.892 -3.843 -0.000557 
(0.031) (0.953) (0.796) (0.438) (0.955) 
Mean outcome in pilot townships before 
introduction of pilot programme 54.12324 65.65453 29.3612 146797.8 0.4052415 
Note:  
a) p values are shown in brackets. 
b) *0.05≤p＜0.1; ** 0.01≤p＜0.05, *** p＜0.01.
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Appendix Table 5. Causes, effects and links related to gatekeeping 
Category of 
factors 
Causes Effects (direct and indirect)  Source Constructed links Feedbac
k loops 
1. Governance Gatekeeping created extra procedure, 
particularly as others are not doing this. 
Gatekeeping affected people with political 
influence mainly use tertiary hospitals. 
Resentment of patients. Influential people in 
particular put pressure on the local 
government which reduced the political will 
of strict gatekeeping, this put a pressure on the 
management agency in implementing 
gatekeeping. 
D06, D08, 
M01, A02  
gatekeeping (+)→ resistance (-)→ 
gatekeeping 
 
B1 
Insurance management agency needs to 
respond to the demand of patients. 
Difficulty in extending gatekeeping policy 
with the weak primary care service capacity. 
A02, A03 hospital visits (+)→ hospital 
bargaining power (-)→ gatekeeping 
 
R3 
Insurance management agency integrated 
within health bureaucracy needs to 
respond to the demand of health facilities 
as a system. 
Pressure to strengthen primary care facilities 
through gatekeeping (reducing the 
attractiveness of hospital care). 
A02 gatekeeping (-)→ hospital care 
attractiveness (-)→ PC visits 
R1’, R1a 
Monitoring and evaluation focusing on 
public health services and NCD 
management 
Shift of care from ambulatory curative care to 
public health services and NCDs. 
D05, D02, 
M01 
performance evaluation focusing on 
public health services  (-)→ PC 
curative service quality 
R1’, R1a 
2. Health 
financing 
Revenue surplus or deficit from 
fundholding. 
The intended effect is that surplus or deficit is 
used to stimulate performance improvement of 
primary care. 
A02, A03 gatekeeping (+)→ performance bonus 
(+)→ PC curative service quality; PC 
visit(+)→ PC revenue (+)→ 
performance bonus 
R1’, R1a 
Gatekeeping makes hospital care less 
attractive by lowered reimbursement rate. 
The intended effect is that patients are 
incentivized to use primary care with more 
visits. 
A03, A02 gatekeeping (-)→ hospital care 
attractiveness (-)→ PC visits 
R1’, R1a 
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Increased service use of primary care 
facilities. 
The intended effects are reduced hospital 
visits and expenditures. 
M03, M04 PC visits(-)→ hospital visits(+)→ 
hospital revenue 
B1’ 
Fixed and low total amount of salary. Relatively low work morale. D03, M05, 
M02 
PC salary policy (-)→ performance 
bonus (+)→ PC curative service quality 
R1’, R1a 
As primary care staff members consider 
that total salary should be equally 
distributed, actual amount variations of 
performance-based bonus is small. 
Performance-based bonus is generally unable 
to incentivize curative care performance (the 
intended but not achieved goal).  
M01, M02, 
M03, M04, 
M05, A02 
performance bonus (+)→ PC curative 
service quality 
R1’ 
PC staff incentive related policies provides 
little control knob of internal management. 
Relying on personal relationship for 
management 
M01, M02 PC salary policy (-)→ 
performance bonus (+)→ 
PC curative service quality 
R1’, R1a 
High-powered incentive in hospitals. Relatively high work morale in hospitals 
contributed hospital care attractiveness, to the 
large patient volume, and to large revenue. 
M05 hospital incentive (+)→ hospital 
performance (+)→ hospital revenue 
R2 
Hospitals maintained high revenue. Relatively higher salary for hospital doctors, 
with higher stress related to work. 
M05 hospital revenue (+)→ hospital salary 
(+)→ hospital job attractiveness 
R1’, R1a 
Hospitals accounting for the lion share of 
expenditures and patients. 
Prioritizing hospital-related policies. M01, A02 hospital visits (+)→ hospital 
bargaining power 
R3 
3. Service 
delivery 
Poor curative service performance in 
primary care facilities. 
Low patient trust of primary care facilities and 
hence higher attractiveness of hospital care. 
M02 PC curative service quality (-)→ 
hospital care attractiveness 
R1’, R1a 
Relatively low trust of primary care 
doctors by patients, contributes to higher 
attractiveness of hospital care. 
Lower primary care visits, and unsophisticated 
cases (patients coming to buy drugs). 
P01, D03, 
D05, M02 
hospital care attractiveness(-)→ PC 
visits 
R1’, R1a 
Small volume and unsophisticated cases of 
patients in curative care. 
Declined clinical capacity. M05, M02 PC visits (+)→ clinical experiences 
(+)→ PC capacity 
R1a, R1’ 
Complicated procedures Patient resentment against gatekeeping. Even 
doctors resent the policy (as they had little 
P01, P06, 
D02, D06, 
gatekeeping (+)→ inconvenience(-)→ 
gatekeeping 
B1 
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interest) D04 
Integrative care arrangements are 
underdeveloped (Patients referred had no 
advantage in accessing specialist care in 
hospitals. Hospitals did not know doctors 
and their capability at primary care level). 
Ineffective referral policies, which contributed 
to patient’s resentment to gatekeeping 
policies. 
D02, D05, 
D06, D07, 
M01, M05, 
A02 
lack of integrated care arrangement 
(+)→ inconvenience (-)→ gatekeeping 
B1 
Tension between doctors and patients Patient get referrals if they insist, so the policy 
becomes an inconvenience in many cases. 
D04, D06, 
D07, D08 
doctor-patient tension  (+)→ 
inconvenience 
B1 
Elimination of hospitalisation and surgery 
at primary care level. 
Surgeons’ skills are wasted. Professional 
development was hindered.  
M01, M03, 
M04 
restriction of PC function (-)→ PC 
visits (+)→ clinical experiences 
R1a 
Relatively low trust of primary care 
doctors by hospital doctors. 
Low hospital-to-primary-care referral rates, 
and primary care doctors are unable to 
function as a coordinator of care. 
D07, M05,  
D08 
hospital doctors lack confidence in PC 
capacity (-)→ hospital-to-PC referrals 
B1’ 
Small volume of patients at primary care. Primary care doctors converted to public 
health services staff, making the job 
unappealing to medical graduates. 
M03, M04, 
D04 
PC visits (-)→ PC doctors pivoting to 
public health services (-)→ PC job 
attractiveness 
R1b 
Weak primary care capacity. Hospitals flooded with patients. M05 PC capacity (+)→ PC curative service 
quality (-)→ hospital care 
attractiveness 
R1a 
Increasing workload and performance 
pressure from public health services, and 
small work low from curative care. 
Primary care doctors required to pivot to 
public health services. 
D02, D03, 
D06, M03, 
M04 
performance evaluation focusing on 
public health services (+)→ PC doctors 
pivoting to public health services 
R1b 
Doctors significantly abandoning their 
previous curative functions. 
Patients perceived a decline of doctors’ 
capacity 
P03 PC doctors pivoting to public health 
services(+)→low patient perception of 
PC doctor capacity 
R2 
4. Health Poor quality of primary care doctors. Low trust in the technical competence of D02, D04, PC HR quality (+)→ PC capacity R1a, R1b 
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workforce primary care doctors by both patients and 
doctors.  
D08, M05 
PC doctors training improves PC HR 
quality. 
Good doctors leave after training due to lack 
of willingness to stay. 
M02, M05 PC staff training (+)→ PC HR quality 
(+)→ PC brain drain 
B2, R1b 
Poor career prospects for primary care 
doctors. 
Difficulty in recruiting and retain good quality 
doctors  
D08, M02, 
M03, M04, 
M05, A02  
PC job attractiveness (+)→ PC 
recruitment (+)→ PC HR quality; PC 
job attractiveness (-)→ PC brain drain 
(-)→ PC HR quality; 
R1b, B2 
Expansion of hospitals service capacity. Recruitment of doctors trained for primary 
care level. 
D04, A03 hospital capacity expansion (+)→ 
hospital job attractiveness (+)→ 
hospital recruitment (+)→ hospital 
capacity advantage;  
hospital job attractiveness (-)→ PC job 
attractiveness (+)→ PC brain drain 
(+)→ hospital recruitment; 
hospital expansion (+)→ hospital job 
attractiveness (-)→ PC job 
attractiveness (+)→PC recruitment 
R1b, R2 
Performance-based salary policy under 
which managers were not able to stimulate 
the entrepreneurship of staff. 
Primary care doctors had low working morale, 
and tended to send patients away to hospitals. 
M02 PC salary policy (+)→ performance 
bonus (+)→ PC curative service quality 
R1a 
Low work morale of primary care doctors 
perceived by hospital specialists. 
Low trust in the technical competence of 
primary care doctors by doctors. 
M05  hospital doctors lack confidence in PC 
capacity (-)→ hospital-to-PC referral 
B1’ 
Low work morale of primary care doctors. Primary care facilities recruiting people with 
low professional aspiration. 
M05 PC salary policy* (-)→ PC job 
attractiveness 
R1b 
5. Medical 
technologies 
Hospitals technical advantage (poor 
technical capacity in primary care 
Unappealing primary care capacity, and 
therefore hospital attractiveness 
P01, D02, 
D03, D04, 
hospital capacity advantage(+)→ 
hospital care attractiveness 
R2 
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facilities). M01 
Physician patient tension. Hospital technology use a necessity, therefore 
primary care doctors would tend to reject/refer 
such patients and hospital care became more 
attractive. 
D08 doctor-patient tension* (+)→ reliance 
on technology (+)→ hospital care 
attractiveness 
R1a, R1’ 
Hospital doctors prescribe medicines not 
available at primary care (“advanced 
medicines”). 
Patients can only get the medicines prescribed 
from hospitals. 
Primary care facilities the main facilities to 
adopt restrictive medicines policy. 
P02, P03, 
P04, D01, 
D02, D03, 
D04, D07, 
M01, M02, 
M03, M04  
restrictive pharmaceutical policies 
(-)→ PC capacity 
R1a 
Essential medicine policies reduced access 
to “advanced medicines” 
Patients cannot get from primary care 
facilities the medicines prescribed by hospital 
doctors. 
M01, M04 balance of equipment (+)→ PC 
capacity; restrictive pharmaceutical 
policies (-)→ PC capacity 
 
R1a 
6. Information  With limited information sharing, hospital 
doctors don’t know primary care doctors’ 
capability and have little trust. 
Reluctance to refer discharged patients to 
primary care facilities. 
D04, D05, 
D08, A02 
hospital doctors lack confidence in PC 
capacity (-)→ hospital-to-PC referrals 
B1’ 
Note:  
1) The polarity of relationship is determined based on the direction of association between the two neutral factors (e.g. quality of primary care doctors instead of poor quality 
of primary care doctors).  
2) In the table, “(+)Æ” was used as a symbol for positive link causations, i.e. all else being equal, an increase in the factor preceding the signs leads to an increase in the factor 
following the sign; “(-)Æ” was used as a symbol for negative link causations, i.e. all else being equal, an increase in the factor preceding the signs leads to an increase in the 
factor following the sign. 
3) Variables with a sign * appear more than ones.
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Appendix Research Tools 
1. Information for participants and informed consent form  
2. Recruitment procedures 
3. Semi-structured question guide 
 
 
  
Information for Participants   
Study title: Impact Evaluation of a Gatekeeping Pilot Program and Its Role in the Dynamic 
Development of Health System in China You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully and to talk to others about the study, if you wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.  
1. What is the purpose of the study? Shifting patients from hospitals towards primary care facilities has been a priority in the reform and development of health system in China. A new pilot program is going on in Beijing to achieve this aim. Our purpose is to see how effects the reform is likely to have in terms of cost and quality of care and further implications for the health system. The study is a student research project.  
2. Why have I been chosen? You are chosen because you represent one of the key informants of this study. 40-50 other participants will be studied.  
3. Do I have to take part? It is up to you to decide to join the study. We will describe the study and go through this information sheet. If you agree to take part, we will then ask you to sign a consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. This will not affect the standard of care you receive.  
4. What will happen to me if I take part? 
In the case of semi-structured interviews: We will conduct an interview with you, which will take about 10-15 minutes. You will be asked a few questions based on a flexible interview guide. In order to make sure the fidelity of notes, and for better analysis of the interview, we will audio-record and transcribe all the interviews, if you agree.  
In the case of focus group discussions: We will organize a focus group discussion with key stakeholders of gatekeeping including you, around the implications of gatekeeping for health system development. In order to make sure the fidelity of notes, and for better analysis of the discussion, we will audio-record and transcribe all the interviews, if you agree.   
5. Gift  
A souvenir gift from Peking University will be given to participants as a ‘thank-you’ for 
participation.  
 
6. What do I have to do? You are expected to share your genuine answers to the questions posed to you.  
7. What are the possible benefits of taking part? We cannot promise the study will help you directly but the information we get might help improve the health system reform in Beijing and other areas in China. 
 
8. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? Will my taking 
part in the study be kept confidential?  There is not likely any risk of taking part in the research. All information collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential. 
 
9. What will happen to the results of the research study? The result of the study will be part of a PhD thesis. And our intention is to publish the findings and communicate it with policy makers in the hope that policy can be improved with sound evidence. You will not be identified in any report/publication.  
10. Who is organising and funding the research?   The funding for the research is jointly provided by China Scholarship Council and Peking University. 
 
11.   Who has reviewed the study?  This study was given a favourable ethical opinion by the Research Ethics Committees of London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and Peking University.  
12. Contact Details Jin Xu, Peking University China Centre for Health Development Studies  Mailbox 505, No. 38, Xueyuan Road, Haidian, Beijing Telephone: 010-82805701 Email: xujin@bjmu.edu.cn 
 
 
 
 
You will be given a copy of the information sheet and a signed consent form to 
keep. 
 
Thank you for considering taking the time to read this sheet. 
 
 INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
Full Title of Project: Impact Evaluation of a Gatekeeping Pilot Program and Its 
Role in the Dynamic Development of Health System in China 
Name of Principal Investigator: Jin Xu  Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the participant information sheet dated ......….. (version .........) for the above study.  I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered fully.  2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected.  3. I agree to take part in the above study.  4. I agree for my quote/recording to be used in the publication or report released on the study.    Name of Participant 
(printed)   
 Signature/Thumbprint  Date 
Name of Person taking consent   
 Signature  Date 
Principal Investigator   Signature  Date  
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Chinese version of information for participants and informed consent 
参与访谈知情同意书 
我们将要开展“基层首诊制改革试点效果评估及其卫生体系发展的促进作用研
究”，您的具体情况符合访谈人条件，因此，我们想邀请您参加该项研究。本知情
同意书将向您介绍该研究的目的、步骤、获益、风险、不便或不适等，请仔细阅读
后慎重做出是否参加研究的决定。当研究者向您说明和讨论知情同意书时，您可以
随时提问并让他/她向您解释您不明白的地方。您可以与家人、朋友以及您的主治
大夫（对患者适用）讨论之后再做决定。我们期待您提供您对所提的问题给予真实
无保留的回答。 
 本项研究的中方项目负责人是孟庆跃教授，单位是北京大学中国卫生发展研究
中心，研究资助方是国家留学基金委及北京大学。我们的研究目的是了解北京市新
型农村合作医疗制度正在开展基层首诊制试点的效果，以及对卫生体系发展的长期
作用。 
1. 为什么进行这项研究？ 
强化基层卫生服务体系，将患者从医院转移到基层卫生机构是我国医药卫
生体制改革和发展的重点之一。为此，北京市新型农村合作医疗制度正在开展
基层首诊制的试点。我们的研究目的是了解该试点政策对于医疗服务质量和费
用的影响，以及对卫生体系发展的长期作用。 
2. 哪些人将被邀请参加这项研究？ 
研究选取首诊改革前后相关的关键知情人。您被选中是因为您代表了本研
究的一种关键知情人。 
3. 多少人将参与这项研究？ 
本研究计划招募 40-50名知情人，包含以下类别： 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. 本研究包括哪些内容？ 
受访者类型 人数 
门诊患者 4 
有经验的医生 4 
卫生机构管理者 4 
新农合管理人员 2 
一年总数 14 
两年总数 28 
参与者类型 人数 
有经验的医生 4 
卫生机构管理者 2 
新农合管理人员 2 
基层卫生专家 2 
一年总数 10 
两年总数 20 
关键组讨论列表 访谈对象列表 
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分别进行半结构式访谈和关键组讨论。对于半结构式访谈的参与者，调查
员将对您进行访谈。调查员将灵活地依据访谈提纲向您询问几个问题。为了确
保记录的完整如实，也为了更好地分析，如果您同意的话，我们将对访谈进行
录音和文字转录。对于关键组讨论的参与者，我们将组织一场涉及到基层首诊
制的关键人员将参与讨论。讨论将围绕基层首诊制对卫生体系发展的影响展
开。 
5. 这项研究会持续多久？ 
访谈时间大概 10-15分钟，关键组讨论时间大概 60-90分钟。 
6. 参加本项研究的风险是什么？ 
参与研究不会给您带来危险。研究过程中所有关于您的信息都将严格保
密。如果不慎泄露个人私密信息，可能会给您的工作和生活带来一些困扰。 
风险的控制措施：我们将在得到谈话记录文件后第一时间进行匿名化处
理，并采取其他妥善的保密措施（详见 12）。 
7. 参加本项研究的获益是什么？ 
我们不保证参与研究会直接对您有帮助，但通过您所提供的信息，我们将
能够为帮助改进北京基层首诊制政策以及相关政策在全国的制定和实施提出更
好的建议。 
8. 是否一定要参加并完成本项研究？ 
 您有权决定是否参与本研究。我们将描述研究并读完本告知书。如果您同意
参与，我们将请您签署知情同意书。如果您不愿意，可以拒绝参加，不会对受到
任何负面影响（对于患者：这将不会影响您所接受的医疗服务）。即使您同意参
加以后，您也可以在任何时间改变主意，告诉研究者退出研究，而不会对受到任
何负面影响（对于患者：这将不会影响您所接受的医疗服务）。原则上，在您退
出之后，研究者将严密保存您的相关信息直至最终销毁，期间不会继续使用或透
露这些信息。但在以下极少数情况下，研究者将继续使用或透露您的相关信息，
即使您已经退出研究或研究已经结束。 
这些情况包括： 
-          除去您的信息将影响研究结果的科学性的评价； 
-          为研究、教学或其他活动提供一些有限的信息（这些信息不会包括您的姓
名、身份证号码、或者其他能识别您身份的个人信息）； 
一旦出现任何可能会影响您决定是否继续参加该项研究的信息，我们会及时告
知您。 
9. 关于研究费用和补偿 
本研究由国家留学基金委及北京大学共同资助。 
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10. 参加该项研究受试者是否获得报酬？ 
谈没有经济报酬，您是否参与研究完全是自愿的。 
11. 发生研究相关伤害的处理？ 
本研究为观察性研究，无可预期的相关伤害。 
12. 我的信息会保密吗？ 
如果您决定参加本项研究，您参加研究及在研究中的个人资料均属保密。
您的谈话记录（含录音）文件及在研究中的个人资料均会在存储及分析前做匿
名化处理。在匿名化处理中，您的姓名及其他可识别身份的信息将替换为不可
识别身份的研究编码，比如“某区某乡镇卫生院某科医生张某”将被编码为
“01020103”。记录文件以匿名化的研究编码加以标识和存储。建立并保存一
个数据表格，记录受访者属性与其相应编码，删除具体科室和机构的可识别信
息，仅保留工作岗位的性质信息，不保留可识别信息。所有的研究成员和研究
相关方都会按要求对您的身份保密。录音文件转录和翻译的有关人员不接触受
访者属性表格，仅承担匿名化后的文件转录和翻译工作，并且需在签署保密协
议后方可承担相关任务。您的档案将妥善保存，仅供研究人员查阅。为确保研
究按照规定进行，必要时，政府管理部门、学校当局或伦理委员会的成员按规
定可以在研究单位查阅您的个人资料。这项研究结果发表时，将不会披露您个
人的任何资料。 
13. 如果我有问题或困难，该与谁联系？ 
如果您有与本研究相关的任何问题，请联系请联系徐进，010-82805701; 
xujin@bjmu.edu.cn 
如果您有与参与研究者自身权益相关的问题，可与北京大学生物医学伦理
委员会联系，联系电话：010-82805751，电子邮件：llwyh@bjmu.edu.cn。 
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研究者声明 
我已告知该受访者“基层首诊制改革试点效果评估及其卫生体系发展的促进作
用研究”研究背景、目的、步骤、风险及获益情况，给予他/她足够的时间阅读知
情同意书、与他人讨论，并解答了其有关研究的问题。我已告知受访者可以退出本
研究；我已告知该受访者将得到这份知情同意书的副本，上面包含我和他/她的签
名。 
 
   
获得知情同意的研究者签名及其联系方式            日期 
 
 
受访者声明 
我已被告知“基层首诊制改革试点效果评估及其卫生体系发展的促进作用研
究”研究的背景、目的、步骤、风险及获益情况。我有足够的时间和机会进行提
问，问题的答复我很满意。我已经阅读这份知情同意书，并且同意参加本研究的半
结构式访谈。我知道我可以在研究期间的任何时候无需任何理由退出本研究。我被
告知我将得到这份知情同意书的副本，上面包含我和研究者的签名。 
 
 
 
                             
受访者签名                                    日期 
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 研究者声明 
我已告知该受访者“基层首诊制改革试点效果评估及其卫生体系发展的促进作
用研究”研究背景、目的、步骤、风险及获益情况，给予他/她足够的时间阅读知
情同意书、与他人讨论，并解答了其有关研究的问题。我已告知受访者可以退出本
研究；我已告知该受访者将得到这份知情同意书的副本，上面包含我和他/她的签
名。 
 
   
获得知情同意的研究者签名及其联系方式            日期 
 
 
受访者声明 
我已被告知“基层首诊制改革试点效果评估及其卫生体系发展的促进作用研
究”研究的背景、目的、步骤、风险及获益情况。我有足够的时间和机会进行提
问，问题的答复我很满意。我已经阅读这份知情同意书，并且同意参加本研究的关
键组讨论。我知道我可以在研究期间的任何时候无需任何理由退出本研究。我被告
知我将得到这份知情同意书的副本，上面包含我和研究者的签名。 
 
 
 
                             
受访者签名                                    日期 
  
 
